The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Angelo Augusto Costa.pdf: 2058806 bytes, checksum: 2de38ac3bf800d2685f0bcb29a8f6c55 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-15 / The main goal of this work is to explore normative connections between the due process clause, as stated in the Brazilian Constitution (CF 5º, LIV), and the reduction of administrative discretion when it comes to deciding particular cases. The relevance of the subject lies on the need of defining criteria for judicial review of discretionary administrative action, in order to secure and preserve both administrative decision-making and judicial reviewing powers. The working hypothesis is that due process of law provides a sound normative basis for a rule forbidding arbitrary display of powers in Brazilian law. This is so because due process clause requires in decision-making a kind of cognitive, volitive and argumentative process with the basic attribute of rationality. Thus all the limits imposed by the law on administrative discretion could be placed under the due process clause. Furthermore, due process could be viewed as grounds for a systematic exposition of vicious discretionary actions, including not giving reasons for action and poor correlation of fact-findings and legal norms. Robert Alexy's theory of legal principles was adopted as a landmark. Brazilian and foreign production on administrative discretion was taken into account as well, in an attempt to overcome the loopholes of legal positivism's description of how the law is applied. Whenever it was possible, we managed to use case study methods to uncover legal argumentation structures and the way fact-findings and legal norms correlate. As a result, we built a system of vicious discrectionary actions / O objetivo do trabalho é o de explorar as conexões normativas entre a cláusula do devido processo legal (CF 5º, LIV) e o fenôneno da redução da discricionariedade administrativa nos casos concretos. A importância do tema reside na necessidade de definir critérios sistemáticos para o exercício do controle jurisdicional dos limites da discricionariedade a fim de preservar as competências decisórias da Administração Pública e, ao mesmo tempo, assegurar a plenitude da revisão judicial. A hipótese geral é a de que o devido processo legal proporciona o fundamento normativo da proibição da arbitrariedade no direito brasileiro por exigir a adoção de um processo de cognição, volição e argumentação com o atributo fundamental da racionalidade. Desse modo, todos os limites à discricionariedade administrativa, cuja violação resulta em arbitrariedade proibida, podem ser reconduzidos à cláusula do devido processo. Além disso, o devido processo legal serve de base para a construção de um sistema dos vícios do exercício da discricionariedade administrativa, em especial dos vícios de ausência de motivação e de relacionamento defeituoso entre os elementos fáticos e normativos relevantes. Adotou-se, como referência, a teoria dos princípios de Robert Alexy, assim como a produção nacional e estrangeira sobre discricionariedade administrativa, no marco das tentativas de superação das lacunas do positivismo jurídico na descrição do processo de aplicação do direito. Empregou-se, sempre que possível, a metodologia de estudo de casos para revelar as estruturas de argumentação jurídica e o modo como se relacionam os elementos fáticos e normativos. O resultado foi a construção de um sistema de vícios do exercício da discricionariedade administrativa

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

The present study has as object of study the duty to justify the judicial decisions established in art. 489 of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, which, in accordance with the Federal Constitution, established the grounds as an essential element of the judicial pronouncement, but innovated in the conception of §1º which deals with the inherent contours of the obligation to state reasons, and §2º which provides for the justification of a consolidated judicial decision in the weighting of legal rules. Seen in this way is that once consolidated in the judicial decision the preponderance of the implementation of legal norms, the legitimation of the exercise of the judicial activity and thus the guarantee of correction of the legal discourse by means of its consistency is in the duty of justification of the judicial decision an important tool to control the interpretation and application of legal norms. Thus, in view of the dimension of the thematic, several theories were developed in order to better clarify the phenomenon described and with that to trace parameters of its verification, among these the present work took as object of investigation the doctrine undertaken by the German Robert Alexy, which widely received in Brazil has as theoretical framework the development of an argumentative legal theory, besides being responsible for the introduction of the weighting technique as a form of resolution of the normative conflict between principles. For this reason, the purpose of this study is to analyze the duty to state reasons for the judicial decision, set forth in art. 489, §1º and §2º in the light of the discursive theory developed by Alexy, in order to draw the parallel between the theoretical framework chosen and the regulation of the thematic. Such an approach presupposes the necessary verification of the compatibility of that with the current procedural system, so that its scope and limitations are established. / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo o dever de fundamentação das decisões judiciais disposto no art. 489 do Código de Processo Civil brasileiro, o qual em consonância com a Constituição Federal erigiu a fundamentação como elemento essencial do pronunciamento judicial, mas inovou na concepção do §1º o qual trata dos contornos inerentes a materialização do dever de fundamentação, e do §2º que dispõe sobre a justificação de decisão judicial consolidada na ponderação entre normas jurídicas. Visto desta maneira é que uma vez consolidada na decisão judicial a preponderância da concretização das normas jurídicas, a legitimação do exercício da atividade jurisdicional e assim a garantia da correção do discurso jurídico por meio de sua coerência tem-se no dever de fundamentação da decisão judicial uma importante ferramenta de controle da interpretação e aplicação das normas jurídicas. Deste modo, diante da dimensão da temática várias teorias foram desenvolvidas no sentido de melhor esclarecer o fenômeno descrito e com isso traçar parâmetros de sua verificação, dentre essas o presente trabalho tomou como objeto de investigação a doutrina empreendida pelo alemão Robert Alexy, a qual amplamente recepcionada no Brasil tem como marco teórico o desenvolvimento de uma teoria jurídica argumentativa, além de ser responsável pela introdução da técnica da ponderação como forma de resolução do conflito normativo entre princípios. Por essa razão é que se propõe nesse estudo a análise do dever de fundamentação da decisão judicial, exposto no art. 489, §1º e §2º à luz da teoria discursiva desenvolvida por Alexy, no sentido de traçar o paralelo entre o marco teórico elegido e a regulamentação da temática. Tal abordagem se faz pressuposto necessário à verificação da compatibilidade daquela com a sistemática processual vigente, de modo que assim sejam estabelecidos seu alcance e limitações.

由於概括條款欠缺明確的構成要件，其適用方法即有異於其他規定，本文係在探討概括條款具體化時合適的法學方法，並且以信用卡定型化契約之內容控制為例加以說明。 司法判決曾有認為信用卡循環息約款違反消費者保護法第12條第1項規定之誠信原則，但該判決經上訴後遭高院廢棄，現行司法實務見解在該問題上多與高院見解相同。事實上，該2判決結論的不同，起因於該2判決對相同事實有不同的評價，以及其分別使用不同的法學方法。是以引發幾項問題，包含該「評價」在法學方法中的意義為何？其所使用的法學方法有無學理之依據？ 法律適用過程必須對事實作出「評價」可以在「價值法學」中找到其意義，由此也彰顯了其與傳統法學方法的不同。雖然「評價」無法避免其主觀性，但「價值法學」仍要求評價應儘量求其客觀，所以發展一個有助於評價活動客觀化的法學方法有其必要性。本文嘗試在所舉的案例中操作Larenz的法學方法，發現其方法仍有不足之處，進而思考「法律論證」可以提供的助益。 依學理之觀察，「法律論證」有助於評價活動的客觀化。在主要幾種法律論證方法中，本文認為「論題學」（類觀點學）應該是最適合運用於本案的方法之一，其與傳統法學方法的根本差異在於其本質為「修辭式推理」及「問題導向論證」。學理也認為，在論題學的各種觀點中，「結果」具有相當程度的重要性，所以本文介紹了學理上關於「結果考量」（後果考量)之論述，並建議其得與論題學結合運用。 / The method of applying general clauses is different from the method of applying other clauses due to general clauses are short of requisite elements. This Essay is discussing the methodology of materializing general clauses in jurisprudence and taking judicial review of the provisions in the credit card pre-formulated standard contracts for an example. There was a judicial judgment awarded the revolving interest clause in the credit card pre-formulated standard contracts violate good faith principle in Consumer Protection Act article 12, section 1. However, the judgment was abandoned by the High Court. Now, almost all the courts’ perspectives about the issue are the same as the High Court. In fact, the different outcomes of the two judgments resulted from the different “evaluations” of the case fact and the different legal methods used in the judgments. The observation inspire us: what is the meaning of the evaluation in the legal method? Is there any academic basis for the legal method used in the judgments? For “Jurisprudence of Evaluation”, evaluations are necessary when we applying provisions of the law. That is different from the traditional legal method. Although evaluations cannot be objective purely, Jurisprudence of Evaluation still requires evaluations as objective as possible. That’s why it’s necessary to improve the legal method to comply with the requirement. This essay also tries to use Larenz's legal method in the case mentioned before to figure out the shortcomings of the method and reflects on the advantages of “Legal Argumentation”. According to academic research, Legal Argumentation is helpful to objective evaluations. In several methods of Legal Argumentation, this essay takes up the position that “Topic Argument” should at least be one of the best to the case mentioned before. The radical difference between Topic Argument and traditional legal method is that the former's essential is “Rhetorical Inference” and “Problem-oriented Argument”. Besides, according to academic research, “consequence” is a quite important perspective when we use Topic Argument. Therefore, this essay introduces “Consequentialist Argument” and proposes it can be used with Topic Argument.