During World War II, 106 Australian medical officers were taken prisoner of war by the Japanese, along with 22,000 Australian troops and many thousands more British and Dutch. Over three and a half years, they accompanied work parties of Allied prisoners sent to camps all over southeast Asia and Japan, living in a variety of harsh and dangerous conditions. Despite the doctors’ efforts, one in three Australian POWs died in captivity. Of those who survived, most attributed this not to inner strength or to luck, but to the care of their medical personnel. Yet apart from the attention recently accorded to Sir Edward “Weary” Dunlop, who was only one of these doctors, the experiences and work of all Australian POW medical officers in World War II has been largely overlooked. / Medical officers were crucial for the survival of Australian prisoners, both physically and psychologically. Doctors attempted to keep men of all nationalities alive with little medication, tools or diagnostic equipment, and battled a variety or medical conditions, starvation and systematic physical brutality from their captors. As survival became more difficult, the increased status and responsibilities of the doctors had significant ramifications for the military chain of command and for the burdens on the doctors themselves. / This thesis explores many aspects of Australian POW doctors’ experience of captivity: the complexities of practising modern medicine without any of its tools; the development of unique strategies to combat a wide variety of environmental limitations and life-threatening medical conditions; the unique relationship between medical personnel and their captors; the relationships between Australian POW medical officers and combatant officers and a comparison with relationships in the British military in captivity; the daily dilemmas faced by doctors trying to reconcile their professional ethics with their military obligations, and how they coped with these responsibilities. Doctors’ continuing roles in the postwar lives of ex-POWs, and the influence captivity had on their own lives and careers after the war are also analysed. / While examination of the influence of medical officers on other prisoners’ lives is important, studying their experience as a group in their own right is equally valuable. In this thesis, both these areas are investigated to bring a variety of perspectives to understanding the complexity and importance of Australian POW doctors’ captivity experience.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Würzburg, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 531-544).

Approved for public release / The atrocities committed by Americans at Abu Ghraib shocked the collective American moral conscience. Guilty of inhumane treatment of its prisoners there, Abu Ghraib did immeasurable damage to U.S. credibility and made clear that American detainee policy is off-track and needs to comply with objective standards of law, morality, and operational effectiveness. The emotional aftermath of 9/11 created a politically permissive environment within which the military organizational structures was unsuited for the critical tasks assigned to them relative to the context of the Bush Administration’s “new paradigm.” Two issues sit at the forefront of the political context of U.S. detainee policy: war powers and human rights. This thesis will utilize a synthesized decision-making model to analyze the President’s decisions leading to the current detainee policy. Policy alternatives require smaller corrections to bureaucratic process, not a major reorganization of bureaucratic structure. This thesis will provide policy-makers with a moral and legal framework for a corrected detainee policy. Adoption of the full framework of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including U.S. ratification of Additional Protocols I and II (1977), provides the best framework to combat transnational insurgency, while retaining the moral and legal high ground required of the world’s superpower. / Major, United States Air Force

„Der heilsame Umweg”, 1939 mit dem Schleswig-Holsteinischen Literaturpreis ausgezeichnet, gehört zu der Gattung der deutsch-französischen Verständigungsromane, die in den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts sehr erfolgreich waren. Der Roman beschreibt das Leben französischer Kriegsgefangener in einem holsteinischen Dorf während des Ersten Weltkriegs und ist das fiktionale Pendant zu den Kriegserinnerungen von F.E. Peters, der selbst von 1914 bis 1920 Gefangener in Frankreich war und dort als Dolmetscher eingesetzt wurde. Im Mittelpunkt der Handlung steht die junge Elisabeth Tormählen, die sich von der weltfremden Schülerin eines Mädchenpensionats zu einer tüchtigen Bäuerin und reifen Ehefrau entwickelt. Während ihr Mann an der Front ist, entspinnt sich eine kurze harmlose Romanze zwischen ihr und dem französischen Dolmetscher Gaston Marzais, die schnell beendet ist, als Elisabeth endgültig zu ihrem Mann findet und dieser sich nach Kriegsende von ihrer Treue überzeugen kann. Das vielschichtige Werk beschreibt unter Verzicht auf die gängigen nationalen Stereotypen oder mittels deren Demontage Deutsche und Franzosen als in ihrer Unterschiedlichkeit sehr ähnlich. Durch zahlreiche Symmetrie-Effekte und konsequent durchgeführte Perspektivwechsel, die sowohl die deutsche als auch die französische Sicht zu berücksichtigen suchen, wird das Gleiche im Fremden hervorgehoben. Gleicher Patriotismus und gleiche Opferbereitschaft auf beiden Seiten, aber auch gleiche Friedenssehnsüchte und gleiches Leiden unter den Grausamkeiten des Krieges sowie gleiche fachliche Kompetenz – denn auch die gefangenen Franzosen sind erfahrene Bauern und bewähren sich im täglichen Zusammenleben. Fanatiker wie die verbitterte Soldatenwitwe Greta Harders oder der hasserfüllte Brandstifter Maurice Thaudière werden als lebensuntüchtig dargestellt und begehen Selbstmord. Den ideologischen Grundtenor des Werkes betonen zum Schluss noch einmal die Intellektuellen: Gaston Marzais und sein deutscher Freund, der Jurist Georg Schmitt, beide erfüllt von dem Wissen um und dem Respekt vor der Kultur des anderen. Gemeinsam wollen sie nach der deutschen Niederlage weitere deutsch-französische Kriege verhindern und beschwören die pazifistische Vision eines Europas der Toleranz und der Aufklärung. „Der heilsame Umweg“ ist darüber hinaus eine Hymne an bäuerliche Kultur und familiäre Werte. So bewundert Marzais Interieur und Kleidung der alten Bäuerin Abel Schierholdt. Auch ein traditionelles norddeutsches Begräbnisritual wird detailliert beschrieben. Frankreichs Landleben ist präsent durch nostalgische Evozierungen der Gefangenen und deutliche Anklänge an den am Anfang des letzten Jahrhunderts sehr beliebten Roman von Henry Bordeaux „Les Roquevillard“ (1906), den F.E.Peters während seiner Kriegsgefangenschaft übersetzt hat. Schließlich reflektiert der Roman Macht und Ohnmacht von Sprache sowie die autobiographische Dimension literarischer Produktions- und Rezeptionsprozesse. Seine Heldin - und mit ihr der Leser - erkennt, "dass Dichtung nur echt ist als erlittenes Leben und dass sie nur aus der Erfahrung des Leides verstanden wird."

No description available.

La notion de participation directe aux hostilités n’a jamais été définie de manière précise au regard du droit international humanitaire. Cette ambiguïté a conduit à des interprétations divergentes du concept d’hostilités et des critères juridiques utilisés pour définir une participation directe par opposition à une participation indirecte (effort de guerre).D’ailleurs, les conflits contemporains posent de nouveaux défis quant à la définition et la mise en oeuvre de la notion de la participation directe aux hostilités. Les moyens de guerre de haute technicité (l’attaque de réseaux informatiques) et l’externalisation des forces armées (sociétés militaire privées), illustrent l’imbrication croissante des activités civiles et militaires et la difficulté à identifier précisément qui participe directement aux hostilités et quelles sont les mesures à prendre pour protéger ceux qui n’y participent pas directement. / The notion of direct participation in hostilities has never been precisely defined in international humanitarian law. This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of the concept of hostilities and legal criteria imply a distinction from direct participation in hostilities as opposed indirect participation (war effort).Indeed, contemporary conflicts have given rise to further challenges in terms of defining and implementing the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The use of high-tech warfare (computer network attack), privatization of the armed forces (private military company), among others, illustrate the increased intermingling of civilian and military activities which make it difficult to determine who is taking a direct part in hostilities and what measures should be taken to protect those who are not directly participating.

This thesis examines the legal case of Inouye Kanao, a second-generation Japanese Canadian who was executed for high treason in August 1947 in Hong Kong. In this thesis, I trace not only Inouye's legal case, but also his early life, the broader political context, diplomatic correspondence, and other war crimes cases. By employing race-thinking and Critical Race Theory as theoretical frameworks, I consider the role of race and racism and aim to better understand its influence on Inouye's legal case. In doing so, this thesis challenges previous narratives and misinformation about Inouye. I conclude that racism was a significant factor that affected all aspects of Inouye's case, resulting in an unjust execution that did not reflect the crimes. Ultimately, Inouye was executed not because of his actions but because he was racialized as a treacherous and cruel Japanese Canadian. / Graduate

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.