Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a identificação de divergências inconciliáveis. Joseph Raz é um dos principais expositores contemporâneos do positivismo jurídico, porém sua tese não apenas é controversa, como também mal compreendida. Nesta pesquisa, defendo o argumento de que a má compreensão deve-se ao fato de ser ignorada uma premissa ontológica adotada por Raz. O filósofo supõe que práticas sociais não se referem a nada mais do que fatos socialmente praticados e, portanto, não as reconhece como fonte de normatividade. Com base nesse pressuposto, a natureza do direito não poderia ser investigada do mesmo modo como se investigaria a natureza de um jogo lúdico: aos olhos de Raz, ambos possuem estruturas lógicas e normativas completamente distintas. Com isso em vista, sustento que a divergência a respeito dessa questão de ordem ontológica gera um impasse insolúvel no debate a respeito da normatividade do direito. Para testar o argumento, examino as críticas que Dennis Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin e Stephen Perry fazem à teoria do direito de Joseph Raz. / This is a research on the grounds of irreconcilable disagreements. Joseph Raz is one of the leading authors of legal positivism, whose theory generated a lot of controversy, matched only by the same degree of misapprehension. This research argues that this is due to the fact that an ontological premise held by Raz has been largely ignored. The philosopher considers that social practices are nothing more than socially practiced facts and, therefore, do not acknowledge them as a source of normativity. Furthermore, on that token, laws nature cannot be known and investigated in the same way games are known: according to Raz, both have completely different logical and normative structures. I sustain that there cannot be any fruitful debate regarding the normativity of law, until this ontological matter is not approached. This thesis was tested on the criticism made to the razian theory by Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin and Stephen Perry.

Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a identificação de divergências inconciliáveis. Joseph Raz é um dos principais expositores contemporâneos do positivismo jurídico, porém sua tese não apenas é controversa, como também mal compreendida. Nesta pesquisa, defendo o argumento de que a má compreensão deve-se ao fato de ser ignorada uma premissa ontológica adotada por Raz. O filósofo supõe que práticas sociais não se referem a nada mais do que fatos socialmente praticados e, portanto, não as reconhece como fonte de normatividade. Com base nesse pressuposto, a natureza do direito não poderia ser investigada do mesmo modo como se investigaria a natureza de um jogo lúdico: aos olhos de Raz, ambos possuem estruturas lógicas e normativas completamente distintas. Com isso em vista, sustento que a divergência a respeito dessa questão de ordem ontológica gera um impasse insolúvel no debate a respeito da normatividade do direito. Para testar o argumento, examino as críticas que Dennis Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin e Stephen Perry fazem à teoria do direito de Joseph Raz. / This is a research on the grounds of irreconcilable disagreements. Joseph Raz is one of the leading authors of legal positivism, whose theory generated a lot of controversy, matched only by the same degree of misapprehension. This research argues that this is due to the fact that an ontological premise held by Raz has been largely ignored. The philosopher considers that social practices are nothing more than socially practiced facts and, therefore, do not acknowledge them as a source of normativity. Furthermore, on that token, laws nature cannot be known and investigated in the same way games are known: according to Raz, both have completely different logical and normative structures. I sustain that there cannot be any fruitful debate regarding the normativity of law, until this ontological matter is not approached. This thesis was tested on the criticism made to the razian theory by Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin and Stephen Perry.

In the first part of the article, the author discusses two types of liberalism from the thoughts of prominent philosophers. On the one hand, she analyzes the ideas of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz as examples of perfectionist liberalism and, on the other hand, those of John Rawls and Charles Larmore as examples of political liberalism. He then discusses the notion of comprehensive doctrines in John Rawls’s oeuvre, for from Nussbaum´s perspective, the construction of this notion brings Rawls close to a variant of perfectionist liberalism that he himself would try to avoid. That is why Nussbaum’s proposal is to restore a notion of comprehensive doctrines simply understood as those kinds of doctrines to which reasonable citizens adhere. / En la primera parte del artículo la autora discute dos variantes de liberalismo a partir del pensamiento de destacados filósofos. Por un lado, analiza las ideas de Isaiah Berlin y Joseph Raz como ejemplos de liberalismo perfeccionista y, por el otro, las de John Rawls y Charles Larmore como ejemplos de liberalismo político. A continuación problematiza la noción de doctrinas comprehensivas en la obra de John Rawls, pues desde la perspectiva de Nussbaum, la construcción de dicha noción acerca a Rawls a una variante de liberalismo perfeccionista que él mismo trataría de evitar. Es por ello que la propuesta de Nussbaum consiste en restaurar una noción de doctrinas comprehensivas simplemente como aquel tipo de doctrinas a las que adhieren ciudadanos razonables.

In the first part of this article, the author discusses two types ofliberalism from the thoughts of prominent philosophers. On the one hand, sheanalyzes the ideas of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz as examples of perfectionistliberalism and, on the other, those of John Rawls and Charles Larmore asexamples of political liberalism. It also identifies differences between Berlin’spluralism and Raz’s and between Rawls’ liberalism and Larmore’s. / En la primera parte del presente artículo, la autora discute dos tipos de liberalismo a partir del pensamiento de destacados filósofos. Por un lado, analiza las ideas de Isaiah Berlin y Joseph Raz como ejemplos del liberalismo perfeccionista y, por el otro, las de John Rawls y Charles Larmore como ejemplos del liberalismo político. Asimismo, identifica las diferencias entre el pluralismo de Berlin y el de Raz y entre el liberalismo de Rawls y Larmore.

Two central issues in literature discussing legal authority seems to the the questions of what the law has when it has authority and under what conditions the law can be said to have authority. This thesis analyses an answer to these two questions as it has been developed by legal philosopher Joseph Raz. The analysis is conducted through scrutinizing the relation within and between three central concepts in Raz´s theory on legal authority; authority as normative power, the service conception and the obligation to obey. As for the concept of normative power, Raz seems to alternate between defining normative power as the ability to change protected reasons for action and as being a protected reason for action. The question the thesis aims to answer is whether normative power is best understood as the ability to change protected reasons for action or as being a protected reason for action? Raz does not seem to make a distinction between the two and thus, he regards both definitions as plausible. However, the analysis suggests that while it might be plausible to use both definitions as a definition of normative power, they are not interchangeable, but rather seems to represent two different levels of normative power. The analysis of the second concept, the service conception, examines Raz´s statement that justified exclusionary reasons entail a moral obligation to obey the law. Here the thesis asks if a moral obligation to obey is a plausible consequence of justified exclusionary reasons, given Raz´s own definition of obedience. The analysis suggests that a moral obligation to obey is not a plausible consequence of exclusionary reasons being justified and thus, that there seems to be incoherence between the two. Lastly, the thesis asks about the coherence between Raz´s two statements A. that justified exclusionary reasons entail a moral obligation to obey and B. that there is no moral obligation to obey the law. This last question had to be somewhat revised as the first statement (A) had already been suggested to be incoherent by the previous analysis. As such, this last question was revised into asking how the law can have legitimate authority when its legitimacy is tied to a moral obligation to obey, which is denied by Raz? The analysis suggests that these two statements are incoherent and that, as such, it is implausible that the law has the possibility to have legitimate authority at the same time as there exists no moral obligation to obey, as the former is dependent on the latter. The thesis ends in a number of concluding reflections.

Thesis advisor: Stephen Hudson / There has been a growing consensus within political philosophy that liberalism is the most rational form of political organization. The arguments in favor of liberalism are theoretical and also based on historical observations. The view of liberalism as a moral conception of the good life, however, seems to betray its original historical purpose, namely, to provide a peaceful political forum despite competing comprehensive doctrines. How can liberalism be a thick moral conviction of its own if it was meant to temper such zero-sum convictions? To pose this question more concretely: If historic wars between strong religious convictions were tempered by provisional liberal ceasefires, could we accept the evolution of liberalism into a strong conviction of its own? This paradoxical development of liberalism in history runs parallel with contemporary philosophical debates. Whether the most proper conception of liberalism is comprehensive, and whether it is legitimized upon such comprehensiveness are both hotly debated. Exploring these historical and philosophical avenues uncover what I think is a need for a conception of comprehensive liberalism. It is beyond my scope here to formulate a new conception of liberalism that decisively settles the debate. I do, however, point to reasons why comprehensive liberalism should be the focus of contemporary efforts. First, I find that history shows a trend of liberalism growing into a positive doctrine of its own. Second, I invoke two famous traditional conceptions, one successful and one failed, which fuel our baseline intuitions of liberalism with comprehensive, not political justifications. Finally, I show that while contemporary philosophy surrounding liberalism developed a political conception, it cannot avoid slipping towards comprehensiveness. Taken together, my argument is that any enforceable and useful theory of liberalism must be grounded on thick and comprehensive philosophical premises. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 401132.pdf: 802388 bytes, checksum: 514208b0aeab6ad3b7f7646277fd7e9a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-03-14 / A tese da fundamenta??o da moral no limite da raz?o em Kant ap?ia-se principalmente em tr?s argumentos: na concep??o dos noumena como conceito-limite e respectiva determina??o dos limites da raz?o pelo uso especulativo-regulativo das id?ias transcendentais; na defesa da liberdade pr?tica; e na doutrina kantiana do Facto da Raz?o. Para o desenvolvimento da argumenta??o, exploram-se conceitos presentes no pensamento cr?tico que aparentemente n?o s?o submetidos a qualquer cr?tica, mas que, segundo Kant, constituem a pr?pria natureza da raz?o humana, tais como o de necessidade e interesse da raz?o. Defende-se a integra??o destes elementos din?micos da raz?o na discuss?o de argumentos centrais do pensamento kantiano n?o s? no intuito de contribuir para uma melhor compreens?o da proposta kantiana de uma fundamenta??o racional da moralidade, mas, principalmente, para chegar a um bom termo acerca da unidade da raz?o, tendo em vista que a justifica??o de um princ?pio moral puro exige tal unidade. Enfatiza-se a posi??o de Kant de que a determina??o dos limites do conhecimento s? pode realizar-se por algo externo ao pr?prio campo da experi?ncia poss?vel, isto ?, por id?ias transcendentais, id?ias necess?rias da raz?o, e que justamente, na determina??o dos limites do conhecimento, a raz?o v? ao redor de si um espa?o vazio no qual as id?ias morais encontram um lugar fora do campo da especula??o. Examina-se este lugar vazio, ?nico lugar que as id?ias morais podem ocupar, que se mostra como fator respons?vel tanto pela fragilidade quanto pela for?a dos argumentos de Kant em prol de um princ?pio pr?tico puro, e, principalmente, pela coer?ncia do pensamento kantiano no seu todo. A fragilidade dos argumentos morais mostra-se na medida em que, com eles, Kant tem de justificar um princ?pio sem qualquer recurso externo ao pr?prio princ?pio, e a for?a destes mesmos argumentos manifesta-se no fato de serem constitu?dos de tal modo que mostram a moral na sua ess?ncia .

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 444078.pdf: 180512 bytes, checksum: e534ffcd50a6d67a152638a3c84ad399 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-25 / This thesis aims to show what an enlightened individual (aufgekl?rter Kritiker) is and how he can contribute to the improvement of the State. In addition, our thesis seeks to highlight the fact that Kantian education is directed to moral, that is, discipline, cultivate, civilize and moralize aim the moral formation of men. However, education doesn t guarantee that individuals will become enlightened since the enlightenment (Aufkl?rung) is an internal process that each individual must reach himself. There is not any external requirement able to make someone enlightened, it is contradictory, because the only motive strong enough to make the individual undergo the process of Aufkl?rung comes from the internal and is expressed as a categorical commandment: you must become enlightened, use the reason as the only criteria of action. The moral law, expressed in the categorical imperative, offers a strong commandment to force individuals to move from the state of underage . So, to move from the underage status and to pass to the M?ndigkeit is what we name process of the Aufkl?rung and it calls the individual to assume himself as a rational subject owning his life and decisions. However, the process of Aufkl?rung can only happen in a situation where there is a certain social harmony, otherwise the people would concern with the defense of property and life than with leaving of underage. The State, through public laws, must guarantee the freedom and legal equality. Furthermore, it must allow the use of public reason by which the individual who performed the process of Aufkl?rung can publicly criticize the actions and decisions of the State. Thus, the State faces a continuous and evolutionary reform toward the idea of Republican State. Therefore, the relationship between the enlightened critic (aufgekl?rter Kritiker) and the State is crucial, because while the State guarantees the harmonious coexistence between the subjects and allows the freedom to use the public reason, the aufgekl?rter Kritiker uses the public reason to criticize the decisions, rules and laws of the State with the intention of improving it. The aufgekl?rter Kritiker s critique aims at the public improvement and doesn t promote private interests or communitarian ideas, as well as it doesn t incite the population to rebel. / A presente tese busca mostrar o que ? um indiv?duo esclarecido (aufgekl?rter Kritiker) e como ele pode contribuir para o aprimoramento do Estado. Al?m disso, nossa tese busca evidenciar que a educa??o kantiana direciona-se para a moral, ou seja, disciplinar, cultivar, civilizar e moralizar visam a forma??o moral do homem. No entanto, a educa??o n?o garante que os indiv?duos se tornar?o esclarecidos, visto ser o esclarecimento (Aufkl?rung) um processo interno, o qual cada indiv?duo deve por si mesmo faz?-lo. N?o existe uma obriga??o exterior capaz de tornar algu?m esclarecido, visto ser isso contradit?rio, pois o ?nico motivo suficientemente forte para obrigar o indiv?duo a fazer o processo da Aufkl?rung prov?m do foro interno e se expressa como um mandamento categ?rico: tu deves tornar-te esclarecido, usar a raz?o como crit?rio ?nico do agir. A lei moral, expressa no imperativo categ?rico, oferece um mandamento forte o suficiente para obrigar os indiv?duos a sair da menoridade. Assim, sair da menoridade e passar ? maioridade ? o que chamamos de processo da Aufkl?rung e convoca o indiv?duo a assumir-se verdadeiramente como um sujeito racional dono de sua pr?pria vida e decis?es. No entanto, o processo da Aufkl?rung s? pode acontecer em uma situa??o onde j? reina certa harmonia social, pois do contr?rio os indiv?duos preocupar-se-iam muito mais com a defesa de sua propriedade e de sua vida do que com a sa?da na menoridade. O Estado, atrav?s das leis p?blicas, precisa garantir a liberdade e a igualdade legal. Al?m disso, ele deve permitir o uso da raz?o p?blica, atrav?s da qual o indiv?duo que realizou o processo da Aufkl?rung pode criticar publicamente as medidas e decis?es do Estado. Desta forma, o Estado sofre uma cont?nua e evolutiva reforma em dire??o ? ideia de Estado Republicano. Portanto, a rela??o entre o cr?tico esclarecido (aufgekl?rter Kritiker) e o Estado ? fundamental, pois enquanto o Estado garante a conviv?ncia harm?nica entre os s?ditos e permite a liberdade de usar publicamente a raz?o, o aufgekl?rter Kritiker vale-se da raz?o p?blica para criticar as decis?es, regras, normas e leis do Estado com o intuito de melhor?-lo. A cr?tica do aufgekl?ter Kritiker visa o melhoramento p?blico e n?o promove interesses privados ou ideias comunitaristas, assim como n?o incita a popula??o a se rebelar.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 457205.pdf: 913328 bytes, checksum: f1dba7ea8ebc579bfbe523741d79fcb6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-18 / With the purpose to present the philosophic transition from theoretical freedom to practical freedom in Kant, this text is centered in Critique of pure reason (Transcedental Dialectic, above all) and in Critique of practical reason. Trying to overcome a reading that reduces the purposes of the first Critique to the delimitation of the possible knowledge, it s an intention to demonstrate the transcendental naturality such as the systematic relevance that the metaphysic ideas assume already in theoretical philosophy. Then, the discussion focus the concept of transcendental freedom, that presents as not contradictory for the speculative reason, what can be thought without contradicting the rigorous natural laws. Pacifying the conflict between spontaneous causality (free) and the phenomenal causality (determinate), so the conditions to the edification in practical circuit, by means of the possibility of an unconditioned dominion, secured by the theoretical freedom are visualized. In this sense, in spite of the self-sufficiency of the Kant s practical philosophy, it isn t indifferent about the results achieved by the theoretical reason, because it s through these effects that the moral enterprise receives investigative legitimacy. On the other hand, so far as the moral law reality presents as a factum of the reason, besides the evidence of the practical range, the own negative freedom concept assumes a positive reality. If the practical reality of the moral law is demonstrated, so the objective reality of the freedom is equally confirmed, because the freedom is the basic condition for morality. Then, the transition from the first to the second Critique reveals the philosophic importance of the freedom concept, as to satisfy the speculative reason as to edify the project of the practical reason, taking care with the systematic linkage of both dominions. / Com o prop?sito de apresentar a transi??o filos?fica da liberdade te?rica ? liberdade pr?tica em Kant, a presente disserta??o centra-se na Cr?tica da raz?o pura (Dial?tica Transcendental, sobretudo) e na Cr?tica da raz?o pr?tica. Na tentativa de superar uma leitura que reduz o escopo da primeira Cr?tica ? delimita??o do conhecimento poss?vel, pretende-se demonstrar a naturalidade transcendental bem como a relev?ncia sistem?tica que as ideias metaf?sicas assumem j? na filosofia te?rica. A partir da?, a discuss?o enfoca o conceito de liberdade transcendental, o qual se apresenta como n?o contradit?rio para a raz?o especulativa, podendo ser pensado sem contradizer as rigorosas leis naturais. Ao apaziguar o conflito entre uma causalidade espont?nea (livre) e a causalidade fenom?nica (determinada), visualizam-se as condi??es para a edifica??o do ?mbito pr?tico, mediante a possibilidade de um dom?nio incondicionado, assegurado pela liberdade te?rica. Neste sentido, a despeito da autossufici?ncia da filosofia pr?tica kantiana, a mesma n?o ? indiferente aos resultados alcan?ados pela raz?o te?rica, pois ? atrav?s destes que o empreendimento moral ganha legitimidade investigativa. Por outro lado, na medida em que a realidade da lei moral apresenta-se como um factum da raz?o, al?m da comprova??o do ?mbito pr?tico, o pr?prio conceito negativo de liberdade assume uma realidade positiva. Se a realidade pr?tica da lei moral ? demonstrada, ent?o a realidade objetiva da liberdade ? igualmente comprovada, uma vez que a liberdade ? a condi??o basilar para a moralidade. Portanto, a transi??o da primeira para a segunda Cr?tica revela a import?ncia filos?fica do conceito de liberdade, tanto para satisfazer a raz?o especulativa quanto para edificar o projeto da raz?o pr?tica, isto tudo sem descuidar da articula??o sistem?tica de ambos os dom?nios.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-04T18:21:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Joselle Davanco.pdf: 8424504 bytes, checksum: e0384d3ef015699d06d6a72962819438 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-12-13 / The urban public spaces have been the object of frequent studies, but little attention has been given to parks. Parks are places of great historical and cultural value, of social interaction and are essential to the urban configuration. The study entitled: Parks in the inner cities of Sao Paulo, case studies in the cities of Ribeir?o Preto and Monte Alto, SP , discuss the park in relation of it's concrete situation of territory, with it's different rationalities, global and local, systemic and quotidian, aiming for a wider understanding of the reality of the contemporary spaces. To know the park with it's object and action systems, it was necessary to investigate it in different social aspects, including the economical, the cultural and the spacial. Therefore, studies were made at parks located downtown, in consolidate neighborhoods, gated communities and at the suburbs, in small towns and medium sized cities of Sao Paulo. / Os espa?os p?blicos urbanos tem sido objeto de estudo freq?ente, por?m pouco tem se voltado para o espa?o da pra?a. A pra?a ? um local de grande valor hist?rico, cultural e de intera??o social sendo fundamental na configura??o urbana. O trabalho de tema Pra?as do Interior Paulista: estudo de casos nas cidades de Ribeir?o Preto e Monte Alto / SP, pretende discutir a rela??o das pra?as em situa??es concretas do territ?rio, diante de suas diferentes racionalidades, globais e locais, sist?micas e cotidianas, visando o maior entendimento das realidades dos espa?os p?blicos na contemporaneidade. Para se conhecer a pra?a, com seus sistemas de objetos e de a??es, foi necess?rio investig?-la diante das diferentes inst?ncias sociais, abrangendo a economia, a cultura e o espa?o. Assim, foram estudadas as pra?as de bairros centrais, bairros sub-centrais consolidados, condom?nios fechados e na periferia, em cidades de m?dio e pequeno portes do interior Paulista.