The aim of this paper is to examine the way political parties use populist discourse on social media following a terrorist attack. I analyze what type of populist language is used, and which parties use it, with a theoretical framework of Jagers and Walgrave (2007) and Magin et al. (2024). This is done by studying the 2017 terrorist attack in Sweden as a selected case. All statements regarding the terrorist attack made by a Swedish Member of Parliament on Facebook in the week following the attack are coded into a dataset and the mean value for each party are compared. The main findings are that it is not the beforehand populist-coded party (the Sweden Democrats) that uses the most amount of populist language. It is, however, this party that uses the most anti-elite and exclusion as populist communications. I also argue that terrorism should be seen as a populist issue, meaning statements on this topic contain, on average, more populist characteristics than non-populist issues do. This study is made with a small sample size and I encourage others to recreate this study in i) a bigger scale and ii) other political contexts.

This essay examines the indirect effects of the local strength of the Swedish Democrats on refugee acceptance in the Swedish municipalities. With statistical methods this essay has aimed to investigate if such effects exist and by using statistical data from three periods of time - 2002, 2006 and 2010 – the investigation has been able to measure effects over time. Based on former research and reasonable expectations the hypothesis for the essay claims that the Swedish Democrats has got an indirect effect upon the refugee acceptance. With the statistical analyses made, the essay is able to conclude that the strength of the Swedish Democrats in municipality elections as well as the change of this strength between the elections does have a negative effect upon refugee acceptance in the Swedish municipalities. With this conclusion, the idea of the Swedish Democrats as an isolated and insignificant party is questioned.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1957. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [269]-287).

abstract: Everyday Arias for soprano and orchestra was composed largely in Arizona and completed in February 2011. The text was taken from a small collection of the composer's own poetry referencing her memories of life in rural Mississippi. Everyday Arias endeavors to elevate these prosaic experiences and settings to art, expressing the everyday as beautiful and worthy of artistic treatment. The primary compositional model for this work was Samuel Barber's Knoxville: Summer of 1915, but other influences included Charles Ives, Aaron Copland, Benjamin Britten, and Dominick Argento. Barber's and Argento's musical treatment of prose style seemed particularly appropriate to the goals of Everyday Arias. Ives and Copland used hymn tunes both to evoke certain associations of worship and as sources of interesting material. The vocal writing of all five composers was influential, but the orchestration techniques for winds are largely a product of studying Ives and Argento, while many string gestures are more obviously tied to Britten and - more historically - Debussy.The primary motive that weaves through the work features an ascending major second followed by a descending perfect fourth, in a long-short-long rhythmic pattern. As a melodic fragment, the motive is often inverted to a descending-ascending pattern, or distorted slightly by expanding the second interval to a perfect fifth, or used in retrograde. The motive was derived from the first measure of the melody "Toplady" (1830) by Thomas Hastings, better known as the hymn "Rock of Ages." In the first movement, the motive is used most frequently in sequences. The second movement treats the motive as a melodic element and as a unit in ostinati. The final movement humorously transforms it into a syncopated gesture to evoke ragtime. / Dissertation/Thesis / D.M.A. Music 2011

This thesis tests one of the approaches that analyzes the rise of right-wing populist parties, "the economic crisis" approach. The core idea of this theory is that during an economic crisis, there is a rise of electoral support for the right-wing populist parties. The two case studies which are studied are the (Northern) League in Italy and the National Front/Rally in France. These analyses include a brief history of the said parties, their political profile, and the results in elections after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. As well as data on the profile of supporters of these parties and the reasons why they support these parties, and their views on some of the main political and social issues. From the data confrontation it is shown that there is no correlation between times of economic hardship, and the electoral success of these parties. And what is more important supporters of these parties also emphasize reasons related with identity rather than economic problems for supporting these parties. For economic issues they have a similar perception to the rest of the population. Keywords Populism, right-wing populism, populist parties, economic crisis, elections, identity.

The rise to power of Viktor Orbán in 2010 has brought with it democratic backsliding and suppression of rights in Hungary, a country that in the early 2000s was seen as one of the most promising new democracies in Eastern Europe. In this thesis speeches held by Viktor Orbán during the period of 2011-2022 are examined and analyzed and further connected with identified populist strategies and framing analysis. Which tries to understand the relation between communication in the context of sender and receiver and how the receiver might interpret the message differently depending on how it is “framed”. In an attempt to understand how and which populist strategies and rhetoric has been used to justify and motivate three overarching developments during Fidesz’s period in power: the major constitutional changes of 2012 and 2013, the developments on migration and the “Stop Soros Law” as well as the suppression of LGBT rights. This paper concludes that Viktor Orbán has continuously used populist rhetoric to “attack” and undermine his opposition, whether this is in the form of the EU or domestically, championing the Hungarian cause and its people thus justifying the changes that Fidesz has implemented.

The aim of this study is to explore whether Fratelli d’Italia can be classified as a populist radical right party based on their 2022 electoral manifesto. This thesis puts much emphasis on reviewing the existing literature on the understanding and definition of the populist radical right and the radical right. This is since the concept itself has been written extensively on with many different definitions and terminology existing in the scholarly field. Due to this confusion in how to define the concept this study will explain the chosen definition of the populist radical right applied in this thesis in depth.  This thesis will apply Mudde’s (2007) definition of the populist radical with the main ideological attributes being: authoritarianism, nativism and, populism.  The selected method for this study is qualitative content analysis (QCA) which will operationalize the ideological attributes of the populist radical right into main – and subcategories that will guide the analysis of FdI’s 2022 manifesto. The findings from analysing the party’s 2022 manifesto will show that the party can still be assigned to the populist radical right, although, with a revised tone compared to previous manifestos issued from FdI. The result of this study contributes to existing research on contemporary Italian politics and to the study of ideologies.

The Sweden Democrats has become the third largest party in Sweden after the parliamentary elections in 2014. Ever since the party was founded in 1988, debates regarding the party’s policy has been of great interests but also the party’s ideological affiliation whether to classify it as a populist radical right party or not. Furthermore, many scientists have arrived at the conclusion that the Sweden Democrats should be seen as a populist radical right party. This conclusion makes it interesting to further investigate what ideological affilitation the party should identify itself with since the party itself argues to be a social conservative party with a nationalist ethos. With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to examine if the party has populist radical right fundamentals in its recent policy program through the use of the method idea analysis and through the use of creating an ideal type of the theory populist radical right. In addition, it has thus been possible to confirm or to deny the Sweden Democrats as a populist radical right party. The result of this thesis has shown that the policy program does consist of populist radical right elements. Hence, it has been concluded that the Sweden Democrats should be categorized as a populist radical right party.

<p>The purpose of this study is to present populism as a political phenomenon and to impose focus on the rightwing populist parties that are active in Scandinavia. This essay begins with a presentation of the three rightwing political parties in Scandinavia. The rightwing populist parties have successfully developed their rhetoric and effectively influenced the political establishment in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The parties that the essay focuses on are the</p><p>Swedish democrats (SD), the Norwegian Progress party (FRP) and the Danish People`s party (DF). These parties are interesting in the sense that they share many opinions and are active in comparable political atmospheres, but also that they use approximately the same rightwing populist rhetoric as a way of exerting leverage on political policy.</p><p>The theoretical segment is constructed on a descriptive historical background of populisms three different phases. It begins with the classic populism then the “dissatisfaction party” and in conclusion, today's rightwing populism. The theoretical segment also addresses populisms ideological foundations and its contents. This includes the country of birth, the people, welfare “chauvinism” on ethnic national grounds, targeted dissatisfaction, criticism against representative democracy, populisms dynamic structure, hostility to foreigners and stranger distrust. The empirical analysis of the political parties is based on seven starting points: basic values, views on peoples worth, most important unit in society, method for social change, political forms of managing, economic organization and utopia. To illustrate these points a comparison between the average parties is done, by examining their respective party agendas.</p><p>The conclusion is drawn that there are few resemblances between the political parties examined; the differences considered are clearly stronger than the resemblances. The</p><p>differences lie mostly in basis values, most important unit in society and political forms of managing. Furthermore are the resemblances only partial. The parties were most similar in</p><p>relation to the family’s position in the society. SD and DF can be said to have similar ideologies while FRP’s ideology differs somewhat. SD and DF can be described as conservative nationalist parties, while FRP is a mixture of neoliberalism and conservatism. After studying each party’s principle agendas it can be established that all three parties utilize</p><p>rightwing rhetoric.</p><p>Keywords: rightwing populist parties, Swedish democrats, Norwegian Progress party and Danish People`s party, theoretical and analytical structure, empirical analysis.</p>

The aim of this study is to explore favorable opportunity structures for populist communication of politicians in Western democracies. We analyze the content and style of 2,517 statements from 103 politicians from six countries (France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States) who differ in their party affiliation (populist versus nonpopulist) and hierarchical position (backbencher vs. frontbencher). To learn more about their media strategies and chances of success, we investigate four communication channels (Facebook, Twitter, talk shows, and news media) that systematically differ in their degree of journalistic intervention and examine fourteen often-raised topics that differ in their suitability for populist mobilization. Our content analysis shows the highest probability of populist communication comes from (1) members of populist parties and (2) backbenchers who address (3) mobilizable issues in (4) social media or newspaper articles. We conclude by explaining why populists have become so successful in getting their messages into newspapers.