在眾多新聞報導或是學術論文中，描述到改革開放之後中共政治領導精英的資歷特徵時，皆認可現今中共領導人具有技術官僚出身的背景，但到底技術官僚定義為何？又現今中共領導階層果真多為技術官僚？技術官僚治國實能展現與職業官僚(career bureaucrats)迥異的執政風格？針對這些命題，卻是很少學者能夠提出一個完整而清晰的解釋。 針對以上所提出的疑問，形成了本論文的問題意識與架構，除了第一章導論與最後一章結論外，依序可以分成定義、起源、過程、影響四個部分，進一步說明： 一、從定義方面，何謂技術官僚？在第二章「技術官僚理論」中，提出本文對於技術官僚的定義：技術官僚是一個受過科學、技術等相關學科大學以上高等教育者，擁有專業的知識經驗，掌握政治上權力並傾向推動理性化決策機制，致力發展社會經濟。進而觀察技術官僚理論的歷史脈絡，主要分成兩大主軸發展，包括著重於社會專業技術發展背景的「後工業社會理論」以及著重於國家體制轉變的「漸常化理論」。最後，針對技術官僚理論中的兩大爭議，提出本文的看法：在技術官僚與政治技術官僚爭議方面，技術官僚將超越普通官僚佔據政治上的主導地位，因此採取技術官僚的說法是比較適合的；在有關民主化爭議方面，「政治最小化改革論」正說明技術官僚對於民主化的心態。 二、從起源方面，技術官僚在中共領導階層中興起原因為何？在第三章「中共技術官僚興起的背景」中，著眼於中國大陸的獨特性，從宏觀與微觀兩個方面，進行對於中共技術官僚興起原因的闡釋。在宏觀方面，由於技術官僚具備靈活政策執行能力的特性與經濟發展的觀點，讓中共得以應付極權主義衰退、威權主義興起所帶來的衝擊，創造新的合法性以維持統治地位。在微觀方面，鄧小平理論當中紅專論、科教興國論成為指導思想，新型態的幹部遞補制度則淘汰了年老、不具競爭力的革命幹部，建立年輕、具有執行力的幹部隊伍，這些措施皆幫助技術官僚在中共政治舞台上的興起。 三、從過程方面，中共政治領導精英是否為技術官僚？在第四章「中共技術官僚的發展—政治局案例分析」中，以十二大到十六大政治局作為樣本，從汰換率、教育、職業三個指標驗證中共技術官僚的形成，技術官僚在中共政治領導精英當中的發展，主要可分為三個時期：1982-1987年的「醞釀期」、1987-1997年的「成長期」，1997年之後的「成熟期」。時至今日，技術官僚不但佔了政治局委員一半以上，甚至每位政治局常委皆有技術官僚的背景，由此推論技術官僚已佔據中共政治體制當中的主導地位。 四、從影響方面，技術官僚制是否對於中國大陸政治具有影響力？是否真如理論中所言展現出有別於革命幹部新型態的統治方式？在第五章「中共技術官僚制的影響—三峽大壩決策分析」當中，對照改革開放前後三峽大壩決策方式的差異，革命幹部時期領導人是以防洪、國家安全，以及動員式思考的觀點出發，一元化、非專業化地推動三峽大壩的決策過程，專家能夠論證的空間狹小；技術官僚時期則著重三峽大壩對於經濟發展的帶動效應，決策方式較為多元化、專業化，不同領域的專家能夠針對三峽大壩能有較開放的意見討論空間。由此證明技術官僚理論對於解釋中國大陸政治確有其有效性，也解決了長久以來技術官僚制僅限於理論說明而不能提出實證依據的困境。 本文在結論部分回歸理論層次，反思後社會主義時期精英轉型，學界曾提出兩種對立的觀點：精英再生產理論與精英循環理論，若就中共政治領導精英的更替而言，本文支持精英循環理論的觀點，認為舊的革命幹部已被新型態的技術官僚所取代，老幹部們不再繼續掌握政治甚至社會上的權力。另外，在中共技術官僚制發展成熟之後，經濟以及法律相關系統出身的官僚將會逐漸增加，成為未來注意中共精英政治發展新的焦點。 / Numerous news reports or academic papers with describing the political elites in CCP after the open and reform in 1980’s have mostly recognized that nowadays the leaders of CCP have the same background of technocrats. But who’s technocrat? Are most of CCP’s political leaders technocrats? Is technocracy different from bureaucracy? Few scholars have a complete and clear explanation for this. These questions lead to the main idea and structure of the dissertation, except the first and the last chapter, which is divided in four parts: definition, origin, process, and influence. These four parts are as follows: About the definition, what’s the kind of man so-called “technocrat”? In the second chapter “technocratic theory,” the definition of technocrat is: a technocrat is a highly educated person, who majors in science and technical fields in result of having professional knowledge and experiences. He (She) holds political power in hand, inclines to move decision-making machines into rationalization, and devotes himself (herself) faithfully to develop social economics. Following history step by step, the technocratic theory develops toward two main directions: one is the theory of post-industrial society that focuses on the development of professional technology in modern society; the other is the theory of devolution that focuses on the transformation of national system. Moreover, for two arguments in technocratic theory, our points are as follows: about the difference between technocracy and political technocracy, technocrats will be taking much advantage in politics over career bureaucrats so that the version of technocracy is appropriate; political minimalism describes the attitude of technocrat toward democracy. About the origin, why technocrats could rise in the leading class of CCP? The third chapter “the background of CCP’s technocrats,” focusing on the unique of Mainland China, explains the reason from macroscopic and microscopic vision why technocrats rise. From macroscopic vision, because of technocrats’ policy-enforcing capability and economic-developing ability, CCP could not only control the impact that totalitarianism declines while authoritarianism rises but also establish new legitimacy to maintain its governance. From microscopic vision, the theory of “expert is red” and the strategy of “rejuvenate the country through science and education” direct politics elite recruitment system that young and capable elites replace revolutionary cadres. These measures actually help technocracy built in politics of CCP. About the process, are CCP’s political leaders technocrats? In the fourth chapter “the development of technocrats in CCP: a case study of politburo committee,” it examines the formation of technocrats from 12th to 16th politburo members of CCP with three indexes: recruitment, education, and profession. The development of CCP’s technocrats can be divided in three phases: the recessive period from 1982 to 1987, the growing period from 1987 to 1997, the mature period after 1997.Nowadays, technocrats have been more than 50% in politburo members of CCP. What is more, every standing member of politburo is the technocrat and technocrats take great advantage of political system in Mainland China. About the influence, do technocrats have important influence over Chinese politics? Is technocracy different from bureaucracy as the theory describes? The fifth chapter “the influence of CCP’s technocracy: an analysis of the decision-making process of Three Gorges Dam” compares the difference between the decision-making processes of Three Gorges Dam before and after 1980’s: during the period of revolutionary cadres, political leaders focus on the point of view in preventing flood, national security, and mobilization that drive the decision into monopoly, un-profession, and little discussion of experts; during the period of technocracy, political leaders focus on the promotion of booming economy, meanwhile, drive the decision into pluralism, professionalism, and open discussion. From above, it confirms that technocratic theory has its validity for politics in Mainland China and solves the dilemma of only theory but no actual evidence in technocracy. After all, we turn into the level of theory about the elite transformation during post-Communist period that includes two points of view: theory of elite reproduction and theory of elite circulation. As the recruitment of political leading elite in CCP, theory of elite reproduction is a better explanation because old revolutionary cadres, no longer have political even social power, are replaced by the new type of technocrats. Eventually, after technocracy has been developed maturely, elites who are professional in economics and law will become important and attractive points in the research field of CCP’s elite politics in the near future.

Entre 1947 et 1964, Maurice Thorez, secrétaire général du Parti communiste français, assiste à 381 réunions du Bureau politique et prend des notes pendant la plupart d'entre elles. Présentant une édition critique des notes de cinq années cruciales pour le PCF, ce travail définit le rôle du Bureau politique comme groupe dirigeant dans le processus décisionnel au sein du parti communiste français. Il s'est agi de montrer comment, en s'appuyant sur les notes de Maurice Thorez et en les mettant en relation avec les autres sources disponibles, le Bureau politique joue le rôle de médiateur à la direction du PCF. Composé de dirigeants sélectionnés selon des critères précis spécifiques à une organisation communiste, loyaux envers l'URSS et leur secrétaire général, il se réunit au moins une fois chaque semaine pour traiter principalement de l'actualité politique, intérieure comme extérieure, mais aussi du mouvement communiste international, ainsi que des sujets de prédilection du parti communiste: mouvement de la paix, luttes syndicales et catégories sociales par exemple. Même si, souvent, la ligne est tracée par l'URSS, Maurice Thorez se charge de l'adapter au cadre national et il a besoin, pour ce faire, du Bureau politique. Celui-ci nourrit et enrichit sa réflexion, lui sert de vecteur de transmission. Il est une interface indispensable entre le secrétaire général, relais du mouvement communiste international, et la base militante communiste représentée par le Comité central. / Between 1947 and 1964, Maurice Thorez, general secretary of the French Communist Party (PCF), attended 381 meetings of the Politburo and took notes during most of them. This work reports commented notes of five crucial years for the PCF and defines the role of the Politburo as the directing organ in the decision-making process of the PCF. Relying on Maurice Thorez' notes and relating them to other available sources, the purpose was to demonstrate how the Politburo played a mediation role at the direction of the party. Composed of leaders selected on precise criteria, specific to communist organizations, faithful to the USSR and to their general secretary, the Politburo used to meet at least once a week for talking mainly about the political context - national and international, but also for discussing the international communist movement and brother parties, as well as favourite subjects of the communist party, i.e. the movement for peace, union struggles or social classes for instance. Even if the guidelines were often drawn by the USSR, Maurice Thorez used 10 adapt them to the French context, with the help of the Politburo. The latter fed and enriched the general secretary's thoughts and acted as a transmission vehicle. It was an essential intermediary between the general secretary, representing the international communist movement, and the grassroots represented by the Central Committee.

This thesis focuses on the developments in the Soviet top-elite dynamics from 1981 to 1991. It claims that a careful examination of particular characteristics of the Soviet nomenklatura as a form of top-elite can give us important hints on how the intra-nomenklatura tensions that had been accumulating since its inception aggravated in the last decade of the USSR and contributed substantially to the Union&rsquo / s drive to the end. Hence, the main argument of this thesis is that when the Soviet top-elite lost its confidence on the elite-preserving capacity of Gorbachev, it started searching for alternatives, one of the most notable of which was the market economy option advocated by Boris Yeltsin at that time. This shift in the preferences of the Soviet nomenklatura played a considerable role in the dissolution process.

In 1950, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Walter Ulbricht, began a policy of connecting foreign threats with domestic policy failures as if the two were the same, and as if he was not responsible for either. This absolved him of blame for those failures and allowed Ulbricht to define his internal enemies as agents of the western powers. He used the state's secret police force, known as the Stasi, to provide the information that supported his claims of western obstructionism and to intimidate his adversaries. This resulted in a politicization of intelligence whereby Stasi officers slanted information so that it conformed to Ulbricht's doctrine of western interference. Comparisons made of eyewitness' statements to the morale reports filed by Stasi agents show that there was a difference between how the East German worker felt and the way the Stasi portrayed their attitudes to the politburo. Consequently, prior to June 17, 1953, when labor strikes inspired a million East German citizens to rise up against Ulbricht's oppressive government, the politicization of Stasi intelligence caused information over labor unrest to be unreliable at a time of increasing risk to the regime. This study shows the extent of Ulbricht's politicization of Stasi intelligence and its effect on the June 1953 uprising in the German Democratic Republic.