It is often said that European Immigration Policy has been converged to civic integration policy, which requires immigrants to learn the culture, history, and language etc. of the host country. That trend of convergence is sometimes regarded as the European retreat from multiculturalism, and sometimes even as convergence to the assimilationism, and so called 'fortress Europe.' This doctoral thesis is aiming at attaining more sophisticated understanding of this phenomena, by conducting analyses both at the national level and European level. At national level, it challenges the common wisdom that civic integration basically aims at restricting migrants and tries to revalorize national citizenship, through comparative analysis of the Dutch and the German party politics at the stage of legislating key national civic integration policy. By doing so, it found that the diversity of national civic integration policy from liberal to restrictive. At the EU level, it challenges the assumption that the EU played a role in uploading national interests and promoted European convergence towards restrictive immigration policy. Through the analysis of each EU institution's attitude and their influence over national immigration policy. It tries to figure out the processes of negative Europeanization where the effects of EU laws and soft governance tools of the commission actually pre-emptively guide the national policy towards rather modest civic integration, and even prohibited national member states from adopting very restrictive policy at national level. From the combination of those findings, the thesis tries to propose new model of immigrant integration and citizenship acquisition, that is, 'phased integration model'. It interprets the convergence towards civic integration as institutionalization of immigrant integration path in each member states. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This research explains the variance in voter turnout and ballot roll-off in county and circuit nonpartisan judicial elections in Florida from 2014 and 2016. Based on theory, a collection of constituent (demographic and socioeconomic), candidate, competition, and contextual variables is gathered to construct four regression models. Two full regression models were constructed for turnout and roll-off and analyzed using SPSS software, in addition to two best regression models analyzing five statistically significant variables found within each full model. Presidential year elections and higher populations age 65 and up had positive impacts on voter turnout, while primary elections, campaign expenditures, and populations of minor (other) party registered voters had statistically significant negative effects on turnout. Increases in ballot roll-off were associated with presidential year elections, and populations with more college degrees, higher median household income, and higher percentages of voters registered with no party affiliation or minor political parties. Roll-off decreased in primary elections. While various contextual, competition, and constituent variables had significant impact on both turnout and roll-off in Florida judicial elections, candidate characteristic variables had no significant impact on differences in voter turnout and ballot roll-off.

No description available.

This thesis focuses on how well indicators of judicial ideology and institutional constraints predict whether a judge will vote to increase abortion access. I develop a model that evaluates a judge's decision in an abortion case in light of ideological factors measured at the time of a judge's nomination to the bench and legal and institutional constraints at the time a judge decides a case. I analyze abortion cases from all of the U.S. Federal District Courts from 1973-2004. Unlike previous studies, which demonstrate that the president and the home state senators are the best predictors of judicial ideology, I find that the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of the judge's nomination is the only statistically significant ideological indicator. Also, contrary to conventional wisdom, Supreme Court precedent (a legal constraint) is also a significant predictor of judicial voting behavior in abortion cases.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

The dissertation analyzes obstacles and potential in democracies, specifically Canada, Sweden, and United States, to effectively address empirically documented harms of pornography. Legislative and judicial challenges under different democratic and legal frameworks are compared. Adopting a problem-driven theoretical approach, the reality of pornography’s harms is analyzed. Evidence shows its production exploits existing inequalities among persons typically drawn from other forms of prostitution who suffer multiple disadvantages, such as extreme poverty, childhood sexual abuse, and race and gender discrimination, making survival alternatives remote. Consumption is also divided by sex. A majority of young adult men consumes pornography frequently; women rarely do, usually not unless initiated by others. After consumption, studies show many normal men become substantially more sexually aggressive and increasingly trivialize and support violence against women. Vulnerable populations—including battered, raped, or prostituted women—are most harmed as a result. The impact of attempts to address pornography’s harms on democratic rights and freedoms, specifically gender equality and speech, is explored through the case studies. Democracies are found to provide more favorable conditions for legal challenges to pornography’s harms when recognizing substantive (not formal) equality in law, and when promoting representation of perspectives and interests of groups particularly injured by pornography. State-implemented approaches such as criminal obscenity laws are found less effective. More victim-centered and survivor-initiated civil rights approaches would be more responsive and remedial—a finding with implications for other politico-legal problems, such as global warming, that disproportionately affect disadvantaged populations traditionally largely excluded from decision-making.

Submitted by Felipe de Mendonça Lopes (felipe_lopes25@hotmail.com) on 2018-06-14T22:24:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Final.pdf: 1919518 bytes, checksum: 7268ca7969cd2221eddc7a1b4919fee6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Katia Menezes de Souza (katia.menezes@fgv.br) on 2018-06-15T14:46:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Final.pdf: 1919518 bytes, checksum: 7268ca7969cd2221eddc7a1b4919fee6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Isabele Garcia (isabele.garcia@fgv.br) on 2018-06-15T18:36:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Final.pdf: 1919518 bytes, checksum: 7268ca7969cd2221eddc7a1b4919fee6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-15T18:36:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Final.pdf: 1919518 bytes, checksum: 7268ca7969cd2221eddc7a1b4919fee6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-28 / What do judges want? Although apparently a straightforward question, the motivations that underly judge’s decisions have been a persistent topic of debate in the literature. The discussion arises from the fact that judges, especially those in superior courts, are usually insulated from the ordinary incentives that other agents face. Most enjoy life tenure, their salaries cannot be decreased, and have no performance bonus. Hence, an assumption of economic self-interest would hardly provide useful insights into judicial preferences. In the three essays that form this thesis, I contribute to the judicial behavior literature by providing empirical evidence of at least three different vectors that govern judicial decision-making. In the first essay, I show that judges respond to transparency and scrutiny. The main idea is to explore how a shift in transparency – since 2002 the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) broadcasts its deliberations live on television – may alter behavior. Here, I employ a research design seldom used in the judicial behavior literature – Differences-in-Differences – to test how STF judges have responded to increased transparency. The main finding is that STF justices, when given free television time, act to maximize their individual exposure. They achieve that by writing longer votes and by engaging in more discussions with their peers. In the second essay, I show that political preferences matter. Here, in delving into the judicial activism literature, I test whether activism is related to politics in two ways. First, whether judges appointed by left-wing presidents are more (or less) likely to engage in activist voting than those appointed by right-wing presidents. Second, if judges appointed by presidents of either end of the political spectrum are sensitive to political context, that is, if they respond to the presence of their appointing party in the Executive. In doing so, I propose a new measure of judicial activism, which conditions votes to strike on the Prosecutor-General’s brief. The main result is that activism – both in the traditional and new measures – is associated with ideology measured by presidential appointment. Also, in the new measure, judges are sensitive to political context – they are less likely to engage in activist voting when their appointing party is incumbent in the Federal Executive. Lastly, career matters. Justices that are former politicians are less likely to be activist. Finally, in the third essay, I investigate the determinants of judicial dissent in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Particularly, I disentangle two features of judicial behavior that are known to affect the decision to dissent: ideological heterogeneity and dissent aversion. To do so, I explore the fact that voting in this Court is sequential, that there is a predetermined voting order that varies in nearly every case, to identify where dissent aversion will manifest. The main point is that after a majority has been formed, the justices who vote in sequence know that their votes cannot change the outcome of the case. Hence, they may deviate from their preferred votes and join the majority to avoid the costs of dissenting. Here, I find strong evidence of dissent aversion in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Judges who vote after the pivotal judge are significantly less likely to dissent. The evidence for ideology, however, does not survive all robustness checks. / O que os juízes querem? Embora uma pergunta aparentemente simples, as motivações subjacentes às decisões dos juízes têm sido um tópico persistente de debate na literatura. A discussão surge do fato de que os juízes, especialmente aqueles em cortes superiores, normalmente são isolados dos incentivos que outros agentes enfrentam. A maioria tem cargo vitalício, seus salários não podem ser reduzidos e não têm bônus por desempenho. Desta forma, uma suposição de auto interesse econômico dificilmente forneceria conclusões úteis sobre preferências judiciais. Nos três ensaios que formam esta tese, eu contribuo para a literatura de comportamento judicial, fornecendo evidências empíricas de ao menos três vetores diferentes que regem a tomada de decisões por juízes. No primeiro ensaio, mostro que os juízes respondem à transparência e ao escrutínio. A ideia principal é explorar como uma mudança na transparência - desde 2002, o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) transmite suas deliberações ao vivo pela televisão - pode alterar o comportamento. Neste trabalho, emprego um método raramente utilizado na literatura de comportamento judicial - Diferenças-em-Diferenças - para testar como juízes do STF respondem a uma maior transparência. A principal conclusão é que ministros do STF agem para maximizar sua exposição individual quando lhes é dado tempo gratuito de televisão. Para isso, escrevem votos mais longos e interagem mais frequentemente com seus pares. No segundo ensaio, mostro que preferências políticas são relevantes. Aqui, ao investigar a literatura do ativismo judicial, testo se o ativismo está correlacionado com preferências políticas de duas maneiras. Primeiro, se juízes nomeados por presidentes de esquerda são mais (ou menos) propensos a votar de modo ativista do que aqueles nomeados por presidentes de direita. Segundo, se juízes indicados por presidentes de ambos os extremos do espectro político são sensíveis ao contexto político, isto é, se respondem à presença, no Executivo, do partido que os indicou. Aqui, proponho uma nova medida de ativismo judicial, que condiciona votos pela inconstitucionalidade das leis ao parecer do Procurador Geral da República. O principal resultado é que ativismo - tanto na medida tradicional quanto na nova que proponho - é associado à ideologia política medida pela indicação presidencial. Além disso, na nova medida, juízes são sensíveis ao contexto político - são menos propensos a votar de modo ativista se o incumbente no Executivo Federal foi o responsável por sua indicação à corte. Por fim, a carreira anterior também é importante. Juízes que foram políticos são menos propensos a serem ativistas. Finalmente, no terceiro ensaio, investigo os determinantes da divergência judicial no STF. Em particular, distingo duas características do comportamento dos juízes que reconhecidamente afetam a decisão de divergir: heterogeneidade ideológica e aversão à divergência. Com este objetivo, exploro o fato de que a votação nesta Corte é sequencial, ou seja, que há uma ordem de votação pré-estabelecida que varia em quase todos os casos, para identificar onde a aversão à divergência deve se manifestar. O ponto principal é que depois que a maioria foi formada, os juízes que votam na sequência sabem que seus votos não mudarão o resultado do caso. Logo, eles podem se desviar de seus votos preferidos e se unir à maioria para evitar os custos de divergir. Aqui, encontro fortes evidências de aversão à divergência no Supremo Tribunal Federal. Juízes que votam após o juiz pivotal são significativamente menos propensos a divergir. Evidências a favor da heterogeneidade ideológica, no entanto, não sobrevivem aos testes de robustez.

While there has been a substantial body of research on interest group activity in U.S. federal courts, there has been comparatively little analysis of interest group engagement with state courts. Given that state courts adjudicate the vast majority of cases in the American legal system and very few cases are appealed to the Supreme Court, understanding why organized interests participate in these courts is of great importance. The present study analyzes interest group involvement as amicus curiae in all state courts of last resort from 1995-1999 to examine what factors motivate organized interests to turn to the courts. The results indicate that interest groups are primarily motivated by their policy goals in deciding which cases to file amicus briefs in, but that they are limited in their ability to file by institutional constraints unique to state courts of last resort. This research provides insight into interest group behavior, state courts and the role organized interests play in influencing legal outcomes in the American states.

In the period from 2009-2020, South Africa has witnessed the rise of "lawfare". Lawfare is understood as the judicialisation of politics - turning to the courts and the use of the law to resolve broadly political matters. This thesis explores the unfolding implications of the judicialisation of politics for judicial legitimacy. In the displacement of the political into the judicial the reach of the courts is expanded and the legitimacy of courts engaging in a "political" role is questioned. Situated in the field of judicial-political dynamics, the interplay between law and politics is observed through the adoption of a historical-institutionalist model. This thesis identifies the causes of the judicialisation of politics and then traces its consequences for broader constitutional stability and the impact on the judicial institution. Guidelines for the Court to navigate lawfare to achieve institutional resilience and maintain judicial legitimacy are then proposed. Judicialisation of politics is caused primarily through the failures of the other branches of government to fulfil their assigned constitutional role. Institutional imbalance in a dominant party democracy means that opposition parties and civil society organisations are left with little recourse but to appeal to the Court to be a constitutional bulwark. The Court is then compelled to step into the breach and fill the accountability vacuum. In identifying the causes of judicialisation, a fuller understanding of Lawfare emerges, expanding current scholarship beyond its traditionally abusive characterisation. It posits a duality to Lawfare in that it can be both an abuse of law and a last line of defence. Through observing the judicial political interactions, a trajectory from the judicialisation of politics to the politicisation of law is mapped. The politicisation of law sees political power refocused on the courts, exposing them to political aggression and attack by the dominant party. The judicialisation of politics that seeks accountability from recalcitrant political actors asks much of the courts, at a time when ensuring executive oversight is the most dangerous, because of the ease with which a hostile executive in a dominant party democracy can implement measures that may undermine the independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has shown a remarkable ability to navigate this era of Lawfare, remaining resolute under fire. However, the more successful the Court is in holding the line against executive abuse of power, the more the judicial route is identified as a powerful weapon to achieve more abusive political objectives. The relationship between Lawfare and legitimacy is identified as a wicked problem that demands expanding boundaries to observe the courts influence on the political environment, and the political environment's influence on the judicial role and its legitimacy. Through advancing a multi-dimensional paradigm of judicial legitimacy, the dialectics of judicial legitimacy are shown to be aggravated by the judicialisation of politics. In this respect it is argued that where the foundations and assumptions on which legitimacy is predicated shift, legitimacy must be re-examined. It is therefore argued that in a culture marked by an impunified disregard of non-judicial regulatory enforcement and increasing non-compliance with judicial orders, the impulse to preserve legitimacy through a detached, formalist stance will not be sufficient. Judicial legitimacy must be relocated in the ability of the Court to be responsive. Pulled into the role of judicial statesmanship, the Court must adopt a robust approach to assertively uphold the rule of law. In tracking the unfolding consequences of the judicialisation of politics, the Court is asked to resolve matters beyond its institutional capabilities. Absent the normative commitment to the rule of law, the internationalisation of constitutional norms, and the political interest to implement remedial orders, the Court is unable to effect workable relief. In tracing the dangers of the continued trend of Lawfare, the thesis sketches a downward spiral of reputational strength of the Court and a decline in democratic responsibility. This leads to an inability to achieve effective reform that ends in disenchantment, questioning the faith placed in the Constitution. It depicts how the Constitutional Court as 'constitutional saviour' can unravel into constitutional blame. The Constitutional Court has been able to hold the line in this era of Lawfare and repel assaults on its integrity and efforts to undermine its independence. However, without a broader culture of commitment to the rule of law, civil education and a suffusion of constitutional responsibility beyond the judiciary, the Court will not be able to continue to shoulder the weight of what is asked of it. This research depicts a circular model of Lawfare and legitimacy, where Lawfare is predicated on judicial legitimacy, but an overreliance on Lawfare will destroy judicial legitimacy.