O estudo das políticas públicas recentemente tem despertado a atenção da doutrina no âmbito do Direito. O presente trabalho busca apresentar um quadro geral das políticas públicas previdenciárias, demonstrando a intersecção existente entre o Direito e a Ciência Política, as contribuições de cada disciplina e as tênues fronteiras que as separam. A esfera do Direito, sob a perspectiva do Poder Judiciário, estabelece os parâmetros e limites do controle dos atos editados pelos outros Poderes, à luz dos instrumentos jurídicos previstos no ordenamento, tendo como objetivo a efetivação do direito fundamental à previdência social. A análise de casos concretos, colhidos da jurisprudência pátria, revela alguma oscilação do Poder Judiciário na defesa do direito fundamental em questão, especialmente em decorrência de argumentos de natureza econômica, introduzidos no texto constitucional por meio das reformas de 1998 e 2003. / The analysis of public policies has recently raised the attention in the scope of law. This study has the purpose of presenting a comprehensive view of the public policies on Social Security, by demonstrating the intersection between Law and Political Science, the contributions of each area of study as well as the tenuous frontiers separating them. The scope of law, under the perspective of the Judiciary, establishes the patterns and the limits to regulate the measures taken by Executive and Legislative Power, having as reference the juridical instruments stated by the legal system, whose purpose is to safeguard the right to social security. The analysis of concrete cases, gathered from the Brazilian case law, reveals a lack of coherence and consistency of the Judiciary to uphold the right to social security. This incoherence and inconsistency are mainly due to economic arguments, which were introduced in the Constitution by the time of the reforms carried out in 1998 and 2003.

Emergente a partir do final do século XX, o constitucionalismo popular enquanto campo acadêmico, tem buscado desconstruir a narrativa que legitima a afirmação da supremacia do judicial review estadunidense. Segundo seus expoentes, o melhor desenho envolveria a interpretação política, e não legal, da Constituição. Selecionados os exemplos de Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet e Jeremy Waldron, o trabalho buscará abordar seus argumentos desde um ponto de vista individual, mas também os elementos que lhes são comuns. Nesse sentido, além da ofensiva à revisão judicial, busca-se identificar os debates que se fazem presentes, e atravessam o campo, tais como a utilidade de um tribunal que traga estabilidade ao sistema político, a ideia de melhor intérprete, a questão contramajoritária e o ideal de autogoverno democrático, em uma sociedade contemporânea atravessada pelo desacordo. Considerados os argumentos, busco chamar a atenção para a parcialidade do pensamento dominante, cuja recepção se ampara sobre bases problemáticas. / Since the late twentieth century, popular constitutionalism has risen as an academic field that seeks deconstructing the narrative that justifies the affirmation of the supremacy of the American judicial review. According to its supporters, the best design for it would not involve the legal, but the political interpretation of the constitution. Selecting the examples of Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron, this work aims at addressing their statements not only as individual points of view, but also considering the elements they have in common. In this sense, besides being an assault on judicial review, this texts focuses on identifying the debates that arise and crisscross the field, such as the usefulness of a court which brings stability to the political system, the idea of best constitutional decision-making, the countermajoritarian difficulty, and the ideal of democratic self-government in a contemporary society pervaded by disagreement. Taking such issues into consideration, I propose drawing attention to the bias of mainstream constitutional thinking, whose reception lies on problematic bases.

Este trabalho é uma análise crítica do tema da mutação constitucional. Buscouse a partir da revisitação de temas como o constitucionalismo e do conceito de Constituição, construir uma dogmática da mutabilidade das normas constitucionais e assim procedendo, verificar empiricamente, com base em precedentes da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, o acerto desta construção. Uma vez estabelecidas as bases para a verificação do fenômeno da mutação constitucional, foi possível parametrizar os limites possíveis a esta hipótese de atualização das normas constitucionais. Pois bem, nesses termos, fixado o conceito, verificado a sua aplicabilidade na jurisprudência, bem como estabelecidos os limites de sua utilização, foi possível ainda a partir da análise do contexto atual em que se insere o instituto, vislumbrar as hipóteses de sua aplicação futura. Em suma, trata-se de um trabalho no qual se tenta compreender o papel da jurisdição constitucional com respeito ao tema de mutabilidade das normas constitucionais, sobretudo diante da realidade pós-moderna circundante, que pela sua complexidade, influencia, sensivelmente, a normatividade dos preceitos legais e, notadamente, dos constitucionais, objeto principal do estudo. / This work is a critical analysis of the issue of constitutional change. We sought from revisiting issues such as constitutionalism and the concept of constitution building a dogmatic mutability of constitutional norms and in so doing, to verify empirically, based on the precedents jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the correctness of this construction. Once established the basis for the verification of the phenomenon of constitutional change, it was possible to parameterize the possible limits to this hypothesis update of constitutional norms . Well , in these terms , the concept set, verifying their applicability in case law as well as established the limits of their use, it was still possible from the analysis of the current context in which it appears the institute, envision the chances of its future application. In short, it is a work in which one tries to understand the role of constitutional jurisdiction with respect to the theme of mutability of constitutional norms, particularly in the surrounding postmodern reality, which by their complexity, significantly influences the normativity of legal precepts and especially, constitutional, the main object of study.

A tradição histórica da doutrina e prática constitucionais elegeu o Poder Legislativo como o centro por excelência de manifestação das aspirações de autogoverno. A revisão judicial, nesse cenário, costuma suscitar críticas e defesas das mais variadas, que contrapõem seu exercício à consolidação de direitos engendrada, por sua vez, no âmbito das legislaturas. Para uma compreensão geral do debate travado, é necessário compreender as raízes históricas norte-americanas do instituto da revisão judicial, assim como as teorias construídas para analisar o comportamento daqueles responsáveis por praticá-la os juízes. À luz de um renovado modelo comportamental fundado em aspectos institucionais, está-se diante de mudança de perspectiva quanto à análise da realização de direitos por diferentes atores políticos. Nesse sentido, não há que se falar na autoridade sobre última palavra decisória, mas na melhor solução por meio da interação entre instituições, no contexto das teorias do diálogo. / Traditional doctrine and constitutional practice have elected Parliament as the ultimate center for aspirations of self-government. Judicial Review, on that perspective, usually brings about all sorts of critics and defenses, in comparing its practice with the realization of rights entailed by legislative action and with regard to its legitimacy. For a general comprehension of the matter, one must first understand the historical roots of Judicial Reviews American origins, as well as the theories constructed in order to analyze the behavior of those responsible for practicing it the judges. In light of a renewed model for behavioral analysis that enhances the focus on institutional features, there is a change in perspective when it comes to the implementation of rights. No theories of last word on decisional authority can account for the new objectives in mind, since the best solution should be found through the interaction between institutions, an ideal prescribed by dialogue theories.

A opção pela forma federativa de governo importa em compromisso com a existência de mais de um ente responsável, em territórios sobrepostos, pela realização das tarefas de arrecadação e gasto público, além de suas inerentes atividades políticas. O exercício dessas tarefas pode ser definido com rigor, em um regime dual, ou com possibilidade de auxílios mútuos, em um regime de cooperação. O Brasil adotou, como cláusula pétrea em sua Constituição, a forma de federação cooperativa, estruturada em três níveis de governo, tendo como consequência a divisão de competências materiais entre os componentes dessa federação. Apesar disso, os Tribunais brasileiros têm insistido em sustentar a tese de solidariedade obrigacional entre todos os entes federados em processo que tenham por objeto o controle de políticas públicas sociais. A imposição dessa obrigação solidária, além de desrespeitar a estrutura federativa e afrontar os princípios da efetividade e economicidade da administração com sobreposições e sobrecargas que facilitam o desperdício de verbas e a corrupção ainda não atenta para a regra de ouro da imposição de solidariedade obrigacional, que é a menção expressa em dispositivo legal ou constitucional. Conforme será demonstrado, as decisões proferidas pelos Tribunais nacionais em sede de controle jurisdicional de políticas públicas vem ignorando todo o arcabouço jurídico acerca do tema, além de impor aos entes federados desnecessária dificuldade de gestão de suas competências e de seus recursos financeiros. A defesa de responsabilidades divididas, porém, poderia gerar efeitos nefastos. É que, em sede processual, a demanda ajuizada em face do ente não diretamente responsável pela execução da política pública questionada poderia ser extinta sem resolução do mérito, impondo atrasos à efetivação de direitos sociais decorrentes de óbices processuais. Como os direitos fundamentais categoria na qual estão inseridos os direitos sociais exigem efetivação imediata e são sindicáveis judicialmente a partir dos comandos genéricos dados pela Constituição, foi preciso recorrer a uma técnica antiga já prevista no Brasil, porém mal compreendida de integração subjetiva da demanda por ordem do juiz, a intervenção iussu iudicis. Para evitar a repetição de erros, será refeito o caminho histórico de surgimento e desenvolvimento dessa técnica para melhor compreensão de seus escopos. / The option for the federal form of government matter commitment to the existence of more than one entity responsible, in overlapping territories, for performing the tasks of public collection and spending beyond their inherent political activities. The exercise of these tasks can be defined rigorously, in a dual system, or with the possibility of mutual aid, in a regime of cooperation. Brazil has adopted as entrenchment clause in its Constitution, a cooperative federation, structured in three levels of government, resulting in the division of powers between the material components of this federation. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Courts insisted on supporting the thesis of a mandatory solidarity among all federal entities in the suits whose purpose is the control of public policies. The imposition of such solidarity, besides disregarding the federal structure and defy the principles of effectiveness and economy of administration - with overlays and overloads that facilitate waste of money and corruption - not attentive to the golden rule imposing mandatory solidarity, which is the expressly stated in law or constitutional provision. As will be shown, the decisions handed down by national courts in the seat of judicial control of public policies has ignored the whole legal structure of the topic, and impose to federal entities an unnecessary difficulty in managing their skills and their financial resources. The defense of divided responsibilities, however, could generate adverse effects. Is that in procedural field, a suit filed in the face of an entity not being directly responsible for the execution of the questioned public policy demand could be terminated without resolution, imposing delays to the realization of social rights under procedural obstacles. As fundamental rights - the category in which they belong social rights - require effective immediately be investigated and are chargeable from generic commands given by the Constitution, it was necessary to resort to an old technique - already foreseen in Brazil, but poorly understood - a subjective integration demand by the judge\'s order, the intervention iussu iudicis. To avoid repeating mistakes, will be redone historical path emergence and development of this technique to better understand their scopes.

Prior to the current constitutional dispensation, the development of South African administrative law was restricted by the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Even in that comparatively 'hostile' environment, review for unreasonableness developed as an aspect of judicial review, and was applied as a check on the exercise of administrative power in certain circumstances. The principle of proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness also developed during this period. With the advent of the new Constitutional dispensation, the framework within which administrative law in South Africa operates became one governed by Constitutional Supremacy. The Rights to Just Administrative Action, including a right to reasonable administrative action, were entrenched in the Constitution. Review for unreasonableness is an important aspect of administrative law in the present Constitutional dispensation as the mechanism for protecting the Constitutional right to reasonable administrative action. Proportionality is an important principle underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole, and it is an important aspect of the right to reasonable administrative action, and of review for unreasonableness. In early 2000, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 ("the PAJA"), was passed by Parliament in fulfillment of the Constitutional requirement to pass legislation to give effect to the constitutional rights to Just Administrative Action. This thesis examines whether or not review for unreasonableness, and proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness, have been meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA, and if they have not been, what potential remedies there might be. This is done by examining the basis of judicial review both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; defining unreasonableness, and proportionality; examining the content of the right to administrative action which is "justifiable in relation to the reasons given" in section 24(d) of the Interim Constitution and the right to reasonable administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Final Constitution; examining the application of review for unreasonableness and proportionality by the Courts both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; examining the content of judicial review incorporated in the PAJA and the drafting history of section 6(2) of the PAJA which relates to review for unreasonableness; drawing conclusions regarding whether or not review for unreasonableness and proportionality were meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA; and finally making recommendations with regard to review for unreasonableness and proportionality in light of the provisions of the PAJA.

The primary purpose of this treatise is to revisit and reconsider the development of the review test set out in the Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) and consequently ascertain the correct approach to be adopted by our Labour Courts in the application of such test. The secondary purpose, entail the determination of the extent to which Labour Court judges interfere with the merits of awards and the resulting impact on the distinction between appeal and review. In order to establish whether the test for review was correctly developed and to determine whether our review proceedings deter recurrent interference by our judges, an edifying consideration of judicial review in South Africa, an extensive analysis of various judgements pertaining to such development, followed by a comprehensive comparison with the United Kingdom`s application of review proceedings and judicial composition are made. The research methodology is based on a contour of Sidumo, commencing with the Sidumo judgment, followed by three contentious Labour Appeal Court judgments and concluding with a Supreme Court of Appeal judgement, which clarifies the operation of the review test. The contour is interlinked with the notion of reasonableness. The primary research findings are identified in the judgment of Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA). The judgment, concluding the Sidumo contour, underlines the current position in our law and consequent narrower approach. A comparison made with the United Kingdom, differentiate between such approach implemented by our courts and the strict gross unreasonableness approach applied by Employment Appeal Tribunals, recognising the finding, that our Labour Court judges ardently interfere with the merits of awards. In the conclusion it is submitted that our labour law jurisprudence will constantly evolve, dictated by our courts interpretation of lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness.

Grounding its approach in historical and discursive institutionalist frameworks, this thesis examines the process of judicial review through an evaluation of Hogg et al.’s Charter dialogue hypothesis as it pertains to judicial invalidation of sections of the Charter of the French Language (CFL) and the legislative sequels produced by the National Assembly of Quebec (i.e. Bills 178 and 86). When examined from an historical institutionalist perspective, the National Assembly of Quebec appears to have strategized its response through an assertion of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than the desire to engage in a “dialogue” with the Supreme Court of Canada. However, a closer examination of how the Bourassa government crafted Bill 178 reveals that the first ‘legislative response’ to the Supreme Court’s decision in Devine and Ford was crafted exclusively by the executive branch, in virtual secrecy among a handful of Bourassa’s cabinet members. Displeased with the outcome of Bill 178, Anglophone civil society actors challenged the legitimacy of the CFL, as well as the notwithstanding mechanism at an international level, with their submission of Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). In 1993, the UNHRC ruled that Bill 178 violated sections of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UNHRC’s decision eventually pressured the National Assembly of Quebec to amend Bill 178 with the passage of Bill 86, and consequently brought the Supreme Court’s remedies into partial effect. However, Quebec’s subsequent amendment to the CFL, Bill 86, was not a “legislative sequel” in response to judicial nullification; rather it was primarily a response to comply to international human rights norms. Bill 86 amended sections 58 and 68 of the CFL, but contrary to the recommendations of linguistic equality set forth by the Supreme Court, the Bourassa government ensured that French remained the predominant language on signage. The evidence in this thesis suggests that Charter compliance was an almost secondary effect caused by the primary objective of Quebec’s adherence to international human rights norms for the purpose of continued participation in international affairs. In its rejection of the Charter dialogue model, this thesis uncouples the pairing of the notwithstanding clause with the notion of parliamentary sovereignty and, in doing so, raises critical questions regarding the roles of the provincial executive and legislative branches during the process of constitutional interpretation. This thesis concludes that in lieu of Charter dialogue, a modified version of Baker’s model of coordinate interpretation is a more appropriate model of judicial review for summarizing the interaction of actors within the case studies of Bills 178 and 86.

In the twentieth century, a dynamic expansion of its activities and powers has made government a major supplier of information on an enormous range of topics of concern to citizens. Unfortunately, the information which it provides is not always completely reliable: sometimes it is inaccurate, and government is powerless to protect the citizen from the consequences; at others, it proves misleading because government chooses later to disown it. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the legal remedies available to citizens misled by government information. The analysis has two principal areas of investigation. First, consideration is given to the means whereby the citizen may be able to hold government bound by information which it has provided to him. Separate treatment is given to the situations in which the misleading information deprives the citizen of a benefit or inflicts on him a loss, and in which it subjects him to the risk of criminal liability. Secondly, consideration is given to the possibility of holding government responsible in damages for the consequences of its information being misleading. Of central importance in this wide-ranging analysis is the issue of the proper role of the courts. This stems from the fact that complaints about misleading government information frequently involve challenges to government decisions. Thus the majority of attempts by citizens to hold government bound by its information are generated by the making by government itself of a decision inconsistent with that information. Again, attempts to hold government responsible in damages for the consequences of providing misleading information commonly involve an allegation that a particular government decision relating to the provision of that information was negligent. It is emphasized throughout this thesis that the courts should refuse assistance to a citizen whose complaint of misleading government information is directed essentially towards a government decision, where that decision involves a determination of the priority of competing interests and values represented in society. The provision of a remedy in such a case would enable the courts effectively to review the choices embodied in value-laden government decisions, and as such would facilitate an unwarranted extension of their constitutional role. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms signaled a new and vastly expanded role for the judiciary. By entrenching our civil liberties into the Canadian Constitution, the courts were given the express authority to override inconsistent statutes. Due to the inherent overlap between law and politics, election law is an area that is particularly sensitive to this recent enlargement of judicial power. Despite this, the courts have scrutinized many areas of election law and many federal and provincial statutes have been fundamentally altered. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the courts have developed a uniform theory of judicial review where election law is concerned via four case studies: electoral boundary redistribution, prisoner voting rights, the publication of opinion polls during campaigns and third party spending limits. Through an extensive review of the relevant case law and literature, I conclude that the courts have failed to develop a coherent and consistent theory judicial review regarding the application of the Charter to election law. My analysis reveals that the inconsistencies stem largely from three main sources: first is the failure of the courts to adopt a single vision of what constitutes a fair electoral system; second is that the case studies are dealing with two different sections of the Charter (ss. 2(b) and 3); and third is the Oakes test which has expanded judicial discretion along with the potential for disparity. If consistency is ever going to be achieved, the courts need to adopt a single vision of democracy in Canada. Until then, we are left to guess when our political rights may be justifiably restricted under the Charter. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate