Voice Over IP (VoIP) telephony is becoming widespread, and is often integrated into computer networks. Because of his, it is likely that malicious software will threaten VoIP systems the same way traditional computer systems have been attacked by viruses, worms, and other automated agents. While most users have become familiar with email spam and viruses in email attachments, spam and malicious traffic over telephony currently is a relatively unknown threat. VoIP networks are a challenge to secure against such malware as much of the network intelligence is focused on the edge devices and access environment. A novel security architecture is being developed which improves the security of a large VoIP network with many inexperienced users, such as non-IT office workers or telecommunication service customers. The new architecture establishes interaction between the VoIP backend and the end users, thus providing information about ongoing and unknown attacks to all users. An evaluation of the effectiveness and performance of different implementations of this architecture is done using virtual machines and network simulation software to emulate vulnerable clients and servers through providing apparent attack vectors.

Worldwide computer systems continue to execute malicious software that degrades the systemsâ performance and consumes network capacity by generating high volumes of unwanted traffic. Network-based detectors can effectively identify machines participating in the ongoing attacks by monitoring the traffic to and from the systems. But, network detection alone is not enough; it does not improve the operation of the Internet or the health of other machines connected to the network. We must identify malicious code running on infected systems, participating in global attack networks. This dissertation describes a robust and secure approach that identifies malware present on infected systems based on its undesirable use of network. Our approach, using virtualization, attributes malicious traffic to host-level processes responsible for the traffic. The attribution identifies on-host processes, but malware instances often exhibit parasitic behaviors to subvert the execution of benign processes. We then augment the attribution software with a host-level monitor that detects parasitic behaviors occurring at the user- and kernel-level. User-level parasitic attack detection happens via the system-call interface because it is a non-bypassable interface for user-level processes. Due to the unavailability of one such interface inside the kernel for drivers, we create a new driver monitoring interface inside the kernel to detect parasitic attacks occurring through this interface. Our attribution software relies on a guest kernelâ s data to identify on-host processes. To allow secure attribution, we prevent illegal modifications of critical kernel data from kernel-level malware. Together, our contributions produce a unified research outcome --an improved malicious code identification system for user- and kernel-level malware.

This thesis suggests a set of system characteristics to be used when evaluating or analyzing the IT security of a distributed information system. Each characteristic is meant to be considered in the evaluation of relevant distributed system components. This is considered to be the first step towards finding a technique for modeling and evaluating the security of a system. The work also includes a definition of distributed information system components and a categorization of the found characteristics. The means used to identify the set of characteristics include a thorough investigation of the literature on the relevant subject, as well as a brainstorming session. Thereafter the material has been structured to form the results presented in this thesis.

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The core research question is: how does intelligence and security services of Member States to the AU and established regional and continental security intelligence organisations collectively contribute to the implementation of the APSA? The study empirically reconstructs – descriptively, functionally and analytically – the mechanisms, magnitude and processes of intelligence cooperation at the regional and continental level within the framework of the APSA. In line with the above, the study answers these research questions: i. What are the contributions of the CEWS, as a form of open-source intelligence outfit, to the APSA? ii. What are the roles and contributions of CISSA to the AUC with particular reference to the APSA? iii. How does the Nouakchott and the Djibouti Processes contribute to implementing the APSA? Acknowledging that intelligence cooperation is strategically poised, the interest of this study is directed towards identifying, examining and evaluating established institutions and frameworks and their respective processes of intelligence cooperation. Thus, the study looks at the contribution of security intelligence towards the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union (AU), and the thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study and outlines the research problem, methodology, sources and materials. The second chapter provides an overview of the academic debates around intelligence cooperation. The third chapter empirically reconstructs the configurations of the APSA and conceptualise the function and service roles of each pillar in a descriptive, functional and analytical lens. Chapter 4 reconstructs the operationalisation and institutionalisation of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and further examine its methodology and how it aligns early warning to decision making and early action. Chapter 5 examined the roles and contributions of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) to the African Union Commission (AUC) with particular reference to the APSA. Chapter 6 provides extensive analysis and reconstruction of the operationalisation of the APSA through intelligence cooperation in the Sahelo-Saharan, East and Horn of Africa regions through the Nouakchott Process and the Djibouti Process, respectively, and the last chapter concludes the study by synopsising and reflecting on the research questions and outlining the significant contributions of the study.:Acknowledgements ii List of Figures viii List of Abbreviations ix Chapter One 1 Introduction and Overview of the Study 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 State of the art 3 1.2.1 Global Intelligence Services 3 1.2.2 Intelligence Services in Africa 9 1.2.3 Intelligence Cooperation and the AU 11 1.3 Research Question 14 1.4 Research Design 15 1.4.1 Methodology 17 1.4.2 Methods 18 1.4.3 Sources and Materials 20 1.5 Organization of the thesis 21 Chapter Two 24 Intelligence Cooperation in International and Regional Organisations 24 2.1 Introduction 24 2.2 Intelligence Cooperation in International Organisations 25 2.3 Intelligence Cooperation in Regional Organisations 35 2.4 Intelligence Cooperation Typologies 44 2.5 Intelligence Cooperation Methodologies 47 2.6 Chapter Summary 49 Chapter Three 51 The African Peace and Security Architecture 51 3.1 Introduction 51 3.2 Structure of the APSA 52 3.2.1 Peace and Security Council 55 3.2.2 Panel of the Wise 60 3.2.3 Continental Early Warning System 67 3.2.4 African Standby Force 68 3.2.5 Peace Fund 73 3.3 APSA’s Strategic Priorities 75 3.4 APSA and RECs 80 3.5 Chapter Summary 84 Chapter Four 87 The CEWS, Intelligence cooperation and the APSA 87 4.1 Introduction 87 4.2 Intelligence Cooperation, Early Warning and the OAU 90 4.3 The PSC Protocol and the CEWS 97 4.4 The Operationalisation of the CEWS 100 4.5 The Institutionalisation of the CEWS 107 4.5.1 The Situation Room 107 4.5.2 The African Media Monitor 109 4.5.3 Africa Reporter 110 4.5.4 Africa Prospects 111 4.5.5 Indicators and Profile Module 111 4.5.6 The CEWS Portal 112 4.5 The CEWS Methodology 113 4.5.1 Information Collection and Monitoring 113 4.5.2 Conflict and Cooperation Analysis 118 4.5.3 Formulation of Options 121 4.5.4 Responses 123 4.6 Early Warning, Decision Making and Early Action 124 4.7 The CEWS and RECs 131 4.8 The CEWS and other Early Warning Mechanisms 134 4.8.1 Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework 135 4.8.2 African Peer Review Mechanism and Conflict Prevention 137 4.8.3 Horizon Scanning 139 4.9 Challenges to the CEWS 140 4.10 The Evolution and Future of the CEWS 146 4.11 Chapter Summary 149 Chapter Five 153 Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa and the APSA 153 5.1 Introduction 153 5.2 Genesis 154 5.3 Mandate, Vision and Mission 157 5.4 Objectives 157 5.5 Principles 162 5.6 Functions 163 5.7 Structures of CISSA and their Functions 164 5.7.1 The Conference 164 5.7.2 Panel of Experts 178 5.7.3 Bureau of the CISSA Conference 179 5.7.4 The CISSA Regions 180 5.7.5 Troika 182 5.7.6 The Secretariat 182 5.7.7 Specialised Technical Committees 187 5.8. Relationship between CISSA and the AU 188 5.9 The Intelligence and Security Committee \ CISSA Liaison Unit 189 5.10 CISSA and Regional Security Intelligence Institutions 196 5.11 Challenges to the performance of CISSA 198 5.12 Chapter Summary 210 Chapter Six 213 Intelligence Cooperation in the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes, 2013-2021 213 6.1 Introduction 213 6.2 The Nouakchott Process 216 6.2.1 Genesis 216 6.2.2 Inauguration 219 6.2.3 Implementation of the Nouakchott Conclusions 228 6.2.4 The Nouakchott Declaration 233 6.2.5 The Nouakchott Process vis-à-vis other Regional Frameworks 236 6.2.6 Post-declaration, Challenges and Prospect 237 6.3 The Djibouti Process 245 6.3.1 Background 245 6.3.2 Rationale 246 6.3.3 Establishment 247 6.3.4 Implementation Meetings 252 6.4 The Nouakchott and the Djibouti Processes 257 6.4.1 Joint Meeting 257 6.4.2 Points for Action 259 6.5 Past for the future in the present 261 6.6 Influence and Power Contestations 265 6.7 Chapter Summary 273 Chapter Seven 275 Conclusion 275 7.1 Introduction 275 7.2 Summary of key arguments 276 7.3 Contributions and suggestions for future research 286 8. References 293 8.1 Sources 293 8.2 Literature 303 8.3 Interviews 337 Assurance 338

At its core, this research project is a revision of how we conceptualise the role of international organisations. The concept of role is often invoked International Relations when discussing the function of institutions like the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), but its full meaning in this context has never been problematised, leading to varying perceptions of its meaning and a lack of common understanding in the discourse. In the case of the APSA, this lack of common understanding has led to a wide variance in how the role of the APSA is categorised, and a corresponding discrepancy in assessments of the institution’s success and utility, which has had a knock-on effect on policy recommendations, which also differ wildly from author to author. This thesis devises technical definitions for the various ways in which the word role is utilised in International Relations and related fields, and in so doing, aims to standardise our understanding of the role of institutions, using the APSA as a case study. After developing a new technical definition of role based on Role Theory, the thesis develops a research programme which sets out to investigate the true role of the APSA, based on an examination of how the APSA’s role has been shaped by key limiting and enabling factors, and how this role is shaped and influenced, and directed; all the while highlighting how it differs from the organisation’s stated role, and scholarly perceptions of that role.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The use of specialized single-level networks in current military operations is inadequate to meet the need to share information envisioned by the Global Information Grid (GIG). Multilevel security (MLS) is a key Information Assurance enabler for the GIG vision. The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA), a distributed MLS network, eliminates the need to use separate equipment to connect to many networks at different classification levels. It allows users to view data at different sensitivities simultaneously. MYSEA also allows commercial software and hardware to be used at clients. To address the threat of residual data on the client after a user session change in security state, the MYSEA clients are required to be "stateless", i.e., there is no non-volatile writable memory. Hence the MYSEA server must provide the clients with the ability to execute server-resident client-side applications to access data at different security levels over the MLS Local Area Network (LAN). The MYSEA server currently does not support such capability. This thesis addresses this limitation. A new trusted process family is introduced to provide a pseudo-socket interface for the single level remote application to access the MLS LAN interface. Detailed design specifications were created to facilitate implementation of the remote application support. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

The diploma thesis deals with the contemporary position of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the European security architecture and, in particular, it is devoted to the assessment of the reform possibilities of this organization whose efficiency and relevance are being questioned these days. The thesis concentrates on the unique features of the OSCE as well as on the analysis of its strong and weak points and of the interests of the key players too. Previous attempts of the OSCE's reform including the most recent initiatives and proposals in a wide European security negotiations framework are also profoundly discussed. On the basis of preceding findings, summarizing conclusions are finally drawn and the thesis predicts probable scenarios concerning the future of OSCE and its reform process.

This study is concerned with Canadas policy towards peace, security and development in Africa. It examines Canadas response to these issues in relation to the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD), the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Security Mechanism. With the intensification of violent conflicts in parts of Africa and their impact on individuals, communities, and socioeconomic development, African leaders transformed the OAU into the AU and established APSA to promote regional and human security in Africa. At the sub-regional level, West African leaders established the ECOWAS Security Mechanism to address the (human) security deficit in the West Africa region. These institutional transformations coincided with the launching of the NEPAD, which became one of the central instruments of engagement between Africa and the international community to address the peace, security and development challenges on the African continent. Canadas response to the NEPAD under the Liberal government of Jean Chrtien came in the form of a $500 million Canada fund for Africa (CFA) that among other things supported the capacity building of APSA and the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The promotion of human security played a key role in Canadas approach to the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. I use a non-imperial internationalist approach that draws on the theoretical insights of a constructivist approach to international relations to provide an understanding of the Canadian governments policy. I argue that the Canadian governments policy towards the AU and ECOWAS can be understood in terms of the moral identity that Canada has built or acquired over the years in Africa. While this moral identity provides the means through which Canadian interests are pursued in Africa, it appears that the interest in maintaining this image has overshadowed the need for the Canadian government to craft an overarching policy and put resources behind the rhetoric of promoting peace and security, particularly human security in Africa.

Current research on securing public computing infrastructure like Internet kiosks has focused on the use of smartphones to establish trust in a computing platform or to offload the processing of sensitive information, and the use of new cryptosystems such as Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption (HIBE) to protect kiosk user data. Challenges posed by rural kiosks, specifically (a) the absence of specialized hardware features such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) or a modifiable BIOS in older recycled PCs, (b) the potential use of periodically disconnected links between kiosks and the Internet, (c) the absence of a production-ready implementation of HIBE and (d) the limited availability of smartphones in most developing regions make these approaches difficult, if not impossible, to implement in a rural public computing scenario. In this thesis, I present a practical, unobtrusive and easy-to-use security architecture for rural public computing that uses a combination of physical and cryptographic mechanisms to protect user data, public computing infrastructure and handheld devices that access this infrastructure. Key contributions of this work include (a) a detailed threat analysis of such systems with a particular focus on rural Internet kiosks and handheld devices, (b) a security architecture for rural public computing infrastructure that does not require any specialized hardware, (c) an application-independent and backward-compatible security API for securely sending and receiving data between these systems and the Internet that can operate over delay tolerant links, (d) an implementation of my scheme for rural Internet kiosks and (e) a performance evaluation of this implementation to demonstrate its feasibility.