The civil war in Mali and the perception of threat posed by Islamist Jihadists and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists to international peace and security led to the French military intervention in January 2013 to end the terrorist take-over of Mali, prevent the collapse of the state and spread of insecurity and instability in the conflict-prone and fragile regions of West Africa and the Sahel as well as protect France’s strategic national interests. But what were the real reasons for France’s pre-emptive military intervention in Mali and what does the French and its allied UN, ECOWAS, African Union conflict stabilisation intervention say about donor-driven peacebuilding in Africa, often framed as Liberal peacebuilding intervention? / It will be published by Rienner later this year. David Francis said he would let us know when it is. - sm 05/01/2017 Emailed the publisher for permission 21/12/2016. 22/12/2016 - Lynne Rienner say they're not publishing this book!!! - emailed D Francis! - sm © 2017 Publishers. Reproduced with permission from the publisher. / The full text may be made available after publication and on receipt of permission from the publisher.

My dissertation contributes to the accountability literature in international relations by examining the role constituents' preferences can potentially play in fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in democracies. In times of international crises, domestic audiences have specific coercive foreign policy preferences and will support executives who represent them when selecting coercive foreign policies. Executive actions will increase popular support or generate audience costs depending on whether these actions are consistent with the specific policy preferences that domestic audiences have given the threat a crisis poses to national security. To determine when audiences prefer economic or military coercion and how these preferences affect their evaluation of the executive I conduct three experiments, including a survey experiment conducted with a representative sample of Americans and an experiment conducted with a convenience sample in the United Kingdom. The results show interesting similarities and differences between the cross-national samples regarding foreign policy preferences and the public's propensity to support and punish leaders during times of international conflict. Mainly, I find that (1) the concept of audience costs can be expanded to cases of economic coercion, (2) under certain circumstances audience costs operate even in crises that are not very salient and (3) when there is a mismatch between public preferences and threats issued by the executive, audience costs do not operate at all.

<p>In 1989 the United States choose, after years of conflict, to carry out a military intervention in Panama, to remove Manuel Noriega, convicted for drug dealing and for threatening the lives of the Americans living in Panama. The aim of this study is to examine whether George H. W Bush’s arguments for the military intervention comply with the principles of the just war.</p><p>The method chosen for this study is a qualitative literature study, based primarily on secondary data. It is a case study with two complementing theories, the theory of the just war and the world system theory.</p><p>The result showed that the American intervention both can be justified and unjustified following the principles of the Just War Theory. The World system Theory shows typical signs for a relationship between USA and Panama, built on economic, political and military control.</p>

Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War changed the perceived "viability" of different strategies for projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization--and the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so--led to the expectation by other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The response of other countries to the Clinton Administration's failure to request authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding whether the U.S. should request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, between states and international organizations.

This study explores Security Sector Reform as a concept to address peace building or post-conflict reconstruction in a country attaining independence or emerging from a major conflict as in the case of South Sudan. Although various descriptions for a security sector exist, it is a common term applied to refer to structures, institutions, and personnel who are responsible for managing, providing, and overseeing security within a state. In general it refers to the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, national intelligence agencies, border control agencies, and civil protection entities. SSR refers to actions aimed at strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizens security, justice, and jobs which is crucial to break the cycle of violence. SSR is also conceptualised within the enlarged definition of security which includes human security. This emphasises the approach that SSR is not only restricted to defence and the role of law and order, but is also included in wider political, economic, and social issues. Within the concept of SSR, various prerequisites are stated for the effective execution of SSR within a state. For an analysis of effective SSR in South Sudan, the following aspects were identified to apply as a theoretical model to analyse the execution of SSR in South Sudan. These aspects were the necessity of a formalised peace agreement; the execution of a clear and effective DDR programme; the importance of foreign involvement and international military involvement; the importance of the institutionalisation of security sector structures, and civil oversight. The study concludes that certain aspects of the SSR plan contributed to peace building and post-conflict reconstruction such as certain provisions of the peace agreement, the involvement of the international community, and financial support. However, SSR in South Sudan mainly failed due to a failure of the DDR process, the inability of the international involvement to address outstanding security issues, a failure to address border demarcations, and a total failure to install effective security sectors and civil oversight mechanisms over the military. The study on the other hand suggests SSR as a concept for post-conflict reconstruction, specifically within a state acquiring independence such as South Sudan, should be viewed as a workable concept. As a model to address peace building or post-conflict reconstruction, SSR can indeed be effective. It provides for a wide spectrum of measures to address security, political, and economic disparities within a state emerging from a conflict and aspiring to democratise as a new state such as in the case of South Sudan. The failure of the SSR concept in South Sudan is not ascribed to an insufficient SSR process or plan, but due to the non-adherence of the provisions of the plan by the signatories of the plan and the socioeconomic, ethnic, and security challenges in independent South Sudan that would have complicated any SSR attempt. SSR as a concept can be applied for peacebuilding if certain conditions such as enforced DDR, commitment by international role players, the enforcement of provisions of the peace agreement, and effective measures to institute the de-politisation of the military are provided. / Mini-dissertation (MSecurity Studies)--University of Pretoria, 2015. / tm2015 / Political Sciences / MSecurity Studies / Unrestricted

of Master thesis Russia's Syria policy: geopolitical interests or defense of great power identity? Marcel Hirling Abstract: Russia has been the dominating actor in Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Researchers disagree what Russia motivates to block UN resolutions, support Assad, and intervene militarily in 2015. Academics have mainly focused on neorealist explanations. Constructivist arguments have been shortcoming so far as they miss a detailed theoretical justification and empirical evidence. This thesis aims to fill this gap by arguing that the objective utility of Syria is marginal. Instead, Syria provided Russia the opportunity to present itself as a global power, able to shape world affairs on eye level with the US. Therefore, this paper conducts a congruence analysis, which evaluates each theory's explanatory power. The analytical section is split into three parts. The first shows that events before Syria did not make a Russian intervention in Syria necessary, but that recognition of Russia's global power identity has been denied. That Russia's actions in Syria are not entirely congruent with neorealist expectations is shown by the second part. Finally, by conducting a content-analysis, several Russian narratives are evaluated that support the argument that Russia seeks...

This thesis aims to test the causal connection between internal security threats and political intervention by the military in states which have recently transitioned to democracy. In order to investigate this, a comparative case study is conducted between the recent case of Myanmar and the case of the Philippines in the 1980s with the aim of investigating how the presence of internal conflict in the two countries has impacted the level of military influence post-transition. This is investigated through a qualitative analysis of the countries’ constitutions as well as statements by political and military leaders in order to investigate how the issues of internal conflict and the role of the military are defined, perceived and portrayed. The results of the study demonstrate that differences in these areas may explain why the military in Myanmar has managed to intervene more successfully. <img src="blob:https://uu.diva-portal.org/f8bb8d04-2f8c-4176-a36d-2e9876197374" />

One of the chief international security issues of today is humanitarian militaryintervention. In light of this, some questions have been raised about when and howoutsiders should get involved or if they are morally right at all to engage in humanitariancrises. In this paper Syria is the chosen case study because of its brutal crackdown and amassive human rights violation. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand themoral and legal criteria for launching a military intervention for humanitarian aid in Syriafollowed by a detailed analysis of its ethical, normative and legal issues. The maintheoretical framework of this study is just war theory. This study utilizes the criteria ofJus ad bellum principles, namely ‘legitimate authority’, ‘just cause’ and ‘right intention’in order to asses the extent to which Syria fits into the framework of just war theory. Thispaper also applies legal criteria such as the Charter of United Nations and internationallaw for the purpose of legal examination. The most complex issue in this thesis is the factthat although legitimate authority has the moral responsibilities to protect civilians, but itoften fails to uphold its responsibility mainly because of self-interest and the lack of rightintention.

Initiée dans les années 1960 avec les indépendances des territoires de l’ancien empire français, la coopération de défense a permis à la France ancienne puissance coloniale de continuer à maintenir son influence en Afrique tout en participant à la construction d’armées nationales africaines autonomes. Malheureusement, certains choix politiques et militaires de la France, les risques d’instrumentalisation d’un engagement strictement bilatéral, ont révélé l’archaïsme des relations France-Afrique et engendré la crise de la coopération. Devenue inadaptée en raison des bouleversements du champ politique international intervenus dans les années 1990 caractérisé par la fin de la bipolarisation, la coopération de défense France-Afrique a souffert de la compétition internationale, de l’adhésion de l’Afrique à la mondialisation et à de nouvelles solidarités internationales, et de la menace terroriste.En souscrivant à l’approche réaliste de sécurité, en considérant la théorie politico-sociologique constructiviste de l’intérêt national défendue par Alexander Wendt d’une part, et le concept de complexe régional de sécurité de Barry Buzan d’autre, cette étude se propose de montrer comment la France met en oeuvre une nouvelle politique de sécurité et de défense sur la base de nouveaux accords de défense en Afrique, continent le plus proche de l’Europe dans un contexte de rupture stratégique avérée et de menace contre la sécurité. Après avoir défini celle-ci dans un contexte régional global, cette étude démontre les stratégies de la France et des puissances internationales dans la gestion des conflits et la prévention des crises en Afrique dans un partenariat qui soit à la fois transparent et efficace. / Established in the 1960s with the independence of territories of the former French empire, the defense cooperation allowed the old French, colonial power to continue to maintain its influence in Africa, while at the same time establishing autonomous national African armies. Unfortunately some of the political and military choices made by France and the instrumentalization risks of a strictly bilateral involvement, have revealed the archaism of French – African relations, and have generated a crisis in cooperation. Having become inadequate due to changes in the international political arena that occurred in the 1990s characterized by the end of bipolarity, the French defense cooperation African has suffered from international competition from the commitment of African States to the effective exercise of their sovereignty as well as their full involvement in globalization and in new areas of solidarity and international cooperation, and from terrorist threats.In subscribing to the realist security approach, and considering the political-sociological constructivist theory of national interest defended by Alexander Wendt on the one hand, and on the other hand the regional security complex concept by Barry Buzan, this study proposes to show how France has put in place a new security policy based on new defense agreements in Africa, the continent closest to Europe in a context of proven strategic breakdown and security threats. Defined in a global regional context, this study demonstrates the strategy of France for security in Africa in a partnership that should be both transparent and efficient.

O objetivo deste trabalho é examinar como os principais veículos de cobertura política da imprensa dos Estados Unidos se posicionaram a respeito da estratégia do governo do presidente Barack Obama para combater o Estado Islâmico no Iraque e na Síria, lançada em setembro de 2014. Referido plano estratégico é relevante, uma vez que representou inflexão na posição até então adotada pela administração Obama de não intervir militarmente no conflito armado em curso na Síria, ao mesmo tempo em que visou manter-se fiel à promessa eleitoral do então mandatário de retirada das tropas norte-americanas das guerras no Iraque e no Afeganistão. Faz-se um breve resumo das circunstâncias em que o plano de combate ao Estado Islâmico foi lançado, bem como dos antecedentes de intervenções militares estadunidenses recentes na região, para então se analisar a estratégia em si e o debate travado em três periódicos (The New York Times, Washington Post e The Wall Street Journal) e de duas redes de televisão (CNN e Fox News), no período compreendido entre janeiro de 2014 e dezembro de 2014. / The goal of this work is to review how the main news outlets with political coverage in the United States of America viewed the strategy to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria launched by president Barack Obama in September 2014. Such strategy is a landmark as it represents a turning point in Obama administration\'s policy not to militarily intervene in the armed conflict in Syria, while also aiming at sustaining the president\'s electoral promise to withdraw American troops from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a summary of the circumstances in which the strategy was launched and of the recent US military interventions in the region, this article presents the strategy\'s main components and analyzes the public debate held on three daily papers (The New York Times, Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal) and two television networks (CNN and Fox News) in the period from January 2014 to December 2014.