This bachelor thesis aims to study the relationship between higher capital costs and the households' ability to repay their loans as well as how this affects the housing market. The work studies three areas in three different municipalities in the Stockholm region. The limitations for this report were that it primarily focused on areas that have relatively new housing developments where the interest rate was the sole alternating variable. Today, the interest rates for housing loans are very low which has resulted in that Swedish people has record breaking high leverages. Recently, a new amortization requirement was adopted. This will affect all households when they take new loans with an LTV of 50 percent. House prices in Sweden are at a historically high level, especially in the Stockholm region. Households’ expectations play a large impact on prices, and some experts believe that the market today is overvalued and that we are in a housing bubble, which, if it bursts, can bring negative impact on the housing market. Consequently, migration and housing demands has not previously been seen at these levels in Stockholm. In this paper, we intend to examine how rising interest rates will affect households with different leverage ratios in three different municipalities in the Stockholm county region. Utilizing data from sources such as InsightOne and Konsumentverket among others a spreadsheet was created comparing four different typical households that reflect the most common household composition within the selected municipalities. The disposable income, after all expenses for accommodation and necessities accounted for, will be examined. We will also analyze how these households would cope in a scenario where changing fundamentals give households higher housing costs and further how the selected municipalities, all of which have a relatively high rate of construction, would be affected by a sudden drop in prices on the market. A spreadsheet with data from Statistics Sweden was also set up to investigate the percentage of all households in Stockholm that have the same capital costs as a custom range of the selected mosaichouseholds’. Our results show that not all households could cope with increased housing costs such as higher interest rates among other factors. According to the calculated budget estimate for each typical household, it was concluded that some households would be unable to cover their monthly necessities. In a scenario where this would become reality, the households with a high leverage and a high interest rate would have a much smaller amount of money to live on each month. This would lead to a reduction in consumption and a decrease in demand for housing, which would result in a less secure position in the housing market and force households to reassess its choice of timing for this type of investment. Ultimately this could lead to vacancies in the municipalities we investigated that are located quite a bit outside the city center. Based on our results, we consider the hypothesis proven; due to half of the mosaic households in the study reflecting a deficit in their budget when the leverage and interest rates peaked at high levels. Based on the income statistics from SCB, we could also deduce that 49.8 percent of all households in the Stockholm region displayed a lower annual income than the investigated mosaic households. Consequently, these households would demonstrate a greater deficit in their budget if their housing costs rose. / Kandidatarbetet syftar till att studera hur högre kapitalkostnader påverkar hushållens betalningsförmåga och vilka effekter det kan få på bostadsmarknaden. I arbetet undersöks tre områden i tre olika kommuner i stockholmsregionen. I rapporten finns begränsningen att räntorna är den enda variabeln som ändras och att det i de områden som undersöks finns relativt nyproducerade bostäder. I dagsläget är räntenivåerna väldigt låga för bostadslån och det har medfört att svenskarna aldrig någonsin har varit så högt belånade. Nyligen har även ett nytt amorteringskrav antagits, vilket kommer att påverka alla hushåll som tar nya lån med en belåningsgrad över 50 procent. Bostadspriserna ligger idag på en historiskt hög nivå och speciellt hög är prisutvecklingen i Stockholmsregionen. Hushållens förväntningar har en stor inverkan på priserna och vissa experter menar att marknaden idag är övervärderad och att vi befinner oss i en bostadsbubbla som, om den spricker, kan innebära stora negativa konsekvenser för bostadsmarknaden. Samtidigt har inflyttningen och efterfrågan på bostäder aldrig varit så hög som nu inom Stockholms län. I denna uppsats avser vi att undersöka hur en stigande ränta kan påverka hushåll med olika belåningsgrader i tre olika kommuner inom Stockholms län. Med hjälp av data från bland annat InsightOne och Konsumentverket har en kalkyl för fyra olika typhushåll ställts upp som speglar den vanligaste hushållssammansättningen i de valda områdena. Här kommer sedan den disponibla inkomsten efter att alla utgifter för boende och nödvändigheter är betalade att undersökas. Vi kommer därefter att analysera hur dessa hushåll skulle klara sig i ett scenario där förändrade fundamentala faktorer ger hushållen högre boendekostnader och vidare hur de valda kommunerna, som alla har en relativt hög nybyggnadstakt, skulle komma att påverkas av ett plötsligt prisfall på marknaden. Dessutom har en kalkyl med data från SCB satts upp för att undersöka hur många procent av alla hushåll i Stockholms län som har samma årsinkomst som ett anpassat intervall av de valda mosaichushållen. Våra resultat visar att inte alla hushåll skulle klara av ökade boendekostnader, exempelvis som en följd av högre räntor. De skulle alltså gått med underskott varje månad enligt den budget vi ställt upp för varje mosaichushåll och som redovisar de viktigaste utgifterna ett hushåll med denna sammansättning har. I ett scenario där detta blir verklighet skulle alltså hushåll med en hög belåningsgrad och höga räntor få en betydligt mindre summa pengar att leva på varje månad efter att alla nödvändiga kostnader är betalde, vilket skulle leda till en minskad konsumtion och minskad efterfrågan på bostäder. Detta skulle i sin tur leda till ett osäkrare läge på bostadsmarknaden, vilket skulle få ytterligare hushåll att omvärdera sitt val av tidpunkt för denna typ av investering. I slutändan skulle detta kunna komma att leda till vakanser i de kommuner vi valt att undersöka och som ligger någon eller några mil utanför innerstaden med dess ständigt höga efterfrågan på bostäder. Utifrån våra resultat kan den uppställda hypotesen styrkas. Detta då hälften av de mosaichushåll vi utgick ifrån i undersökningen visade ett underskott i sin budget då ränta och belåningsgrad låg på en hög, om än inte orimlig, nivå. Utifrån inkomststatistiken från SCB kunde vi även utläsa att hela 49.8 procent av alla hushåll inom Stockholms län har en lägre årsinkomst än de undersökta mosaichushållen, vilket innebär att dessa hushåll skulle visa ett större underskott i sin budget om deras boendekostnader ökade.

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

房地產市場與銀行放款業務間，因為存在著密不可分之關係，本研究主要目的為釐清貸款利率與貸款成數對住宅價格是否具有顯著影響，進而探討中央銀行之選擇性信用管制政策，對於貸款利率、貸款成數與住宅價格之間，是否具有政策效果，最後再針對不同的需求族群，給予購屋行為選擇之參考或為銀行選擇貸款客群之參考。 本研究透過實證分析發現，貸款成數對於住宅價格為正向顯著影響，但貸款利率對住宅價格，則未呈現顯著影響。而政府之選擇性信用管制措施，在實證結果中，並未達到抑制房價之目的。但是在實施信用管制之後，購屋者對與貸款利率，相對更為敏感。在需求族群的分析上，發現高所得族群相對較重視貸款利率，而中所得與低所得族群，則相對較重視貸款成數。低年齡族群較高年齡族群而言，相對較為重視貸款利率之增加。 對於持續關心貸款利率、成數與住宅價格關聯之研究者，本研究建議後續研究者在資料取得之允許下，可嘗試拉長研究期間，及考慮增加了解政策鬆綁後之影響。在資料完整度許可下，建議可以增加個人屬性變數，並考量都更效應之變數。 / There is an inextricably linkage between the real estate market and the bank lending business. The main purpose of this study is to identify the relationships among mortgage interest rate, loan to value (LTV) ratio, and housing price. Further, we discuss the policy effect among them, due to the central bank's selective credit control policy. Finally, the supply-demand sides, our study hopes to give the choice of purchase behavior on demand groups or the selection of bank on loan-customers In our study, we found that the loan to value ratio has a significant positive effect on the housing price, but the mortgage interest rate has no significant effect on the housing price. In the empirical results, we found that the government's selective credit control policy did not achieve the purpose of curbing housing prices. However, after the implementation of selective credit control policy, the housing-buyer is relatively more sensitive to the mortgage interest rate. In the analysis of demand groups, the study found that high-income groups pay more attention to the mortgage interest rate. However, the middle-income and low-income groups emphasize on loan to value relative to the high-income groups. Finally, the young age groups relatively emphasize on the increase of the mortgage interest rates. For the researchers who continue to care about the relationships among mortgage interest rate, loan to value ratio, and housing price, the study suggests that follow-up researchers, with the permission of the data, may attempt to lengthen the study period and consider increasing the impact of easing the policy. Under the data integrity permission, it is advisable to add personal attribute variables and take into account the variables of the urban renewal effect.