In this thesis I argue that David Miller has not successfully generated an account of nationalism that is liberal. I first present Miller’s account the nation, national identity and national culture. I then draw out how the ability of internal minorities to contest repugnant elements of national identity or culture is deeply ties to the liberal character of nationalism. I then argue that the exclusion of particular identities that is required by Miller’s public sphere deprives internal minorities of the epistemic resources they need to challenge repugnant elements of national culture or identity. This puts the liberal character of Miller’s nationalism into question. After I provide a rebuttal on behalf of Miller that leads to a reinterpretation of his view. However, I argue the modified account is still unsatisfactory in providing a means for contestation. Consequently I conclude if Miller is to provide an account of nationalism that is truly liberal he needs to tell a different story about the role of particular identities in public sphere deliberation.

At the heart of liberal political theory is a formula for enabling diverse groups to coexist peacefully in spite of their differences. This formula involves seeking broad consensus on certain key political institutions as well as on moral norms against imposing views on others. In recent centuries, this formula has been highly successful. However, it is now under attack from green theorists who claim liberal societies will systematically fail to protect the environment, precipitating a global ecological crisis. The radical societal transformations advocated by these greens diverge from traditional liberal arrangements and seek to entrench green ideas in the foundations of the political order. In this dissertation, I examine how liberals can rebut such proposals without simply dismissing greens and their beliefs. I argue that the most promising route to a satisfactory liberal response is pragmatic in nature, showing that greens have little to gain from radicalism and more to gain from a continued commitment to liberalism. I develop this argument in two complementary ways, demonstrating first that greens have overestimated the likely benefits of their transformational proposals and second that a conciliatory approach in the spirit of liberalism offers great promise for achieving green goals. Ultimately, I contend that even for those who see a crisis on the horizon and worry that liberal societies will not respond appropriately, liberalism remains the best available approach to political life.

The traditional notion of Western liberal democracy has in recent years been met with a barrage of negative criticism. Liberal democracy from both a minimalist and substantive position appears to be backsliding, and once more falling into what Samuel P. Huntington (1991) termed a reverse wave. The analysis which Huntington (1991) presented ended in an era in which liberal democracy once more dominated the political landscape for a third consecutive wave, without any indication that it was going to relapse. In light of Huntington’s (1991) closure, this study has attempted to continue with his analysis and point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal. In order to do so, this study has meticulously used the same methodological approach as Huntington (1991) did to highlight previous wave reversals. This has been done by critically discussing, with examples, the existence of those factors that lead to a global decline in liberal democratic practice as prescribed by Huntington (1991). This study attempts not only to point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal, but also to explain the contextual reasons behind such an increase in anti-democratic rhetoric. The application of Huntington’s (1991) wave theory does not explain the subjective reasoning behind the contemporary deterioration of liberal democracy, as his factors leading to wave reversals may be too pragmatic for this study. It is in this light that a second argument as brought forward by Huntington in 1996, serves as the contextual layer for the decrease in democratic support as it provides the basis for the application of a critical discourse analysis. Therefore, this study serves not only as an investigation of the possible existence of a current third wave reversal, but also as an analysis into the discursive nature of liberal democracy’s historical and future trajectory.

This thesis fills a gap in the political philosophy of liberalism by elaborating the conceptions of the human subject implicit in a central ideal of liberalism. The essence of that ideal is that fortuitous facts about an individual – one’s race, gender, religion, nationality, sexual orientation – ought not to determine one’s life chances. This ideal, I maintain, presupposes a philosophical anthropology. Tacit but essential in this presupposition is that contingency and vulnerability are ineliminable features of the human condition. One of the central aspirations of liberalism is to construct a world in which fortuitous facts about an individual do not determine the individual’s prospects of having a flourishing and dignified life. This thesis argues that a close scrutiny of leading theories of liberal justice reveals that the indisputable fact of human vulnerability is regularly depicted as peripheral. I contend that the marginal depiction of vulnerability in liberalism constitutes a basic problem in the philosophical anthropology implicit in liberalism. I demonstrate this claim by analysing three broad models of philosophical anthropology that can be uncovered in liberal theories and that are the subjects of this study: the Economic Model, as exemplified in Rawls among others, the Sociological Model, exemplified in Will Kymlicka and theorists focusing on cultural concerns, and the Integrationist Model, occurring in at least two somewhat contrasting versions, one by Martha Nussbaum and one by Kwame Anthony Appiah. I argue that the Economic and Sociological Models are in some ways inconsistent with the motifs of contingency and human vulnerability. Unlike the two other models, the Integrationist Model, I argue, is compatible with the motifs of the ideal of liberalism insofar as this Model portrays human beings as vulnerable subjects, as a consequence of universal features of humanity but also of specific features associated with a legitimate degree of local rootedness and partiality. The thesis thus argues by way of the Integrationist Model that liberal cosmopolitanism furnishes liberalism with a matching philosophical anthropology. The overall aim of the thesis is to counter the tendency in an array of liberal theorists to ignore or deny the need for an underlying philosophical anthropology and ultimately to elaborate the essentials of the requisite conception.

In the first chapter, this thesis exemines the legal, political and economic foundations of the liberal state. Drawing upon the works of Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Rousseau the first chapter focuses upon how the idea of natural "good" was replaced by a political "right" manifested through the law. In chapter one, the thesis criticises neo-liberalism and corporate theory in their attempts to strip nature of all intrinsic values except self-preservation. In the context of neo-liberal domination, the first chapter further argues that the legal and political foundations of the liberal state have been miscast. It defends reform liberalism against criticisms and attacks the assumption common to such criticisms that the landscape of liberalism is barren ethically. From this perspective, the second chapter injects competing neo-liberal and reform-liberal ideas into debates about the role of the state and systems of governance in, what is claimed to be, the globalized world. Troubled as the years of nationhood have been, the thesis suggests that it is misleading to summarize contemporary transformations in legal, political and economic systems under the term "globalization". The changes in the global order do not imply the withering away of the nation-state, but rather suggest a re-interpretation and transformation of its role. Besides the nation-state, macro-regional and local entities are emerging as the new sources of political, legal and economic identity. In the third chapter, the thesis explores the nature, content and legal aspects of privatization as the dominant and hugely misused tool of liberal policy. The thesis discusses the analytical framework of the term "privatization" and suggests that privatization may not be regarded exclusively as an economic process but rather should be seen as a policy tool with political, legal, economic and ethical repercussions. In chapter three, the thesis further suggests an elusive line between public and private ownership and argues that the state has direct or indirect rights in practically every economic activity under its jurisdiction, whether undertaken by individuals or public authorities. Our demand for democratization and "liberalization" of liberalism should not be devoted only to the improvement of economic efficiency and the empowerment of private ownership, but rather to the affirmation of the public sphere and changes in the structures of power. The thesis approaches ideology, government and ownership from a theoretical perspective that sees law as a constitutive part of the political, social and economic field. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Le risque économique est, avec la chance, l’un des deux aspects du libéralisme. Il en constitue le volet dommageable. Bien souvent, le risque n’apparait pas explicitement et il s’agit d’un concept sous –jacent. Pour autant, il influence énormément le droit international. En effet, les sujets du droit international acceptent de subir une part de risque économique, inhérente à une économie libre mais ils tentent aussi d’en encadrer les effets excessifs. L’objet de cette thèse est de présenter la manière dont le droit international anticipe le risque économique en permettant son existence et prévenant sa survenance lorsqu’il est excessif. Elle permet de relever l’importance d’un cadre institutionnel et normatif cohérent et contraignant pour que l’anticipation soit efficiente. / Economic risk is, with luck, one of the two aspects of liberalism. This is the harmful component. Often, the risk does not appear explicitly and it is a concept under -jacent . However, it greatly influences the international law. In fact, the subjects of international law agree to be part of the economic risk inherent in a free economy but they are also trying to regulate the excessive effects. The purpose of this thesis is to present the way in which international law anticipates the economic risk by allowing its existence and preventing its occurrence when excessive. It can identify the importance of a coherent and binding institutional and regulatory framework for the anticipation to be efficient.

While most of the states have embraced capitalist market economy, liberal and democratic norms face resistance in large parts of the world. The \enquote{liberal West} under the leadership of the United States has to face critique of his democratization practices and alleged hypocrisy when dealing with the enforcement of its own norms. One of the loudest critics is Russia under President Vladimir Putin. The first objective of my thesis is to understand the rationale behind Russia's Foreign Policy because without that, no efficient and deescalating policies towards Russia can be developed. I do this by means of an ideological discourse analysis of some of the most famous of Putin's speeches. The concepts of the German philosopher Carl Schmitt serve as a frame for tracing the ideas expressed in the speeches of the Russian President. The analysis concludes that, at least rhetorically, democracy, trust, disarmament, freedom of speech, balance of power and the UN as universal institution have a central place for both the Western World and Russia. NATO expansion, U.S. intervention in the Middle East and, related to that, the alleged non--respect of sovereignty are the most dividing issues between Russia and the Western liberal democracies. It becomes clear that Russia has the impression that Western liberal...

This study circuits around the swedish monarch, Gustav V, courtyard speech february the 6th 1914, since this action is seen as the critical moment in the discourse of the defence question in Sweden during that time. This study examines how the local newspaper Hallandsposten and the nationwide newspaper Dagens Nyheter describes the discourse during the courtyard crisis in 1914, and the internal conflict in the liberal party between the left och right wing in the defence question. The purpose of this study is to examine how the two newspapers describe the discourse about the defence question and if the descriptions contain any differences. The purpose is also to study why the differences exist and what they contain. To track any differences this study aims to review the two newspapers use of words that are of significance to the reader's perception of the discourse. The material of this study is thus the article sabout the courtyard crisis found in the two newspapers. This material is analysed by a critical discourse analysis method and the result of this method is then reviewed from the discourse theory.

In recent years, due to the threat of terrorism, there has been a return of banishment, in contemporary terms better known as citizenship revocation or denationalization. The aim of this thesis is to critically assess the most common arguments used for and against liberal nations’ power to revoke citizenships as punishment and as a means to protect national security. This thesis presents an argumentation analysis of some of the most common philosophical arguments used for and against citizenship revocation in liberal democratic states. The arguments are first described and then evaluated based on their evidentiary strength in order to determine whether citizenship should be unconditional. The thesis concludes that the argumentation analysis indicates that citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal democratic state.

This project focusses on the idea of how the person as developed by Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950) is a departure from a common understanding of the person. Mounier's concept of the person is simultaneously singular and relational. Furthermore, the person is a spiritual being who represents the highest form of humanity that one can become. The idea of the person contains liberal and communitarian elements: the person understands herself as a unique subject whilst ontologically requiring the other to fully flourish as a person. It is incoherent for the person to conceive of herself as fundamentally separate of the other, which is why the person joins with the other to form a nous. This draws a stark line between Mounier and liberal individualist thought that conceives of the person as an isolated subject. The liberal element of Mounier's thought is that the state protects the person and her communities against actions that impinge upon the person's fundamental rights so that the person can maximise her freedom to flourish. Moreover, the institutions that form the personalist state are inspired by liberal thought. This means that Mounier's project begins from a communitarian standpoint and finishes by offering a liberal communitarianism. -- Ce projet se concentre sur l'idée de la personne qu'a développée Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950) et comment elle dévie d'une compréhension courante de la personne. Le concept de la personne de Mounier est simultanément singulier et relationnel. De plus, la personne est un être spirituel qui représente la plus honte forme de l'humanité que l'on pourrait devenir. Cette idée de la personne comprend des éléments libéraux et communautaires : la personne se perçoit comme un sujet unique alors qu'elle requiert ontologiquement autrui, afin de s'épanouir en tant que personne. Il est incohérent que la personne se conçoive comme être fondamentalement séparé d'autrui, ce qui est pourquoi la personne se joint à autrui pour qu'ils forment un nous. Cela établit une distinction nette entre Mounier et la pensée individualiste libérale qui conçoit de la personne comme un sujet isolé. L'élément libéral de la pensée de Mounier est que l'État protège la personne et ses communautés contre des infractions contre ses droits fondamentaux, afin que la personne puisse maximiser sa liberté de s'épanouir. En outre, les institutions qui forment l'État personnaliste s'inspirent de la pensée libérale. Cela veut dire que le projet de Mounier commence d'une perspective communautaire et se termine en proposant un communautarisme libéral.