The execution of the modernity project proposed by the capitalist system depends fundamentally of the moment and place where it happens. That allows us to affirm that in Latin America and, particularly in Brazil, it assumes late outlines and it executes historically the deep marks of the slavery and, therefore, of the exclusion. This affects vastly its socio-cultural dimension that establishes a dispute among the pillars of the regulation and of the emancipation that are constituted in its support. In this game, the pillar of the regulation generates a system of social protection that it tends to consecrate rights noticed as privileges/benefits by the citizen, in the pillar of the emancipation, once the State associated to the Community s principle. This articulation alters the sense of Citizenship in Brazil and the order established by the liberal version in the construction of the rights. Here, the social ones preceded the civil and the political ones. This practice which prioritized the regulation to the detriment of the emancipation and it advanced social rights, especially the ones linked to the work, including social segments, until then to the margin of the productive process, in the periphery of the capitalist system, in the period of 1930/45, fell to the Populist State. With no doubt, it was constituted in a social alternative for the modernity in Latin America. / A execução do projeto de modernidade proposto pelo sistema capitalista depende fundamentalmente do momento e do lugar em que ele ocorre. Isso nos permite afirmar que na América Latina e, de modo particular no Brasil, ele assume contornos tardios e se cumpre historicamente com as marcas profundas da escravidão e, portanto, da exclusão. Isso afeta imensamente a sua dimensão sócio-cultural que estabelece uma disputa entre os pilares da regulação e o da emancipação que se constituem no seu sustentáculo. Nesse jogo, o pilar da regulação gera um sistema de proteção social que tende a consagrar direitos percebidos como privilégios/benefícios pelo cidadão, no pilar da emancipação, uma vez que o Estado se associou ao princípio da Comunidade. Essa articulação altera o sentido da Cidadania no Brasil e a ordem estabelecida pela versão liberal na construção dos direitos. Aqui, os sociais antecederam os civis e os políticos. Essa prática que priorizou a regulamentação, em detrimento da emancipação e antecipou direitos sociais, especialmente os vinculados ao trabalho, incluindo segmentos sociais, até então à margem do processo produtivo, na periferia do sistema capitalista, no período de 1930/45, coube ao Estado Populista. Sem dúvida, ela se constituiu numa alternativa social para a modernidade latino-americana.

In recent years a wave of right-wing populist parties has sweep in Europe. Two of these are Sweden’s Swedish Democrats and Norway’s Progress Party. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to research on how political parties are portrayed in mainstream media and how that may influence political party success in the elections. Content of two daily newspapers over two months before the last parliamentary elections in Sweden and Norway is examined within the study. The method used is a quantitative content analysis. The result was added to the agenda setting theory. From the result, an analysis was conducted to reveal how publication in newspapers can be expected to affect or not affect the selected parties’ successes in the elections. The result shows that the Progress Party receives more space in the daily press than the Swedish Democrats. Both parties are often mentioned in relation to other parties. In several articles, other parties want to show that there is a difference between their basic values, as opposed to the right-wing populist parties. Negative value words appear in the articles, especially in the case of the Swedish Democrats. There are both negative and neutral values in the case of the Progress Party. However, the articles often appear in a neutral way. The conclusion is that the daily press does not seem to have influence over the political parties’ successes in the elections in this case.

La présente recherche porte sur l'emploi des termes populisme et populiste lors de l'élection présidentielle française de 2012. Cette étude a été réalisée en traitant deux corpus : les discours politiques et complémentairement les discours journalistiques, recouvrant la période d'octobre 2010 à mai 2012. En se positionnant dans le cadre des théories de la sémantique discursive et de la praxématique, nous avons convoqué l'analyse du discours afin d'analyser la production de sens desdits termes.L'objectif étant de comprendre comment les candidats à la présidentielle de 2012 et les commentateurs dans la presse écrite emploient les termes en question dans leurs discours et de déterminer les procédés linguistiques qui interviennent dans ces discours afin de représenter ces termes.Les résultats obtenus illustrent qu'à partir du point de vue de la production de sens, il existe un jeu sur le sémantisme de ces termes : nous les recevons avec une production de sens majoritairement négative, même si certains locuteurs/écrivains essayaient d'injecter le sens positif dans son sens négatif antérieur. / This research focuses on the use of the terms populism and populist during the French presidential election of 2012. This study had carried out by treating two corpuses : political discourses and additionally journalistic discourses, covering the period from October 2010 to May 2012. By positioning in the theories of discursive semantics and of praxématique, we convened the discourse analysis to analyze the production of the meaning of those terms.The goal is to understand how the presidential candidates of 2012 and commentators in the press use the terms in question in their discourses, and to determine the linguistic processes involved in these discourses to represent these terms.The results show that from the point of view of the production of meaning, there is a semantic act on these terms, which we receive mostly with a negative meaning, although some speakers / writers was trying to inject the positive direction in their previous negative meaning.

Motivating the political will necessary for fair and ambitious climate change policies is significantly complicated by the rise of populism. Right-wing populist communication targets civil servants and intellectuals as conspirators furthering a climate agenda for their own self-interest. Yet, despite the real world implications of populist communication, more work is needed to both (1) understand the presence of populist frames in media communication on climate change and (2) untangle the relationships between the far-right and diverse forms of climate skepticism. Completing a content analysis of newspaper opinion pieces and Fox News programing between 2008 and 2020, I find that populist skeptic frames are an important part of media communication on climate change in both the Wall Street Journal and Fox News. Additionally, I find that populist skeptic frames most commonly use process skeptic claims, leveraging conspiratorial language to describe collusion between the government and scientists to falsify the severity of climate change and control the public for their own gain. Using a survey experiment, I find that higher populist attitudes are negatively associated with both belief in climate change and support for climate mitigation policies among Republicans. Conversely, I do not find a significant effect of exposure to a populist process skeptic frame, prompting the need for more work on the connections between populist skeptic framing and climate change attitudes.

In the past decade, scholars have discovered how European populist radical right parties have increasingly resorted to instrumentalizing issues of gender equality within broader anti-immigration and anti-Islam campaigns. This phenomenon has been coined as femonationalism by sociologist Sara R. Farris; building on her theorization, this thesis aims to investigate thisfurther in a Nordic context by examining whether and how femonationalism can be traced within the politics of the Finns Party (FP) and the Sweden Democrats (SD). This has been achieved by conducting an ideational analysis of the parties’ official election material and policy documents provided on their respective party websites. The analytical framework applied is political scientist Mats Lindberg’s VDP-triad, in which the central task is to capture the proposed value, descriptive, and prescriptive statements in a text. The thesis’ main findings indicate that for the FP, femonationalism could most closely be linked to their policy implications. Here, the FP advocates for extensive anti-immigration and anti-Islam policies, while also promoting policies that uphold a traditional gender order amongst Finns. For the SD, femonationalism was mostly found in their expressed value statements concerning the supremacy of western values in relation to gender equality, which migrants are supposed to internalize and respect. Implications for future research are to examine the phenomenon of femonationalism further in different country settings in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how it presents itself.

Populist movements have been on the rise across Europe and the Americas. In France, the far right-wing party, Le Front National, has experienced recent growth in electoral success. Scholars of the Front National have in part attributed the party’s success to its increased use of populist rhetoric. This thesis examines the populist rhetoric used between the Front National’s past president Jean-Marie Le Pen and current president Marine Le Pen in order to test these scholarly claims. Based on their campaign speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 French presidential elections, I conducted a quantitative dictionary-based analysis on the difference in use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. My results show that there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between the two leaders. Consequently, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist rhetoric in the Front National has more to do with the saliency of populism than numerical fact.

Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to analyze how populist parties argue for state authority in a way that resembles Thomas Hobbes’s arguments in Leviathan. Moreover, the essay analyzes the characteristics of human nature studied by Thomas Hobbes connecting it to the importance of the National State. The parties analyzed are Sweden Democrats from Sweden, VOX from Spain and Jobbik from Hungary. The research questions are: 1)How do populist parties argue for state authority?  2) How do their arguments resemble Thomas Hobbes’s arguments for state authority in Leviathan? The theories used are related to the study of Thomas Hobbes described in Chapter 13 and 29 in Leviathan related to human nature and state of authority. Moreover, Cas Mudde and Hellström’s theories are used related to populist parties on the right. The method used is a qualitative method which includes an argumentative analysis which aims to explain the essay’s purposes. In conclusion, the analyzed populist parties share the ideas of Thomas Hobbes related to the state of authority and the decrease of corporations in the National State. In other words, the populist parties argue that the national state must be unity and solid in order to defend its own interest and citizens’ interests.

In recent years, populism has spread around the world like wildfire. In some places, populist parties are growing in strength and several countries currently have populist leaders. In this essay, we use a qualitative content analysis to investigate whether populist rhetoric has seeped into state power in Sweden through examination of the speeches presented by Swedish party leaders during party leader debates in the Swedish Parliament in 2019 and 2020. The analyses of the party leader debates showed that several components of populist rhetoric could be found in speeches made in the Swedish parliament in 2019 and 2020, especially when it comes to anti-elitist rhetoric. However, the use of populist rhetoric is not widespread, but is mainly used by one of the eight Swedish party leaders, with some tendencies to a spillover-effect.

In 2017, the far right populist, transnational movement “Generation Identity” (GI) embarked on an activist “mission” in the Mediterranean Sea to stop non-European migrants from reaching the European continent. This paper presents a study of how GI was able to do so, analysing the empowering network of support that evolved during the movement’s “Defend Europe” campaign. Its relevance arises from the globally growing assertiveness of populist actors, cooperating and shaping international politics together. However, studies on party politics and international interactions prevail in research on global populism -this paper is the first one to raise the question of how far right populist social movements interact in transnational networks. Applying a resource mobilization approach and drawing on transnational advocacy theory, I attempt to answer this question with a single case study on the German GI-branch’s networking activities during the Defend Europe campaign. The relational data collected shows that far right populists, too, engage in transnational advocacy efforts, and it appears that their populism does not visibly determine how their networks function. Rather, GI’s activism in “defensive mode” seems decisive for the movement’s transnational networking practices, limiting its possibilities to gain in political and societal influence.

No description available.