Orientador: Silvio Seno Chibeni / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-28T07:46:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Menna_SergioHugo_M.pdf: 12902549 bytes, checksum: b9159687e676d7b93c15583d2d6324ce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: Este trabalho de investigação tem como objetivo expor, explicitar, exemplificar e aperfeiçoar as contribuições de Norwood Hanson à metodologia da investigação científica. Com esta finalidade, em primeiro lugar me ocupo das críticas elaboradas por este autor à polarização metodológica clássica entre os contextos de justificação e de descoberta. Em segundo lugar, desenvolvo a proposta de Hanson de um conjunto de regras ou 'critérios' para retratar um domínio de racionalidade científica maior que o estabelecido: a metodologia da plausibilidade. Esta metodologia, tal como defendo, é para Hanson um conjunto de critérios para avaliar a plausibilidade de hipóteses já descobertas (em particular, hipóteses de trabalho) e não um conjunto de critérios ou uma 'máquina' para fazer descobertas ou gerar novas hipóteses -idéia defendida por outros autores. Por último, mediante a formulação de exemplos, analiso a metodologia da plausibilidade de Hanson dentro do continuum de investigação científica, e defendo que ela pode formar uma instância de avaliação independenteda de justificação / Abstract: The goal ofthis work is to present, to exemplify,and to improveNorwood Hanson's contributions to the methodology of scientific inquiry. Aiming to these goals, first I analyze Hanson's criticisms to the classic dichotomy between context of justification and context of discovery. Secondly, I develop his methodology of plausibility; that is, the set of 'criteria' that describe an area or scientific rationality greater than the traditional one. I support that this methodology was used by Hanson as a set of criteria for evaluating the plausibility of already advanced hypotheses (in special, working hypothesis) and not as a set of criteria or a 'machine' for discovering or generating new hypotheses. Last1y, I analyze -by means of different examples- the methodology of plausibility as it works within the continuum of scientific research, and I maintain that this methodology may constitute an instance of evaluation independent from the instance of justification / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The acquaintance is the relation between the mind and certain objects called russell´s objects. These objects are restricted to individuals who can think directly. Appearances, such as colors, are examples of russell´s objects. The acquaintance is a primitive epistemic relation. The individual has the ability to discriminate those objects, distinguishing them from others in the traditional interpretation of acquaintance. The objects are known by acquaintance in the sense that the mind can identify them perfectly. In this case, the subject can not be wrong about the interpretation and the knowledge of what is thinking about it. A individual can, however, be in a relation with one and the same individual at different times, not realizing that it is the same. The cases of the continuous phenomena show that, explaining the difficulty in demonstrating the reference equality through changes in the character of the experience. / A acquaintance consiste na relação entre a mente e certos objetos chamados de objetos russellianos. Estes objetos restringem-se a indivíduos que podemos pensar diretamente. As aparências, tais como as cores, são exemplos de objetos russellianos. A acquaintance é uma relação epistêmica primitiva. O sujeito possui a capacidade de discriminar aqueles objetos, distinguindo-os de outros na interpretação tradicional de acquaintance. Os objetos são conhecidos por acquaintance no sentido que a mente pode identificá-los perfeitamente. Neste caso, o sujeito não pode estar errado no conhecimento daquilo que está pensando naquela interpretação. Um sujeito pode, no entanto, estar em uma relação com um e o mesmo indivíduo, em diferentes ocasiões, sem perceber que é o mesmo. Os casos dos fenômenos contínuos mostram isso, explicitando a dificuldade em demonstrar a igualdade de referência através das mudanças no caráter da experiência.

Theories of Extended Mind have evolved in waves to reach the present state of disagreement with regard to whether or not external artefacts become part of the mind when used for memory purposes. A four-step approach has been used to address and resolve this disagreement. First, a new component for models of mind which provides a saliency function is provided. This saliency function corresponds to computational elements found necessary in large mainframe computer systems for handling rich data environments. Second, there is introduced a Computational Model of Memory containing the new component which models the operation of human memory. The Computational Model of Memory contains four interoperative elements including the new component, short-term memory, long-term memory, and a cross-reference associator. Third, the work of Marcin Milkowski is drawn upon to obtain a general method of assessing a computational model’s well-formedness, and the method is applied to prove the adequacy of the Computational Model of Memory. According to Milkowski’s schema, the model satisfies most criteria for a well-formed computational model, including in particular a separation between conceptual elements of the model, and constitutive elements of the model, which while explicitly related, are required to subsist at separate logical conceptual levels. Fourth, the Computational Model of Memory is applied to outstanding arguments in Extended Mind to clarify and resolve several of these arguments. The model serves to highlight where the nature of the disagreement depends upon a category error of reference, and further resolves a key disagreement by demonstrating that the mind may treat external artefacts as an alternative realizable constitutive element of short-term and long-term memory.

The thesis examines the novels of Anglo-American author Russell Hoban (1923-) and Japanese author Murakami Haruki [Chinese characters] (1949-) as Menippean satires. The Introduction defines the Menippean satire and considers possible sources for this genre as found in the works of Hoban and Murakami. Parts I and II examine several novels by Hoban and by Murakami respectively, demonstrating how their works conform to the conventions of the Menippean satire. In examining Murakami's fiction, Part II also considers possible antecedents in Japanese literature for tropes and topoi that appear Menippean in the light of Western genre theory; there is a special emphasis on Murakami's most recent work, [Chinese characters] Nejimakidori kuronikuru (1994-6, The Wind-up Bird Chronicles). The Conclusion examines why these two authors write Menippean satires. No claim is made that either author has chosen this genre in deliberate imitation of classical or Renaissance models. Rather, from the standpoint of cultural history, the thesis argues that the Menippean satire—or at least a form of postmodernist novel with notable affinities to the Menippean satire—has re-emerged as a genre for our times. Drawing on examples from the fiction of Murakami and Hoban, the conclusion demonstrates that central features of this genre—fantasy, crudity, philosophical dialogues, inserted genres, invented languages, and the descent into hell—are particularly appropriate for the fictional treatment of life in a postmodern world. Moreover, these features are serviceable not only in a Western context. Murakami Haruki, despite his Japanese cultural background and his avowed intention to write about Japan, relies on many of the same generic strategies as does Russell Hoban. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

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Studies of American Indian protest rhetoric often define American Indian opposition either by its resistance or its conformity to non-Native institutional discursive norms, suggesting that only one of the two can be considered authentic to American Indian cultures and identities. Addressing this debate, this thesis examines an instance of Native opposition which successfully blends the two approaches: Russell Means' 1989 statement to the United States Senate. Means employs the mode of story to effectively shift discursive authority from the Senate committee members to pan-Indigenous peoples. I call this shift rhetorical occupation, or the appropriation of rhetorical space. Through rhetorical occupation, Means displaces the dominant narrative of governmental power with his own story, drawing on Lakota storytelling practices and both complying with and resisting white Euro-American forms of persuasion. This analysis suggests that rather than defining a broad category of culturally authentic American Indian opposition rhetoric, scholars should consider how Native opposition rhetorics reflect distinct tribal rhetorical traditions and take unique approaches to navigating non-Native discursive norms.

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