The central argument of this text is that the liberal subject is constitutively rather than coincidentally or contingently exclusionary. From this initial premise, I explore the conceptual and practical inadequacies of liberal articulations of multicultural justice, many of which I argue can be traced back to this exclusionary subject. When making this critique, I frame my analysis around the scholarship of Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka, whose articulation of a distinctly liberal defense of the value of cultural belonging has shaped much of mainstream theoretical debate on multiculturalism both within Canada and elsewhere. Although Kymlicka’s work has faced a multitude of critiques from within and without liberal theory, he is widely recognized as the most prominent liberal defender of multiculturalism, and his work has been particularly influential within related discussions of national unity, multicultural accommodation, and national identity in Canada. I have chosen, then, to focus my critique of liberal multiculturalism on Kymlicka specifically for two reasons. Firstly, due to his prominence within the field and, secondly – and more importantly – because of the instrumental relationship between subject and culture which Kymlicka defends throughout his work. Despite this critical focus, what is primarily at stake in such a project is a rearticulation rather than a rejection of multiculturalism. While my arguments are based fundamentally on a critical interrogation, and ultimately a rejection, of liberal articulations of multicultural justice, within my project I also offer an alternative model of multiculturalism conceived as a vital form of epistemic cooperation. Such an alternative defense of multiculturalism is rooted in a commitment to the value of everyday experience, a more dialectically formed and culturally embedded sense of self, and finally, a critical and substantive awareness of context, both contemporary and historical. In making this positive case for a more radical form of multiculturalism expressed through intercultural dialogue/negotiation and a widening of the public sphere, I challenge dominant understandings of the value of multiculturalism defended within liberal theory and the mainstream of Canadian Political Science (CPS). / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2013-05-29 14:51:51.628

Feminist analyses of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein have yielded fruitful interpretations that make sense of what might otherwise be considered inessential details in the narrative. Specifically, the anxieties and politics of birth and motherhood have been brought forward as central concerns of the novel. However, given the influence of the liberal, Marxist, and radical strains of feminism in the period that laid the foundations of feminist Frankenstein scholarship (the 1960s-80s), most of this work has focused on the burdens of motherhood, the bonds of womanhood, or the oppressive structure of the family, in some cases accusing Shelley of offering a defense of patriarchy. These influential strains of feminism were themselves influenced by the most dominant theories in philosophical ethics, deontology and utilitarianism, both of which emerged from the same Enlightenment intelligentsia that included Shelley's parents, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin. However, in the 1980s, a line of feminist inquiry began to yield an alternative to influential moral theories: the ethics of care. In contrast to the dominant theories, which tend to laud principle- or calculus-based ethical reasoning that assumes interchangeability of moral subjects, the ethics of care emphasises particular relationships and the fact that people are not interchangeable, having different vulnerabilities, dependencies, and dependents. Most importantly, care ethics accuses traditional ethics of ignoring children altogether, creating the illusion that the paradigmatic moral subject is neither dependent nor obligated in non-voluntary relationships. The ethics of care presents challenges for some strains of feminism, particularly in that it takes as given certain natural differences between all people in terms of abilities and circumstances rather than seek to eliminate such differences, and that it argues in favour of the same self-sacrificing values that many feminists have argued have contributed to women's oppression. Because of this dissent, I have decided to approach Frankenstein from the ethics of care, reading it as a criticism of the masculinist values and assumptions embedded in the emerging moral theories of Shelley's period. I will argue that Victor is emblematic of the detached individualistic ethical reasoner valued by masculinist theories and criticised by care ethicists. The Frankenstein family and the DeLaceys both provide examples of caring relations as contrasts to Victor's behaviour. The Creature, offspring of an incomplete moral theory, is both victim and perpetuator of masculinist individualistic, calculus-based moral reasoning. He is more aware than Victor of the necessity of caring relations, but he follows an ethic of retribution inspired by principle-based theories. He knows he needs a partner, but speaks of her in the language that Victor speaks of him—as property. The glimmer of hope in the novel lies with Walton, who, unlike Victor, is willing to engage in dialogue across difference, and finally to set his high aspirations aside for the well-being of his crew.

The current coalition government in England has expressed its commitment to establishing an autonomous teaching profession. This study argues that such autonomy cannot exist in a system that is ideologically driven by market forces and neo-liberal policy. The best situation that most teachers can hope to experience – barring a seismic shift in material conditions – is an earned and scrutinised autonomy, which is an oxymoronic concept. It is argued that the tight control exercised by the state over what happens in schools through its promotion of market forces, reinforces the ideological nature of schooling in England. The theoretical and ontological basis of the study resides in an orthodox Marxist perspective and analyses the way in which neo-liberalism has formed the basis for the material conditions under which teachers currently work. It develops this idea to demonstrate how this dominant ideology pervades current discourse about pedagogy and curriculum, reducing such discourse to a narrower consideration of ‘standards’. It considers how this diminution of what the curriculum has become has, in its turn, had an impact on teachers’ view of their professional autonomy. Data are gathered from two rounds of interviews with 22 serving teachers complemented by some written responses from them. Six others with a professional interest in education policy-making, four of whom are headteachers, are also interviewed. The conclusion is drawn that teachers’ autonomy remains restricted, with any independence of action largely contingent upon the production of outcomes measured against limited, pre-determined and ideologically driven outcomes. The study identifies a disconnection between the aspirations of teachers with regard to their professional autonomy and those of some, but not all, headteachers. A further disconnection between the aspirations of teachers and the policies of central government is also identified. Significantly, teachers may enjoy more professional autonomy in those schools which currently, and possibly temporarily, enjoy market popularity. In terms of a contribution to the debate about teacher autonomy, the study demonstrates that, notwithstanding the effects of the current policy ensemble, teachers maintain a sense of what education could offer young people that goes beyond the existing, reductive models that frame their working lives.

Under the shade of escalating violence and fundamentalism, our epoch's diffused aura of liberalism supposedly tolerates difference, by exorcising the evil phantasms of totalitarianism, in favour of a liberal and humane post-modem order. Consequently, behind contemporary versions of evil, one demonises modem 'fascists', 'totalitarian threats', and 'Hitlers'. As if not obscure enough, fascist evil has been equivocally linked with perversion. Considering this link a tenebrous enigma, my thesis suggests that psychoanalysis can successfully elucidate its problematic and feeble basis, by reappraising previous narratives from a number of different discourses that inscribe the liaison between fascism and perversion in their representational stage. In a first approach, the present study dissects texts as heterogeneous, as film, social theory, political philosophy, and psychoanalysis. This is to show that, despite the divergent speculative angle that each discourse espouses, perversion is a common exegetic thread, intertextually sewing their narratives. The objective of my criticism that goes through psychoanalysis, without, however, exempting it from this criticism, is to reveal that both fascism and perversion implicate the non-symbolisable kernel in politics, which becomes the source of their mystification. My thesis argues that the fascist does not take the same discursive position, as the pervert does, regarding this symbolic gap. The first is interested in domination, drawn from the superiority of his ideology's master signifier, whereas the latter is interested in excavating the emptiness of any master signifier and in constantly provoking prefabricated knowledge, similarly to the hysteric. Apart from the level of discourse, on the ethical level, I disengage the view that sees Sade and the Nazi officer, as emblematic figures of a Kantian ethical gesture. Considering the imaginary hypostasis of their ethical performance, I argue that personal interests, fantasies and desires, determine the austerity of their ethical duty. Yet, the fantasies of Sade and Nazism are incongruent, insomuch as they are organised by antithetical ideals. Finally, I develop a new rhetoric, de-pathologised and de-ideologised, regarding the structure of the so-called pervert, introducing new vocabularies and directions for psychoanalytic research that further distance the pervert, or whom I call the extra-ordinary subject, from fascist politics and, instead, expose his diachronic "fascist" isolation from the social edifice. This reveals the fruitful alternatives that can stem from a 'return to Freud cum Lacan, which supports a flexible on-going reformulation of psychoanalytic knowledge.

Liberal neutrality – as understood in current legal and political debates – has two underlying intuitions and therefore two distinct elements. On the one hand it refers to the intuition that there are matters the state has no business getting involved in (hands-off element). On the other hand it is motivated by the idea that the state ought to treat citizens as equals and show equal respect and for their different conceptions of the good life (equality element). This thesis defends this two-fold understanding of neutrality with reference to Rawls’ conception of society as a fair system of cooperation and the idea of citizens as free and equal persons. In particular, the idea that citizens are to be treated as free justifies the hands-off element and argues that the state must be involved in nothing but justice. In the context of political decision making this requires the state to be justificatorily neutral. Treating citizens as equals requires the state to grant its citizens equal political rights and also to ensure that these rights have “fair value.” Given the danger that cultural bias undermines the equal standing of citizens the state has to ensure procedures of political decision making that are able to take citizens’ different conceptions into account. Treating citizens as free and equal therefore requires that the state bans all considerations of the good from being part of the justification of state action while at the same time taking these considerations into account when deliberating the way how these regulations are to be implemented.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

The problem of legitimate authority is widely regarded as fundamental to moral and political philosophy. This thesis aims to explain what the problem precisely is, and to offer a practical method for solving it. The starting point is a claim about the phenomenology of the person as an inherently authoritative agent: we are persons, as distinct from mere ‘things’, by virtue of the authority we possess over ourselves. This claim explains, I argue, why there is a problem of legitimate authority – why the exercise of state authority stands in need of justification – and what the problem precisely is: given the inherent tension between the authority of the state on the one hand, and the self-governing authority of persons on the other, the problem of legitimate authority is essentially that of creating the conditions for optimal reconciliation between them. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to a search for a solution to this problem. The ideal solution lies in developing a concept which I call the Authorization Principle. In its most basic form, the principle states that the exercise of state authority is legitimate only when it is exercised to enforce arrangements that all citizens authorize the state to enforce. The conclusion of the thesis is that the principle should be formulated as follows: The exercise of state authority is legitimate insofar as it is exercised within the provisions of a constitutional arrangement constructed through a process that gives equal weight to all the epistemically undefeated concerns in the society regarding the conditions necessary for persons to exercise personal authority. The solution proposed in the thesis for the problem of legitimate authority has three important implications. The first is that it is entirely within the capacity of ordinary democratic societies to solve the problem. The second is that there is no single legitimate way to govern a society. Standards for the legitimate use of state authority are in some way indexed to culture, ability and resources as well as to other aspects of a society’s unique circumstances. The third is that a society cannot settle the problem of legitimate authority once and for all. The state’s arrangement will require revision every so often in order to maintain the legitimacy of state authority.

The Iraq ‘Chilcot’ Inquiry is the last in a string of public inquiries tasked with understanding how the British state went to war with Iraq. In so doing, the inquiries have become defined by the problem of striking a balance between publicity and secrecy. While exposing foreign policy decision-making to public scrutiny should be the norm in a liberal democracy, this must be balanced by state secrecy, which is justified in exceptional circumstances when there is a threat to national security. Striking the right balance acts to maintain and legitimise a distinction between liberal and illiberal regimes by justifying exceptions as the mitigation of existential threats to liberal values. In contrast to the balance metaphor, this thesis shows how the inquiries are a site of contestation between two technologies of government: the public gaze and official secrecy. Drawing on Foucault, I demonstrate how both technologies support the liberal ‘security dispositif’: the exercise of freedom without too little or too much government. Each technology secures this liberal governmentality in a different but mutually supportive way. The public gaze seeks constitutes security of the liberal subject by exposing, criticising and disciplining statesmen and statecraft. Official secrecy, meanwhile, constitutes security of the state by protecting the value of privileged information used to support a necessary minimum of government. In this context, the balance metaphor may be recognized as the discursive framework that, in any moment, legitimises either the exercise of publicity in response to insecurity engendered by secrecy or vice versa. The balance metaphor thereby supports a further distinction between the responsible liberal self and the illiberal other. I show how the Iraq Inquiry legitimizes British official secrecy while re-inscribing the conditions of possibility for waging liberal war.

Theory of human democracy The purpose of thesis is to analyse the question of human democracy and to find conclusion if this concept is eligible for society here and now. Author uses analytical, synthetical and historical methods in order to catch the goal of the paper. This research is dealed into universal part and specific part as a logical process. First author finds the problems and after that offer solutions. In concrete how to make from partial democracy, i. e. formal democracy, after accentuation her deficiencies process of changes to full, material democracy. The thesis is composed of seven chapters, each of them dealing with different aspects of topic. Chapter One is introductory and defines basic terminology used in the thesis. The chapter two is subdivided into two parts, where author describes genesis and short historical introduction of democracy and humanity. In Chapter Three the most important ideas of human democracy are mentioned, for example idea of humanity, freedom, equality and fraternity. Result of this part is of course fact, that democracy is expression of sovereignty of people. Last chapter in universal part consists of four subchapters, where analyse of relation between democracy and liberalism is. After that special part follows, which is divided into three chapters. First author...

The American movie industry did not have to develop into the Hollywood dream factory. There were educative, religious, explicitly political, and other non-commercial alternative arrangements to America’s film industry. These alternatives, along with principles such as film free speech and movie propaganda, had to be cast aside by the emerging moguls of Hollywood. Conflicts with the vanquished liquor industries, moral and economic regulatory concerns, Republican Party politics, and the resurgent Klan all shaped the classic Hollywood system from 1906 to 1927, a 20-year period in which the American film industry depoliticized the Hollywood movie screen, shedding its democratic and propagandistic definitions for the politics of publicity and entertainment as a service to Americans. Developments in this infant industry also shaped the broader trajectory of American consumer capitalism toward big producer control and the self-regulation of the industry’s social effects.