Dans un système constitutionnel fondé sur la souveraineté de la nation, le pouvoir constituant fait figure de phénomène ambivalent, difficilement analysable en termes juridiques. Par définition réfractaire à tout encadrement impératif, le pouvoir suprême au sein de l’Etat n’en doit pas moins revêtir une forme organisée pour exprimer une volonté normative. Les acteurs de la Révolution française agissent aux confins du droit, tirant profit des ressources de la philosophie politique et de l’histoire pour établir une constitution, principe fondamental du système juridique qu’ils cherchent à établir. Ils se dotent d’outils pour parvenir à leurs fins : le concept de « convention nationale » en est un, auréolé du succès des réalisations américaines. Plutôt qu’à une transposition institutionnelle, les révolutionnaires français procèdent à une adaptation. En devenant « extraordinaire », la représentation constituante qu’ils conceptualisent perd son caractère révolutionnaire pour devenir pleinement juridique. Elle offre une alternative à l’insurrection. Un tel processus présente cependant un revers. Ce pouvoir, en accédant à l’existence investi de l’exercice de la souveraineté, est dégagé de toutes contraintes juridiques autres que celles qui découlent de son organisation. Ces contraintes pèsent sur ses membres, exacerbant les tensions qui déchirent un corps collectif doté des pouvoirs les plus étendus. Les dérives sanglantes qui frappent la Convention nationale ne sont pas inéluctables ; elles découlent de l’exploitation politique des failles inhérentes au fonctionnement d’une représentation souveraine dont les membres ne doivent jouir d’aucun privilège. / In a constitutional system founded on the sovereignty of the nation, constituent power is an ambivalent phenomenon, difficult to analyse in juridical terms. By definition resistant to mandatory regulation, the supreme power in the state must necessarily take a form which enables it to express a normative will. The actors of the French Revolution push the confines of the law, taking advantage of the resources of political philosophy and history to establish a constitution, fundamental principle of the juridical system they seek to institute. They create tools to achieve their ends: the concept of “national convention” being one, taking inspiration from the success of American achievements. Rather than an institutionnal transposition, the French revolutionaries proceed with an adaptation. By becoming “extraordinary”, the constituent representation which they conceptualize losses its revolutionary character to become fully juridical. It offers an alternative to the insurrection. By coming into existence invested with the capacity to exercise sovereignty, this power is released from all legal constraints other than those arising as a result of its organization. The process, however, is two-sided, and internally produced constraints weigh on its members, exacerbating tensions thar tear a collective body endowed with the broadest powers. The bloody excesses that strike the National Convention are not inevitable. They arise from political exploitation of flaws inherent to the organization of a sovereign representation whose members must not have any privilege.

La démocratie représentative reste un régime essentiellement représentatif qui a été conçu précisément pour exclure la participation directe de l’universalité des citoyens à la prise de décisions politiques. L’introduction d’instruments de la participation directe, en forme de l’e-démocratie, crée un conflit au sein de ce régime, conflit qui ne sera résolu que par un aménagement de la notion de démocratie représentative, voire sa substitution par une autre notion, ayant vocation à concilier les exigences de la participation et de la représentation. Cette thèse se propose de réfléchir à un modèle de régime politique-type susceptible de permettre l'intégration de l'e-démocratie.Une telle intégration met en lumière l’interdépendance entre la démocratie et les droits fondamentaux qui sont menacés de manière inédite à l’ère numérique. La possibilité d’introduire l’e-démocratie est donc conditionnée à la protection renforcée des droits essentiels : la liberté d’expression, le droit au respect de la vie privée, ainsi qu’à la reconnaissance de nouveaux droits fondés sur l’autodétermination personnelle. L’introduction de l’e-démocratie peut également remettre en cause certains concepts bien établis, tels que le principe majoritaire, ou exiger leur reconsidération, comme dans le cas de la bonne gouvernance. / Representative democracy remains essentially a representative government that was created precisely to avoid all the citizens to participate directly in political decision-making. Implementation of direct participation’s instruments in form of e-democracy creates a conflict within this government, a conflict which can be solved only by a renewal of representative democracy concept, even its substitution by another idea committed to reconciling representation and participation. This thesis aims a reflection on a concept of government capable of integrating e-democracy.Such an integration highlights the interdependent character of the link between democracy and human rights that are exposed to totally new threats in the digital era. The possibility to introduce e-democracy is conditional upon the reinforced protection of such essential rights and freedoms: as freedom of expression and right to respect for private and family life in the digital environment, as well as recognition of new rights based on personal self-determination. Implementation of e-democracy can also challenge well-established concepts such as majority principle or require their reconsideration, as in the case of good governance.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre Norberto Carbone de Carvalho.pdf: 1111622 bytes, checksum: 579a2500023600cdd506783797783afe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-09 / This thesis makes an analysis of the democracy practiced by political parties in Brazil, especially regarding their evolution from the 1988‟s Constitution. The study begins covering the different kinds of state‟s power organization, justifying the origin of democracy. After that, it discusses the beginning of representative government and the reasons for the birth of representative democracy and the democracy through political parties. As a result, this dissertation studies the modern political parties, especially its history, role and legal treatment, culminating with a brief historical analysis of those associations in Brazil. Finally, the work makes a thorough assessment of democracy through political parties in Brazil‟s current political framework. There are, at least, three assumptions that must be observed for the model‟s success: only political parties must present candidates; there must be political party loyalty; and we should have intra-party democracy. It took so long before political parties detain the exclusive prerogative of present candidates, that helped consolidate in Brazilians‟ popular culture the so called personal vote , where voters does not care about political parties, following charismatic leaders, regardless of their political party link. For a long time, candidates have become true masters of their term, which allows them to migrate from one political party to another, without any consequences, disturbing the democracy through political parties. Therefore, the absence of intra-party democracy has contributed to a paradox: the existence of an oligarchy inside the Brazilian‟s democracy. The political party leaders, perpetuated in power, impose, top-down, his favorite names to internal and external elections, not allowing sufficient space for debates, distorting the institution of political representation. The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Act nº 22.610/2007, which governs the procedure of term loss due to disloyalty to a political party, represented a significant step forward to insure democracy through political parties; however, a number of small issues still wait for resolution, which delays the full implementation of the political party loyalty in Brazil. The intra-party democracy, on the other hand, must be thoroughly regulated by the law. Only after that, we will be able to discuss, with high probability of effectiveness, one policy reform that has as its objective reduce any existent gap between the voter‟s will and the elected one. / A presente dissertação faz uma análise da democracia pelos partidos praticada no Brasil, especialmente quanto à evolução da figura da agremiação partidária a partir da Constituição Federal de 1988. O estudo inicia seu caminho abordando o surgimento e as diferentes maneiras de organização e funcionamento do poder estatal, justificando a explanação sobre a concepção e a origem da democracia. Ato contínuo, trata do surgimento do governo representativo e do respectivo modelo de exercício do poder político, além das razões do nascimento da democracia representativa e das justificativas para a adoção de uma democracia pelos partidos. Na sequência, a dissertação estuda os partidos políticos modernos, especialmente sua trajetória, função e tratamento legal, culminado com a análise de um breve histórico das agremiações no Brasil. Por fim, o trabalho efetua uma avaliação minuciosa da democracia pelos partidos no atual quadro político pátrio, examinando, à luz da realidade, ao menos três pressupostos que devem ser observados para o sucesso do modelo: a reserva do monopólio das candidaturas aos partidos políticos, a fidelidade partidária e a democracia intrapartidária. Conclui-se que os atrasos na adoção do monopólio das candidaturas e da fidelidade partidária contribuíram para consolidar, na cultura popular brasileira, o modelo de atribuição do voto na figura pessoal do candidato, fomentado, também, pela tradição do mandato representativo. Durante muito tempo, os candidatos tornaram-se verdadeiros donos dos mandatos, podendo migrar de uma agremiação a outra sem qualquer consequência, desnaturando o instituto da democracia pelos partidos. Já a ausência de democracia intrapartidária contribuiu para um paradoxo: fomentou a existência de uma oligarquia dentro de uma democracia, já que, no seio dos partidos políticos, os dirigentes partidários, perpetuados no poder, impõem, de cima para baixo, nomes de sua preferência aos cargos internos e eletivos, não permitindo que haja espaço para questionamentos, viciando a vontade popular e desvirtuando o instituto da representação política. A edição da Resolução do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral n° 22.610/2007, que disciplinou o processo de perda de cargo eletivo nos casos de infidelidade partidária, representou um avanço significativo para a democracia pelos partidos, porém, questões que decorrem da Resolução ainda estão sendo solucionadas, o que contribui para a demora na plena efetivação da fidelidade partidária. Quanto à democracia intrapartidária, torna-se vital a edição de normas que tenham como escopo assegurar o funcionamento democrático dos partidos, para que a vontade popular, quando do exercício do voto, não esteja maculada na origem. Dessa forma, presentes tais sustentáculos, teremos condições de discutir, com alta probabilidade de eficácia, uma reforma política que tenha por intuito diminuir eventual distância existente entre a vontade do eleitor e a do eleito.