This study sought to explore the governance mechanisms that result in agent principal alignment in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), with specific reference to Job Creation. This is important to understand in South Africa as infrastructure PPPs are central to the government’s economic growth strategy. The Renewable Energy Programme (REIPPPP), a decade-old PPP, was identified as the ideal context given its consistent job-creation alignment between the state and its agents, Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Agency Theory posits that agents are inherently self-interested and thus unlikely to act in the interests of principals. However, while some theoretical propositions envisage instances of agent-principal alignment, what is less known are the precise mechanisms by which this can be achieved. This study explored the questions of moral hazard and adverse selection, which refer to goal conflict and information asymmetry in agent-principal relationships. The research was undertaken through a qualitative study, comprised of secondary data analysis as well as semi-structured interviews. It was found that by aligning contracts across multiple stakeholders, agents can increase their enforcement capacity. Furthermore, a rigorous data collection system accompanied by credible penalties, results in greater compliance. This contribution enhances the theory in respect of governance mechanisms whilst simultaneously providing practical guidance for PPP structuring. / Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

租賃是使用權與所有權分離的一種企業或個人取得資產使權的方式。但是租賃市場中卻隱含二種潛在的訊息不對稱問題--逆向選擇與道德機問題。本文首先導出存在逆向選擇問題時之最適租約，並與充分訊息時之最適租約相比較。隨後我們也導出道德危機與逆向選擇問題並存時之最適租約。 　　有鑑於租賃對企業與個人的重要性，本文希望利用機制設計的方式來設計出存在訊息不對稱問題下的最適租約，以幫助租賃市場更有效地運作。針對逆向選擇問題，我們希望能利用誘因相容的直接控制機制，透過契約的設計，由承租人自己選擇租約，來幫助出租人分辦承租人之類型，並依此決定最適的租賃契約。針對道德危機問題，探究其成因主要是由於租約到期時資產的殘值完全不影響承租人報酬所致，所以我們希望能設計一組能使作維護努力的承租人得到充分獎勵的租約，也就是透過讓承租人作努力決策時將資產殘值納入考量的方式，使承租人的努力決策對出租人也是最適的。