No disponible a texto completo / El evaluar los impactos económicos causados por la regulación y sus trámites, conociendo las consecuencias de la inadecuada normativa existente y procurando una regulación de calidad en la conducción de las actividades económicas de la ciudadanía, es conocido como una política anti red tape. En este breve ensayo se analizan conceptos elementales del término, y desde la perspectiva de la Teoría Económica de las Instituciones se aboga por la adopción formal de políticas que abatan a dicha problemática. Se revisa la experiencia en el tema de algunas naciones, observando sus resultados en cuanto a costos y tiempos de ejecución de la regulación, así como sus formas de organización. Del mismo modo, se observa la experiencia institucional que ha desarrollado la administración pública chilena al respecto; todo ello, con la finalidad de rescatar los puntos exitosos de las experiencias y perfilar una postura de política pública para enfrentar el red tape en Chile.

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays. Essay 1, "Dispatchers", is a study of a specialized service sector that has arisen in many developing countries. It is a well-established fact that the government bureaucracy in many developing countries is large, difficult to understand, non-transparent and time-consuming. However, "de jure" procedures sometimes have little to do with how firms or individuals actually go about when dealing with the government bureaucracy. One institution that has emerged is a specialized intermediary, henceforth called dispatcher, that assists individuals and firms in their contacts with the public sector. A model is developed to study the effects of dispatchers on time and resources spent in obtaining licenses, on informality and on the incentives of bureaucrats and dispatchers to make regulation more/less complicated. Essay 2, "Informal firms, investment incentives and formalization", studies informal firms in developing countries. In a typical developing country, the majority of small firms are informal and entry costs into formality are high. What can we expect in terms of firm investment, growth and formalization in such a setting? I show that investment and growth trajectories differ substantially between firms that choose to formalize and those that do not. The formalization decision depends non-trivially on the informal firm's productivity. This, in turn, has an effect on how policies should be designed. The long-run firm size distribution exhibits a "missing middle" and depends on the initial firm-level stock of capital, a result that can be interpreted as a poverty trap. Essay 3, "Compositional and dynamic Laffer effects in a model with constant returns to scale", studies dynamic effects of tax cuts. The possibility of tax cuts paying for themselves over time seems like an attractive option for policy makers. In a constant returns to scale model, I study conditions under which reductions in capital taxes are self-financing

This dissertation explores multiple stakeholders' perceptions with regard to administrative rules governing public participation in the Hampton Roads Transportation Planning Organization (HRTPO) in Virginia. In 2007, the HRTPO received conditional certification during its quadrennial review with seven corrective actions related to public participation. Subsequently, it started to reform its public participation practices, and in 2012 it received full certification. This study explores how the HRTPO stakeholders perceive the administrative rules that govern public participation processes, more positively (as 'green tape') or more negatively (as 'red tape'), and how those perceptions have changed since 2007, relying on in-depth interviews as well as archival documents. Before 2007, top management officials had pessimistic perceptions of public participation in general and the rules in particular. The negative perceptions changed when new senior staff arrived in 2008 and initiated reforms, most notably by hiring a public involvement administrator. Acting as a transformative leader, this administrator began to adopt outreach programs, which stakeholders considered successful. By unpacking the notion of stakeholder red tape, guided by the attributes of stakeholder red tape and green tape, this study found that stakeholders perceived the rules more positively than they did in 2007. / Ph. D.

Submitted by Guilherme Stein (stein.guilherme@gmail.com) on 2016-09-14T03:16:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese.pdf: 430062 bytes, checksum: 5a8a1a0eaba91cd18e8142932105ee3b (MD5) / Rejected by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Guilherme, Favor fazer as alterações abaixo para que seu trabalho seja aprovado: 1: O nome da fundação (Getulio) não possuí acento. Favor retirar de todas as páginas que constam o nome. 2: Faltam as sessões de Agradecimentos, Resumo e Abstract. Atenciosamente, Letícia 3799-3631 on 2016-09-14T12:11:08Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Stein (stein.guilherme@gmail.com) on 2016-09-14T13:20:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese 2.0.pdf: 432636 bytes, checksum: 00494ab653e6be0fae54f42a49f2fe99 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br) on 2016-09-14T13:22:52Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese 2.0.pdf: 432636 bytes, checksum: 00494ab653e6be0fae54f42a49f2fe99 (MD5) / Rejected by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Guilherme, Os agradecimentos em uma trabalho tem uma importância significante. Para tirar suas dúvidas, a Suzinei irá entrar em contato com você para esclarecer essa situação. Após o contato dela, favor mandar o novo trabalho. Atenciosamente, Letícia 3799-3631 on 2016-09-14T13:24:21Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Stein (stein.guilherme@gmail.com) on 2016-09-14T14:45:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese 3.0.pdf: 434242 bytes, checksum: 203925cdcd2f5883b66766677952d8f0 (MD5) / Rejected by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Guilherme, Favor fazer a ultima alteração: A sessão Resumo deve estar após a sessão Abstract, devido ao seu trabalho ser em inglês. Atenciosamente, Letícia, 3799-3631 on 2016-09-14T14:48:27Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Stein (stein.guilherme@gmail.com) on 2016-09-14T14:53:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese 4.0.pdf: 434238 bytes, checksum: 2c9c2be7ae9e557ae3eb8805d6b97afd (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br) on 2016-09-14T14:54:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese 4.0.pdf: 434238 bytes, checksum: 2c9c2be7ae9e557ae3eb8805d6b97afd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-14T14:55:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese 4.0.pdf: 434238 bytes, checksum: 2c9c2be7ae9e557ae3eb8805d6b97afd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-19 / This thesis presents two theoretical models. The first shows how the cost of doing business associated with red tape arises as a response to institutional failure, namely, a failure of the legal system. It shows that, when legal system is inefficient, an increase in the cost of doing business can increase society’s welfare. The second model shows how credit constraints affect political preferences of the society relating to human capital investments. Families that are credit constrained invest less in their offspring human capital and thus also prefer policies that involve direct cash transfers to human capital investments. / A tese desenvolve dois modelos teóricos. O primeiro deles mostra como o custo de realizar negócios associados a burocracia surge como resposta a uma falha instituicional, em particular, uma falha no sistema de justiça. Ele mostra que, quando o sistema de justiça é ineficiente, um aumento no custo de realizar negócios pode aumentar o bem-estar da sociedade. O segundo modelo mostra como restrições de crédito afetam as preferências políticas da sociedade no que tange investimentos em capital humano. Famílias com restrição de crédito investem menos no capital humano dos filhos e, por esse motivo, acabam também acabam preferindo políticas que envolvam transferências diretas de renda a investimentos em capital humano.

Architecture’s Red Tape is a critical study of the relation between public architecture and public administration in the 1960s and 1970s. The thesis focuses on the work of the Swedish National Board of Public Building, KBS, which was a government agency in charge of providing premises for the Swedish state at that time. KBS expanded its construction of new buildings during the 1960s and did extensive research and development work to find new rational and efficient working methods and building systems. The development of KBS culminated in the implementation of an official architectural philosophy in 1968, called the “structure philosophy.” The architectural ideas were drafted parallel to new administrative systems that were in turn based on rational choice theories. The thesis studies the developments of KBS’ architecture, both as processes of building production (architecture practice) and as the built result of these processes (buildings), through the analysis of four different instruments. These instruments – Program Budgeting, KBS’ Structure Philosophy, Incentive Contract, and System Building – were important means in KBS’ efforts to rationalize building production and make operations more efficient. KBS highlighted new features in the practices of architecture – emphasizing process, the user, functionality, performance, evaluations, results, etc. – that could be reviewed as a redefinition of the architectural project. This review is explicit on two different levels: firstly, as a redefinition of the architectural object most clearly found in KBS’ publicly announced shift from building construction to “premises production.” Secondly, there is a redefinition of architectural practice that relocates the interest of design, making it more about programming with a heightened interest in the processes of defining the scope and problems of design. / <p>QC 20170825</p>

As current social problems grow more complex, public organizations have to deal with more complicated problems and values than in the past. Public organizations arguably need more knowledge to effectively address such complex problems. However, there is little study of the relationship between knowledge sharing and government performance. This study has several primary purposes. First, it tries to find out more about the roles and effects of knowledge sharing on program performance in public organizations. Second, by examining the factors affecting the relationships between knowledge sharing and program performance, the study explores the importance of individual and organizational conditions in connecting knowledge sharing to program performance. Lastly, the study helps clarify the effect of knowledge sharing on program performance by also examining other factors that are likely to affect program performance. To explore the relationships among explicit and tacit knowledge sharing, public service motivation, self-set goals, red tape, economic conditions, staffers' professionalism, budgetary resources, and program performance, I examined Virginia's Child Protective Services program. The Virginia Department of Social Services determines the guidelines and policies for the state's CPS program and supervises its implementation by local agencies. I focused on the implementation of the CPS program. The study examined the relationships between CPS program performance and the degree and dynamics of knowledge sharing at the local jurisdictional and at the individual social worker levels in each of the 23 local CPS departments in which staffers responded to an on-line survey. In addition to these relationships, the study examined the effects of individual, organizational, and financial factors in Virginia local CPS departments on the relationships between knowledge sharing and program performance. The study yielded numerous findings. First, at the local agency level evidence showed that explicit knowledge sharing played an important role in affecting CPS program performance. At the individual level, only the reported usefulness of explicit knowledge sharing affected CPS program performance, while the usefulness of tacit knowledge sharing and time devoted to explicit knowledge sharing affected usefulness of explicit knowledge sharing. The personal motivation of CPS staffers influenced program performance through tacit knowledge sharing, and red tape evidently affected CPS program performance by decreasing explicit and tacit knowledge sharing. Even when factors like local economic conditions and available financial resources were taken into account, the usefulness of explicit knowledge sharing still affected CPS program performance. Second, the relationships among time devoted to, usefulness of, and access to explicit and tacit knowledge sharing were diverse. They affected CPS program performance through the reported usefulness of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing. Third, individual and organizational factors influenced the relationship between knowledge sharing and CPS program performance. The personal motivation of CPS staffers had a positive effect on tacit knowledge sharing, but red tape appeared to have a negative effect on explicit and tacit knowledge sharing. Fourth, the study showed that several factors other than knowledge sharing such as local economic conditions, work training of CPS staffers, family assessments, CPS staffer education, and additional budgetary resources also affected CPS program performance. / Ph. D.

Submitted by André de Castro Oliveira Pereira Braga (bragaandre@terra.com.br) on 2015-02-28T17:10:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 O TCU INIBE INOVAÇÕES EM CONCESSÕES PÚBLICAS - DISSERTAÇÃO.pdf: 2266216 bytes, checksum: d81cfc03210912c9021115e11dbf7c43 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-03-03T12:59:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 O TCU INIBE INOVAÇÕES EM CONCESSÕES PÚBLICAS - DISSERTAÇÃO.pdf: 2266216 bytes, checksum: d81cfc03210912c9021115e11dbf7c43 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-03-03T13:00:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 O TCU INIBE INOVAÇÕES EM CONCESSÕES PÚBLICAS - DISSERTAÇÃO.pdf: 2266216 bytes, checksum: d81cfc03210912c9021115e11dbf7c43 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-03T13:09:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 O TCU INIBE INOVAÇÕES EM CONCESSÕES PÚBLICAS - DISSERTAÇÃO.pdf: 2266216 bytes, checksum: d81cfc03210912c9021115e11dbf7c43 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02 / For the past 20 years, public concessions promoted by the Brazilian government have been overseen by the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), Brazilian supreme audit institution. What are the effects of this oversight? Using data related to contracts audited from 1993 to 2014, we analyse if the TCU prevents innovation in concessions. The empirical results show that there is no significant correlation between innovations and red tape originated in TCU’s audit procedures. On the other hand, we find a significant negative correlation between TCU’s degree of interventionism and the emergence of innovations in public concessions. / O Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) fiscaliza as concessões públicas federais há mais de 20 anos. Quais os efeitos desse controle? Esta dissertação buscou verificar se a atuação do TCU inibe o surgimento de inovações em contratos de concessão pública. Por meio de uma análise qualitativa e quantitativa de dados referentes a contratos fiscalizados pelo TCU de 1993 a 2014, identificamos indícios de que um maior grau de intervencionismo do TCU está associado a uma menor quantidade de inovações em concessões públicas. Por outro lado, o aumento da burocracia nos processos de fiscalização do TCU não vem representando um obstáculo significativo para o surgimento de inovações nessa espécie de contrato.

The thesis is focused on finding administrative costs of the selected public spending program - the Operational Programme Education for Competitiveness. The work presents the theory of public expenditure, public spending projects and administrative costs to the extent required. There is also described the Operational Programme Education for Competitiveness itself. The core is in the analysis of administrative costs for the three types of projects, the administrative burden is watched in the selected projects at various levels of implementation structure. The values observed are compared, evaluated and commented. The problematic areas are formulated pursuant to the observed data. To determine the necessary data has been used a questionnaire survey.