Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 1, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-03-16T12:14:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniella da Silva Nogueira de Melo.pdf: 1507705 bytes, checksum: 71a4b1ca952fbd0fbe9045d92bce5531 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-16T12:14:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniella da Silva Nogueira de Melo.pdf: 1507705 bytes, checksum: 71a4b1ca952fbd0fbe9045d92bce5531 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / In the period of the Cold War, NATO's performance outside the territorial boundaries covered by Article 6 was provided through informal arrangements and operations that were not under its command. Therefore, NATO's action in the South Atlantic had occurred in a very limited way due to the absence of an official policy on out-of-area operations. With the end of the bi-polar era, NATO gained more space in the world and it is no longer only to be a mere military alliance, under the base of collective defense, and became a collective security organization. Likewise, throughout the 2000s, the South Atlantic acquired strategic importance in the eyes of global and regional powers, constituting itself as an area of economic opportunities for the achievement of energy autonomy and the projection of political and military power. There-fore, the aim of the research is to analyze how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operates in the geostrategic environment of the South Atlantic. This is to understand the motivations that lead members to involve the organization in an area that offers few threats to its security and that was not contemplated in its most recent Strategic Concept 2010. In this research, there are three factors of Alliance's involvement in the region: natural re-sources, security reality and the increasing presence of China, India, Russia. For countries such as France, England, Portugal and the USA, which already have significant influence in the region, there are greater advantages in engaging NATO in the South Atlantic. On the other hand, the lack of clarity of the organization's objectives in the region creates a distrust image for the regional powers (Brazil, Argentina) that take a defensive stance in avoiding the inter-ference of extra-regional actors in their strategic spaces. Overall, the research shows that the Alliance's participation in the South Atlantic serves to reinforce the interests of allies and to reshape the region's power relations through diplomatic agreements, joint military exercises, partnerships, exchange of resources and capacity as it is seen in NATO relations with Cape Verde, Mauritania, Colombia and other countries in this region / No período da Guerra Fria, o desempenho da OTAN fora dos limites territoriais abrangidos pelo Artigo 6º sucedia-se por meio de arranjos informais e operações que não estivessem sob o seu comando. Logo, a atuação da OTAN no Atlântico Sul ocorreu de forma bastante limita-da em decorrência da ausência de uma política oficial acerca das operações out-of-area. Com o fim da era bipolar, a OTAN ganhou maior espaço de atuação no mundo e deixou de ser uma mera aliança militar, sob a base da defesa coletiva e, transformou-se em uma organização de segurança coletiva. Do mesmo modo, ao longo dos anos 2000, o Atlântico Sul adquire impor-tância estratégica aos olhos das potências globais e regionais, constituindo-se como uma área de oportunidades econômicas para conquista de autonomia energética e de projeção de poder político e militar. Portanto, a pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar como se dá a atuação da Or-ganização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) no ambiente geoestratégico do Atlântico Sul. Isso serve para compreender as motivações que conduzem os membros a envolver a or-ganização em uma área que oferece poucas ameaças às suas seguranças e que não foi contem-plada no seu mais recente Conceito Estratégico de 2010. Nessa pesquisa, elencam-se três fato-res de envolvimento da Aliança na região: os recursos naturais, a realidade de segurança e a crescente presença de China, Índia, Rússia. Temos que para países como França, Inglaterra, Portugal e EUA, que já possuem significativa influência na região, há maiores vantagens em engajar a OTAN no Atlântico Sul. Por outro lado, a falta de clareza dos objetivos da organi-zação na região cria uma imagem de desconfiança para as potências regionais (Brasil, Argen-tina) que assumem uma postura defensiva em evitar a interferência de atores extrarregionais em seus espaços estratégicos. De forma geral, a pesquisa mostra que a participação da Aliança no Atlântico Sul serve para reforçar os interesses dos aliados e reformular as relações de força na região por meio de acordos diplomáticos, exercícios militares conjuntos, formação de par-cerias, intercâmbio de recursos e capacidades como se vê nas relações da OTAN com Cabo Verde, Mauritânia, Colômbia e outros países desse entorno regional

<p>Det som undersökningen beskriver är hur EU:s säkerhetsstrategi påverkade de utrikespolitiska målen inför militära insatser i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo 2006, Tchad/Centralafrikanska republiken 2008 och Somalia 2009.</p><p>Vår <em>utrikespolitiska vilja</em> och dess <em>utrikespolitiska mål</em> motiverar vårt deltagande i militära insatser utomlands. Dessa mål skall vara vägledande och skall genomsyra insatsens genomförande. Detta generade en problemställning i denna uppsats som lyder:</p><p>På vilket sätt har bakomliggande säkerhetspolitiska resonemang till EUs säkerhetsstrategi påverkat utformandet av de nationella svenska motiven till internationella insatser i de EU-ledda militära insatserna i Afrika 2006-2009? Kan incitament och motiv identifieras som inflytelser i propositioner från samma period?</p><p>Syftet var att undersöka målsättningarna i dokumentet <em>Ett</em> <em>säkert Europa i en bättre värld, en Europeisk säkerhetsstrategi (ESS)</em>, för att se hur dessa målsättningar påverkat de svenska propositionerna inför de EU-ledda insatserna.</p><p>Som metod användes en kvalitativ textanalys deduktivt, genom att analysera de utrikespolitiska målen med ett <em>analysverktyg </em>indelat i s<em>äkerhets-</em>, <em>välfärds-</em> och <em>idémål</em>.</p><p>Resultatet visade att EU:s övergripande säkerhetsstrategi genomsyrade våra motiv i propositionerna men att det fanns sammantaget en avsaknad av EU:s tydlighet med att vara aktiv, preventiv och handlingskraftig i propositionerna. För att få effekt i välfärdsmålsättningar anser EU att detta skall integreras med olika resurser och där även med civil och militär integrering. Denna integrering var inte fullt tydlig i undersökningens studerade propositioner.</p><p>Den främsta och prioriterade effekten var att tillgodose de mänskliga rättigheterna vilket gör att signaleffekten var hög både för EU och Sverige i insatserna, både regionalt och strategiskt.</p> / <p>This essay examines how The EU Security Strategy affected the objectives of Swedish foreign politics before launching military operations in The Democratic Republic of Congo 2006, Chad/Central African Republic 2008 and in Somalia 2009. The intentions and goals of foreign politics determine Governmental bills and the objectives for the military operations that are sent overseas. These objectives are to serve as guidelines for the realization of the operations.</p><p>This was the basis of the overall problem for my study which asks: How have security policies based on EU reasoning of Security Strategies affected the Swedish national motives for military operations commanded by the EU in Africa 2006-2009? Can they be identified and explained in the Governmental bills from the same era?</p><p>The document, <em>A secure Europe in a better world ­ European Security Strategy, </em>(2003) is used in the case study to identify the objectives and to compare how these have been implemented in the Swedish governmental bills before the initiation of the EU commanded military operations. This was achieved by using qualitative text analysis and a deductive method to analyse foreign policies with an analysis tool, divided into <em>security,</em> <em>welfare of the state</em> and <em>ideological objectives.</em></p><p>The outcome of the study identified that the motives for the Governmental bills were permeated by EU’s overall objectives. In the Governmental bills, it was identified that there was generally a lack of the sharpness that the EU policy stands for, regarding being active, preventive and resolute. In order to achieve more effectiveness in the <em>welfare of the state </em>objectives, the EU considers this objective ought to be integrated into all resources as well as into civil and military integration. Additionally, this integration was not emphasized in explicit terms in the examined bills. The main and most prioritised outcome was to consider Human Rights, which resulted in high ranking publicity for the EU and Sweden in the outcome of the operations, both regionally and strategically.</p>

Thesis (Master').

Thesis (Master').

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la décolonisation, la France est la seule puissance extérieure au continent africain à avoir conservé en permanence des forces armées en Afrique subsaharienne. L'armée de l'air joue un rôle majeur dans la défense des territoires africains pendant la Guerre froide. Outil militaire de la puissance française, elle doit adapter son action en fonction des grands bouleversements internationaux et des crises locales. D'une force de présence pour assurer la sécurité de l'Union française, elle se transforme, après la décolonisation, en une force d'intervention capable d'agir depuis la métropole. L'armée de l'air devient un des moyens privilégiés par la France pour respecter les accords de défense bilatéraux avec ses anciennes colonies en cas d'agression par un Etat tiers. Toutefois, la fragilité des nouveaux Etats africains remet en cause la nouvelle stratégie militaire française en Afrique. Les forces aériennes françaises doivent alors être capables d'assurer à la fois la gestion de crises locales mais aussi la préparation de guerres modernes sur le théâtre d'opération africain. L'adaptation permanente de l'armée de l'air à la défense d'une zone d'action éloignée de la métropole requiert une réévaluation constante de ses choix doctrinaux, organisationnels, technologiques et de ses relations avec ses interlocuteurs africains. Si l'armée de l'air française a été un acteur crucial dans les relations internationales en Afrique, ses engagements outre-mer ont, en retour, largement modelé son évolution. L'armée de l'air porte ainsi en elle l'héritage de ses opérations sur le continent africain. / Since the end of World War II and the subsequent end of colonialism, France has become the sole external power engaged in Africa to have preserved a permanent military presence in the sub-Saharan region. The French Air Force played a major role in the defense of African territories during the Cold War. As a military tool of French power, its actions have had to be regulated according to major political upheavals and regional crises. Having first served as a stabilising presence protecting the security of the French Union, it transformed itself into a post-colonial intervention force able to react in Africa both locally and from airbases in metropolitan France. The French Air Force has become one of the most important means available to France to uphold its obligations to its bilateral defense agreements with its former colonies against third party aggression. Nonetheless, the fragility of newly created African states has frequently called into question this new French military strategy for Africa. French air forces in the African theatre of operations must be capable of conducting crisis management at the local level, but also remain ready to conduct high-level warfare in the African theater of operations. The decision to permanently commit the French Air Force to the defense of a zone of action far from metropolitan France requires a constant reevaluation of doctrinal, organisational and technological choices; and of its international relations with its African interlocutors. The French Air Force has played a critical role in French international relations in Africa and its overseas commitments have largely shaped its evolution. In this fashion, the French Air Force carries with it the legacy of its operations on the African continent.

Against the backdrop of repeated political violence between Israel and different belligerents in the first and second decades of the 21st century (2003-2017) and by employing a social-psychological theoretical framework, this dissertation explores the effects of political violence on Israelis ’ social and national identities. The findings support the discussion of the social consequences of political violence in Israel, be them increased cohesiveness among different social groups (ethnic minority and majority) or social fragmentation and increased polarization between other groups (rich vs. poor or political right vs. left). Whereas Social Identity Theory constitutes the theoretical base for the explored hypotheses, Israeli social place-making practices are also discussed. Topic Whereas a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to the effects of exposure to violence on individuals and groups for over a century, it mainly focuses on type, duration or location of such violence. Since the relevant literature seems to consider the occurrence of political violence a unitary phenomenon, it consistently fails to attend to a most important factor- the aftermath of such violence. By overlooking the discrepancy in violence’ aftermath and by neglecting any analysis derived from it, I argue that the comprehensive literature examining the social effects of political violence and post-conflict societies is missing a vital piece of the puzzle. Accordingly, the contribution of this dissertation to the conflict literature is twofold: first, it disaggregates the aftermaths of two common forms of political violence, wars and military operations and explores their effects on individuals, groups and the Israeli society as a whole. Second, it closely examines some of the central assumptions of Social Identity Theory, one of the most comprehensive theories of group relations in the context of concrete political violence. It does so while paying special attention to highly fascinating identity components and basic social building blocks: national identification, social trust and social rifts in Israel. Methods The dissertation employs various methodologies: First, a macro-level, statistical examination of the relationship between different war outcomes and socio-national identities was conducted using two web-based experiments. Second, a qualitative analysis of Zionism in Europe and in Israel’s early years complemented a discussion of Israeli narratives of belonging, memory politics, ingredients of national pride and contemporary social challenges. Third, a quantitative micro-level analysis of the effect of successful and unsuccessful military operation on the Israeli society was conducted. The latter utilized a unique, self-compiled database, following an extensive manual content analysis , alongside data originating in annual social surveys conducted in Israel by the Guttmann institute. Knowledge gained The first empirical chapter (chapter four) was set to establish the underlying assumption upon which the dissertation is based; Namely, that different outcomes of political violence have distinctive effects on individual identities. In this chapter, predictions derived from Social Identity Theory were put into an initial macro-level analysis through two original web experiments. The latter explored the effect of different war outcomes (distinguishing between victory, defeat, stalemate and a negotiated agreement) on social and national identities . Whereas the research supported the underlying hypothesis according to which distinctive war outcomes are associated with distinctive effects when national identification is concerned, no significant differences between war outcomes were found in relation to individuals’ social identities. These results are consistent with Social Identity Theory and the self-esteem protection/enhancement strategies derived from it (BIRGing and CORFing ); the significant differences between war outcomes (mainly between victories and defeats) are explained by individuals’ tendencies to share in the glory of a successful other (to BIRG) following a positively evaluated war outcome, and to distance themselves from an unsuccessful group (to CORF), following a negatively valued war outcome. The non-significant results concerning social identities are consistent with Simmel’s conflict hypothesis suggesting that conflicting interactions strengthen the internal cohesion of pre-existing groups. In this regard, it appears as though individuals react to the conflict itself whereas its aftermath did not play any significant role. The overall outcomes obtained thus laid the foundations for an extensive micro-level analysis of the effect of outcomes of political violence on socio-national identities among Israelis. Chapter five refocused the attention on the state of Israel and the Israeli society. It provided a historical analysis of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, rooted in the Zionistic movement in Europe in the late 19th century, which preceded the establishment of the state of Israel. The analysis centered on nation-building processes which took place in Israel’s first years, namely, the constructing of a new Jewish-Israeli identity by means of institutionalizing the Hebrew language as an official language, integration of new immigrants and the role of the Israeli defense force as a melting pot. The study of the origins of Israeli national pride, both in the country’s first years and in contemporary times, complemented the discussion as it is entwined with both Jewish and Israeli identities. The analysis suggests that while Israel was established as a democracy, it was never a space of ethnic diversity. As the national home for world jury based on a Zionist narrative and highly influenced by the Holocaust, no plurality of ethnic discourses existed in Israel in over 50 years. The research describes the way state-sponsored dominant Jewish and Zionist narratives morphed into a uni-dimensional Israeli identity. This, in turn, prevented Arab-Israelis, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, from being incorporated into the Israeli society. Recurrent political violence as part of the on-going Israeli Palestinian conflict further contributed both to the exclusion of Arab-Israelis from the original Israeli narrative and to the bonding of Jewish Israelis. It was only in the last decades and against the backdrop of significant changes endured by the Israeli society that place-making processes were put on the political and social agenda. Whereas nation and community-building processes are still prominent in contemporary Israel, they now exist side by side a vibrant and vocal discourse of post-Zionism, Jewish secularism and “Israelism” which is not based on Judaism but on an Israeli cultural narrative. Persistent political violence that contributed to social fragmentation in Israel’s first decades alongside cultural commonalities between Jewish and Arab Israelis now begin to serve as a common denominator in contemporary Israeli society. If those continue to resonate among Israelis, it is thus not implausible that they would eventually substitute Judaism and Zionism as social unifiers in the process of creating a “same boat” society. Under such circumstances and with diminishing boundaries between Arab and Jewish Israelis, the former will no longer be construed as an “out-group” by the Jewish majority in Israel. Nonetheless, drifting away from the original Jewish integrator and common factor of more than 75% of the country’s population may threaten the Jewish communities of Israel with social fragmentation. Consequently, the study of the effect of political violence on both Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Israel set forth in the upcoming chapters is of great importance for the future of Israel. Chapter six set out to examine the relationship between Israelis and their nation-state following different outcomes of Israeli military operations. Special attention was paid to changes in levels of national pride among Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis and new immigrants across a tempestuous ten-year period (2003-2013) and in conjunction with successful and unsuccessful conclusions of Israeli warfare, as perceived by the Israeli public. Using a regressing analysis of data originating in social surveys, the research tested the validity of predictions derived from Social Identity Theory in both the individual and the social levels. Results indicate that the effect of recurrent warfare on national identification among Israelis is highly mitigated by the perceived outcome of such warfare as well as by sub-group membership (ethnic/social majority vs. minority). Consistent with Social Identity Theory, an Israeli military success was highly associated with increased national identification for the general Israeli population. However, contrary to conventional wisdom and to the “minority hypothesis ”, the same effect was also registered among Israeli Arabs. While Israeli Arabs, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, might share neither the country’s collective Jewish narrative nor its Zionist ethos they are Israeli citizens who nonetheless feel a sense of belonging to the state of Israel . As such, they are a part of a larger in-group which shares personal and economic interests. Those are equally and existentially threatened when Israel is experiencing unsuccessful military operations. This positivistic evidence suggests that Israeli Arabs’ identification with the state of Israel lies in the area of “Israeliness that is beyond Jewishness”. The analysis also affirmed the existence of an “embedded identity effect” concerning national identification among Jewish Israelis; Israeli Jews, the majority ethnic group in Israel, maintained high national-identification levels regardless of the way the warfare was concluded. This finding is unsurprising considering Israel’s Jewish character and the circumstances of its creation. Whilst societies subjected to external threat may unite in the face of a common enemy, chapter seven sought to examine whether this is true in the Israeli context and if so, whether the outcomes of political violence mitigate the effect. Whereas a large scholarship examined the effect of violence on social cohesion and political tolerance in Israel, it mostly focused on Arab-Israelis and immigrant. The research presented in chapter seven studied the effect of discrepant outcomes of Israeli warfare on social cohesion, social tensions and trust between the various communities of Israel (both Jewish and non-Jewish). The research focused on the general level of social trust in society alongside six specific social rifts, prevalent in present-day Israel: the intercommunal rift (between the Israeli Jewish community and the Israeli-Arab community), the Jewish intercommunal rift (between Jews of Ashkenazi and Sephardic/Mizrachi origins), the religious rift (between orthodox and non-orthodox Jewish communities), the ideological/political rift , the socio-economic rift and the nativist tension (between native Israelis and new immigrants). Results revealed a highly significant effect of Israeli military success concerning all six social rifts and a very mild effect concerning social trust. For all but one rift (the Jewish inter-communal rift), successful termination of Israeli warfare was associated with an increased social tension between the different communities in Israel (though in different levels of significance). This unfortunate finding which points to increased fractionalization among the different communities in Israel following Israeli military successes is in line with several other studies examining the effects of political violence on political exclusionism in Israel. Whereas the literature supports the notion that in time of crisis social cohesion increases, it is not surprising to find increased tensions following military successes rather than failures. An exception to the observed rise in social tensions in Israel is the increased cohesion between Ashkenzi and Sephardic/Mizrachi Jews (the Jewish intercommunal rift). The results support the conclusion that the Jewish population, the majority ethnic group in Israel, is united behind the idea that Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people (and possibly a necessary refuge from rising anti-Semitism around the globe). A decrease in Jewish intercommunal tension following Israeli victories supports the cohesive potential of in-group pride and is consistent with the Jewish foundation and Zionistic narrative of Jewish Israelis and with the existence of an embedded Jewish-Israeli identity . As for the national level, a “rally around the flag” effect is a term used to describe the uniting power of common threats. An underlying motive for this surge in national unity is linked to patriotism, as individuals respond to threats by identifying with their in-group . However, when the crisis is over, politics and society quickly revert to normal and existing social rifts resurface. Whereas an unsuccessful termination of an Israeli military operation is likely to induce a “rally around the flag” effect, a military success demonstrates the opposite effect. Consequently, the seemingly rising tensions between various communities in Israel observed following an Israeli military success is consistent with a reverse “rally around the flag” effect and reflects the fractionalized nature of the Israeli society. Another explanation to the observed trend of increased social tensions following a successful warfare may be directly linked to the experience of in-group guilt or shame despite a successful outcome. Such gilt might lead to rising tension between those who are more/less supportive of the outcome, or perhaps feel that more should have been done to achieve a more solid outcome. Finally, the increased tensions may speak to the theorized dynamic at the heart of the present and similar works that reflects the more destructive side of pride and in-group glorification. According to that scholarship, out-group hate can even extend to people perceived to be “hostile minorities ”. Whilst the increase in intercommunal tension is expected and in line with the results of similar studies examining the effect of violence or stress on the relationships between Jewish and Arab Israelis, the increase in religious tensions, socio-economic tension and ideological tensions could be reflective of a second circle of out-group hate; Supporters of the political left alongside less observant and wealthier elements of the Israeli society , may experience in-group guilt and possibly shame despite the perceived successful outcome, thus distancing themselves from those experiencing pride at the outcome. The effect of education, in particular higher education, in reducing social tensions and increasing social trust emerges as another important finding of this research. Whether education provides a sense of optimism and control over one’s life that allows people to trust, or whether it provides opportunities for contact and networks’ creation with others, the study confirms the potential role of education in reducing social tension even in a highly diverse and conflict-torn Israeli society. Moreover, since social divisions may be exploited by political entrepreneurs, and since increasing social tensions might result in the erosion of social capital, raising the alarm would be the first step in directly addressing such important issues (for example, by policy making). Lastly, any serious peace negotiation with a Palestinian leadership would require difficult concessions to be made by both parties. As such, the way towards a peaceful conclusion of the Israeli Palestinian conflict would inevitably depend, among others, on the social strength and cohesion of the Israeli civil society.:Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Background and Motivation ................................................................................. 7 1.1.1 National Identification ............................................................................ 10 1.1.2 Social Trust ............................................................................................. 14 1.1.3 Focusing on Israel ................................................................................... 16 1.2 Prologue ............................................................................................................. 17 1.3 Contribution Scope ............................................................................................. 18 1.4 Overview of Aims and Chapters ........................................................................ 20 2. Theoretical Framework: Conflict Research, National Identification and Social Trust Part I: Conflict Research 2.1 Conflict Research ................................................................................................. 24 2.1.1 General Theory and Practices ................................................................ 25 2.1.2 Contemporary Trends and Challenges ................................................... 26 2.1.3 Looking Forward ................................................................................... 27 Part II: Belonging, Identity and the Nation 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Identity Formation ................................................................................................ 28 Social Belonging and Group Identification ......................................................... 29 The Sense of Belonging, Nationhood and Statehood .......................................... 30 2.4.1 What is a Nation? ................................................................................... 30 2.4.2 National Identification ........................................................................... 32 2.4.3 Hierarchies of National Belonging ........................................................ 33 2.4.4 The Nation State .................................................................................... 34 2.4.5 Nationhood and Statehood ..................................................................... 35 Conflict Patriotic Affinity: Conceptual Outlines ............................................................. 38 2.6.1 Between Patriotism and Nationalism ..................................................... 41 Coping With Threatened Social Identity ........................................................... 42 and Group Identification ........................................................................ 36 2 3 2.7.1 Social Identity Theory ......................................................................... 42 2.7.2 Basking In Reflected Glory ................................................................. 45 2.7.3 Cutting Off Reflected Failure .............................................................. 46 2.7.4 Self-Embedded Social Identity ............................................................ 48 2.7.5 National Identity of Ethnic Minorities ................................................ 50 Part III: Social Trust and Cohesiveness 2.8 Social Capital and Cohesion .............................................................................. 52 2.9 Unraveling the Riddle of Social Trust ............................................................... 54 2.9.1 Threats to Social Trust and Social Cohesion ....................................... 56 3. Methodology 3.1 Macro-level Analysis ......................................................................................... 60 3.1.1 Appropriateness ..................................................................................... 60 3.1.2 A Short History of Web Experiments .................................................... 61 3.1.3 Web Experiments: Advantages and Challenges .................................... 63 3.2. Micro-level analysis ........................................................................................... 69 3.2.1 Focusing on The state of Israel and Israeli Society ............................... 69 Contemporary Israeli Media .................................................................. 72 Military Censorship ............................................................................... 75 3.2.2 Episodes of High Intensity Political Violence ....................................... 75 3.2.3 Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence ............................................ 77 3.2.4 Relevant Issues Concerning the Use of Survey Data ............................ 78 Vague Concepts .................................................................................... 78 Categorizing Identities .......................................................................... 80 3.2.5 The Israeli Democracy Index ................................................................ 82 3.2.6 Control Variables ................................................................................... 83 3.3 Framing in Communication and Their Effect on Public Opinion ...................... 84 3.3.1 The Use of Emphasis and Equivalence Framing in Shaping Public Opinion .................................................................................................. 85 3.3.2 The Effect of Frames in Shaping Individual Perceptions ...................... 87 3.3.3 Assessing a Frame’s Strength in Political Settings ................................ 88 4. The Ending matters: National and Social Identification Following Discrepant War Outcomes 4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 90 4.2 Experimental Study I ........................................................................................... 93 4.2.1 Procedure and Experimental Design ..................................................... 93 4.2.2 Measures ................................................................................................ 95 4.3.3 Results .................................................................................................... 95 4.2.4 Discussion .............................................................................................. 99 Seriousness Check ................................................................................. 99 National Identity .................................................................................. 100 Social Identity ...................................................................................... 102 4.3 Experimental Study II ......................................................................................... 103 4.3.1 Using video Vs. Text in Experimental Research ................................. 103 4.3.2 Procedure and Experimental Design .................................................... 104 4.3.3 Measures .............................................................................................. 105 4.3.4 Results .................................................................................................. 106 4.3.5 Discussion ............................................................................................ 109 Seriousness Check ............................................................................... 109 National Identity .................................................................................. 109 4.4 Limitations ....................................................................................................... 110 4.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 111 5. Focusing on the State of Israel and Israeli Society 5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 114 5.2 Jewish Nationalism and the Zionist Movement in Europe .............................. 114 5.3 Zionism, National Identity and Hebrew Culture Following the Establishment of The State of Israel ....................................................................................... 118 5.3.1 The Israeli Defense Forces .................................................................. 119 Serving in the Israeli Defense Forces .................................................. 120 Education, Socialization and Nation Building ..................................... 121 The Effect of the IDF on the Israeli Society ........................................ 123 5.3.2 Sport as an Integrative Tool for Shaping Israeli Collective Identity ... 129 5.4 The Jewish and Democratic Nature of the State of Israel ................................ 132 4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5 Current Challenges to Contemporary “Israeliness” ........................................ 134 5.5.1 Ethnic-religious Classification of Israelis- Between Citizenship and Nationality ........................................................................................... 136 5.5.2 Israeli Nationalist Particularism ........................................................... 137 Israeli Patriotism and Ingredients of Israeli National Pride ............................. 140 5.6.1 Tzedakah, Gemilut Hasadim and Tikun Olam ..................................... 141 5.6.2 Mashav ................................................................................................. 142 5.6.3 Operation “Good Neighbor” ................................................................ 144 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 148 6. Together We Stand? Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence and National Pride 7. 6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 150 6.2 Hypotheses ...................................................................................................... 151 6.3 Data, Measures and Method ........................................................................... 153 6.3.1 Focusing on Israel .............................................................................. 153 6.3.2 Military Operations ............................................................................ 154 6.3.3 Survey Measures: National Identification ......................................... 155 6.3.4 Perceived Outcome of Military Operation ......................................... 157 6.3.5 Control Variables ............................................................................... 158 6.4 Findings and Discussion ................................................................................ 159 6.4.1 Preliminary Findings .......................................................................... 159 6.4.2 Disaggregating the Israeli Society ..................................................... 163 6.4.3 Interaction Analysis ........................................................................... 164 6.5 Robustness Checks ......................................................................................... 169 6.5.1 Israel’s General Situation ................................................................... 170 6.5.2 Proximity to the Center of Violence .................................................. 171 6.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 172 In Us We Trust? The Effect of Military Operations on Social Cleavages and Social Cohesion in Israel 7.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 174 7.2 Hypothesis ....................................................................................................... 175 7.3 7.4 6 Data, Measures and Method ............................................................................ 179 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3 7.3.4 The Israeli Society in Context ............................................................ 179 Military Operations ............................................................................ 181 Perceived Levels of Tension and Trust in the Israeli Society ........... 183 Perceived Outcomes of Israeli Military Operations .......................... 185 Control Variables .............................................................................. 185 7.3.5 Findings and Discussion .................................................................................. 186 7.4.1 7.4.2 7.4.3 Preliminary Findings ......................................................................... 187 The Effect of Individual Level and Country Level Variables on Social Tensions and Social Trust ....................................................... 189 Examining the Effect of Israeli Military Operation on Inter-group Tensions ............................................................................................. 193 Exploring the Rise and Fall of Social Trust ...................................... 197 7.4.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 200 7.5 8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 203 8.1 Limitations ...................................................................................................... 210 8.2 Going forward: Ideas for Future Research ...................................................... 213 8.3 Final remarks/Epilogue ................................................................................... 215 9. References ................................................................................................................ 218 10. List of Figures .......................................................................................................... 254 Appendices A. The Evolution of Conflict Research in the 20th Century ................................. 255 B. Supplementary Material Chapter Four ............................................................ 268 B.1 Experiment I .......................................................................................... 268 B.2 Experiment II ......................................................................................... 274 B.3 Witnessing a Real Conflict as a Potential Covariate ............................. 287 C. Supplementary Material and Robustness Checks, Chapter Six ....................... 288 D. Supplementary Material and Robustness Checks, Chapter Seven .................. 308

There has been a significant evolution in the French African policy during the presidency of Jacques Chirac. Reasons for this must be searched in the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide of 1994 which showed that Paris did not understand the political evolution in Africa. This fact was only confirmed by two crisis in Ivory Coast in 1999 and 2002. This is why the French launched the RECAMP military program. It was no more thinkable for Paris to be kept alone in a military trap in Africa. Moreover, it was necessary to change state/regime perception. Paris neither could nor wanted to be held responsible for the security of African regimes that were by power. Therefore, France started to depersonalize its African policy. Stability of the African states assured by the Africans, not the security of the African regimes assured by Paris was the goal. This shift enabled the French to have more flexible African policy. Nevertheless, they did not withdraw from Africa. Military interventions were regarded as a source of credibility both for France and for the European Union.