The South African government has attempted to find a balance of interests between the employer and the employee by the introduction of the Labour Relations Act in 1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act in 1997. It is critical to the health of the South African economy that these labour laws do not impact small businesses to the extent that the Gross Domestic Product of the country is negatively affected. There are conflicting reports as to how these labour laws affect small businesses. It is therefore important for government to be able to understand, define and measure the impact of its labour laws on small businesses, in order for it to strategise corrective measures, which may include reconsidering the application of the legislative directive, regulated flexibility, if required. The study was limited in the sense that it was solely based on evidence collected from employers. An interpretivist approach was applied as a research methodology to data collected through in-depth interviews. The main findings of the empirical analysis demonstrate that labour legislation does not heavily impact small firms. It was thus determined that extensive measures were not needed with regard to correcting the framework of regulated flexibility.

This thesis analyses the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and its application in labour law in South Africa. After an initial examination of the general concepts with regards to employment equity and current international conventions regarding employment equity, the study will move on to examine employment equity as it stands in the law today. In examining the current law regarding employment equity, a brief historical background will be offered in order to show the legacy of apartheid: the immense disparity between the different categories of South African people in the modern era. By using this background and analysing the relevant provisions of the Constitution, it will be argued that there is a very real need for employment equity measures to bring about a true sense of equality in South Africa and that such measures are fully endorsed by the Constitution. After it has been established that affirmative action is an important tool in the creation of an equal South Africa, the measures put in place to help create this equal South Africa will be critically analysed. This critical analysis will point out certain weaknesses in the current affirmative action system. Following this critical analysis of the South African employment equity law, the employment equity systems used in Brazil, Canada and Malaysia will be examined in detail. The purpose of this analysis will be to find the strengths and weaknesses and successes and failures of these foreign systems. This will be done in order to highlight those areas of the foreign systems that can be implemented into South African law in order to make the South African employment equity system stronger. The weaknesses of those systems will also be highlighted in order to learn valuable lessons from other system’s failures so that South Africa does not make the same mistakes. The final part of this thesis will be in depth discussions and the proposal of solutions to the weaknesses of the South African employment equity system that have been highlighted throughout the thesis. These proposals will be put forward in order to ensure the most efficient and effective employment equity system in South Africa. There will also be a reassessment of the most valuable lessons learned from the foreign systems that would be easily implemented into or avoided by the South African system in order to ensure an effective employment equity system. The purpose, therefore, of this thesis is to critically analyse employment equity in South Africa. A further purpose will be to propose certain amendments and changes to the current system to ensure the Employment Equity Act is reflective of the needs of the people South Africa.

This study sought to explore and explain the impact of labour laws on small firms, focusing on employer perceptions of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 in three towns of the Eastern Cape. It is important to focus on this impact of labour laws on these firms because of the high unemployment that faces the country. In this regard, it must be emphasised, firstly, that small firms are central to job creation; therefore, they contribute to a reduction in the unemployment rate; hence, the strategies created by the government to reduce any burdens (including regulatory burdens) on small firms. It is therefore important to study the impact of labour law on small businesses in order to assess the regulatory burden on small firms. The theoretical framework which underpins this study on the impact of labour law on small firms arises from the neo-corporatist critique of neo-liberalism. The two frameworks maintain the extent to which the government should intervene in the industrial relations system. Liberalism maintains that there should be a minimum role of the government, which involves only the facilitation of a framework for negotiations between employers and employees. Corporatism, however, maintains a social democratic approach, and holds that there should be an active role of the government in the industrial relations system with business, labour and the state working co-operatively (Klerck, 2009). This theoretical framework therefore shapes the extent to which employers perceive labour laws or state’s regulatory role impacts small businesses. The data was collected through the qualitative inquiry; using face-to-face, semi-structured interviews. The findings in this study included negative employer perceptions of labour laws. More specifically, many of the employers that were interviewed claimed that labour laws were burdensome on their businesses. They claimed that labour laws imposed financial and administrative costs to their firms, negatively affected the employer-employee relationships in these firms as well as the employing decisions of the employers. As a result, the employers saw labour laws as undermining flexibility and imposing unfair rigidities on small firms. Furthermore, employers perceived South African labour laws as not addressing the unique iii circumstances of small firms. They maintained that labour laws treated small firms similarly to large firms. Even though the employers held these perceptions of labour laws, it was evident that these subjective perceptions did not reflect the objective impact of labour laws on small firms. This was firstly related to the fact that many of the employers that were interviewed had negative views of labour laws but these views were not substantiated by particular events in their firms. Secondly, it was revealed that the employers’ perceptions of labour laws were based on their misconception or misunderstanding of labour law. Thirdly, it was revealed in this thesis that small firms were not affected in the same way to big firms by labour regulation. This was related to the fact that many of the small firms’ employers that were interviewed tended to be less concerned by regulation. Specifically, although many employers that were interviewed claimed that labour laws were burdensome on their firms it was evident that regulation was avoided because of the informality that characterised these firms. Consequently informality mediated the impact of labour laws on these firms, and labour laws imposed less ‘costs’ on these firms. However, it cannot be argued that small firms are isolated from the sphere of labour laws. Rather, although these firms were governed by regulation it was found that the extent to which employers complied with regulation depended on the extent to which organisational practice already reflected similarity with the legislative objective. / Acrobat PDFMaker 10.1 for Word / Adobe PDF Library 10.0

Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act defines ’strike’ as the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and employee, and any reference to “work” this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory. According to Mcllroy: “As long as our society is divided between those who own and control the means of production and those who only have the ability to work, strikes will be inevitable because they are the ultimate means workers have of protecting themselves.” 1 The Constitutional Court justified the exclusion of a constitutional right to lock out and the inclusion of a constitutional right to strike by indicating that the right to strike is not equivalent to a right to lock out and is essential for workplace democracy. 2 The right to strike is essential to bolster collective bargaining and thereby to give employees the power to bargain effectively with employers. The employers on the According to the Constitutional Court employers enjoy greater social and economic power compared to individual workers and may exercise a wide range of power against workers through a range of weapons, such as dismissal, the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusion of workers from the workplace. To combat this and have a say in the workplace, the Constitutional Court held that “employees need to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain effectively with employers and exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of strike action”. The importance of the right to strike in creating workplace democracy is also reflected in a number of Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court judgments. other hand have economic strength that is used to bargain effectively. That is why the strike enjoys constitutional protection, whereas the lock-out does not. / Abstract

During the apartheid era in South Africa there was an unequivocal commitment to white supremacy, segregation and inequality. Discrimination but not on the basis of race was entrenched by the pre-democratic government. The 1980‟s saw the first steps towards reversing such practices through various measures, in the form of formal equality. Formal equality holds that the state must be act neutrally in relation to its employees and must favour no one above another. It assumes that all people are equal and that inequality can be eradicated simply by treating all people in the same way. Formal equality is therefore blind to structural inequality. Substantive equality in contrast to formal equality holds the value that equality is not simply a matter of likeness, that those who are different should be treated differently. The very essence of equality is to make distinction between groups and individual in order to accommodate their different needs and interests. It considers discrimination against groups which have been historically advantaged to be qualitatively aimed at remedying that disadvantage. The Constitution Act 108 of 1996 confers the right to equal protection and benefit of the law and the right to non discrimination. Prohibition of unfair discrimination in itself is insufficient to achieve true equality in a historically oppressed society. Hard affirmative action measures are required, the Constitution further explicitly endorses such restitutionary measures. Affirmative action is a systematic, planned process whereby the effects of colonialism and racial discrimination are being reversed in all areas if life. It is designed to achieve equal employment opportunities. In order to achieve this goal the barriers of the workplace which restrict employment and progressive opportunities have to be systematically eliminated through proactive programmes. Affirmative action is a delicate instrument of social engineering which must be used with caution. The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 gives effect to the constitutional provisions and to regulate affirmative action measures in employment. The Employment Equity Act spells out the beneficiaries, who should do the protection, and advancement and what may happen to employers if they fail to comply in the view of the Director-General of the Labour. However the explicit constitutional and legislative endorsement of affirmative action comes with its controversy and legal challenges and it has been left to the courts to resolve tension on the one hand and to ensure equal treatment on the other. / Abstract

The right to legal representation at internal disciplinary hearings and arbitration proceedings at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and bargaining councils, where the reason for dismissal relates to misconduct or incapacity is a topic that is raised continuously and often debated. Despite no amendments to labour legislation pertaining to the issue at hand there was however a recent Supreme Court of Appeal judgment. This judgment alters one’s view and clarifies the uncertainties that were created around Rule 25 of the CCMA rules, it also brings a different perspective to the matter, but it will however continue to ignite significant interest. There is no automatic right to legal representation at disciplinary hearings, at the CCMA, and at bargaining councils where disputes involve conduct or capacity and this is the very reason why it is a contentious matter for all parties to grapple with. The dismissal of an employee for misconduct may not be significant to the employer, but the employee’s job is his major asset, and losing his employment is a serious matter to contend with. Lawyers are said to make the process legalistic and expensive, and are blamed for causing delays in the proceedings due to their unavailability and the approach that they adopt. Allowing legal representation places individual employees and small businesses on the back foot because of the costs. Section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, provides everyone with the right to fair labour practices, and section 185 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 gives effect to this right and specifies, amongst others, that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. At internal disciplinary hearings, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is silent as to what the employee’s rights are with regards to legal representation and the general rule is that legal representation is not permitted, unless the employer’s disciplinary code and procedure or the employee’s contract allows for it, but usually an employee may only be represented by a fellow employee or trade union representative, but not by a legal representative. In MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that there exists no right in terms of the common law to legal representation in tribunals other than in courts of law. However, both the common law and PAJA concede that in certain situations it may be unfair to deny a party legal representation. Currently the position in South Africa is that an employee facing disciplinary proceedings can put forward a request for legal representation and the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing will have the discretion to allow or refuse the request. In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the South African law does not recognise an absolute right to legal representation in fora other than courts of law, and a constitutional right to legal representation only arises in respect of criminal matters.

Common law does recognise the concept of dismissal based on operational requirements. It recognises dismissals that are based on breach of expressed or implied terms of contract of employment. The concept of operational requirements has its roots in the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. This Act recognised termination of employment of a number of employees due to ability, capacity, productivity, conduct and operational requirements and needs of undertaking industry trade or occupation of the employer as legitimate. Under the 1956 LRA, employers were allowed to dismiss employees if employees refused to accept the proposed change to conditions of employment. The dismissal is called lock-out dismissal. This kind of dismissal entitled employers to dismiss employees on condition that the dismissal was temporary and the workers would be re-employed when they agree to the demands of the employer. After the contract of employment was terminated between the employer and employees, the employer was allowed to implement the changes using scab labour. The 1995 Labour Relations Act introduced section 187(1)(c) that was intended to re-enforce the abolishing of the lock-out dismissal. This section strictly forbids the dismissal of employees in order to compel them to accept demands of the employer in matters of mutual interest. Such dismissals are regarded as automatically unfair. In terms of section 64(4) of the 1995 LRA employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to employees’ terms and conditions of employment. They are required to seek and obtain consent of the affected employees. If employees refuse to accept the proposed changes, the employer can use lock-out as defence. Firstly, the employer can initiate lock-out until employees accede to its demand. Secondly, the employer can lock-out employees in response to the notice of strike or strike of the employees. The employer can use scab labour during this lock-out period. Unlike the lock-out dismissal, lock-out under the 1995 LRA does not include termination of contract of employment. iv In contrast, employers are allowed to dismiss employees who refuse to agree to change to their terms and conditions of employment on the ground of operational requirements provided a fair procedure is followed. This reason for dismissal is not viewed by the courts as a dismissal to induce employees to accept the demand of the employer. The question that this study seeks to examine is the relationship between automatic unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act and dismissal for operational requirements. A dispute between the employer and employees regarding change to terms and conditions of employment is a mutual interest dispute; and it therefore falls under collective bargaining. The same dispute can easily fall to rights dispute, because the reason for the proposed change to the production system and demand to the pursuit of improved efficiency and better achievement of profit objective related to operational requirement. There is obvious overlap between operational requirements and wage work bargaining. In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics, the court held that the employer is entitled to run its business in a prosperous way and this may entail affecting changes to terms and conditions of employment when the market forces demand so. In Mwasa v Independent Newspapers, the court held that change to terms and conditions of service of an employee can be proposed as a way to avoid retrenchment; dismissal of employees for refusing to accept the change is not covered by section 187(1)(c). In Fry’s Metals v Numsa, the court has rejected the notion that there is tension between section 187(1)(c) and section 188(1)(a)(ii). The court held that section 186(1) refers to dismissal or termination of workforce with the intention to end the employment contract and replacing the workforce with employees that are prepared to accept terms and conditions of employment that suit the employer’s operational requirements. The court argued further that the meaning of dismissal should be a v starting point when one wants to dispute the two sections. On the other hand, section 187(1)(c) was effected with a certain purpose, which is to prohibit the employer from dismissing employees in order to compel them to accept its demand in dispute of mutual interest. The court held that the dismissal in this case was final. The employer dismissed its employees because it did not need them anymore. This dismissal is in accordance with section 186(1). The court rejected that operational requirements is confirmed to saving business from bankruptcy. The court argued that the principle includes measures calculated to increase efficiency and profitability. The employer can dismiss and make more profit.

In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Ltd ((2007) 12 BLLR 1097 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC)) the Constitutional Court made two findings of immense significance for dismissed employees: firstly, the court rejected the use of the so-called “reasonable employer” test in our law, a test which traditionally required arbitrators and courts evaluating the fairness of a dismissal for proven misconduct to treat the employer’s decision on sanction with a measure of deference; and secondly, on scrutiny of the more controversial issue before the court, to wit, the basis, if any, upon which arbitrators are obliged to make reasonable decisions, the court (in confirming that arbitrators are so obliged) held that the obligation to do so suffuses section 145 of the LRA, and that the extended review grounds legislated under PAJA do not apply. In the present article these judicial conclusions are critically analysed and evaluated, and a number of submissions are made, inter alia: it is submitted that the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the “reasonable employer” test was premised on a fundamental misinterpretation of the test; that while the court’s attempt to locate the reasonableness standard within the LRA was perhaps justifiable, the court failed to consider properly, or at all, the wording of section 145 and its history, with the consequence that the court failed to appreciate that section 145 of the LRA (save on an unduly strained interpretation) could not conceivably be construed to cater, in itself and without more, for the constitutional right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action; and further, that the labour landscape post-Sidumo is, to an extent, unquestionably one bathed in greater uncertainty. In conclusion, the author poses the question whether, on a review of Sidumo, the Constitutional Court should not be considered to have fallen short of fulfilling its constitutional obligations under the rule of law.

This treatise will focus on the review of labour arbitration awards provided for under the oversight of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), bargaining councils, statutory councils, accredited private agencies and approved private arbitration tribunals. The general grounds of review applicable to the arbitration awards of the different bodies are set out. Thereafter the case of Carephone (Pty) Limited v Marcus NO & others (1998) 19 ILJ 1452 (LAC) is analysed and the core principles pertaining to the justifiability test are clarified for the first time in the forum of the Labour Appeal Court. The judicial rationale for the relevance and applicability of the test to CCMA arbitration proceedings and criticisms of the test are examined. The justifiability tests are only applicable to review proceedings in CCMA matters and not available to private arbitration review matters. There are however three approaches which are being suggested for the application of the justifiability tests to private arbitration review. Firstly, it is suggested that the Arbitration Act could be interpreted to include the justifiability test under the statutory review grounds. Secondly, the arbitration agreements could be interpreted to include an implied term that the arbitrator is under a duty to give justifiable awards. Finally, it can be submitted that the law should be developed by reading into all arbitration agreements the ability to arbitrators to give justifiable awards. Since the judgment of Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) various critical questions arose in relation to the interpretation and application for the purpose of dealing with subsequent review applications. Firstly, this research paper will seek to establish whether the courts in subsequent matters to the Sidumo judgment have interpreted reasonableness as a test or ground for review. Secondly the research paper will scrutinise case law whether the reviewing court is entitled to rely on and consider reasons other than those provided for by the commissioner in his award to determine inter alia, the reasonableness of his decision arrived at. The Constitutional Court in the Sidumo case rejected the so-called employer’s test, stating that ultimately the commissioner’s sense of fairness is what must prevail and not the employer’s view. Consequently an impartial determination whether or not a dismissal was fair is likely to promote labour peace amongst the labour force. The test arrived at by the Constitutional Court in the Sidumo case for determining whether a decision or arbitration award of a CCMA commissioner is reasonable, is a stringent test that will ensure that such awards are not easily interfered with. The question to be asked in determining whether there has been compliance with the standard is whether the decision of the commissioner is one which a reasonable decision maker could have reached. This approach will underpin the primary objectives of the Labour Relations Act which is the effective resolution of disputes. This finding will be apparent from important cases decided and discussed after the Sidumo landmark ruling.

LL.M. (Labour Law) / Commentators have warned that when men are given absolute control over their fellow men, there is the danger that what appeared pragmatically desirable may become morally intolerable. The current usage of polygraph testing by employers undoubtedly confirms this. In what follows, it will be argued that there is a serious shortcoming in South African law in that there is no legislative framework that governs and regulates the use of polygraph testing in the workplace. It is fairly likely that many South African employers will at some time be faced with dishonesty or criminal activities, such as fraud or theft, without accurately being able to identify where, how, and by whom such dishonesty was committed. If dishonesty and criminal activities are not properly managed, there may be adverse ramifications. As a result, many employers have opted to insert a clause in the employment offer and employment contract that relates to security obligations on the part of the employees or prospective employees. The clause would normally read as follows: “The company may request that you subject yourself to a polygraph test before commencement of employment or if an incident has occurred or and random testing during your period of employment with the Company. The employee hereby declares that he is aware of the company polygraph policy and accepts that this policy as a term and condition of his employment. The employee undertakes to comply with the said policy in all respects and acknowledges that he is bound thereby”. Magna Alloys & Research v Ellis introduced a significant change to the Courts’ approach to restraint of trade agreements by declining to follow earlier decisions based on an English precedent that an agreement in restraint of trade is prima facie invalid and unenforceable. The implication of this decision is that a right to choose a trade, occupation, or profession freely may