Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en une nouvelle édition critique avec introduction, traduction en italien et commentaire de l’« Éryxias » pseudo-platonicien, un dialogue socratique ayant été transmis parmi les œuvres de Platon mais qui était déjà connu par les anciens pour être inauthentique et faussement attribué au grand philosophe (voir par exemple Diogène Laërce 3, 62). L’édition critique la plus récente du texte, publiée dans la « Collection des Universités de France » par les soins de Joseph Souilhé en 1930, est fondée sur une reconstruction de la tradition manuscrite qui a été remise en question par les études de L.A. Post (1934). En outre, malgré le récent retour d’intérêt pour les dialogues « apocryphes » du corpus platonicien, l’« Éryxias » reste méconnu et peu étudié : après les deux dissertations allemandes d’O. Schrohl (Göttingen 1901) et G. Gartmann (Bonn 1949), il n’y a pas eu de travaux dédiés spécifiquement au dialogue, exception faite de la décevante traduction annotée par R. Laurenti (Bari 1969). L’hypothèse avancée au cours de ce travail voit en l’« Éryxias » un produit composé à l’école fondée par Platon, l’Académie, après la mort du fondateur et plus précisément pendant la première moitié du troisième siècle avant Jésus-Christ : cela ferait du dialogue un témoin de la reconstruction de la pensée et de l’activité littéraire de l’Académie hellénistique. L’introduction est divisée en quatre chapitres. Les deux premiers abordent les problèmes plus strictement philologiques, liés à la transmission du corpus et du dialogue dans l’antiquité et à la chronologie du texte, notamment fixée par les savants sur la base de la présence d’un magistrat – le gymnasiarque – qui n’apparaît pas à Athènes avant la fin du quatrième siècle avant Jésus-Christ. Le troisième chapitre porte sur le contenu philosophique : le sujet de l’« Éryxias » est le rapport entre richesse (ploutos) et vertu (arete). Deux conclusions différentes sont présentées, en s’appuyant sur deux définitions différentes de la richesse : selon la première, ayant trait au concept de valeur, le sage est le plus riche des hommes ; selon la seconde, identifiant la richesse à la possession de biens matériels (chremata), le plus riche des hommes sera le plus méchant. Les deux conclusions sont parfaitement en accord avec un arrière-plan philosophique constitué par les dialogues de Platon et s’insèrent dans une tentative visant à accorder les divers traitements de la richesse dans les écrits authentiques. La recherche menée dans l’« Éryxias » peut bien être contextualisée dans le mouvement général de « renaissance du Socratisme » qui a été individué par les savants durant la première moitié de l’époque hellénistique (voir A. A. Long, Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy, CQ 38, 1988, 150-171 ; F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Napoli 2000). L’Académie, comme le montre la production de dialogues socratiques, occupe un rôle central dans ce mouvement, ayant l’effort de revendiquer l’héritage de Socrate à travers son disciple, Platon. Le quatrième chapitre porte sur l’aspect littéraire : l’« Éryxias » a été reconnu par les savants comme le plus soigné des dialogues inauthentiques en ce qui concerne la cure de l’élément artistique. Après un paragraphe sur la poétique du dialogue dans l’« Éryxias », nous relevons une étude approfondie du proème, qui se montre particulièrement détaillé, ainsi que de Socrate et des autres personnages. À la fin du chapitre, le style et la langue du dialogue sont examinés. À la suite d’une note sur la tradition manuscrite, est donnée une nouvelle édition critique avec apparat du dialogue, suivie d’une traduction en italien. Le commentaire extensif porte sur des questions de détail s’insérant dans le plus grand cadre tracé au cours de l’introduction : son approche est autant philologique-littéraire qu’historique et philosophique. Un appendice de tables et une bibliographie sont ajoutés en qualité d’instruments nécessaires au lecteur. / This PhD thesis consists in a new critical edition with introduction, italian translation and commentary of the pseudo-platonic Eryxias, a Socratic dialogue transmitted inside the corpus of Plato’s works but already known in antiquity (see Diogenes Laertius 3.62) to be inauthentic and falsely attributed to the ancient philosopher. The latest critical edition of the Eryxias, which dates back to 1930 and was published by J. Souilhé in the «Collection des Universités de France», is not reliable, as it depends on a misleading reconstruction of the manuscript tradition, outdated at least since the pioneering work of L. A. Post (1934, The Vatican Plato and its Relations, Middletown); moreover, notwithstanding the text’s philosophical and literary interest and length inside the group of the Platonic spuria, the Eryxias has not been object of specific studies in the past century, exception made for the two dissertations by O. Schrohl (Göttingen 1901) and G. Gartmann (Bonn 1949), two works that remain hardly accessible even to scholars in the field, and for the italian edition by R. Laurenti (Bari 1969). Even in recent years, when the spurious dialogues have seen a renaissance as a field of study (see for example the volume edited by K. Döring, M. Erler and S. Schorn, Pseudoplatonica, Stuttgart, 2005), the Eryxias remains less studied than other items in the corpus, mainly due to its extension – fifteen pages of the canonic edition by Stephanus (1578) – and to its overall complexity. In spite of this marginal role in recent studies, the Eryxias had attracted since the 18th century the interest of scholars and historians of ancient economy, as it presents an ancient discussion on the value of wealth and material goods. The first part of the introduction deals with the philological issues and the general problems related to the transmission of the text in antiquity. In the second chapter I turn to the philosophical content. The theme of the Eryxias is an enquiry on the relationship between wealth (ploutos) and virtue (arete), led by Socrates together with his interlocutors Erasistratus, Eryxias and Critias (the tyrant). Two definitions of wealth are investigated: according to the first, which is centered on value (axios) the wealthiest man will be the wise man (sophos), as wisdom is the greatest value for mankind. According to the second, which identifies wealth with the possession of material goods (chremata), the richest man will be the most wicked. Both of these conclusions are consistent with the main model of the dialogue, that is to say the authentic writings of Plato. In the introduction I argue that the philosophical aim of the Eryxias is in fact an attempt to draw a coherent doctrine of wealth based on the Platonic dialogues and on the research developed inside Plato’s school, the Academy, in the first decades of the third century: to prove this point I show the coherence with many parallel passages in Plato’s writings, which show a careful study of the whole body of work associated to the name of the founder of the Academy, and I try to set the Eryxias in its historical frame, namely the «return to Socrates» that historians have seen in the first part of the Hellenistic Age (see A. A. Long, Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy, CQ 38, 1988, 150-171; F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Napoli 2000). In the third and final chapter I concentrate my attention on the literary aspect, with a particular interest in the reception of the models of Socratic literature in the composition of the dialogue. Follows a note on the medieval tradition. After the text and translation, the extended commentary focuses on issues of detail, both literary-philological and philosophical. An appendix with tables as a full bibliography are included.

The main purpose of the thesis is: on the basis of an analysis and interpretation of Plato's Dialogues, to describe his personal characteristics in its relation to his pedagogic reality, and, on the basis of these descriptions, to analyse and interpret his teaching methods as a result of two different processes. The scientific perspectives of the thesis are inspired by hermeneutic philosophy of history and especially by the theories of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Furthermore, the perspective is grounded on three concepts of pedagogics, by the help of which both explicit and implicit pedagogic processes are analysed. In order to interrelate the interpretations some analytical and interpretational models have been used, based on Ricoeur's mimesis concept and his theory of narrative identity. The final interpretations maintain that a particular line runs through Plato's teaching, and that its goal is intellectual autonomy and a change in the pupil's whole view of the world, which implies a fusion between intellect and existential experience. This line shows that Plato teaches in both a sensual and spiritual dimension and that these processes, though contrasted, function in parallel. The goal of intellectual autonomy demonstrates how Plato breaks with his culture and by doing so recommends solitude - something quite revolutionary in an age when the group, a strong sense of community and of being one of Us sets its stamp on everyones mentality. An interpretation of the Symposium shows how any change in world view calls for a combination of existential experience and thought. The main principal features in Plato's teaching methods are presented as preparation, change, liberation and wisdom.

Protreptic is a form of rhetoric, textual and oral in form, which exhorts its recipients to reorient their lives both morally and intellectually. Plato frequently portrays Socrates' use of this rhetoric with interlocutors who are enticed by the moral and political views of figures from Athens' intellectual culture. During these conversations Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors to reorient their lives in a way that conforms more closely to his own moral and intellectual practice of philosophy. Plato's depiction of protreptic, however, also exerts a protreptic effect on readers of his dialogues. Plato's writing thus performs a dual function, simultaneously depicting instances of protreptic at work and attempting to exert a protreptic effect on readers. In this dissertation I argue that understanding this dual function of Plato's writing is inseparable from understanding his conception of philosophy. I analyze the structure of protreptic in Plato's writing by identifying four aspects essential to an interpretive method that takes full stock of the protreptic function of Plato's dialogues. These aspects are (1) the proper recipient of protreptic; (2) the persuasive means available to protreptic; (3) the immediate target of persuasion; (4) the ultimate philosophical aim toward which protreptic advances the recipient. While some of these aspects must be determined with respect to particular dialogues, those that concern the form of Plato's writing—such as the means of persuasion and ultimate philosophical goals—can inform a general approach to Plato's dialogues. The means that Socrates uses to persuade his interlocutors are sometimes affective, influencing their emotions, and other times intellectual, appealing to them exclusively with logical argument. I argue that a combination of these means into a form I call “provocative-aporetic” better accounts for the means that Plato uses to exert a protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously intellectual and affective experience, and the way that readers choose to respond to aporia has a greater protreptic effect than either affective or intellectual means alone. The Republic is a crucial dialogue for studying protreptic because it addresses the ultimate moral and intellectual ends toward which Plato hopes to reorient readers, and puts the various protreptic means at Socrates' and Plato's disposal on full display. The dialogue offers both an argument for a life committed to virtue, and an outline of the theoretical insights—mathematical and dialectical—that philosophers may hope to gain from more serious study. It also portrays Socrates in conversation with characters of a variety sufficient to show his rhetorical and argumentative repertoire. In this dissertation I carry out a reading of the Republic according to the four aspects of the structure of protreptic discussed above. More specifically, I identify moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus answer Socrates' questions in such a way that they concede to Socrates the truth of premises that contradict their defense of the unjust life. These moments reveal that the central point of dispute in the Republic concerns the nature of moral agency— particularly the functions of reason, desire, and habituation for moral agents. Accordingly, I identify two models of agency—a Technē Model and a Virtue Model— that ground their respective defenses of justice and injustice, and hold their own assumptions about reason, desire, and habituation within their respective moral psychologies. Glaucon and Adeimantus' moments of capitulation, function as moments of aporia for readers, who are then provoked to overcome the aporia by explaining why the capitulation is reasonable. In doing so, we gain an account how Glaucon and Adeimantus are coaxed to abandon their original views about justice, injustice, and moral agency and to accept those of Socrates. This account in turn yields insight into protreptic by depicting how Socrates brings about a reorientation toward philosophy from within a non-philosophical perspective.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de la Sorbonne nouvelle, Paris III, 1997-1998. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 727-744) and index.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de la Sorbonne nouvelle, Paris III, 1997-1998. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 727-744) and index.

Face à la diversité des textes platoniciens consacrés au passé, les commentateurs ont le plus souvent proposé d'y voir soit une philosophie de l'histoire unitaire et profondément pessimiste, soit une simple forme rhétorique permettant à Platon de défendre ses différentes idées. En mettant en cause la lecture historiciste des récits sur l’origine et la chute de l'État idéal dans la République et du mythe cosmologique du Politique, nous en présentons une lecture analytique, tout en prenant en compte le rapport qu'entretiennent ces textes avec la tradition hésiodique et sophistique des récits sur le passé. Nous proposons de distinguer, d'autre part, la catégorie particulière des textes platoniciens qu'on pourrait appeler les « mythes sur le passé d'Athènes » : le récit atlante et la partie historique du Discours funèbre de Socrate dans le Ménexène, dont la spécificité se comprend le mieux, à notre avis, compte tenu de l'idée de noble mensonge proposée par Platon dans la République. Nous nous intéressons enfin au statut du récit des Lois III, considéré souvent comme le texte le plus historique chez Platon, et nous nous efforçons de montrer, à l'aide de cet exemple, comment Platon réussit à combiner le matériau historique concret et ses théories politiques et psychologiques, en adoptant ainsi la même démarche que dans les récits de la République II et VIII – IX. / In view of the diversity of Plato's texts about the past, the commentators have most commonly suggested to consider them either as a unitary, profoundly pessimistic, conception of history or as a rhetoric form that enables Plato to defend his different ideas. By calling into question the historicising interpretation of the narratives discussing the origin and the decline of the ideal state in the Republic and of the cosmic myth of the Statesman, we offer an synchronic reading of them, taking in consideration the connections between these passages and the Hesiodic and Sophistic tradition of narratives about the past. We suggest to distinguish, on the other hand, a specific category of the Platonic historical accounts that could be called the «myths about the past of Athens» : the Atlantis story and the historical section of the Funeral oration of Socrates in the Menexenus that we could understand the most clearly, in our opinion, if we take in consideration the notion of the “Noble Lie” that Plato introduced in the Republic. Finally, we're focusing our attention on the status of the narrative of the past in the Laws III, often considered as the most historical text in Plato, and we try to show, from this example, how Plato manages to combine the concrete historic facts and his political and psychological theories, following the same approach as in his accounts in the Republic II and VIII – IX.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis, 'shadow' is investigated as an object of thought and (analogically connected to this) of perception. This dialectical process is structured through means of a series of experiments and Plato's allegory of the cave, which is interpreted as a process directed towards selfconciousness. This process is further explained through thinkers such as, Blumenberg, Heidegger, Levinas en Voegelin. The purpose of this study is to break with the self-evident way in which 'shadow' is 'normally' treated and to bring back about a sense of astonishment for it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word die 'skaduwee' as waarnemingsobjek en (analogies verwant daaraan) as denkobjek ondersoek. Hierdie dialektiese proses word gestruktureerd met behulp van 'n aantal eksperimente en Plato se grotgelykenis, wat geinterpreteer word as programmaties van die proses van selfbewuswording. Hierdie proses word verder toegelig aan die hand van denkers soos Blumenberg, Heidegger, Levinas en Voegelin. Die doel van die ondersoek is om die vanselfsprekendheid waarmee daar met die fenomeen van die skaduwee omgegaan word te deurbreek en weer verwondering daarvoor op te roep. / NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING: In deze thesis wordt de 'schaduw' als waarnemingsobject en (analogisch verwant daaraan) als denkobject onderzocht. Dit dialectische proces wordt gestructureerd met behulp van een aantal experimenten en Plato's grotvergelijking, die geïnterpreteerd worden als een proces gericht op zeltbewustwording. Dit proces wordt verder toegelicht aan de hand van denkers zoals, Blumenberg, Heidegger, Levinas en Voegelin. Het doel van het onderzoek is om de vanzelfsprekendheid waarmee met het fenomeen van de 'schaduw' omgegaan wordt, te doorbreken en er opnieuw verwondering voor op te roepen.

摘要 本篇論文的討論起點來自柏拉圖如何面對靈魂能夠認知真理的這個可能性。柏拉圖設立那與變動的感覺現象完全分離的「不變動的『相』」作為知識得以成立的條件，這個歷史緣由可從亞里士多德的記載當中知道：一方面，柏拉圖認同克拉梯樓斯與赫拉克利圖學派所主張的感覺現象的永遠流動、無一停留，並因此認為絕不可能有關於感覺現象的知識，然而，另一方面，那致力於倫理事物研究的蘇格拉底則堅持必定有那可被定義的知識對象得以被思考與認知；由於受到這兩方所堅持的信念，柏拉圖則在為了拯救現象並使思考與知識得以可能的情況下，他設立了那必須與變動的感覺現象完全分離的相來作為感覺現象之所以如此存在的原因，並在透過那分有相的感覺現象當中，靈魂得以思考並回憶起關於相的知識，而由此拯救現象並保全靈魂得以思考且獲得知識的可能性。 然而，柏拉圖的分離相論卻有可能引發諸多困難，這主要可由《巴曼尼德斯篇》裡的少年蘇格拉底所遭遇到的三個困境所表現出來：○1少年蘇格拉底對於是否有卑下者的相的存在，顯得猶疑不定；○2由於無法回答相與現象之間到底是如何分有，以致於分有成為不可能；○3更進一步地，正是由於相與現象彼此的完全分離，以致於原本肩負拯救現象這使命的相，到頭來卻反而根本無法拯救現象，而且也面臨無法為人所知的這個最大困境。 這三個困境其實正是柏拉圖真理之路---愛智者如何能擁有那與現象完全分離的相的知識？---所蘊含的兩個一體兩面的論題：第一，思考與知識的可能性如何成立？也就是，相如何拯救現象？第二，愛智者要以什麼樣的方法才能正確地獲得相的知識以成為真正的哲學家？關於第一個論題，筆者認為，柏拉圖在《巴曼尼德斯篇》第二部分的八組推論當中提出一種具有數特徵的存有論，這個存有論綿密、細緻地論說《蒂邁歐篇》裡的宇宙生成論以及「未成書研究」裡的原理論，在這當中，相拯救現象的可能性乃在於---神以其意願與叡智將相形塑於這個數存有的世界並因此使那些在場域裡生滅變化的現象獲得一致性，如此，神的意願（i.e.善）乃作為相得以拯救現象的最具統馭力的原因與原理；關於第二個論題，那能使少年蘇格拉底獲得真理以成為哲學家的訓練，正是那以合理論說所掌握的相為對象的訓練，筆者認為，柏拉圖在這個訓練當中，試圖透過假設法的運用，使得愛智者能緊守在對「是」（i.e.相）的追求上，並得以在一步步的往上探求當中，在最後能以最終的決定性原因---善---來束縛住所有的相，如此，當愛智者能在「善」的指導下以合理論說來正確地指出每個相的真實本質時，這個愛智者也就成為真正的哲學家。 在這樣的解決方式當中，柏拉圖證成了靈魂能夠認知真理的可能性，為自己的真理之路尋得一個合理的立足點。柏拉圖在這當中所奮力搏鬥的，主要並不是亞里士多德在《物理學以後諸篇》A 6.987a33-b10所提及的這些哲學家，而是歷史上的這位伊利亞哲學家---巴曼尼德斯：柏拉圖分離相論的核心來自巴曼尼德斯其毫無生滅變動的「完滿的是」，然而，柏拉圖拯救現象以及保全思考與知識的可能性的這個企圖，卻又是必須對巴曼尼德斯的「完滿的是」提出批判。而在柏拉圖藉由這兩個假設與八組推論來與巴曼尼德斯奮力搏鬥當中，柏拉圖所完成的不僅僅只是解決分離相論所可能引來的困境，而更是走上一條不同於巴曼尼德斯的真理之路，因為現象的拯救是柏拉圖所主要異於巴曼尼德斯的地方，而那使得現象得以被相所拯救的最具統馭力的原因與原理乃在於---宇宙父親的意願與叡智，而這乃作為柏拉圖自己的真理之路的最終磐石。 關鍵詞：相論，分離，分有，善，假設法，柏拉圖，巴曼尼德斯，〈未成書研究〉，《巴曼尼德斯篇》，《蒂邁歐篇》。 / Abstract The aim of this thesis is to show that how Plato might deal with the possibility for soul of knowing the truth. The historical reason for Plato positing the invariable Forms, which are totally apart from the variable sensible things, is remarked by Aristotle that: on the one hand, having been agreed with Cratylus and the Heracllitean doctrines that all sensible things are always in a state of flux and that no science of them exists, yet on the other hand, taking into account the Socrates’ efforts to find general definitions of ethical terms, Plato, having been inspired by both views, thinks that there must be some invariable things, i.e. Forms, which are totally apart from the variable sensible things and could only be thought with logos（or reasonable account）, as the causes of the sensible things. Therefore, the soul could recollect and think of Forms by perceiving these sensible things, which participate in the corresponding Forms. Hence, Plato saves the phenomena and secures the possibility for soul of thinking and knowing the truth by his theory of Forms. However, there might be many problems that arisen from Plato’s theory of Forms. These problems are shown mainly by the three perplexities, which are encountered by the young Socrates in the Parmenides. First, the young Socrates is undecided about whether the base things could have their Forms, second, having been unable to solve the problem of the sharing between the sensible things and Forms, the young Socrates finally has to accept the impossibility of sharing, third, further, just owing to this totally separation that is between the sensible things and Forms, Forms finally could not save the phenomena and could not be known by anyone. Actually, the three perplexities are the two topics of Plato’s way of truth, which is that how the lover of wisdom could know the Forms that are totally separate from the sensible things. The first topic is that, in what way the possibility of thinking and acquiring knowledge could be secured. That is, how the phenomena could be saved by Forms? The second topic is that, in what way the lover of wisdom could acquire the truth and becomes the real philosopher. As for the first, I think that Plato claims a kind of ontology, which has numerical character, in the second part of the Parmenides. This ontology provides deliberately the cosmogony of the Timaeus and the theory of the Principles in the Unwritten Doctrines that could justify the possibility of the phenomena that are saved by Forms. This possibility lies in the god’s nous and will, i.e. the world that has numerical character is fashioned by the god with Forms as model, and then the becoming phenomena that cling to the receptacle are saved and intelligible. Therefore, the god’s will is the supremely valid cause and principle of this possibility. As for the second, this exercise that can make the young Socrates as a real philosopher if he takes it into practice is the training, which takes Forms as its objects and be practiced in hypothetical method. I think the reason for Plato of using the hypothetical method is that this hypothetical method can make the lover of wisdom to cling to Forms when he is putting this exercise into practice, and in this upward process systematically, finally, he can fasten all the Forms with the final cause, i.e. the good. Therefore, when the lover of wisdom could show the real essence of each Form with reasonable account under the guidance of the good, he at that time is a real philosopher. Under this solution, Plato justifies the possibility for soul of knowing the truth, and makes his way of truth possible. In this fighting, those with whom Plato fights are not those philosophers that are remarked by Aristotle in Metaphysics A 6.987a33-b10, but the philosopher of Elea, Parmenides. On the one hand, the key point of Plato’s theory of Forms is coming from Parmenides’ concept of Being, which is ungenerated and imperishable, yet on the other hand, the attempt for the possibility of saving the phenomena and for soul to know the truth is urging Plato to put Parmenides’ claim to the question. Then what Plato has done in this fighting, which mainly occurs in the second part of the Parmenides, is that as he is solving these perplexities, he at the same time is stepping upon another way of truth, which is different from Parmenides. In this fighting, saving phenomena is the main difference between Plato and Parmenides. The god’s nous and will is the supremely valid cause and principle of the saved phenomena and this most supreme cause is the coping-stone for Plato’s way of truth. Keywords: Plato’s theory of Forms, separate, participate, the good, the hypothetical method, Plato, Parmenides, the Unwritten Doctrines, the Parmenides, the Timaeus.

Esta Dissertação de Mestrado examina o tema Utopias/Distopias e o discurso totalitário em duas obras de caráter e gênero distintos: A República, de Platão (Filosofia), e Admirável Mundo Novo, de Aldous Huxley (Literatura). Tendo como objetivo principal a comparação de elementos narrativos, temáticos e ideológicos encontrados nessas duas obras, utiliza como metodologia a análise embasada em referenciais da Literatura Comparada e da Teoria da Literatura (Narratologia e a Tematologia), da Análise do Discurso Francesa, dos estudos da obra de Platão e de estudos sociológicos. Esta análise segue a sequência de apresentação dos pressupostos teóricos, análise das obras de Platão e de Huxley (em seus aspectos internos e externos), para, finalmente, apresentar um quadro comparativo com os discursos totalitários retirados dessas obras - discursos esses que são analisados em pormenores. Por fim, esta Dissertação culmina com a compreensão de que o tema utopia/distopia, e os discursos acerca dele, não se restringe somente à literatura ficcional, mas pode ser encontrado em estudos filosóficos e políticos, e no nosso dia a dia. / This thesis examines the theme of Utopia/Dystopia and the totalitarian discourse in two works of different nature and genre: Plato's Republic (a work of Philosophy) and Brave New World (a work of Literature) by Aldous Huxley. The thesis' main objective is to compare narrative, thematic and ideological elements. In order to perform this analysis, the author will make use of methodologies taken from Comparative Literature, Literary Theory (Narratology and Thematology), the French school of Discourse Analysis, studies on Plato's works and sociological studies. After presenting and explaining those theoretical references, the author shall perform an analysis of Plato's and Huxley's works, considering their internal and external aspects; afterwards, a final analysis shall be performed, comparing the totalitarian discourses contained within those works. After examining minutely those discourses, the thesis concludes by stating that the theme of Utopia/Dystopia is not restricted to fictional literature; it can be found, also, within the frame of philosophical and political studies, and in our day-to-day lives.

Esta Dissertação de Mestrado examina o tema Utopias/Distopias e o discurso totalitário em duas obras de caráter e gênero distintos: A República, de Platão (Filosofia), e Admirável Mundo Novo, de Aldous Huxley (Literatura). Tendo como objetivo principal a comparação de elementos narrativos, temáticos e ideológicos encontrados nessas duas obras, utiliza como metodologia a análise embasada em referenciais da Literatura Comparada e da Teoria da Literatura (Narratologia e a Tematologia), da Análise do Discurso Francesa, dos estudos da obra de Platão e de estudos sociológicos. Esta análise segue a sequência de apresentação dos pressupostos teóricos, análise das obras de Platão e de Huxley (em seus aspectos internos e externos), para, finalmente, apresentar um quadro comparativo com os discursos totalitários retirados dessas obras - discursos esses que são analisados em pormenores. Por fim, esta Dissertação culmina com a compreensão de que o tema utopia/distopia, e os discursos acerca dele, não se restringe somente à literatura ficcional, mas pode ser encontrado em estudos filosóficos e políticos, e no nosso dia a dia. / This thesis examines the theme of Utopia/Dystopia and the totalitarian discourse in two works of different nature and genre: Plato's Republic (a work of Philosophy) and Brave New World (a work of Literature) by Aldous Huxley. The thesis' main objective is to compare narrative, thematic and ideological elements. In order to perform this analysis, the author will make use of methodologies taken from Comparative Literature, Literary Theory (Narratology and Thematology), the French school of Discourse Analysis, studies on Plato's works and sociological studies. After presenting and explaining those theoretical references, the author shall perform an analysis of Plato's and Huxley's works, considering their internal and external aspects; afterwards, a final analysis shall be performed, comparing the totalitarian discourses contained within those works. After examining minutely those discourses, the thesis concludes by stating that the theme of Utopia/Dystopia is not restricted to fictional literature; it can be found, also, within the frame of philosophical and political studies, and in our day-to-day lives.