Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-87).

Despite its ubiquity in debate over the justifiability of civil disobedience and conscientious objection, “conscience” remains an opaque concept. The attempt to define and employ it properly is not a purely academic exercise. The political language and behavior we associate with conscientiousness are empty to the point of being vulnerable to co-option by manifestly non-conscientious, violent, and reactionary movements. My argument is that the ease with which political actors adopt the language of conscience is due, not poor public understanding of the concept of “conscience,” but to the concept itself. In modern philosophical interpretations of conscience, such as that of Martin Luther and John Locke, the conscience is reified as a moral faculty or interior conversation of the individual. This is a departure from classical views of conscientiousness (for instance, Augustine’s), which emphasize the shared, fragile and habitual nature of conscience. Once “conscientiousness” is reified as “conscience,” it becomes difficult to characterize, except in negative terms, as an inner space free from tradition and force. My thesis is that the co-option of the language of conscience stems, in part, from the empty and conflicted characterization of philosophy in modern contract theory. One example of this conflicted characterization of conscience is the abortive project of distinguishing civil disobedience and conscientious objection. In law, politics, and philosophy, it is difficult to offer sound reasons for distinguishing these latter categories, despite frequent attempts to do so. The attempt fails on conceptual as well as practical grounds. I criticize two prominent treatments of civil disobedience and conscientious objection in evidence of this claim (John Rawls and Michael Walzer). When it comes to the language of conscience, modern American culture has committed the philosophic fallacy (John Dewey). We have substituted the clear divisions and images created by conscientious movements for the process that created them. I argue that “conscience” is best seen as a quality of healthy debate between adversaries—debates over problems so fundamental that they will be carried on in extra-legal and even illegal spheres. Conscience is a not a language that just any political actor can speak at will. It is a series of decisions that indicate to a public that we are not political enemies but political adversaries, seeking a political future together (Chantal Mouffe).

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Sous l’Ancien Régime, l’armée française était, en principe, composée de troupes professionnelles recrutées sur le mode du volontariat. Son recrutement était par ailleurs complété par différentes formes d’obligations militaires comme le ban, le guet et garde ou encore la milice provinciale. Les aspects techniques de ces institutions, leurs origines, leur évolution ou encore leur ampleur, sont connues. Il n’en va pas de même des fondements et des limites de l’exercice du pouvoir de contrainte qu’elles supposent. Il existe certes des études classiques sur l’histoire de la conscription, du pro patria mori ou de l’obligation to die for the state. Mais leurs conclusions sont contradictoires, elles négligent la doctrine et la législation d’Ancien Régime, et leur perspective n’embrasse qu’une partie des conditions de légitimité d’une obligation qui impose aux sujets de risquer leur vie et de tuer. L’objet du présent travail est donc d’offrir un exposé des justifications avancées en faveur ou contre l’obligation militaire, et d’identifier les débats auxquels celle-ci a donné lieu entre le XVIe et le XVIIIe siècle. Pour éclairer et ordonner le syncrétisme des préambules de la législation royale et déceler les obstacles que permettent de surmonter les arguments, il a paru nécessaire de calquer le plan de la thèse sur l’ordre du traitement de l’obligation militaire dans les ouvrages doctrinaux. Or, ceux-ci abordent l’obligation militaire sous trois angles complémentaires, trois séries de conditions cumulatives correspondant aux trois appartenances qui définissent l’état des personnes : citoyens membres du corps politique ; chrétiens membres du corps mystique de l’Église ; hommes intégrés dans un ordre et considérés dans leur individualité. À ces trois séries de personnes correspondent alors trois séries de biens : le bien commun de l’État, le bien divin, commun lui aussi, et le bien propre des individus. Ces trois biens correspondent aux conditions classiques de la légitimité des lois qui, dans la doctrine thomiste, sont orientées vers le bien commun, doivent respecter la loi divine et être justement réparties. Ces séries de considérations permettent de structurer la thèse en trois parties. Deux enseignements peuvent être tirés du tableau des conditions de légitimité de l’obligation militaire sous l’Ancien Régime. En premier lieu, il révèle un besoin constant de légitimation d’un devoir mortel. Tout absolu qu’il était, le roi de France ne pouvait exiger ad nutum l’obligation militaire. Il lui fallait, au moins, avancer une argumentation et, au mieux, respecter certaines conditions. En second lieu, l’histoire des justifications de l’obligation militaire sous l’Ancien Régime est celle de la progression du bien commun qui permet de repousser les limites traditionnelles qui encadrent le pouvoir royal. Cette évolution n’est pas sans susciter des critiques de la doctrine qui, d’une certaine façon, cherche à protéger l’individu. / Under the Ancien Régime, the French army was, in principle, composed of professional troops recruited on a voluntary basis. In addition, recruitment included various forms of military obligation, such as the arrière-ban, the watch and guard or the territorial militia. The technical aspects of those institutions are well known, as are their origins, their evolutions, and their scope. But the underlying foundations and limitations of the enforcement powers implied by them are not. There have been classic accounts of the history of conscription, pro patria mori, or the obligation to die for the state. But their conclusions are contradictory; they overlook the doctrine and legislation of the Ancien Régime, and they embrace but a fraction of the conditions governing the legitimacy of the obligation for subjects to risk their lives and kill. The subject of this present work is to offer an account of the justifications put forward in favor or against military obligation, and to identify the debates it has generated between the 16th and the 18th century. In order to clarify and organise the syncretism of the preambles of the royal legislation and detect the challenges that allows to overcome the arguments, it was deemed necessary to model the thesis plan on the treatment order of the military obligation in doctrinal publications. They address that topic from three complementary perspectives, with three sets of cumulative conditions corresponding to three affiliations that define a person’s status: citizen, who are members of the body politic; Christians, who are members of the mystical body of the Church; men members of an order or considered in their individuality. Three series of goods correspond to those three types: the common good of the State, the divine good, common as well, and the individual good. Those three goods correspond to the classical conditions of the law’s legitimacy that, in Thomistic doctrine, are aimed at the common good, must abide by the divine law and be justly distributed. These sets of considerations help to structure the thesis in three parts. Two conclusions can be drawn from the overview of the conditions for the legitimacy of military obligation under the Ancien Régime. Firstly, it shows a constant need of legitimation of a deadly duty. As absolute as he was, the King of France could not demand ad nutum military obligation. He needed to, at least, put forward an argument and, at best, respect certain conditions. Secondly, the history of the justifications for military obligation under the Ancien Régime is that of a progress of the common good, which led to push back the traditional limitations to the royal power. This evolution is not without instigating criticism of the doctrine that, in a certain way, seeks to protect the individual.

Health conscientious objection in Spain: nature and exerciseConscientious objection is conceived as the infringement of a legal duty, peacefully and morally motivated, which aims to safeguard the own moral integrity against a heteronomous imperative judged as unfair. Generally, there is social agreement concerning some justice principles that generate group-shared laws. However, there can be disagreement among some of the members of the group, which can lead them to decide to break the law. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the social and juridical legitimacy of an individual’s moral obligation to disobey a rule that is incompatible with his or her personal options, in order to assert that faculty and base it on the existence of a conscientious objection right. Also, it seeks to point out the existing difficulties in Spain to exercise the conscientious objection within the healthcare sector. / La objeción de conciencia se concibe como el incumplimiento de un deber jurídico, pacífica y moralmente motivado, que procura salvaguardar la propia integridad moral frente a un imperativo heterónomo que se juzga injusto. En general, existe acuerdo social en torno a unos principios de justicia que generan normas compartidas por el grupo. Sin embargo, pueden existir discrepancias entre algunos de los miembros del mismo, que los lleven a optar por la desobediencia a la norma. En este trabajo se pretende reflexionar acerca de la legitimidad social y jurídica de la obligación moral de un individuo de desobedecer o incumplir una norma jurídica incompatible con sus opciones personales, con el objetivo de afirmar dicha facultad y fundamentarla en la existencia de un derecho a la objeción de conciencia. También se quiere poner de manifiesto las dificultades que encuentra en España el ejercicio de la objeción de conciencia en el contexto sanitario.

I uppsatsen presenterar jag “luck egalitarianism” och specifikt Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser. Målet med Dworkins teori är att sammanväva de två till synes motstridiga principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt. Dworkin försöker föra samman principerna genom att nå en fördelning som är ambitions-känslig samtidigt som den är talang-okänslig. Han försöker uppnå detta ideal genom att kombinera en fri marknad som visar lika respekt för medborgarnas valfrihet och ansvar, med en försäkringsmarknad som visar lika hänsyn till medborgarna genom möjligheten att teckna försäkring mot oförutsägbara konsekvenser under lika möjlighet och lika risk. Elizabeth S. Anderson påstår att Dworkins teori misslyckas i att kombinera principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt på ett rimligt sätt och presenterar två övergripande invändningar: hårdhetsinvändningen och förnedringsinvändningen. Den första invändningen (hårdhetsinvändingen) påstår att teorins ramverk för att fastslå vilka av de utsatta som har rätt till kompensation inte visar lika hänsyn till alla som är utsatta. Den andra invändningen (förnedringsinvändingen) påstår att grunderna för kompensation är förnedrande och inte visar lika respekt för alla medborgare. Målet med uppsatsen är att analysera Dworkins teori och undersöka om den vederläggs av Andersons invändningar. Den slutsats jag skall försvara är att så inte är fallet. Forskningsfrågan är följande: Påvisar Andersons invändningar att Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser inte visar lika hänsyn och respekt för alla medborgare?

The protection of the emerging right of conscientious objection to military service is one of the most challenging questions in international human rights law. The primary objective of this doctoral thesis is to clearly identify the minimum international legal standards on the phenomenon of conscientious objection to military service as emerging from the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies. Furthermore, this study aims to explore and assess how the Member States of the Council of Europe are effectively implementing these standards within their domestic laws and practice. The implementation of legal standards on conscientious objection in the Council of Europe varies considerably between the 47 Member States of the organisation due to a rapidly transforming sociopolitical landscape that affects the speed in which legislative and procedural amendments take place. Some of the themes explored throughout this thesis include: the legal contours of the right to conscientious objection to military service, including the grounds legally accepted to justify a conscientious objection; procedural guarantees with regard to the application process to be granted conscientious objectors status; the provision of accurate information to members of the public affected by mandatory military service and the extension of these principles to professional members of the armed forces. The thesis is structured as a thematic presentation of applicable international human rights standards and State practice and explores common issues, best practices and future challenges between the Member States of the organisation. The study does not merely aspire to describe the present situation in the Council of Europe, but rather aims to contribute to academic know ledge by proposing the development of a more coherent framework of legal and procedural obligations, based on the need to review and adapt national legislation in accordance to indicators and benchmarks derived from the Council's standard-setting policies.

INSTITUT PROMLČENÍ V OBČANSKÉM PRÁVU S PŘIHLÉDNUTÍM K NOVĚ PŘIJATÉMU OZ RESUMÉ IN ENGLISH RESUMÉ IN ENGLISH LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN CIVIL LAW WITH REGARD TO THE NEWLY ADOPTED CIVIL CODE The limitation of actions is a significant private law institute reflecting an impact of passing of time on rights. Its basic construction remaining almost unchangeable for ages contains a big amount of variables being subject to modification following a direction of private law development. Mentioned above matches the tendency of amendments to the limitation of actions legislation contained in the new civil code. The drift towards liberalization is one of the most obvious tendencies. It manifests itself beside other matters by shifting from obligatory to none-obligatory character of provisions. That matter of fact is being reflected in the new civil code's limitation of actions legislation by entitling the subjects to depart from a prescribed period of limitation length. Another private law inclination being found in the new civil code limitation of actions legislation, might be defined as a protection of a subject having the right reinforcement. It is presented primarily by determining the subjective nature of a general three-year long period of limitation valid for all rights of a property character which are subject to...

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This thesis discusses the politics of conscientious objection in Turkey within a framework of citizenship. In this study citizenship is identified with being political and conceived as a process comprised of acts and practices. According to this conception, while practices reproduce the discourse of citizenship in a given context, acts are the deeds that challenge this discourse. Conscription, within this framework, is defined as a citizenship practice which re/produces the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of the Turkish citizenship. Conscientious objection is approached as an act of citizenship that contests and challenges the established citizenship regime in the country. This challenge and contestation is presented through the interviews with the conscientious objectors and activists as well as a review of the already published material by and on them. Conscientious objection challenges the citizenship regime in Turkey on three inter-related grounds: 1. It challenges and exposes the militaristic content of the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. 2. It challenges the political content of &lsquo / Turkishness&rsquo / &ndash / that is the nationalistic content of Turkish citizenship- with particular reference to Kurdish issue / and 3. It challenges the prevailing gender roles and the values of hegemonic masculinity in Turkey.