The fluid power systems equipment industry has shown a 117 percent growth from 1957 to 1968. This impressive growth rate is critically affected by a shortage of competently trained workers. The needs of selected Utah industries for trained personnel in fluid power were studied, and the results were projected from the sample to the state of Utah. The skill levels most in demand were skilled, two-year technician, and semi-skilled. Industries indicated that training to meet their needs could be conducted by on-the-job training, inplant schools, special schools, adult education programs, vocational high school programs, tow-year vocational school programs, two-year university programs, and technical institute programs. Based on the recommendations of Utah industries for training needed and using the Fluid Power Society curriculum as a substructure, recommendations for fluid power instructions in Utah were made.

Experimental implementations of the Ultimatum Game are some of the most well studied economic experiments of the last twenty years. There are two popular explanations for why Proposers offer substantially more than the smallest positive amount of the pie. One is that the Proposers have other-regarding preferences and the other explanation is that Proposers are selfish, but fear rejection by Responders who will reject low offers. Most experiments that attempt to discriminate between these two explanations contrast behavior in the Ultimatum Game to behavior in the Dictator Game. The Dictator Game removes strategic concerns from the Ultimatum Game without substantially changing the predicted behavior of a selfish Proposer. Researchers thus believe that subtracting Dictator Game offers from Ultimatum Game offers isolates the fraction of average offers in the Ultimatum Game motivated by other-regarding preferences. In most Dictator Game experiments, Proposers offer less than they do in Ultimatum Games, but they still offer non-trivial positive amounts. This result has led analysts to posit that Proposer behavior in the Ultimatum Game is motivated in part by other-regarding preferences. There are, however, potential problems in drawing inferences about Proposer behavior in the Ultimatum Game from observations of Proposer behavior in the Dictator Game. First, it is well known that objectively irrelevant contextual details in experiments can affect subject behavior in systematic ways. Second, altruistic motivations are less costly to satisfy per monetary unit in the Ultimatum Game because each monetary unit offered to the Responder reduces the probability of rejection. Thus strategic motivations may be sufficient to explain behavior in the Ultimatum Game. In other words, a Proposer with altruistic preferences may offer the same amount of money as an identical Proposer who differs only in his lack of such preferences. In contrast to previous approaches that remove the strategic incentives in the Ultimatum Game, we remove the incentives for expressing other-regarding preferences. We do so through a treatment in which humans are paired with robots that, for each choice in the Proposer’s decision space, reject with the same frequency as humans in previous experiments. Proposers are aware they are playing with automata that are programmed to reject and accept as humans have done in previous implementations of the experiment. Under the mild assumption that humans do not express other-regarding preferences for fictional automata, this treatment presents an Ultimatum Game with only strategic motives operative. Note also that unlike previous attempts that use a different game to make inferences about behavior in the Ultimatum Game, we are able to measure the effects of strategic and other-regarding motives without changing the fundamental structure of the Ultimatum Game. Moreover, previous analyses do not formally include decision error as an important motivation for non-SPNE offers. To test for misunderstanding of the strategic environment, we develop a second treatment in which subjects play the Ultimatum Game with a robot Responder that rejects or accepts every offer with equal probability. If Proposers are truly thinking about Responder rejection rates in formulating their offers, they should offer $0 in this treatment.

It has been suggested that reward processing and related neural substrates are disrupted in some common mental disorders such as depression, addiction, and anxiety. An increasing number of psychiatric studies have been applying reinforcement learning (RL) models to examine these disruptions in self-regarding learning (learning about rewards delivered to the learners themselves). A review of RL alterations associated with mental disorders in extant studies will be beneficial for uncovering the mechanisms of these health problems. Although impaired social reward processing is common in some mental disorders [e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), social anxiety and autism], RL has not been widely used to detect the potentially disrupted social reward learning, especially for other-regarding learning (learning about rewards delivered to others). Meanwhile, it has not been clear whether some drugs, e.g., oxytocin (OT), can alter other-regarding learning, so they may serve as a therapeutic intervention when related deficits occur. In the present set of studies, we summarized common and distinct features in terms of self-regarding RL disturbances among depression, addiction and anxiety disorders based on previous findings (Paper I), tested whether behavioral and neural self- and other-regarding RL were impaired in PTSD with and without comorbid depression (Paper II), and investigated OT's behavioral and neural effects on self- and other-regarding RL in healthy males (Paper III). The results of our literature review showed that the commonalities in all three mental disorders were inflexibility and inconsistent choices, and the differences included decreased learning rates in depression, a higher weight to rewards versus punishments in addiction, and hypersensitivity to punishments in anxiety. The results of the PTSD study demonstrated impaired behavioral other-regarding learning in PTSD patients with and without depression, supposedly due to their hypervigilance to unexpected outcomes for others, as evidenced by the heightened responses in their inferior parietal lobule. The OT study detected OT's effects of attenuating behavioral other-regarding learning, as well as the neural coding of unexpected outcomes for others in the anterior cingulate cortex. These findings provide new evidence of self- and other-regarding RL alterations in mental disorders, reveal potential targets for their treatments, and bring caution for using OT as a therapeutic intervention. / Doctor of Philosophy / People learn to make choices to gain rewards and to avoid punishments delivered to themselves. As social animals, people also take account of outcomes delivered to others when learning. With the help of computational modeling, previous studies have found abnormal reward learning for oneself in people with mental health problems. To better understand mental illnesses, we summarized the similarities and differences of the learning abnormalities reported in previous studies about depression, addiction, and anxiety. We have found that people with these mental illnesses all tend to be inflexible and make more random choices when learning. As for the differences, people with depression tend to learn slower; people with addiction tend to see gaining rewards as more important than avoiding punishments; and people with anxiety tend to be oversensitive to punishments. Using computational modeling and imaging of brain function, we also tested whether learning for other was abnormal in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and found that, compared to healthy people, PTSD patients had slower learning for others' rewards, and the inferior parietal lobule, a brain region for processing social information, showed higher responses to unexpected outcomes for others. In another study, we examined whether oxytocin (OT), a neuropeptide that has been reported to change people's social functions, could influence reward learning for others in healthy males. The results showed that OT slowed down people's learning for others, and also decreased the neural learning signals in the anterior cingulate cortex, a region involved in processing other's outcomes. Our findings provide new information about how reward learning for oneself and others are changed in mental illnesses, reveal potential targets for their treatments, and bring caution for using OT as a therapeutic intervention.

If we want to take the agency of the oppressed seriously, we need to think about their normative situation. We need to understand what oppression does to victims, and what victims ought to do as a result. The first half of my dissertation develops a new account of oppression, one that identifies cases not by the wrongs that oppressors embody but by the burdens that victims suffer. The second half questions what kinds of moral and political actors victims can and should be. According to the prevailing "group relationship" of model of oppression, the members of a social group are oppressed when they're subordinated, marginalized, constrained, or displaced in a way that benefits the members of a different social group. In place of this prevailing view, I propose a new, effects-centered model: a person is oppressed when their autonomy or their life prospects are systematically and wrongfully burdened. I then use this account to understand the moral and political agency of the oppressed. I argue that victims have a self-regarding moral obligation to resist their oppression, grounded in considerations of objective well-being. And I develop Aristotle's account of political virtue to apply across ideal and oppressive circumstances alike, adapting it as a defense of nonviolent civil disobedience. This dissertation is the beginning of a larger research project concerned with the nature of victimhood, how injustice affects agency, and how obligations can be grounded in the absence of just institutions.

This dissertation studies issues associated with various topics related to a worker’s effort. For example, I explore how different wage incentives affect a worker’s productivity. I explore how exogenous shocks, what we often refer to as “luck,” can affect a worker’s motivation. In addition, I explore how different wage contracts destroy cooperation and can lead to destructive activities such as cheating and sabotage, as well as how these activates, in turn, affect productivity. Finally, in the last chapter, I analyze behavioral issues related to fairness and altruism in tournaments, and how these behaviors affect worker’s effort.

This thesis uses laboratory and field experiments to examine the underlying motivations that drive biased and discriminatory behaviour. Its focus is on the differential treatment of others that stems from individuals’ preferences for particular social and ethnic groups. The unifying theme of this thesis is the exploration of how such discriminatory tastes can manifest themselves within individuals’ social and other–regarding preferences, determining the extent to which they care about the welfare of others. The prevalence and implications of these types of preferences are considered in both market and non–market settings.

Social economic decision-making considers the well-being and emotions of others. Unlike traditional economics which routinely assumes that individuals care only about their own outcomes, behavioral economics and neuroeconomics offer research strategies which help us explore our social motivations. This dissertation consists of three essays studying the underlying behavioral and neural mechanisms of individuals' social economic decision-making. The analyses focus on investigating experimentally how humans make decisions in three distinct social economic environments. Chapter 2 examines how individuals react to hold-up when explicit promises are available. Hold-up happens when two parties can form an incomplete contract to cooperate, but the agreement may fall apart due to concerns about the other party gaining bargaining power. We propose that a belief-dependent frustration anger model can explain behavior about investment, cooperation, and costly punishment in a hold-up environment. We show experimentally that communication improves cooperation and increases efficiency. Promises lead to cooperation, and broken promises lead to costly punishment. Chapter 3 explores threats' deterrence effect and credibility in an ultimatum bargaining environment where two parties can both benefit over trade but have a conflict of interests. We show that a belief-dependent frustration anger model captures the relationship among messages, beliefs, and behavior. Our design permits the observation of communicated threats, credibility, and deterrence. As we hypothesize, messages convey intention to punish the opponents (threats) changes players' expectations, that first movers are largely deterred by the threats and second movers' threats are credible. Threats lead to deterrence and greater propensity for costly punishment. Chapter 4 investigates the neural basis of individuals' charity donation behavior in a modified dictator game. The right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) has been associated with social decision-making, but the exact neural mechanism of charitable giving remains unknown. In our experiment, participants allocate money between themselves and a charity in a graphical revealed preference task, that measures both parameterized other-regarding preferences and economic rationality (Monotonicity, WARP, and GARP). We find evidence for a causal role of the rTPJ in determining fairness preferences and economic rationality. / Doctor of Philosophy / Social economic decision-making considers the well-being and emotions of others. Individuals engage in social economic decision-making on a daily basis, for example, negotiating over an offer, investing or cooperating on a project, bargaining over a purchase, or interacting with friends or strangers. Each of these decisions involves a variety of motivations including money for oneself, the well-being of others, each participants’ emotions and future relationships. Because of the complex nature of social economic decisions we need to employ an interdisciplinary research strategy. Behavioral economics applies psychological insights to economic problems and allows us to model the behavior of people who care about more than just money. Neuroeconomics integrates neuroscientific techniques and information about how the brain works to further expand our set of research tools. In this dissertation, we use all of these methods to explore how people make economic decisions in three distinct social scenarios. All three scenarios are especially intriguing since they represent different ways in which individuals integrate “others” into their own decision-making process. First, hold-up happens when two parties can form an incomplete agreement to cooperate and achieve higher efficiency together, however, the agreement may fall apart due to concerns about the other party gaining more bargaining power. In a historic example, Fisher Body had an exclusive supply agreement with General Motors. When the demand for cars increased sharply, Fisher Body held up General Motors by increasing prices. Second, negotiation is a situation where two parties can both benefit from trade, but they have conflicting interests. Third, individuals who engage in charity donations often sacrifice themselves monetarily to improve well-being of others. The scientific mission of this dissertation is to advance understanding of how individuals engage in social decision-making. In particular, we examine how communication (promises and threats) influences decision-making involving hold-up and negotiation respectively, and explore the neural mechanism governing altruism and charitable giving. We find evidence that communication enhances cooperation and efficiency in social economic decision-making through by changing expectations about monetary payoffs. In addition, we find evidence that the neural circuits responsible for fair-minded behavior also play a role in regulating economic rationality. This dissertation improves our understanding about how humans engage in social exchanges on both behavioral and neural levels.

In this information driven society it is a given that the medical field are more explored to be able to live a sustainable healthy life well into the golden years. Everyone is responsible for his or her own health, and as Abraham Lincoln said: “You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today”. To be proactive in attitude and behaviour can be beneficial to avoid or supress serious illnesses or diseases. This study measures the proactive attitudes and behaviours of South Africans and then to compare it prior studies that was done in United States of America. Three major areas of change are explored namely: healthcare and delivery; construction of medical aid packages; information availability. An extensive literature study about proactiveness and the major role players that influence and aid patients, to gather the necessary information to adopt a positive attitude towards health issues. The results of the empirical data expressed that tendencies are similar regarding proactive attitudes and behaviour in selected areas of South Africa comparing to results in America. / MBA, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

In this information driven society it is a given that the medical field are more explored to be able to live a sustainable healthy life well into the golden years. Everyone is responsible for his or her own health, and as Abraham Lincoln said: “You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today”. To be proactive in attitude and behaviour can be beneficial to avoid or supress serious illnesses or diseases. This study measures the proactive attitudes and behaviours of South Africans and then to compare it prior studies that was done in United States of America. Three major areas of change are explored namely: healthcare and delivery; construction of medical aid packages; information availability. An extensive literature study about proactiveness and the major role players that influence and aid patients, to gather the necessary information to adopt a positive attitude towards health issues. The results of the empirical data expressed that tendencies are similar regarding proactive attitudes and behaviour in selected areas of South Africa comparing to results in America. / MBA, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

A CHARGE AS A SECURITY Act No. 89/2012 Coll., the New Civil Code (the "New Civil Code") has been in effect since 1 January 2014. The New Civil Code has substantially changed Czech civil law in many respects, including the rules governing the grant and enforcement of asset security. The following paper analyzes, inter alia, the changes to these rules brought about by the New Civil Code, and in particular seeks to evaluate them from a practical perspective, utilizing standard interpretative methodologies, as well as interpretation e ratione legis, and comparative law. Prior to adoption of the Act, rules governing security were unsatisfactorily derived from a number of legislative sources (Act No. 40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, Act No. 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial Code and Act No. 591/1992 Coll., the Securities Act), and were relatively underdeveloped, such that some quite basic issues were left for the courts to decide. Both of these deficiencies have been addressed by the New Civil Code. The New Civil Code replaces the old Civil Code, the Commercial Code and the Securities Act, thus unifying the divergent rules on asset security, and develops these rules in greater detail. The New Civil Code has introduced new legal concepts and instruments to the asset security framework under Czech law. These...