A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the organizational culture in three local companies of the transport corporation. The analysis is carried out with the aim to map the organizational culture in the local companies. At the beginning of the work is described theory, which is composed from the organizational culture, models of individual organizational cultures and elements that may affect the strength of the organizational culture and others. In the empirical part are analysed the data obtained by various methods of diagnostics organizational culture. These include observation, interviewing and analysis the documents of company. At the end of this thesis are found the recommendations for the company.

A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.

“A Shine of Truth in the ‘universal delusional context of reification’ (Theodor W. Adorno)” comprend sept chapitres, un prologue et un épilogue. Chaque partie se construit à deux niveaux : (1) à partir des liens qui se tissent entre les phrases contiguës ; et (2) à partir des liens qui se tissent entre les phrases non contiguës. Les incipit des paragraphes forment l’argument principal de la thèse. Le sujet de la thèse, Schein (apparence, illusion, clarté) est abordé de manière non formaliste, c’est à dire, de manière que la forme donne d’elle-même une idée de la chose : illusion comme contradiction imposée. Bien que le sujet de la thèse soit l’illusion, son but est la vérité. Le Chapitre I présente une dialectique de perspectives (celles de Marx, de Lukács, de Hegel, de Horkheimer et d'Adorno) pour arriver à un critère de vérité, compte tenu du contexte d’aveuglement universel de la réification ; c’est la détermination de la dissolution de l’apparence. Le Chapitre II présente le concept d’apparence esthétique—une apparence réversible qui s’oppose à l’apparence sociale générée par l’industrie de la culture. Le Chapitre III cherche à savoir si la vérité en philosophie et la vérité en art sont deux genres distincts de vérités. Le Chapitre IV détermine si l’appel à la vérité comme immédiateté de l’expression, fait par le mouvement expressionniste du 20e siècle, est nouveau, jugé à l’aune d’un important antécédent à l’expressionisme musical : « Der Dichter spricht » de Robert Schumann. Le Chapitre V se penche sur la question à savoir si le montage inorganique est plus avancé que l’expressionisme. Le Chapitre VI reprend là où Peter Bürger clôt son essai Theorie de l’avant-garde : ce chapitre cherche à savoir à quel point l’oeuvre d’art après le Dada et le Surréalisme correspond au modèle hégélien de la « prose ». Le Chapitre VII soutient que Dichterliebe, op. 48, (1840), est une oeuvre d’art vraie. Trois conclusions résultent de cette analyse musicale détaillée : (1) en exploitant, dans certains passages, une ambigüité dans les règles de l’harmonie qui fait en sorte tous les douze tons sont admis dans l’harmonie, l’Opus 48 anticipe sur Schoenberg—tout en restant une musique tonale ; (2) l’Opus 48, no 1 cache une tonalité secrète : à l'oeil, sa tonalité est soit la majeur, soit fa-dièse mineur, mais une nouvelle analyse dans la napolitaine de do-dièse majeur est proposée ici ; (3) une modulation passagère à la napolitaine dans l’Opus 48, no 12 contient l’autre « moitié » de la cadence interrompue à la fin de l’Opus 48, no 1. Considérés à la lumière de la société fausse, l’Allemagne des années 1930, ces trois aspects anti-organiques témoignent d’une conscience avancée. La seule praxis de vie qu’apporte l’art, selon Adorno, est la remémoration. Mais l’effet social ultime de garder la souffrance vécue en souvenir est non négligeable : l’émancipation universelle. / “A Shine of Truth in the ‘universal delusional context of reification’ (Theodor W. Adorno)” defends Adorno’s aesthetics as a theory of advanced, or avant-garde, artworks. Its seven chapters show that aesthetic experience implies liberation from illusion (Schein). Chapter I engages a dialectic of viewpoints to explain how different dialectical thinkers (Marx, Lukács, Hegel, Horkheimer, Adorno) have contributed to a criterion of truth adequate to today’s total delusional context of reification—determinate negation of illusion. Chapter II introduces the concept of artistic aesthetic illusion—a reversible illusion opposed to the social illusions of mechanical musical reproduction and of the culture industry. Chapter III examines the question of whether truth in philosophy is a different kind of truth than truth in art. Chapter IV considers whether truth in twentieth-century Expressionism is a new truth based on immediate expression, in light of an important precedent for Expressionism in Robert Schumann’s “Der Dichter spricht.” Chapter V determines whether inorganic montage is more advanced than Expressionism. Chapter VI takes up a parting suggestion of Peter Bürger: to treat artworks after Dada and Surrealism on the model of “prose” in Hegel’s aesthetics. Chapter VII pursues the idea that Dichterliebe, op. 48, (1840) by Robert Schumann is a true artwork. Three results emerge from this close musical analysis: (1) exploiting, on occasion, an ambiguity in the rules for figuration that permits all twelve tones in the harmony, Schumann anticipates Schoenberg; (2) Op. 48, No. 1 is in a hidden key: to all appearances, its key is either A major or F-sharp minor, but its secret key is the Neapolitan region applied to C-sharp major; (3) the other “half” of the cadence with which Op. 48, No. 1 breaks off suddenly may be found in a brief applied-Neapolitan passage in No. 12. The thesis argued is that the antiorganicity in such a work is advanced with regard to the false reality of 1930s Germany and the place of organicity therein. According to Adorno, the only life-praxis afforded by art is remembrance. But the social effect of remembering social suffering is considerable when the Here-and-Now is its own justification.

Master´s thesis „Suggestion for the Improvemnetof the Company´s Culture“ is engaged in analysis of corporate culture in the company called Diplomat.cz which belongs to the significant seller of services on the Czech market. The main target of Master´s thesis was to engage the power and level of corporate culture, satisfaction of employee, to identify the components of corporate culture due to the Schein ´s model and suggest on the basis of questionnaire´s results steps, which could improve corporate atmosphere and contribute to increase the productivity of labour.

The thesis “A Suggestion for the Improvement of the Company Culture in the Centre of Insurance” deals with the analysis of the corporate culture in the Centre of Insurance, a company that provides financial services. The main target of the thesis is to ascertain the power and standard of the corporate culture, as well as employees’ satisfaction. It aims to identify the elements of the corporate culture according to Schein’s model, and based on a questionnaire enquiry suggest such measures that would improve the corporate atmosphere and thereby contribute to the increase in the productivity of labour.

Creative dissertation. / Malinowski aurait peut-être souhaité que son journal soit révélé à titre posthume afin de contester l’accent mis sur la méthode scientifique par l’anthropologie sociale de son époque. Le dévoilement du journal de Bronislaw Malinowski renverse la domination des explications du fait social par le déterminisme, ouvrant la voie à ce qui devient, dans les années 1960, le tournant discursif. Le journal offre un aperçu de l’impulsion de vitalité de Malinowski et de ses préoccupations existentielles, qui sont excisées dans le processus de réécriture, connu pour transformer les notes de terrain en l’expression formelle caractérisant les monographies. L’anthropologue rédige des monographies pour ses contemporains en construisant des récits étayés par des preuves scientifiques d’une manière qui dissimule par la censure, les automatismes et la catégorie plus large de la subjectivité, ainsi que la possible relégation temporelle de l’Autre, qui peut entraîner la discrimination envers celui-ci. La personnalité publique de l’anthropologue est stylisée par le souci professionnel de représenter correctement le natif-comme-texte. Puisqu’il réfléchit à son avenir publiable, on émet l’hypothèse que Malinowski aurait l’intention de rédiger les entrées de son journal afin d’apporter une contribution posthume à l’anthropologie. Si cela est vrai, le journal est l’espace où les stratégies d’auto-dévoilement surgissent au premier plan, révélant la vulnérabilité supposée de l’auteur. Le dévoilement de l’expérience de vie n’est pas le produit d’un monologue intérieur chaotique, mais possède une fin en soi, qui est de révéler, à travers le mode de l’aveu, l’anthropologue-comme-texte. On pensait autrefois qu’en anthropologie, le système de la vérité était basé sur l’écriture théorique. Maintenant, le journal est mis en évidence. L’héritage de Malinowski repose avant tout sur la sophistique utilisée pour réorganiser le système de vérité entre l’écriture théorique et l’intime, entre la monographie et le journal. Cette réorganisation des vérités est accomplie à travers Writing in Schein qui est mon idiome se référant au jeu textuel avec des composantes du discours destiné à produire la litterarité inspirée d’images brillantes dans l’art apollinien. Writing in Schein est alors la diffusion des apparences, qui amplifie la crise de la représentation entre la copie qui imite, et le simulacre qui invente, puisque la sophistique nécessaire pour aligner les éléments du discours est une folle simulation littéraire. Par l’acte unique du journal et son dévoilement prévu pour la postérité, Malinowski détruit l’enchainement de l’activité productive en anthropologie. / Malinowski may have wished for his diary to be revealed posthumously in order to contest the intense focus on the scientific method, adopted in his time. The unveiling of Bronislaw Malinowski’s diary overthrows the dominance of explanations of social fact based solely on determinism, paving the way for what becomes known, during the 1960s, as the discursive turn. The diary offers insight into Malinowski’s impulse of vitality, along the existential concerns and narratives of personal experience, which are excised in the process of rewriting known to transform field notes into the type of formal expression that characterizes monographs. The anthropologist writes monographs for contemporaries by responding to their expectation of accounts backed by scientific evidence in a way that fosters concealment through censorship, automatisms and the larger category of subjectivity, as well as the possible time-relegation of the Other, which may result in discrimination against him. A positive public persona is stylized out of professional concern for properly staging the native-as-text. It is hypothesized that Malinowski possible future publication of the journal intends to compose its entries so as to make a posthumous contribution to anthropology. If that is true, the journal is the space where strategies of self-showing come to the fore, revealing the author’s assumed vulnerability. The unveiling of life experience is not the product of chaotic interior monologue or brooding, but has an end-goal which is to unveil, through the mode of avowal, the anthropologist-as-text. It was once thought that the anthropological system of truth is based on theoretical writing. Now, however diary is highlighted. Malinowski’s legacy rests foremost upon the sophistry used to reorder the system of truth between theoretical and intimate writing, between the monograph and the diary. This reordering of truths is accomplished through Writing in Schein, which is my idiom referring to the textual play with components of discourse intended to produce beautiful constructs inspired by shining images in Apollonian art. Writing in Schein is then the dissemination of appearances, which amplifies the crisis of representation between the copy that imitates, and the simulacrum that invents, since the sophistry required to align elements of discourse is a mad literary simulation. Through the single act of the diary and its unveiling planned for posterity, Malinowski destroys the sequence of productive activity in anthropology. / Malinowski możliwie życzył sobie, aby dziennik został ujawniony pośmiertnie. Podsuwam hipotezę, że chciał on w ten sposób rzucić wyzwanie metodzie naukowej przyjętej przez ówczesną antropologię społeczną. Odsłonięcie dziennika Bronisława Malinowskiego odwraca uwagę od dominacji wyjaśniania faktów społecznych przez determinizm, torując drogę zwrotowi dyskursywnemu spopularyzowanego w dyscyplinie od lat sześćdziesiątych. Pamiętnik oferuje wgląd w impuls witalności Malinowskiego i jego obaw egzystencjalnych, które są strategicznie wykreślane z tekstu podczas przekształcania notatek terenowych w formalne wyrażenia, charakteryzujące monografie. Antropolog komponuje monografie dla współczesnych czytelników, konstruując tekstualne relacje poparte dowodami naukowymi i cenzurą automatyzmów, szerszej kategorii podmiotowości, a także czasowego degradowania Obcego. Postać publiczna antropologa jest stylizowana, aby poprawnie przedstawiać rdzennego-jako-tekst. Spekuluje się, że zastanawiając się nad swoją publikowalną przyszłością, Malinowski zamierza formułować wpisy do swojego dziennika, aby pośmiertnie przyczynić się do nauki o kulturze, i ludzkości. Jeśli to prawda, dziennik jest przestrzenią, w której ujawnia się jego rzekoma wrażliwość. Odsłonięcie doświadczenia życiowego nie jest wytworem chaotycznego monologu wewnętrznego, ale ma cel samo w sobie ujawnienia, poprzez poufałość, antropologa-jako-tekst. Kiedyś uważano, że w antropologii system prawdy opierał się na piśmie teoretycznym. Teraz dziennik jest podświetlony. Dziedzictwo Malinowskiego polega przede wszystkim na sofistyce, za pomocą której reorganizuje on system prawdy między pismem teoretycznym a prywatnym, między monografią a pamiętnikiem. Tę reorganizację prawd dokonuje się poprzez Scheinschrift, które jest moim idiomem odwołującym się do gry tekstowej mającej na celu wytworzenie systemu wyrazów piękna inspirowanych sztuką apollińską. Scheinschrift potęguje kryzys reprezentacji między modelem a kopiami. Scheinschrift jest zatem sofistyką niezbędną do zestrojenia elementów dyskursu i rozpowszechnienia pozorów, miejącymi na celu kształtowanie szalonej symulacji literackiej. Wyłącznym aktem pisma pamiętnika i jego odsłonięciem przeznaczonym dla potomności, Malinowski niszczy dawny łańcuch twórczej działalności antropologii.