The practice of domestic courts continues to present challenges for understanding the relationship between international law and municipal law. Whereas constitutions increasingly contain more or less similar provisions on international law, the subsequent use of international law by domestic courts varies from traditional doctrinal approaches. This divergence by domestic courts is attributable to the fact that domestic and international courts/tribunals are engaged in exchanging ideas and formulating similar decisions on diverse substantive law issues out of a sense of common judicial identity and enterprise. Due to the multitude of actors and the complexity of the relationships involved, the traditional monism-dualism doctrines do not accurately reflect current practice. Rather, this process is better termed as transnational judicial dialogue. Through transnational judicial dialogue, domestic courts collectively engage in the co-constitutive process of creating and shaping international legal norms and, in turn, ensuring that those norms shape and inform domestic norms. This study analyzes decisions of the superior courts of Kenya and South Africa in order understand the manner in which the courts receive, interpret and re-formulate international legal norms. It is clear that the domestic courts are not mere conduits for the reception of international legal norms into the domestic legal order but that they act as mediators between the international and domestic legal norms. This study also attempts to demonstrate that transnational judicial dialogue may provide normative guidance for the relationship between international law and national law in the domestic legal order. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Centre for Human Rights / LLD / Unrestricted

Universal suffrage is a guiding principle of democracy. However, it has a long history of being selectively denied. While many of these exclusions have dissipated in twentieth century rights revolutions’, the right to vote is still widely withheld for prisoners. This paper looks at criminal disenfranchisement, its origins, development, and contemporary manifestations. Part I will discuss the history of criminal disenfranchisement to trace its development from a tool of social exclusion to a collateral consequence of criminal conviction. Part II will look at the judicial treatment of contemporary disenfranchisement laws through a selection of representative case studies. Part III will consider how the representative cases form a trend towards criminal enfranchisement, and the implications of this trend for future constitutional challenges in jurisdictions where such laws persist. This paper argues that this trend, while tangible, is tentative and its force may be strengthened through a transnational judicial dialogue.

Universal suffrage is a guiding principle of democracy. However, it has a long history of being selectively denied. While many of these exclusions have dissipated in twentieth century rights revolutions’, the right to vote is still widely withheld for prisoners. This paper looks at criminal disenfranchisement, its origins, development, and contemporary manifestations. Part I will discuss the history of criminal disenfranchisement to trace its development from a tool of social exclusion to a collateral consequence of criminal conviction. Part II will look at the judicial treatment of contemporary disenfranchisement laws through a selection of representative case studies. Part III will consider how the representative cases form a trend towards criminal enfranchisement, and the implications of this trend for future constitutional challenges in jurisdictions where such laws persist. This paper argues that this trend, while tangible, is tentative and its force may be strengthened through a transnational judicial dialogue.

The aim of the thesis is to address the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict between the Court of Justice and national courts with constitutional jurisdiction. It seeks to determine how the principle of primacy of EU law works in reality and whether the jurisprudence of the courts under analysis supports this concept. In so doing, the goal is to determine if the theory of constitutional pluralism can explain and guide the application of the principle of primacy of EU law in the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict. The analysis has been carried out on two levels. First, by exploring sovereignty claims by the courts under analysis, as well as reconciliatory vocabulary they employ to manage and contain constitutional conflict. Second, by further studying the three areas of constitutional conflict - ultra vires review, identity review, and fundamental rights review - to provide more nuance in the analysis of the way the Court of Justice has expanded the self-referential system of the Treaties; the different limits that constitutional adjudicators have placed on the principle of primacy as a result; and what possible solutions they envisage in the event of a constitutional conflict. All the courts under analysis have employed the vocabulary of mutual respect and self-restraint as principles guiding the resolution of constitutional conflict. Constitutional conflict is managed through incremental and permanent contestation and accommodation of their opposing claims to sovereignty (the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism) that results in the uniform interpretation and application of Union law, but keeping in line with conferral as its defining principle. The analysis demonstrated the existence of a heterarchical constellation - the potential of all the courts involved for being ranked in a number of different ways at different times - grounded in mutual respect and self-restraint.

This thesis analyses the traditional notion of jurisdiction in the light of Internet based activities which are inherently decentralised and ubiquitous. It is clear that the unique nature of the Internet has undermined the very foundation of the traditional notion of jurisdiction and the territorially based concepts of law and their application. Which court should hear disputes arising out of Internet activities? On what grounds may a court assert or decline the jurisdiction? These are perplexing questions currently facing courts worldwide because of the trans-national nature of the Internet by which people can transcend borders readily and rapidly. One simple and straightforward factor confronting lawmakers is that while most laws have a territorial nexus, the Internet defies the notion of territoriality. Traditionally, judicial jurisdiction has been exercised on a number of bases, such as where the defendant resides, whether the defendant is present within the forum and whether the defendant has property in the forum or not. These elements have been made largely irrelevant by the Internet. The Internet does not respect traditional boundaries and territories and it can even enable people to cross borders without any physical mobility. For instance, people are able to interact and even do business without revealing their identity. In the absence of any definite international law on Internet jurisdiction, how have the courts responded to this challenge? This thesis has examined the recent case law in Australia, United States of America and France. In examining the case authorities, the only conclusion that can be reached is that current court approaches are unworkable. This thesis has also examined some international proposals on the matter and found them to be deficient. Now, the dilemma before us is this: on the one hand, the present court approaches on Internet jurisdiction are unworkable. On the other hand, there is no clear international guidance to govern the jurisdictional issue. I believe this book makes a small contribution towards this perplexing question by proposing a new transnational principle which could be achieved through a "trans-national judicial dialogue". Trans-national judicial dialogue can play a significant role in the creation, recognition, and enforcement of global norms. There are a number of benefits to be gained if this approach is adopted in Internet jurisdiction cases. Ideally, trans-national judicial dialogue would reduce the conflicts among courts and foster a consensual approach, thus providing a stable and predictable paradigm for the crucial issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, the parties involved in a case would be prevented from forum shopping in search of a forum with a greater likelihood of a favourable decision. Also, courts would not be able to decline jurisdiction merely because of foreign elements involved. This may be the most appropriate global approach which is urgently required to address an increasingly global problem.

This research explores the role of public interest litigants in the circulation of arguments among courts regarding the interpretation of fundamental rights. Such circulation is often labeled ‘judicial dialogue’. ‘Public interest litigants’ are here defined as entities (individuals or groups) with no direct interest in the case, who use procedural avenues to participate in the litigation. Despite extensive scholarly attention for judicial dialogue, the necessity for more empirical research devoted to the exchanges among jurisdictions had been stressed. Three jurisdictions with different postures towards cross-citations were chosen for the analysis: the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the South African Constitutional Court. Among their vast case law, landmark cases were selected dealing firstly with death penalty or related questions and secondly with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Briefs submitted by public interest litigants to courts were collected and analyzed, mainly to inquire about the identity of the actors involved in the cases, to see whether their briefs contain comparative material and, if they do, to record what sort of references are made and whether they are accompanied by justifications supporting their relevance.The analysis reveals that the briefs contain comparative material. Many public interest litigants can be considered as messengers of this information. They push for the detachment of judicial interpretation from the text at hand and propose a variant of the interpretative exercise in which the mobilized material is not exclusively jurisdiction-bound. The cross-analysis also reveals that, contrary to the picture painted by the literature on the phenomenon, there are actually many comparisons in the broad sense (referring for example to a ‘universal practice’) that are used in a norm-centric way, that is, where the simple mention of a comparative element in the form of a broad reference or the outcome of a foreign case should have weight in the adjudication and not in a reason-centric way, that is, by exposing the reasoning of a foreign judge. The research also hypothesized that the comparative material brought by public interest litigants influences the judges. Analyzing the cases using the process-tracing method allowed to substantiate that briefs are read and established that several comparative references brought by public interest litigants were debated during the oral arguments and found an echo in the judgments (in majority and dissenting opinions). Along with the use of other methods such as interviews of judges, the hypothesis was thus confirmed.Exploring the roles of external actors also enables to supply the literature on judicial dialogue with factual insights regarding the identities of the actors behind the circulation of legal arguments. It was found that, in the United States, the traditional domestic ‘repeat players’ (that is, actors often involved in the litigation) do not clearly embrace a comparative approach while most public interest litigants in Europe and South Africa do. Similarly, the pregnant role of transnational actors is underlined. The analysis suggests an explanation drawn from an aspect of the legal culture in which the public interest litigants evolve and which influences their argumentative strategies: the horizon of the ambient rights discourse: a civil rights discourse, more territorially bounded (and more often found in the U.S. context), is distinguished from a human rights or fundamental rights discourse which entails a more cosmopolitan dimension.The final part of the research explores and discusses the justifications provided by public interest litigants to support the relevance of a comparative approach in the interpretation of rights. The compilation of these justifications allows to confront those provided first hand to the judges with those constructed post facto by the scholarly literature. It reveals the uncertain implications of some of these justifications, in particular the one pointing to the universal nature of the discussed rights and the one invoking the need for consistency among the approaches of jurisdictions.The research thus allows to confirm the hypothesis that public interest litigants play a key role in judicial dialogue. Moreover, it points at further promising researches, and this thesis hopes to draw the attention to often neglected elements, such as the identity and status of the actors bringing comparative information, the forms of citations and the roles assigned to them, the aspects of legal culture that are seldom mentioned in the literature and the implications of the justifications explicitly or implicitly provided for the relevance of comparative material. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

L’Union européenne est, selon l’article 2 TUE, « fondée » sur des « valeurs » précisément identifiées. L’affirmation juridique de cette dimension fondatrice est d’autant moins neutre qu’elle est systématiquement revendiquée. Elle renvoie à une recherche d’essentialité laissant supposer que l’Union accorde volontairement une place centrale à ses valeurs. Ce choix s’exprime concrètement dans différentes dispositions issues des traités constitutifs. Les valeurs exercent notamment une influence décisive sur des questions aussi fondamentales que celles de la définition des objectifs de l’Union (article 3 TUE), du prononcé d’éventuelles sanctions à l’encontre d’États membres qui menaceraient leur intégrité (article 7 TUE), de l’orientation des relations qu’elle tisse avec son voisinage (article 8 TUE), ou encore des modalités de l’éventuelle adhésion d’un État tiers à l’Union européenne (article 49 TUE). Au-delà de la portée symbolique, juridique et politique de ces différents thèmes, les valeurs participent en réalité à déterminer l’identité spécifique de l’Union européenne. Il convient alors de s’interroger quant à la traduction concrète de cette dimension fondatrice. Afin de démontrer la consubstantialité et l’irréversibilité du lien que partagent l’Union européenne et ses valeurs, il est d’abord nécessaire de mettre en relief la vocation structurante et fonctionnelle des valeurs pour l’Union. Il reste ensuite à mesurer à quel point leur portée existentielle dépend de l’enjeu de leur protection, qu’elle soit politique, administrative ou juridictionnelle / The European Union is, according to Article 2 TEU, "founded" on "values" precisely identified. The legal affirmation of this fundamental dimension is systematically claimed. It refers to a research of essentiality suggesting that the Union voluntarily gives a central place to its values, which confirms the analysis of the main stages of its history. This choice is expressed in various provisions of the founding treaties. These values carry a decisive influence on fundamental issues such as the definition of the objectivesof the Union (Article 3 TEU), the imposition of any sanctions against member states that threaten their integrity (Article 7 TEU), the orientation of the relationships it forges with its neighbours (Article 8 TEU), and the terms of the possible accession of a state outside the European Union (Article 49 TEU). Beyond the symbolic, legal and political scope of these themes, the values determine the specific identity of the European Union. Thus, it is appropriate to question the concrete translation of the founding dimension of the values in the integration project and, therefore, to test the strength of community beliefs. The aim of the research is to determine whether a Union based on values can withstand the rigour of scientific analysis as well as the pressure of events. In order to demonstrate the consubstantial nature and the irreversibility of the link shared by the European Union and its beliefs, it is crucial to highlight the structural and functional vocation of the values for the Union. Lastly, their existential scope is yet to be assessed as this will depend from the level of their protection, whether political, administrative or judicial

Dans l’ordre juridique international, les organes de protection des droits de la personne sont de nature différente, indépendants et non hiérarchisés. Le phénomène du dialogue juridictionnel est une pratique spontanée qui consiste pour un organe de protection à intégrer dans le processus d’interprétation d’une disposition donnée, des éléments étrangers à son système, qu’il s’agisse de décisions ou d’instruments de protection émanant d’autres organes. Le dialogue est illustré avec la jurisprudence interprétée à l’aide de ces éléments extrasystémiques en matière de prohibition de la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Il est envisagé comme une technique interprétative permettant d’aboutir à des interprétations communes du contenu, du sens et de la portée de cette interdiction, bien que ces interprétations partagées puissent être extensives ou restrictives. L’étude interroge l’étendue et la teneur du pouvoir juridictionnel dans l’ordre juridique international ainsi que sa capacité à aboutir à une convergence normative en matière de protection des droits de la personne, qui découlerait d’une convergence interprétative. Implicitement, le dialogue joue le rôle d’un outil de régulation et de coordination qui s’impose spontanément dans la pratique interprétative des organes internationaux, contribuant à l’émergence d’un objectivisme jurisprudentiel. Ce dernier tend à s’opposer au volontarisme étatique dans un but de protection de l’ordre public international et de garantie des droits de la personne. / In the international legal order, international bodies protecting human rights are both of a different nature and independent. Judicial dialogue consists in referring to decisions or international instruments that are external sources to the system in which the international body has to exercise its power of interpretation. The example of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments will be used to illustrate this spontaneous practice. Judicial dialogue is seen as an interpretive technique, allowing to reach common interpretations of the substance, the meaning and the scope of this prohibition, by reaching a normative convergence through the use of external sources that shows an interpretive convergence in the first place. Nevertheless, the use of external sources does not always lead to extensive interpretations since it can also highlight disagreements in which case restrictive interpretations are inevitable. Finally, it appears that the international jurisprudential dialogue can both contribute to coordinate and harmonize the application and interpretation of international human rights law in order to protect the international public order.

The present thesis suggests that judicial interaction can benefit constructive solutions of concrete human rights problems as a specific way of integrating European human rights protection. This affirmation is substantiated by case studies examining the interaction of the European Court of Human Rights with the UK House of Lords and Supreme Court on the one hand and with the German Federal Constitutional Court on the other. Yet, the manner in which the courts proceed in their interaction, notably in view of their potentially conflictual stances, can deflect from the concentration on constructively solving the substantive human rights problem with which the courts are confronted. Accordingly, the courts might be inclined to preserve the status quo of their initial positions and to resort to a mere compromise between the different interests involved.<p>This thesis identifies two major factors in the courts’ reasoning that inhibit the fruitful discussion of the substantive human rights questions brought up by the cases: the reference to “culture” and the focus on their institutional relationship with the balancing of possibly conflicting interests. By way of analysing practical cases against a legal- and political-theoretical backdrop, this work develops how these two factors contribute to the obstruction of a constructive interaction between the courts and to the shielding of controversial views from being discussed and challenged. In response, also by reference to the concrete practice of the courts, this thesis puts forward an approach to the interaction which avoids this inhibiting effect and therefore allows for a comprehensive, deep and critical discussion on how to solve the specific human rights problems raised by the cases./La présente thèse soutient que l’interaction judiciaire peut bénéficier à des solutions constructives des problèmes concrets de droits de l’homme comme une forme spécifique d’intégration de la protection européenne des droits de l’homme. Cette affirmation est corroborée par des études de cas qui examinent l’interaction de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme avec la House of Lords et la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni d’un côté et avec la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale de l’Allemagne de l’autre. Pourtant, la manière dont les cours procèdent dans leur interaction, notamment au vu de leurs points de vue potentiellement conflictuels, peut détourner l’attention de la solution constructive des problèmes substantiels des droits de l’homme auxquels les cours font face. En conséquence, il se peut que les cours soient susceptibles de préserver le statu quo de leurs positions initiales et d’avoir recours à un simple compromis entre les différents intérêts en cause.<p>Cette thèse identifie deux facteurs majeurs dans le raisonnement des cours qui entravent la discussion fructueuse des questions substantielles soulevées par les cas :la référence à la « culture » et la concentration sur leur relation institutionnelle avec le balancement des intérêts possiblement conflictuels. Au moyen de l’analyse des cas pratiques sur le fond de la théorie juridique et politique, ce travail fait ressortir comment ces deux facteurs contribuent à l’obstruction d’une interaction constructive entre les cours et à la protection des opinions controversées contre leur discussion et défi. En réponse, également en se fondant sur la pratique concrète des cours, cette thèse avance une approche quant à l’interaction qui évite cet effet inhibant et, par conséquent, permet une discussion complète, profonde et critique de comment résoudre les problèmes spécifiques de droits de l’homme posés par les cas.<p><p> / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished