The Liar Paradox and related semantic antinomies seem to challenge our deepest intuitions about language, truth and logic. Many philosophers believe that to solve them, we must give up either classical logic, or the expressive resources of natural language, or even the “naïve theory of truth” (according to which "P" and “it is true that 'P'” always entail each other). A particularly extreme form of radical surgery is proposed by figures like Graham Priest, who argues for “dialetheism”—the position that some contradictions are actually true—on the basis of the paradoxes. While Priest’s willingness to dispense with the Law of Non-Contradiction may be unpopular in contemporary analytic philosophy, figures as significant as Saul Kripke and Hartry Field have argued that, in light of the paradoxes, we can only save Non-Contradiction at the expense of the Law of the Excluded Middle, abandoning classical logic in favor of a “paracomplete” alternative in which P and ~P can simultaneously fail to hold. I believe that we can do better than that, and I argue for a more conservative approach, which retains not only “monaletheism” (the orthodox position that no sentence, either in natural languages or other language, can have more than one truth-value at a time), but the full inferential resources of classical logic.

The sharing of information across government intra- and inter-agencies provides enormous benefits to Intelligence operations, but it also poses risks to Intelligence organizations’ operational capability. These benefits and risks of sharing information within Intelligence Communities introduce a paradox that disturbs decision-making abilities and affect existing and future relationships with local and national Intelligence partners. With this paradox, there exist particular forces that affect the paradox, such as organizational factors and the behavior of an information sharer, the responsible actor that decides on how, when and with whom to share the information. Combining the two can produce a positive (desired) outcome that leads to successful mission accomplishment or negative (inadvertent) outcome that leads to loss of information disclosed or intentional loss of valuable information. An inadvertent outcome could result in an impact to the national defense of the United States. Do Intelligence Analysts share information when the risks outweigh the benefits? This research examines how understanding the paradox of information sharing is a critical element in understanding the behavior of Intelligence Analysts’ decision-making in Intelligence operations.

Dans le contexte actuel, les organisations sont soumises à des bouleversements constants et confrontées de manière croissante à des objectifs contradictoires. Le secteur public ne fait pas exception, notamment dans le cadre du nouveau management public qui amène les organisations publiques à transposer des principes de gestion issus du secteur privé et à faire face à de nombreux paradoxes. Pour Morgan (2007), si le paradoxe est une des forces majeures qui font retarder le changement à tous les paliers de l’organisation, tendant à l’immobilisation, tant sur le plan psychologique que sur celui de l’action, il peut se transformer en important levier de changement. L’approche par étude de cas retenue dans le cadre de la présente recherche, nous amène à nous intéresser à un organisme de service public contraint suite à d’importantes réformes réglementaires à évoluer vers le modèle marchand. La confrontation de deux logiques antagonistes, celle d’une culture de moyens longtemps entretenue par le régime de la subvention et celle d’une culture de résultat, incontournable dans le contexte de la mise en concurrence, se manifeste à tous les niveaux de l’organisation. Après nous être attaché à mieux comprendre l’émergence et la dynamique des paradoxes organisationnels en analysant leur évolution à des périodes clés de la vie de l’organisation, nous nous intéressons aux mécanismes de transmission et aux effets des tensions contradictoires sur les acteurs de l’organisation. Nous proposons ensuite, dans le cadre d’une approche de recherche-action, des pistes permettant à l’organisation de tirer profit de ces tensions contradictoires plutôt que d’en subir leurs effets dysfonctionnants. / 21st Century organizations encounter continuous change and are increasingly confronted with contradictory objectives. The public sector is no exception particularly in the context of new public management that results in public organizations implementing management principles originating from the private sector which lead to paradoxical outcomes. If paradox is one of the major forces constraining change at all levels of an organization, including both a psychological and action level, it can however according to Morgan (2007) be alternatively transformed into a major lever or catalyst for change. This research focuses on a case study of a public service organization confronting market pressure and examines the confrontation of two contrasting approaches, the first being one of long term objectives supported by a regime of subsidies, as opposed to a second approach consisting of short term objectives, that are self-financing and results orientated. After investigating the emergence and the dynamics of organizational paradoxes at critical periods in the evolution of the organization we focus on the transmission mechanisms and effects of conflicting tensions on the actors of the organization. We then suggest, through an action research approach, ways that enable organizations to take advantage of these conflicting tensions rather than suffer their dysfunctional effects.

This thesis comprises three main chapters-each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate 'true' either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic and semantics that shows how they can answer central conceptual and logical challenges for their view. In Chapter 2, I motivate and develop a modal account of propositions on the basis of an iterative conception of propositions, where the modality is logico-mathematical. The modal account of propositions takes the conception to motivate an inherently potential hierarchy of propositions. I show that the account helps provide satisfying solutions to the intensional paradoxes of Russell-Myhill, Kaplan, and Prior. In Chapter 3, I propose that 'true' is polysemous. I suggest that 'true' is initially polysemous between correspondence truth and disquotational truth, and further polysemous between the meanings corresponding to the subconcepts of the concept truth generated by the indefinite extensibility of that concept. I show that the proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes.

This thesis explores Russell’s Paradox and the comparative analysis of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory, and Russell’s Type Theory from a mathematical Platonist perspective, focusing on the ontology of sets. Our conclusion posits that, although these theories have made significant attempts in addressing Russell’s paradox and other inconsistencies of naïve set theory, we currently lack a proper language for expressing set theory that fully captures the underlying Platonic world of sets. Consequently, it is impossible to definitively refute or accept any of the given theories as the ultimate solution the paradox.

Una de las principales teorías jurídicas ha sido la de soberano absoluto, la cual supone que es inherente a cualquier sistema jurídico la existencia de un soberano absoluto e ilimitado. En la primera parte de la tesis examino a los principales autores que han sostenido tal concepción (Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Austin), así como los principales argumentos.En la segunda parte de la tesis mi propósito es criticar tal concepción y plantear una visión pluralista de la idea de autoridad suprema en un orden jurídico y, en este sentido, distingo cuatro modelos de autoridad suprema:1) autoridad preinstitucional suprema primaria;2) autoridad preinstitucional suprema secundaria;3) autoridad jurídica suprema continua;4) autoridad jurídica suprema autocomprensiva.De tales modelos trato de ofrecer un correlato empírico, así como una explicación de los justificaciones político-jurídicas en las que pueden descansar. / Una de les principals teories jurídiques ha estat la de sobirà absolut, la qual suposa que és inherent a qualsevol sistema jurídic l'existència d'un sobirà absolut i il·limitat. A la primera part de la tesi examino els principals autors que han sostingut tal concepció (Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Austin), així com els principals arguments.A la segona part de la tesi el meu propòsit és criticar tal concepció i plantejar una visió pluralista de la idea d'autoritat suprema en un ordre jurídic i, en aquest sentit, distinguo quatre models d'autoritat suprema:1) autoritat preinstitucional suprema primària;2) autoritat preinstitucional suprema secundària;3) autoritat jurídica suprema contínua;4) autoritat jurídica suprema autocomprensiva.De tals models tracte d'oferir un correlat empíric, així com una explicació dels justificacions polític-jurídiques en les que poden descansar. / One of the main juridical theories has been that of absolute sovereign, which supposes that the existence of an absolute and unlimited sovereign is inherent to any juridical system. In the first part of the thesis I examine the main authors of such conception (Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Austin), as well as the main arguments they have sustained.In the second part of the thesis my purpose is to criticise such conception and to bring up a pluralistic vision of the idea about supreme authority in a juridical order and, in this sense, I distinguish four models of supreme authority:1) primary supreme pre-institutional authority;2) secondary supreme pre-institutional authority;3) continuous supreme juridical authority;4) selfcomprehensive supreme juridical authority.On the other hand I tried to offer a correlated empirical of these models, as well as an explanation of their justifications political-juridical.

Les réseaux d’entreprises sont des formes organisationnelles conduisant à un certain nombre d’avantages pour les entreprises qui en sont membres. Pour ces dernières, cette forme organisationnelle présente l’intérêt de ne pas supprimer leur autonomie ni leur indépendance, tout en bénéficiant des avantages liés aux rapprochements inter-organisationnels. De par cette particularité, les réseaux comprennent ainsi deux niveaux organisationnels distincts mais indissociables : le niveau organisationnel des entreprises membres et le niveau organisationnel du réseau. Avant de bénéficier des avantages auxquels conduit l’organisation en réseau, il est nécessaire qu’il soit construit par les organisations qui en sont à l’origine. Dans le temps, la construction du réseau conduit à un certain renforcement de son degré de néguentropie, se traduisant par une complexification sur le long-terme. Cette complexification s’opère tout en conservant l’autonomie et l’indépendance des organisations qui en sont membres. Peu de recherches se sont intéressées à cette question de la construction des réseaux. Cette thèse propose d’y répondre un utilisant l’approche par les oppositions paradoxales (approche par les paradoxes et approche par les dialectiques), qui permet de prendre en considération l’indissociabilité du double niveau organisationnel des réseaux. Par le biais d’une étude de cas appliquée à un réseau d’entreprises dans le secteur horticole de la région angevine, nous cherchons à identifier comment les objectifs de chacun des deux niveaux organisationnels contribuent à la construction du réseau en question et au renforcement de son degré de néguentropie. / Business networks are organizational forms that lead to a number of benefits for business members. For the latter, this organizational form has the advantage of not eliminating their autonomy or their independence, while benefiting from the advantages linked to inter-organizational reconciliations. In this way, the networks thus comprise two distinct but inseparable organizational levels : the organizational level of the member companies and the organizational level of the network. Before benefiting from the advantages of networking, it is necessary that it be built by the organizations that are at the origin of it. In time, the construction of the network leads to a certain strengthening of its degree of negentropy, resulting in a long-term complexification. This complexity takes place while preserving the autonomy and independence of the member organizations. Little attention has been paid to this question of network construction. This thesis proposes to answer it using a paradoxical approach (paradoxical approach and dialectical approach), which makes it possible to take into account the indissociability of the dual organizational level of networks. Through a case study applied to a network of companies in the horticultural sector of the Angevin region, we seek to identify how the objectives of each of the two organizational levels contribute to the construction of the network in question and to the reinforcement of its degree of negentropy.

Dans un cadre ethno-sociologique et à partir d’un travail empirique longitudinal lié à notre statut professionnel d’enseignante, l’étude porte sur l’engagement des élèves dans les pratiques de danse et de cirque en milieu scolaire et plus particulièrement en Education Physique et Sportive (EPS). Au travers de l’observation de différents espaces de pratiques scolaires et la mise en œuvre d’entretiens compréhensifs, cette recherche propose un questionnement analytique, faisant émerger des contradictions/paradoxes entre le discours des élèves engagés, celui des enseignants d’EPS promoteurs de ces pratiques, et celui porté par les textes officiels. La typologie des formes d’engagement produite tend à montrer que les élèves se construisent dans un engagement singulier par un jeu complexe de négociations, de glissements entre les normes et les valeurs portées par l’institution scolaire et celles des « mondes de l’art » (H. Becker). Cette construction de l’élève investi dans les Activités Physiques Artistiques (APA) passe par des variations des modalités d’attachements (A. Hennion), à l’activité et aux enseignants militants qui les transmettent. / This study deals with the commitment of pupils in dance and circus practices within schools and more specifically in Physical Education (P.E.). It was lead within an ethno-sociological framework and based on empirical and longitudinal work in relation to our professional status as a teacher. Throughout our observation of different types of practices in various conditions in schools, along with our comprehensive interviews, this research project suggests an analytical questioning, which lead to the idea of contradictions / paradoxes between the discourses of the committed pupils, the P.E. teachers who promote these practices, and the official school curriculum. The typology of the forms of commitment thus created tends to show that pupils evolve by building a rather singular type of commitment through a negotiation process, a shift between the norms and values represented by the school institution and those of the “ worlds of art” (H. Becker). The construction, by the pupil who is committed to the Artistic Physical Activities (APA), goes through variations of attachment modalities (A. Hennon) to the activity and to the activist teachers who pass those activities on.

My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.

<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. My main thesis is that the two different groups of paradoxes need different kinds of solution. Based on the analysis of the diagonal method and truth-gap theory, I propose a functional-deflationary interpretation for semantic notions such as ‘heterological’, ‘true’, ‘denote’, and ‘define’, and argue that the contradictions in semantic paradoxes are due to a misunderstanding of the non-representational nature of these semantic notions. Thus, they all can be solved by clarifying the relevant confusion: the liar sentence and the heterological sentence do not have truth values, and phrases generating paradoxes of definability (such as that in Berry’s paradox) do not denote an object. I also argue against three other leading approaches to the semantic paradoxes: the Tarskian hierarchy, contextualism, and the paraconsistent approach. I show that they fail to meet one or more criteria for a satisfactory solution to the semantic paradoxes. For the set-theoretic paradoxes, I argue that the criterion for a successful solution in the realm of set theory is mathematical usefulness. Since the standard solution, i.e. the axiomatic solution, meets this requirement, it should be accepted as a successful solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)