Satisficing game theory is an alternative to traditional non-cooperative game theory which offers increased flexibility in modeling players' social interactions. However, satisficing players with conflicting attitudes may implement dysfunctional behaviors, leading to poor performance. In this thesis, we present two attempts to "bridge the gap" between satisficing and non-cooperative game theory. First, we present an evolutionary method by which players adapt their attitudes to increase raw payoff, allowing players to overcome dysfunction. We extend the Nash equilibrium concept to satisficing games, showing that the evolutionary method presented leads the players toward an equilibrium in their attitudes. Second, we introduce the conditional utility functions of satisficing theory into an otherwise traditional non-cooperative framework. While the conditional structure allows increased social flexibility in the players' behaviors, players maximize individual utility in the traditional sense, allowing us to apply the Nash equilibrium. We find that, by adjusting players' attitudes, we may alter the Nash equilibria that result.

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[pt] O Objetivo deste trabalho é prover os fundamentos necessários ao desenvolvimento de uma metodologia voltada para a análise e desenho das estratégias, regras e regulamentos associados ao setor elétrico, sob o contexto da teoria dos jogos evolutivos. A importância da escolha de estratégias eficientes, que formem perfis de estratégias com melhores payoffs traz a necessidade de uma abordagem que leve em conta as interações entre os agentes, submersos às incertezas regulatórias, hidrológicas e mercadológicas, existentes no setor elétrico, que geram superfícies de payoff descontínuas e ruidosas. É demonstrado como tais superfícies descontínuas podem ser desmembradas em um hiperespaço de estratégias mistas, onde órbitas regidas por dinâmicas baseadas em equações diferenciais convergirão para os perfis de equilíbrios atratores estáveis no sentido assintótico. Para a modelagem é sugerida a utilização de estratégias comportamentais, que possuem a propriedade de gerar perfis em equilíbrio mais robustos às constantes mudanças, assim como propiciar a análise entre os ambientes cooperativos e competitivos. / [en] The objective of this thesis is to provide the crucial points to the development of a methodology focused on the analysis of strategies, rules and regulations connected with the electrical sector, under the context of the evolutionary game theory. The importance of choosing efficient strategies responsible for profiles, with better payoffs, displays the approach regarding the interactions among agents under regulatory, hydrological and market uncertainties, which are present in the electrical sector, resulting in noncontinuous and noisy payoffs surfaces. It is demonstrated that the already mentioned non-continuous surfaces can be expanded in a hyper-space of mixed strategies, where orbits governed by the dynamics based on differential equations, will converge to profiles of stable attractive equilibrium, in an asymptotic meaning. In order to achieve the modeling, is suggested the employment of behavioral strategies, which possess the role of creating equilibrium profiles, immune to the frequently changes, as well as to propitiate the analysis in cooperative and competitive scenarios.

This thesis in the beginning deals with the history of 3D printing and its development. For better understanding the nature of 3D printing are the significant technologies that includes. Professional part includes work with the printer MakerBot Replicator 2X. Mechanical parts of the device are analyzed together with the operating software MakerBot DesktopThe following chapter is dealing with the limits and restrictions when it is printed on said 3D printer, except that describes important aspects when working on the printer. For the creation of electronic models are suggested appropriate programs for use in elementary school. A significant milestone is forming the problems of 3D printing, which can serve as a guide for the elimination of print quality problems, malfunctioning of 3D printers and others. Interesting models are designed for teaching physics and working activities that the students facilitate understanding of the substance of the response and act as activating element within lesson. It was created a list of important sites where you can find models suitable not only for teaching in elementary schools, but also for other purposes. The last chapter deals with the economic aspect of 3D printing.

[pt] Utilizando o instrumental da teoria dos jogos evolucionários, a proposta desta dissertação é analisar as interações entre emissores de dívida e agências de avaliação de risco de crédito em um ambiente com assimetria de informação. Enquanto os primeiros precisam das notas emitidas pelas agências para acessar fontes de financiamentos no mercado, as agências são remuneradas pela prestação desse serviço. Os resultados mostram que, de forma geral, quando o número de emissores grau de investimento é pequeno, incentiva-se a adoção de uma estratégia pouco transparente de divulgação de informação por parte do emissor, aumentando a assimetria de informação. A melhor resposta das agências é utilizar uma análise básica do perfil de crédito de seus clientes. O aumento do número de emissores grau de investimento na economia incentiva o aperfeiçoamento das políticas corporativas de transparência, enquanto as agências sofisticam sua análise com o objetivo de evitar os custos de reputação associados a erros de avaliação. Empiricamente, os resultados são condizentes com a evolução da economia colombiana nas últimas décadas. A melhoria do ambiente macroeconômico desse país atraiu emissores grau de investimento incentivando a atuação de agências que utilizam metodologia de análise sofisticada e emissores que adotam uma estratégia transparente de divulgação de suas informações. / [en] Using evolutionary game theory, this work aims to analyse the interactions between debt issuers and credit rating agencies in an asymmetric information environment. While the ratings grades are required by issuers to access funding sources for their investment projects, the agency s revenue is provided by this service. The results show that when the number of investment grade issuers is small, non-transparency strategy and basic methodology of analysis dominate, worsening the information asymmetry problem. The increase in the number of investment grade issuers encourages transparency policies while the agencies adopt a sophisticated analysis, avoiding the reputation costs associated with errors. Empirically, the results are consistent with the evolution of the Colombian economy in recent decades. The country s improvement in the macroeconomic environment attracted investment grade issuers encouraging the proliferation of sophisticated rating agencies and transparent issuers.

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<p dir="ltr">This dissertation addresses three progressively fundamental problems for functional data analysis: (1) To do efficient inference for the functional mean model accounting for within-subject correlation, we propose the refined and bias-corrected empirical likelihood method. (2) To identify functional subjects potentially from different populations, we propose the dominant-set based unsupervised clustering method using the similarity matrix. (3) To learn the similarity matrix from various similarity metrics for functional data clustering, we propose the modularity guided and dominant-set based semi-supervised clustering method.</p><p dir="ltr">In the first problem, the empirical likelihood method is utilized to do inference for the mean function of functional data by constructing the refined and bias-corrected estimating equation. The proposed estimating equation not only improves efficiency but also enables practically feasible empirical likelihood inference by properly incorporating within-subject correlation, which has not been achieved by previous studies.</p><p dir="ltr">In the second problem, the dominant-set based unsupervised clustering method is proposed to maximize the within-cluster similarity and applied to functional data with a flexible choice of similarity measures between curves. The proposed unsupervised clustering method is a hierarchical bipartition procedure under the penalized optimization framework with the tuning parameter selected by maximizing the clustering criterion called modularity of the resulting two clusters, which is inspired by the concept of dominant set in graph theory and solved by replicator dynamics in game theory. The advantage offered by this approach is not only robust to imbalanced sizes of groups but also to outliers, which overcomes the limitation of many existing clustering methods.</p><p dir="ltr">In the third problem, the metric-based semi-supervised clustering method is proposed with similarity metric learned by modularity maximization and followed by the above proposed dominant-set based clustering procedure. Under semi-supervised setting where some clustering memberships are known, the goal is to determine the best linear combination of candidate similarity metrics as the final metric to enhance the clustering performance. Besides the global metric-based algorithm, another algorithm is also proposed to learn individual metrics for each cluster, which permits overlapping membership for the clustering. This is innovatively different from many existing methods. This method is superiorly applicable to functional data with various similarity metrics between functional curves, while also exhibiting robustness to imbalanced sizes of groups, which are intrinsic to the dominant-set based clustering approach.</p><p dir="ltr">In all three problems, the advantages of the proposed methods are demonstrated through extensive empirical investigations using simulations as well as real data applications.</p>

La théorie des jeux évolutionnaires est un outil qui permet d’étudier l’évolution des stratégies dans une population composée d’un grand nombre d’agents qui interagissent d’une façon continue et aléatoire. Dans cette théorie, il y a deux concepts essentiels qui sont la stratégie évolutivement stable (ESS), et la dynamique de réplication. Une stratégie évolutivement stable est une stratégie, qui, si adoptée par toute la population,ne peut pas être envahie par une autre stratégie ”mutante” utilisée par une petite fraction de la population. Ce concept statique est un raffinement de l’équilibre de Nash, et il ne peut pas renseigner, par exemple, sur la durée du temps nécessaire pour que l’ESS élimine la stratégie mutante. La dynamique de réplication, originalement proposée par Hawk-Dove, est un modèle dynamique qui permet de prédire l’évolution de la fraction de chaque stratégie dans la population en fonction du temps, en réponse aux gains des stratégies et l’état de la population.Dans cette thèse, nous proposons dans une première partie une extension de la dynamique de réplication classique en y introduisant des délais hétérogènes et aléatoires.En effet, la plupart des phénomènes qui se produisent prennent un temps incertain avant d’avoir des résultats. Nous étudions l’effet de la distribution des délais sur la stabilité de l’ESS dans la dynamique de réplication et nous considérons les distributions uniforme, exponentielle, et Gamma (ou Erlang). Dans les cas des distributions uniforme et Gamma, nous trouvons la valeur critique de la moyenne à laquelle la stabilité de l’équilibre est perdue et des oscillations permanentes apparaissent. Dans le cas de la distribution exponentielle, nous montrons que la stabilité de l’équilibre ne peut être perdue,et ce pour toute valeur de la moyenne de la distribution. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que la distribution exponentielle peut affecter la stabilité de l’ESS quand une seule stratégie subit un délai aléatoire issu de cette distribution. Nous étudions également le cas où les délais sont discrets et nous trouvons une condition suffisante et indépendante des valeurs des délais pour la stabilité de l’équilibre. Dans tous les cas, nous montrons que les délais aléatoires sont moins risqués que les délais constants pour la stabilité de l’équilibre, vu que la valeur moyenne critique des délais aléatoires est toujours supérieure de celle des délais constants. En outre, nous considérons comme paramètre de bifurcation la moyenne de la distribution des délais et nous étudions les propriétés de la solution périodique qui apparait à la bifurcation de Hopf, et ce en utilisant une méthode de perturbation non linéaire. En effet, à la bifurcation de Hopf, une oscillation périodique stable apparait dont l’amplitude est fonction de la moyenne de la distribution. Nous déterminons analytiquement l’amplitude de l’oscillation au voisinage de la bifurcation de Hopf en fonction du paramètre de bifurcation et de la matrice des jeux dans les cas des distributions de Dirac, uniforme, Gamma et discrète, et nous appuyons nos résultats avec des simulations numériques. Dans une deuxième partie, nous considérons une population hétérogène composée de plusieurs communautés qui interagissent d’une manière non-uniforme. Pour chaque communauté, nous définissons les matrices des jeux et les probabilités d’interaction avec les autres communautés. Dans ce contexte, nous définissons trois ESS avec différents niveaux de stabilité contre les mutations: un ESS fort, un ESS faible et un ESS intermédiaire. Nous définissons un ESS fort comme suit: si toute la population adopte l’ESS, alors l’ESS ne peut pas être envahi par une petite fraction de mutants composée d’agents de toutes les communautés. / In this dissertation, we study evolutionary game theory which is a mathematical tool used to model and predict the evolution of strategies in a population composed of a largenumber of players. In this theory, there are two basic concepts which are the evolutionarilystable strategy (ESS) and the replicator dynamics. The ESS is originally definedas follows [1]: if all the population adopts the ESS, then no alternative strategy used bya sufficiently small fraction of the population can invade the population.The ESS is astatic concept and a refinement of a Nash equilibrium. It does not allow us, for example,to estimate the time required for the ESS to overcome the mutant strategy, neither to predictthe asymptotic distribution of strategies in the population. The replicator dynamics,originally introduced in [2], is a model of evolution of strategies according to which the growth rate of a given strategy is proportional to how well this strategy performs relative to the average pay off in the population.In the first part of this work, we propose an extended version of the replicator dynamics which takes into account heterogeneous random delays. Indeed, in many situations,the presence of uncertain delays is ubiquitous. We first consider continuous delays and we study the effect of the distribution of delays on the asymptotic stability of the mixed equilibrium in the replicator dynamics. In the case of uniform and Gamma delay distributions,we find the critical mean delay at which a Hopf bifurcation is created and the stability of the mixed equilibrium is lost. When the distribution of delays is exponential, we prove that the stability of the equilibrium cannot be affected by the delays. However, when only one strategy is delayed according to the exponential distribution,the asymptotic stability of the ESS can be lost. In all the cases, we show that the critical mean delay value is higher than that of constant delays, and thus random delays are less threatening than constant delays. In addition, we consider discrete delays and one o four results is that, when the instantaneous term is dominant, that is when the probabilityof zero delay is sufficiently high, the stability of the ESS cannot be lost.Furthermore, by taking as a bifurcation parameter the mean delay distribution, we examine the properties of the bifurcating periodic solution created near the Hopf bifurcationusing a nonlinear perturbation method. Indeed, near the Hopf bifurcation, a stable periodic oscillation appears whose amplitude depends on the value of the bifurcation parameter. We give a closed-form expression of the amplitude of the periodic solution and we validate our results with numerical simulations.In the second part, we consider an heterogeneous population composed of several communities which interact in a nonuniform manner. Each community has its own set of strategies, payoffs, and interaction probabilities. Indeed, individuals of a population have many inherent differences that favor the appearance of groups or clusters. In this scenario, we define three ESS with different levels of stability against mutations: strong,weak, and intermediate ESS, and we examine their connection to each other. A strongESS is a strategy that, when adopted by all the population, cannot be invaded by a sufficientlysmall fraction of mutants composed of agents from all the communities. Incontrast, a weak ESS is a strategy wherein each community resists invasion by a sufficientlysmall fraction of mutants in that community (local mutants). In the intermediateESS, the population adopting the ESS cannot be invaded by a small fraction of mutantswhen we consider the total fitness of the population rather than the fitness of eachcommunity separately.

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