Nesta pesquisa, analisa-se a qualidade democrática colombiana nas décadas de 1980 e 1990, período de tempo no qual existiram os partidos de oposição Alianza Democrática M-19 e a Unión Patriótica. Estudam-se dois teóricos que analisaram esse período da democracia colombiana, Scott Mainwaring e Arend Lijphart, desde uma revisão bibliográfica. Realiza-se análise de dados de: eleições presidenciais; dos resultados eleitorais dos partidos políticos Alianza Democrática M-19 e a Unión Patriótica (1986 à 1998) e dados dos direitos humanos desse mesmo tempo. Analisa-se o sistema partidário, o sistema eleitoral e a dinâmica dos direitos humanos. Mostra-se que as análises da democracia colombiana, que utilizaram parâmetros institucionais, não conseguem caracterizar a complexa situação de violência e violações aos direitos humanos. Neste trabalho, verifica-se, portanto, que, para dimensionar a qualidade democrática, faz-se necessário estabelecer como parâmetro os direitos humanos, pois, esse permitiria identificar os mecanismos da sistematicidade e permanência das violações contra os setores de oposição política, aguçados quando esses setores se fazem mais relevantes politicamente. Nos países democráticos, onde há elevadas situações de violência e de violações aos direitos humanos, torna-se intrincado mensurar a qualidade da democracia. A partir deste estudo, pode-se considerar que a utilização dos direitos humanos, como parâmetro, ajudaria a entender melhor processos democráticos como o do caso colombiano. / In this research the Colombian democratic quality during the decades of 1980 and 1990 is analyzed, a period of time in which the opposing parties Alianza Democrática M-19 and Unión Patriótica existed. We perform data analysis from: presidential elections; election results from both aforementioned parties (from 1986 to 1998); and human rights data from the same time frame. We also analyze the party system, the electoral system and the human rights dynamics. It is shown that the analysis of the Colombian democratic quality, in which institutional parameters were used, fails to properly characterize the complex situation of violence and human rights violations. This work therefore finds that in order to evaluate the democratic quality, it becomes necessary to establish the human rights as parameter, because this would help to identify the mechanism of systematical and permanent violation against sectors of the political opposition, heightened when those sectors become more relevant politically. In democratic countries where violence and human rights violations are elevated, it becomes difficult to measure democratic quality. From this work it can be considered that the use of human rights as a parameter would help to better understand democratic processes similar to the the Colombian case.

Nesta pesquisa, analisa-se a qualidade democrática colombiana nas décadas de 1980 e 1990, período de tempo no qual existiram os partidos de oposição Alianza Democrática M-19 e a Unión Patriótica. Estudam-se dois teóricos que analisaram esse período da democracia colombiana, Scott Mainwaring e Arend Lijphart, desde uma revisão bibliográfica. Realiza-se análise de dados de: eleições presidenciais; dos resultados eleitorais dos partidos políticos Alianza Democrática M-19 e a Unión Patriótica (1986 à 1998) e dados dos direitos humanos desse mesmo tempo. Analisa-se o sistema partidário, o sistema eleitoral e a dinâmica dos direitos humanos. Mostra-se que as análises da democracia colombiana, que utilizaram parâmetros institucionais, não conseguem caracterizar a complexa situação de violência e violações aos direitos humanos. Neste trabalho, verifica-se, portanto, que, para dimensionar a qualidade democrática, faz-se necessário estabelecer como parâmetro os direitos humanos, pois, esse permitiria identificar os mecanismos da sistematicidade e permanência das violações contra os setores de oposição política, aguçados quando esses setores se fazem mais relevantes politicamente. Nos países democráticos, onde há elevadas situações de violência e de violações aos direitos humanos, torna-se intrincado mensurar a qualidade da democracia. A partir deste estudo, pode-se considerar que a utilização dos direitos humanos, como parâmetro, ajudaria a entender melhor processos democráticos como o do caso colombiano. / In this research the Colombian democratic quality during the decades of 1980 and 1990 is analyzed, a period of time in which the opposing parties Alianza Democrática M-19 and Unión Patriótica existed. We perform data analysis from: presidential elections; election results from both aforementioned parties (from 1986 to 1998); and human rights data from the same time frame. We also analyze the party system, the electoral system and the human rights dynamics. It is shown that the analysis of the Colombian democratic quality, in which institutional parameters were used, fails to properly characterize the complex situation of violence and human rights violations. This work therefore finds that in order to evaluate the democratic quality, it becomes necessary to establish the human rights as parameter, because this would help to identify the mechanism of systematical and permanent violation against sectors of the political opposition, heightened when those sectors become more relevant politically. In democratic countries where violence and human rights violations are elevated, it becomes difficult to measure democratic quality. From this work it can be considered that the use of human rights as a parameter would help to better understand democratic processes similar to the the Colombian case.

Nesta pesquisa, analisa-se a qualidade democrática colombiana nas décadas de 1980 e 1990, período de tempo no qual existiram os partidos de oposição Alianza Democrática M-19 e a Unión Patriótica. Estudam-se dois teóricos que analisaram esse período da democracia colombiana, Scott Mainwaring e Arend Lijphart, desde uma revisão bibliográfica. Realiza-se análise de dados de: eleições presidenciais; dos resultados eleitorais dos partidos políticos Alianza Democrática M-19 e a Unión Patriótica (1986 à 1998) e dados dos direitos humanos desse mesmo tempo. Analisa-se o sistema partidário, o sistema eleitoral e a dinâmica dos direitos humanos. Mostra-se que as análises da democracia colombiana, que utilizaram parâmetros institucionais, não conseguem caracterizar a complexa situação de violência e violações aos direitos humanos. Neste trabalho, verifica-se, portanto, que, para dimensionar a qualidade democrática, faz-se necessário estabelecer como parâmetro os direitos humanos, pois, esse permitiria identificar os mecanismos da sistematicidade e permanência das violações contra os setores de oposição política, aguçados quando esses setores se fazem mais relevantes politicamente. Nos países democráticos, onde há elevadas situações de violência e de violações aos direitos humanos, torna-se intrincado mensurar a qualidade da democracia. A partir deste estudo, pode-se considerar que a utilização dos direitos humanos, como parâmetro, ajudaria a entender melhor processos democráticos como o do caso colombiano. / In this research the Colombian democratic quality during the decades of 1980 and 1990 is analyzed, a period of time in which the opposing parties Alianza Democrática M-19 and Unión Patriótica existed. We perform data analysis from: presidential elections; election results from both aforementioned parties (from 1986 to 1998); and human rights data from the same time frame. We also analyze the party system, the electoral system and the human rights dynamics. It is shown that the analysis of the Colombian democratic quality, in which institutional parameters were used, fails to properly characterize the complex situation of violence and human rights violations. This work therefore finds that in order to evaluate the democratic quality, it becomes necessary to establish the human rights as parameter, because this would help to identify the mechanism of systematical and permanent violation against sectors of the political opposition, heightened when those sectors become more relevant politically. In democratic countries where violence and human rights violations are elevated, it becomes difficult to measure democratic quality. From this work it can be considered that the use of human rights as a parameter would help to better understand democratic processes similar to the the Colombian case.

The purpose of this dissertation was to address the problem expressed in the following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" A qualitative approach was used. The researcher interviewed officials of twelve representative parties out of the total of eighteen parties. The responses of the interviewees are in appendix 5. This work reveals the problems of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Among others, the study addressed the following issues: the reform of the electoral system, political party funding, dominance of the ruling party, prohibitive legislation and party leadership. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the opposition parties have been noted. The MMP electoral model, introduced in 2001 and tested in 2002, created a more inclusive party system, but it is not the sole solution for the weakness of the opposition parties. Patronisation and lack of political party funding appear to be major factors. / Political Sciences / M. A. (Politics)

The purpose of this dissertation was to address the problem expressed in the following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" A qualitative approach was used. The researcher interviewed officials of twelve representative parties out of the total of eighteen parties. The responses of the interviewees are in appendix 5. This work reveals the problems of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Among others, the study addressed the following issues: the reform of the electoral system, political party funding, dominance of the ruling party, prohibitive legislation and party leadership. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the opposition parties have been noted. The MMP electoral model, introduced in 2001 and tested in 2002, created a more inclusive party system, but it is not the sole solution for the weakness of the opposition parties. Patronisation and lack of political party funding appear to be major factors. / Political Sciences / M. A. (Politics)

The paper shows that the use of linguistic mechanisms of political discourse plays a large role in the construction of electoral campaigns in all cases examined. The mechanisms of manipulation of different countries depend on the characteristics of the country's political communication. The study and the correct use of mechanisms allows a politician to wage an effective struggle for power, which is the main goal of any political activity. / В работе показано, что использование лингвистических механизмов политического дискурса играет большую роль при построении электоральных кампаний во всех рассмотренных кейсах. Механизмы манипуляции разных стран зависят от особенностей политической коммуникации страны. Изучение и корректное использование механизмов позволяет политическому деятелю вести результативную борьбу за власть, что является главной целью любой политической деятельности.

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. / The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. / The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.