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La personne est un concept tributaire de la catégorie de substance, à laquelle la métaphysique contemporaine continue souvent de l'assimiler. Or, la substance méconnaît la nature profondément relationnelle de la personne, et n'est quasiment plus d'aucune utilité en dehors de la métaphysique elle-même. Nous lui substituons d'autres catégories, afin de distinguer méthodiquement la personne d'une part de l'animal humain, comme nous y invite l'ontologie animaliste, et d'autre part de l'ego cartésien, si fortement critiqué par Parfit. Ce faisant, nous retrouvons les deux thèses les plus puissantes de la personne : la thèse chrétienne* qui en fait un centre de relations, et la thèse bouddhiste* qui en fait un complexe de propriétés. Toutefois, la première affilie la personne au modèle particulier de la Sainte Trinité, tandis que la seconde aboutit le plus souvent à un nihilisme de la personne tout aussi spéculatif. Nous proposons de penser la personne comme un processus, ou une série d'événements, afin de faire droit à l'idée de "personhood" : c'est à travers l'interaction entre les niveaux psychologiques et sociaux que la personne émerge, comme une activité auto-organisatrice qui ne se réduit pas à des propriétés biologiques, et n'est pas davantage soluble dans des structures collectives. Le saut quantique que la personne accomplit au sein de la nature, sans correspondre à une rupture ontique, peut être mieux apprécié : l'agentivité et la dignité propres à la personne sont aussi des phénomènes émergents, et des caractéristiques objectives. La personne est donc moins une entité qu'une instance, ou un réseau particulier de relations au sein d'un monde en perpétuel mouvement. / The concept of a person is historically dependent on the metaphysical category of substance, and contemporary metaphysics keeps assimilating one and the other. But the substance ignores the deeply relational nature of the person, and is virtually of no use outside of metaphysics itself. That is why we substitute other categories, to systematically distinguish the person firstly from the human animal, as prompted by the animalist ontology, and secondly from the Cartesian ego, so strongly criticized by Derek Parfit. In doing so, we find the meaning of the two most powerful theories of the person: the Christian thesis*, making it a center of relationships, and the Buddhist thesis*, making it a complex of properties. However, the first one affiliates the person to the particular model of the Holy Trinity, while the second leads most often to a nihilism of the person just as much speculative. We therefore propose to consider the person as a process, or series of events, so as to stand for the the metaphysical idea of an emergent personhood: it is through the interaction between psychological and social levels that the person continuously emerges as a self-organizing activity that cannot be reduced to biological properties, and is not more soluble in collective structures. The quantum leap that the person accomplishes in nature, without corresponding to an ontological rupture, can in turn be best appreciated: the agentivity and the dignity of the person, are also emerging phenomena, which count as objective features. The person is considered less as an entity than as an instance, that is to say a particular network of relations in a changing world.

In this thesis I establish a hitherto unseen parallel between John Rawls’ theory of justice and utilitarian accounts with respect to population ethics; I argue that the absurd conclusions which plague utilitarianism also plague Rawls’ theory. These are the repugnant and preposterous conclusions. I then argue that Kant's political philosophy offers the resources to escape these absurd conclusions because of a crucial metaphysical difference between theories governed by outcome-oriented considerations and those governed by freedom-oriented constraints.

The nonidentity problem is the issue of how to justify the belief that it is wrong to bring a person into existence if they would have a flawed life, though still worth living, instead of bringing another, nonidentical person into existence who would have a better life. To have an impaired life that is worth living seems to be a good existence, at least for the person in question. The nonidentity problem was made known mostly by Derek Parfit. The problem draws attention to three intuitions that seemingly cannot all be correct. How we respond to this predicament and which intuitions a solution depends on have severe implications primarily in population ethics but it will also affect other areas, to mention a few; genetic engineering, if and how to correct historical wrongdoing, and just resource management. In this essay, I will discuss David Boonin’s objections to previously proposed approaches to handle the nonidentity problem and his proposal on a solution. The conclusion I will draw is that although Boonin presents an answer based on a strategy of biting the bullet he fails to show how this is a plausible response to the nonidentity problem. Instead, I argue for my preferred strategy to tackle the problem by referring to a consequentialist moral theory such as utilitarianism. I intend to show that such a theory provides the most plausible solution and make the case that Boonin’s critique of such an approach is unjustified.

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The use of reason appears to lead to divergent conclusions for what is right and what is good in human action. While reason is a central feature in ethical theory, there is a problem when that central feature does not lead to consistent conclusions about how to act in a given situation. Several philosophers have attempted to combine previous moral theories in order to provide a better template for human action. I contend that the use of reason is of vital import when determining the foundation for moral action and that moral theories, to be consistent with reason, should incorporate aspects of both non-consequentialist and consequentialist ethical theories. I argue that there is a unifying foundation presupposed by the moral theories of both Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Through the use of reason the theories of Kant and Mill can be reconciled to show that these theories can be combined when understanding the basic foundation that they share.

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What can be assumed to be a general understanding of personal identity, is that it is constituted by a fixed and unchanging core of every self-conscious being that remains the same over time. This view could be traced to the notion that a perfect copy of you would not be you since you constitute the original and not the copy. But maybe it's not that simple, maybe a copy of you can also be you, while existing as your "original"?In this essay I will explore a functionalist argument as well as a self-constructed thought experiment that challenges the traditional view of personal identity as a fixed and unchanging core, inextricably linked to a single body. This exploration will lead to the idea of "metasurvival". Metasurvival is understood as the possibility that a person can survive through another person. The idea of metasurvival thus challenges the dichotomy between life and death. / Vad som kan antas vara en allmän uppfattning om personlig identitet, är att den utgörs av en fast och oföränderlig kärna i varje självmedveten varelse som förblir densamma över tid. Denna uppfattning skulle kunna härledas till föreställningen att en perfekt kopia av dig inte skulle vara dig, eftersom du utgör originalet och inte kopian. Men kanske är det inte så enkelt, kanske kan en kopia av dig också vara dig, samtidigt som du existerar som ditt ”original”?I denna uppsats kommer jag att utforska ett funktionalistiskt argument, samt ett eget konstruerat tankeexperiment som ifrågasätter den traditionella synen på personlig identitet som en fast och oföränderlig kärna, oupplösligt knuten till en enskild kropp. Denna utforskning kommer att leda fram till idéen om ”metaöverlevnad”. Med metaöverlevnad förstås möjligheten att en person kan överleva genom en annan person. Idéen om metaöverlevnad utmanar därmed dikotomin mellan liv och död.