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Status quo on fiscal decentralisation in MongoliaLkhagvadorj, Ariunaa January 2007 (has links)
This paper gives a review on the theoretical foundation for fiscal decentralisation and a status quo analysis of the intergovernmental relations in Mongolia. It consists of two parts. Part I briefly reviews the theories of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on the nations’ welfare considering the major challenges for a transition economy. Part II of the paper describes the general structure and scope of the government and examines the current fiscal autonomy in Mongolia focusing on the four main areas of intergovernmental relations. This paper concludes that local governments in Mongolia are still far away from having the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy. New approaches for the assignments of expenditures and revenues in Mongolia are urgently needed.
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Frameworks for Planning Collaborative Supply Chain ProgramsGurumurthi, Suryanarayanan January 2011 (has links)
<p>This dissertation is written in three progressively restrictive parts. Part I is a set of two expansive essays on collaborative supply chain management that proposes several new perspectives and interconnections between current day global business and economic issues, and the evolving supply chain structures and decision-making paradigms that depend on extensive inter-firm collaboration. Part I also develops new guidelines for both practitioners as well as academic researchers in their quest to incorporate collaborative requirements as an explicit component of existing planning frameworks and modeling approaches. Part I further comments on how the technological evolution of manufacturing, service, and general business processes have led to decentralized structures that require a fundamentally collaborative approach to the planning of such processes. We also argue that existing supply chain decision-making and planning approaches are modeled in the fashion of corporate and enterprise resource planning systems, which given their scope, limit the extent of collaboration in both planning and in execution. The arguments and discussion in this part are not specific to any particular supply chain function and is without technological bias. The frameworks presented in Part I are also unified in their approach to managing supply chains of service providers, manufacturing partners, or some combination of both types of activities. This unified presentation is also a fundamental contribution of this first part of the dissertation.</p><p>Part II of the dissertation, while still expansive in scope of application and the range of industry sectors and supply chain environments discussed, develops the ideas presented in Part I for more specific (or functional) categories of business processes. A commonly accepted categorization of operational processes, at least in manufacturing settings, is into (i) product design and development or related projects, which are akin to services in the nature and interaction between implied tasks, (ii) procurement, production, and customer service processes, and (iii) logistics and distribution networks. Projects are typically represented as a network of inter-related activities bound by a common purpose, and by a time-line dictated by a finite product or project life cycle; activities are also sometimes defined and created in response to project environments. Processes in the procurement, production, customer service, or logistics domains, on the other hand, are typically modeled as a set of inter-related but more loosely coupled activities that are repeated indefinitely across multiple product or project life cycles. Our primary concern in Part II is to understand environments where projects and processes span multiple firms, and therefore require a collaborative effort, not only for executing the activities entailed, but also in the planning of the tasks and projects.</p><p>Modeling of supply chain management problems (such as those discussed subsequently in Part III) assume that the fundamental structure of tasks and processes are at least well-defined for analysis and subsequent design of parameters for optimal performance. Often, however, the inclusion and structuring of these tasks is also a collaborative exercise that requires negotiation and careful consideration of the costs and advantages presented by alternative sets of tasks. The scope of tasks is also frequently determined by their assignment to one or more firms with differing capabilities. For example, the range of logistics activities and services provided by a specialized firm would be greater than a manufacturer assuming additional responsibility for the distribution or procurement logistics. Similarly, the capabilities of a supplier would either expand or restrict the range of tasks that would be included in the design and development of a product or a service. Therefore, Part II of the dissertation, consisting of Chapters 4 and 5, develops strategic frameworks that can allow the definition and structuring of tasks and processes in a collaborative setting. These chapters present frameworks for strategy and for defining project or process objectives which are commonly the guideposts for task definition and structuring. </p><p>These frameworks presented in Part II can also help determine the degree of collaboration either warranted or indeed suitable for different project and logistics environments. Thus, we propose that some business and technology environments call for more cohesive or coupled structuring of tasks that in turn require collaborative frameworks for planning and execution. Some other environments, either as a result of market forces or technological constraints, are a bad fit for collaborative efforts unless they are seamless and frictionless. Identifying such environments through a small set of market and technological factors is a fundamental contribution of Part II of the dissertation. Similar to our efforts in Part I, we also chart the evolution of collaborative planning and execution environments; here we adopt a more direct case based approach to illustrating issues, and related concepts. Another significant contribution of this second part is to outline how various facets of the operating environment shape the parameters of the collaborative arrangements between partner firms. In particular, we address the environmental and strategic forces that motivate a model of work sharing in environments where collaboration is not a technological requirement. Thus, we address the fundamental value proposition in collaborative logistics management for the outsourcing provider and the contracting firm, and discuss how product or process technology and structure influences such choices by firms. </p><p>Part III, which is more restrictive in its statements and conclusions, is devoted to models of collaborative supply chain management that are motivated by the imperatives outlined in Part I, but whose elements are defined by the strategic frameworks and structuring guidelines of Part II . While Part III derives guidance from Part II in the formulation of its models, it can also be viewed and read independently for its contributions to the (related) academic literature. Part III consists again of two independent modeling exercises. Through either of these exercises, we address two of the most important problems in collaborative supply chain planning: partner selection, or alternatively task and project assignment, and decentralized capacity management in a supply chain or logistics environment. These models describe two environments where collaborative planning is vital to the success of firms: (i decentralized and collaborative projects or programs that frequently determine how supply chains of diverse firms are structured and take form, and (ii) decentralized logistics and transportation systems where firms in a supply chain must invest in common infrastructure, and further determine the material flows utilizing such infrastructure. In both cases, we show how decentralized structures can be inefficient relative to centralized decision-models, while characterizing the equilibrium behavior of firms in decentralized decision-frameworks under the proportional risk-sharing regimes. We then provide mechanisms that can coordinate the decentralized systems. These mechanisms turn out to be highly conditional on the rules of information exchange and the decision-hierarchies in the supply chain, and therefore can claim to remedy coordination problems in only a subset of collaborative environments. However, this subset -- as it turns out -- is not insignificant, as many different supply chains operate with such restrictive information exchange and decision-hierarchies. </p><p>In the next introductory chapter, we provide a more detailed synopsis of Parts I-III with the objective of identifying the considerable interconnections between the various chapters within the three parts. We also aim to highlight the contributions of the work to various streams of academic literature. Throughout this dissertation, we strive to maintain a dual tone of discussion: One for practitioners and researchers in the field of operations strategy that focuses on synthesizing insights on supply chain structure and the crucial elements of collaborative supply chain planning for the sake of managers, and the second theme focusing on more fundamental operations research problems underlying the collaborative planning environment.</p> / Dissertation
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Die verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen des horizontalen Länderfinanzausgleichs nach Art. 107 Abs. 2 GG /Lintner, Markus. January 2004 (has links) (PDF)
Univ., Diss.--Würzburg, 2003. / Literaturverz. S. 203 - 215.
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Vliv velikosti obce na její financování / Effects of the size of the municipality on its financingFialová, Barbora January 2012 (has links)
This thesis examines how the size of the municipality affects its finances in terms of income and expenditure. The aim of this study is to assess the benefits of the merger of small villages to larger town and reveal some areas where the size of the municipality plays a role in terms of its financing. The thesis composes of three parts. The first chapter is an overview of theoretical knowledge about the topic to faciliate understanding of the following two parts. These are already showing a practical example - a case study of marging six small villages with a larger town. The second part of the analysis focuses on the revenue site of their budgets. Finally, the third section is dealing with the expenditure site of municipal budgets. Partial conclusions on benefits and drawbacks of merging municipalities are made in each part of the work.
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台灣省統籌款分配之研究--兼論精簡省府組織後分配方案之設計 / Revenue sharing in Taiwan Provincial Government蘇詩雅, Su, Shih-Ya Unknown Date (has links)
民國八十五年國家發展會議做成「精簡省府組織」之決議,並於民國八十六年修憲通過,自八十七年起停止省長及省議員選舉,省成為--監督各縣市自治事項之監督機關,使得各縣市政府自治地位提高,使得各縣市政府自治地位提高,為使縣市政府能適當的發揮功能,必須有適當的財政制度來解決縣市政府「垂直」及「水平」的財政不均。
為解決個政府間財政的不均,我國所運用的調整工具有補助款、共分稅與統籌分配稅等制度。補助款制度為上級政府的權衡策略,長扮演著“救急”或上級政府影響下級政府政策之工具;共分稅可用來解決不同層級政府間垂直的財政不均衡,在中央與台北市、高雄市及台灣省政府間更可透過不同的共分比例,發揮調整水平財政不均的功能。面對台灣省二十一縣市患寡又患不均的財政問題,由於共分稅不易對個別縣市設定不同的共分比例,因此一致的共分比例將造成「富者愈富,貧者愈貧」的現象,再者,共分稅運用的擴大亦將削弱中央政府進行財政調整之能力;統籌分配制度則是將地方政府的財源透過--適當機制,依照地方政府的財政狀況予以分配,具有調劑各地方財政不均之功能。
本文的目的乃在研究「精簡省府組織」後,原來的台灣省統籌分配稅制度應如何設計,以達到調劑各縣市財政盈虛之目的。本文以八十五年度政府決算數資料將省府財政適當合理的重劃並調整精省後各縣市的財政收支,在此基礎下,研擬可行的分配公式,使統籌分配的過程得以透明公開。本文之研究結論及其建議如下:
1.台灣省各縣市財政之歲入結構以非自有財源的補助收入為主,自有財源比例在各縣市間又有甚大差異,顯示各縣市間有患寡又患不均現象。亟需以統籌分配稅來提高地方自主財源並促進各地方財政均衡之必要。
2.目前的省統籌分配稅由於被賦予過多的財政目標,而使其最重要的保障財源與均衡縣市財政之功能未能發揮,且容易令人與補助制度發生混淆。
3.目前省統籌分配稅之預算編列與分配公式並未法制化,行政首長對於省統籌款有大部分的掌控權,難以提高地方自主財源之功效。
4.統籌分配稅之名稱有限制財源必須來自於「稅」之意,且「統籌」就字面意義容易令人誤解,被視為上級政府有任意運用統籌款之權,故建議精簡省府組織後,以「平衡台灣省各縣市預算基金」代替「台灣省統籌分配稅」之名稱,或以「平衡預算基金」代替「統籌分配稅」之用語。
5.平衡預算基金的財源宜擴大,可考慮的財源有土地增值稅、營業稅、印花稅、地價稅、房屋稅、所得稅、貨物稅、證卷交易稅、中央的獨占及專賣收入等。在本研究的五種平衡預算基金財源方案中,發現基金的財源愈多,或將稅源分佈不均的稅目納入此基金的比例愈高,所得到的財政均衡效果愈佳。但觀察其等級相關係數(rs)測度之平衡預算基金分配前、後各縣市財政狀況的排序,發現基金的財源愈多,排序變異的情況愈嚴重,是以平衡預算基金並非愈多愈好,而應在財政均衡與排序倒置的效果中做--權衡。
6.平衡預算基金的分配公式應考量各縣市的財政狀況,以「相對」的概念計算各地方所得到的分配權數,應納入均等化的指標可包括「財政能力」、「財政需求」與「財政努力」等項。
7.本研究建議的分配公式有下列四式:
公式一 a1 每人平均稅課收入之財政能力指標 +a2 學生數指標 +a3 都市人口指標 +a4 社會福利指標
公式二 b1 每人平均稅課收入之財政能力指標 +b2 學生數指標 +b3 都市人口指標 +b4 農地面積指標 +b5 工廠附加價值指標 +b6 社會福利指標
公式三 c1 每人平均稅課收入之財政能力指標 +c2 學生數指標 +c3 都市人口指標 +c4 社會福利指標 +c5 非租稅努力指標
公式四 d1 每人平均稅課收入之財政能力指標 +d2 學生數指標 +d3 都市人口指標 +d4 農地面積指標 +d5 工廠附加價值指標 +d6 社會福利指標 +d7 非租稅努力指標
a1~a4,b1~b6,c1~c5,d1~d7 為分配因子之權數,權數設定為:財政能力以「稅課收入不足數占歲出的比例」為其權數,即縣市稅課收入加上平衡縣市預算基金數後仍不足縣市歲出的比例;非租稅努力為稅課外自有財源占歲出的比例,其餘部分為財政需求比例。第一及第二公式未考慮非租稅努力指標,其權數以財政能力與財政需求的相對比例修正;而個別財政需求因子之權數,以其支出相對比重再乘上財政需求之權數而得。由於不同的方案,稅課收入與平衡預算基金數額不同,故其權數的設定亦有差異。
本研究的四種分配公式在不同的平衡預算基金方案中皆能降低各縣市間財政差異。在調整省縣稅源重劃方案中,發現將地價稅及房屋稅納入平衡預算基金的比例愈高,有助於縣市財政的均等化,且以公式一或公式二分配對縣市間排序倒置的現象影響不大,惟此方案是否對鄉(鎮、市)的財政造成影響,仍須加以評估。在加入中央稅源的調整方案中,公式化的分配仍可降低縣市間的財政差距,惟政策目標不同應選擇不同的公式以求得適當的分配效果,若公式分配的目標在於縣市間財政平衡效果,則可以公式二或公式四分配;若分配公式的目標首重分配前後縣市間財政狀況排序的相關性,則應以公式一或公式二分配為佳。
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我國營業稅稅收分配之研究 / The research of the business tax revenue-sharing in Taiwan李惠懿, Li, Huey Yih Unknown Date (has links)
一、研究目的與方法:
我國營業稅為省(市)政府主要的財源,在省、市間存有分配不均的現象,雖直轄市按其營業稅收入總額百分之五十交付中央統籌分配省及直轄市,但實際分配的結果,以82年度為例仍是財政狀況最佳的臺北市分配最多,財政狀況最差的臺灣省分配最少,未能有效改善營業稅稅收在省、市間分配不均之現象。再者各省、市對於總繳制度、外銷財貨適用零稅率退稅、海關代徵營業稅等制度多有不滿,此等問題如何解決,值得深入研究。本文主要的目的在建立一套明確的營業稅稅收分配公式,並試擬不同的營業稅稅收分配方案,以改善目前營業稅稅收在省、市間分配不均之情況。
本文先探討營業稅稅收收入權應屬中央或地方政府及介紹其他聯邦體制下國家之加值稅分配情況,繼而透過我國營業稅稅收分配制度的分析,以探討造成營業稅稅收分配不均之原因,並建立一明確分配公式,配合不同之營業稅稅收分配方案,計算不同之分配結果,以作為未來營業稅稅收分配制度改革的參考。
二、研究發現:
(一)由基本性質及租稅收入劃分原則來分析,加值稅應由中央統一徵收並屬國稅。聯邦體制國家為避免課徵加值稅後減少地方政府財源,通常採用收入分成公式將加值稅收入分配予各級地方政府。
(二)營業稅在省、市之間的分配,雖已透過中央統籌分配稅之調整,但其實際分配在省、市之間仍存在水平不均的現象。
(三)營業稅雖然為省(市)稅,但其制度之設計又與國稅相仿,因此,「總繳」、「海關代徵營業稅」、「外銷財貨退稅」更使目前營業稅水平分配不均。
(四)營業稅水平分配不均,根本解決之道是將營業稅改列為國稅,但因修法不易且造成省市自有財源流失,故可行之道乃制定一明確之公式將營業稅統籌分配予省、市政府。
(五)試擬以下三種不同分配方案:
方案一:將全部營業稅劃歸中央統籌分配稅款,再按公式分配予各省、市。
方案二:將各分支機構之營業稅分配至分支機構所在地,直轄市仍以其營業稅收百分之五十交付予中央統籌,並按公式分配省及直轄市。
方案三:各省(市)將造成目前營稅稅收分配不均因素對營業稅收入之影響金額加回或扣除,為各省(市)調整後營業稅收入,臺北市以其總收入百分之六十五,高雄市以其總收入百分之五十五交付中央統籌,按公式分配直轄市及省。
三方案均可有效解決營業稅水平分配不均的現象,但方案一可以徹底消除目前營業稅分配不均的原因,且因其將全部營業稅收列為可分配的對象最能顯示分配的公平性,故此方案為最佳的方案,但其須修法的幅度較大,短期可以方案二或方案三代之,長期改制方向仍應以方案一作為努力之標準。
三、研究建議:
為有效改善目前營業稅稅收分配不均的問題,本文對未來營業稅稅收分配制度有如下的建議:
(一)設計一明確的營業稅分配公式。
(二)營業稅仍列為省(市)稅。
(三)公式的設計以有效解決目前營業稅稅收分配不均為目標。
(四)省、市政府支付中央統籌分配稅款之比例,應考慮不同地區的財政狀況之差異。
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Modeling Private Information In Bilateral Relationships For Revenue ManagementVanamalla, Sri V 10 1900 (has links)
This thesis addresses two issues which arise in the context of airline revenue management. In the first part of the thesis, we develop an incentive mechanism to prevent revenue leakage caused by customers buying down. In the second part of the thesis, we discuss the revenue sharing problem between alliance partners and develop a mechanism by which the combined revenue can be distributed fairly among them. Situations which give rise to impossibility and possibility results are established.
The practice of revenue management, employs the principle of differential pricing of a product based on various product restrictions. These product restrictions segment the market in such a manner so as to maximize the revenue. Airline industry which pioneered the practice of revenue management generally prices low for those who book early and high for those who book late for essentially the same seat. The low-fare products are targeted towards the market segment comprising of those customers who have a low valuation (reservation price) for the product (who are typically leisure customers, also called as low-fare customers).The high-fare product, on the other hand is targeted at the market segment comprising of customers who have a high valuation (reservation price) for the product (business class customers, also called as high-fare customers). However, it may happen that customers with high valuation for the product may also buy the low-fare product if it is available. This behavior of high-fare customers buying a low-fare product due to its availability is called the customer buy-down behavior. Such a customer behavior causes revenue leakage to the airline industry. Revenue management literature that primarily focuses on pricing and seat inventory control does not account for the customer buy-down behavior. In Part I of the thesis we address this issue of customer buy-down behavior. We develop an incentive mechanism in the form of a new product bundle which would attract only the high-fare customer.
High fare customers such as business class customers typically have repeated travel plans, while low fare customers such as leisure travelers typically do not travel repeatedly. The proposed incentive mechanism takes advantage of this characteristic of high fare customers that distinguishes them from the low fare customers. In general, high fare product permits cancellation and does not impose any travel restrictions, and a low fare product, on the other hand does not permit cancellation and has other travel restrictions associated with them. A high fare customer with potential future travel plan might associate uncertainties with respect to travel dates and his ability to procure a low fare ticket for future travel. This uncertainty is exploited in the proposed product bundle. The new product bundle permits the customer to cancel the ticket for the future journey and relaxes the restrictions associated with the requested day and the future travel day. Such incentives would attract only the high fare customer and the low-fare customer will not be enticed by this product bundle. This is because the low fare customer is a one-off traveler. Thus, the acceptance of the product bundle by the customer reveals that he is a high-fare customer and its denial reveals that he is truly a low-fare customer. We determine the optimal price to be charged for each of the days (requested day and the future travel day) and the refund value for the future travel day. We find that multiple optimal solutions exist, and its existence indicate a win-win situation for both the customer and the seller. The customer benefits through the incentives offered and the seller benefits in the form of additional revenue that is achieved in the process of preventing revenue leakage.
In Part II of the thesis, we discuss the revenue sharing problem between alliance partners of a network. Airlines form alliances and coordinate through activities such as code sharing, scheduling of flight arrival and departure times, arrival and departure gates, frequent flyer programs, airport lounges and ground facilities among several others. Code sharing is a key feature among the coordinated activities of alliance partners. Parallel code sharing refers to code sharing between carriers operating on the same route to increase frequency of services and to strengthen market position. Complementary code sharing refers to carriers using each other’s flights to provide connecting services, where they do not offer a full service on their own. The main objective of the complementary code share flights is to increase scope of the partner’s network, allowing them to supply service on markets where they did not operate before. When complementary code shared flights aim at maximizing their combined revenue, it might lead to inequitable distribution of revenue and may cause an alliance partner to lose revenue. In Part II of the thesis, we address this issue of achieving a fair division of the combined revenue generated by the alliance network. The common assumption in revenue sharing methods that are generally practiced is that airline’s valuation of seats in the alliance network is common knowledge. However, in reality it is not true. We therefore consider the valuations of the carriers of their respective products as private information and the price of the product over the entire network to be common knowledge. Under such an information environment, we formulate the problem in the bargaining framework. We discuss the implementation of two solution concepts; namely the Shapley value and the Core of a cooperative game.
For the two person cooperative game, the Shapley value equally distributes the surplus among the two parties, while the core allocations of two person cooperative game consists of all possible proportions of the distribution of the surplus. In a bargaining set up, the parties communicate their valuations through sealed bids and agree upon a transfer rule. We analyze two situations. In the first situation we assume that the two parties do not associate any cost towards failure to arrive at an agreement. We determine the optimal bids for the two parties and prove that these optimal bids do not implement any desired point on the core i.e., desired proportion of the distribution of the surplus (which includes the Shapley value).This impossibility result motived the analysis of the second situation, in which we assume that the two parties associate costs towards failure to arrive at an agreement. We once again determine the optimal bids and prove that for a certain structure of the bargaining costs, any desired point on the core, including the Shapley value can be implemented by enticing the players to reveal their true valuations.
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The Effects of Fluctuations in Federal Revenue Sharing Payments Made to Rural Counties on School District BudgetsHarmer, Camille 01 December 2019 (has links)
Federal revenue sharing programs aim to make up lost tax revenue to counties that contain federal land, as counties do not receive any property tax revenue from publicly owned lands. This may have a significant impact on rural school districts with a limited tax base, as most funding for public education comes from property tax revenue. My analysis seeks to determine the full impact of certain federal revenue sharing payments (paid out by the U.S. Forest Service) on school districts in counties that contain U.S. Forest Service land. My analysis shows that the payments have little impact on school district budgets, indicating that states likely smooth for variations in the U.S. Forest Service payments.
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Telecom Fraud Detection Using Machine LearningXiong, Chao January 2022 (has links)
International Revenue Sharing Fraud (IRSF) is one of the most persistent types of fraud within the telecommunications industry. According to the 2017 Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) fraud loss survey, IRSF costs 6 billion dollars a year. Therefore, the detection of such frauds is of vital importance to avoid further loss. Though many efforts have been made, very few utilize the temporal patterns of phone call traffic. This project, supported with Sinch’s real production data, aims to exploit both spatial and temporal patterns learned by Graph Attention Neural network (GAT) with Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) to find suspicious timestamps in the historical traffic. Moreover, combining with the time-independent Isolation forest model, our model should give better results for the phone call records. This report first explains the mechanism of IRSF in detail and introduces the models that are applied in this project, including GAT, GRU, and Isolation forest. Finally, it presents how our experiments have been conducted and the results with extensive analysis. Moreover, we have achieved 42.4% precision and 96.1% recall on the test data provided by Sinch, showing significant advantages over both previous work and baselines. / International Revenue Sharing Fraud (IRSF) är en av de mest ihållande typerna av bedrägerier inom telekommunikationsindustrin. Enligt 2017 Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) bedrägeriförlustundersökning kostar IRSF 6 miljarder dollar per år. Därför är upptäckten av sådana bedrägerier av avgörande betydelse för att undvika ytterligare förluster. Även om många ansträngningar har gjorts är det väldigt få som använder telefonsamtalstrafikens tidsmässiga mönster. Detta projekt, med stöd av Sinchs verkliga produktionsdata, syftar till att utnyttja både rumsliga och tidsmässiga mönster som lärts in av Graph Attention Neural Network (GAT) med Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) för att hitta misstänkt tid i den historiska trafiken. Dessutom, i kombination med den tidsoberoende skogsmodellen Isolation, borde vår modell ge bättre resultat för telefonsamtalsposterna. Denna rapport förklarar först mekanismen för IRSF i detalj och introducerar modellerna som används i detta projekt, inklusive GAT, GRU och Isolation forest. Slutligen presenteras hur våra experiment har genomförts och resultaten med omfattande analys. Dessutom har vi uppnått 42.4% precision och 96.1% återkallelse på testdata från Sinch, vilket visar betydande fördelar jämfört med både tidigare arbete och baslinjer.
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Aspects technologiques et économiques de la qualité de service dans les alliances de fournisseurs de servicesAMIGO, Maria Isabel 12 July 2013 (has links) (PDF)
Providing end-to-end quality-assured services implies many challenges, which go beyond technical ones, involving as well economic and even cultural or political issues. In this thesis we first focus on a technical problem and then intent a more holistic regard to the whole problem, considering at the same time Network Service Providers (NSPs), stakeholders and buyers' behaviour and satisfaction. One of the most important problems when deploying interdomain path selection with Quality of Service (QoS) requirements is being able to rely the computations on metrics that hold for a long period of time. Our proposal for solving that problem is to compute bounds on the metrics, taking into account the uncertainty on the traffic demands. We then move to a NSP-alliance scenario, where we propose a complete framework for selling interdomain quality-assured services, and subsequently distributing revenues. At the end of the thesis we adopt a more holistic approach and consider the interactions with the monitoring plane and the buyers' behaviour. We propose a simple pricing scheme and study it in detail, in order to use QoS monitoring information as feedback to the business plane, with the ultimate objective of improving the seller's revenue.
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