此篇論文研究以恥感情緒作為創作手法的七位重要畫家庫爾培、馬內、克林姆、羅特列克、畢卡索、馬格利特、以及培根，分析此一時期現象之因，其發展形式為何，探討恥感圖像的延續脈絡與終極目標，以及對繪畫藝術史進程有何獨特意義。對照特定創作圖像的恥感意識之源，與畫家人格與作品之社會回饋，了解畫家所開創之藝術性影響。筆者以分析理論基礎、視覺與美學理論、畫家專述三大部份的文獻資料，探索畫家重大生命事件與社會氛圍，以研究西洋近現代繪畫史中獨特的發展時期，發現恥感圖像，為畫家逃避現實的另類語法，恥感情緒於畫面的舒展，深深地影響了西方近現代繪畫，並成為當代廣為接受的形式。 此外，恥感圖像的意義遠遠超越現今世人的理解，它構成一種藝術家用以昇華羞恥、執筆表達複雜人生的特殊圖型語言。然而恥感圖像所顯現之恥感，並非真實之恥感，一如圖像並非即為真實，而是現實的再次呈現，以至於重複的再現。恥感圖像或非純然為描繪淫穢下流的現實存有，而是體現了諸如想像、壓抑、慾望、與顛倒夢想的奇異幻境與情色妄念。然而，足以確信的是：任何一種源自於恥感情緒的圖像，所見皆為人類意識所創生，並以獨立渠徑，或其它相互關聯的方式，在獨特的繪畫美學中顯現其存在，成為文化與藝術史中砂磧涓滴的一部分。 / This thesis studies the shame emotions as an important creative technique used by seven famous artists: Gustave Courbet, Édouard Manet, Gustav Klimt, Henri Raymond de Toulouse-Lautrec, Pablo Picasso, René François Ghislain Magritte, and Francis Bacon. The researcher aims to analyze the origin of this phenomenon in this period and the form of development of the shame images. The researcher also discusses the extensile sequence and ultimate goal of the shame images, and the special meanings to the process of the history of painting. By comparing the sources of the shame feelings of the specific creative images, realizing the social feedback of painters’ personalities and their works, the researcher tries to understand artistic effects created by the artists. Moreover, the researcher explores the artists’ important life events and the social atmosphere as the theoretical basis to learn the visual and aesthetic theories, painters’ documents, and this unique period of history of western modern art. And find that the shame image is the alternative linguist for artists to escape. Using the shame emotions to compose the picture had been influencing the western modern painting deeply, and becomes a popular art form contemporary. Furthermore, inner part of the shame images had deeper and more fascinating meanings and associations than we now realize. They made up a language of pattern used by artists to convey ideas about complex human life by the path of the sublimation of ashamed. The shame images show us the shame not the shame itself. Images are not the things shown but are representation thereof: re-representation. What shame images represent may otherwise not exist in the indecent reality and may instead be confined to the realm of imagination, depress, desire, dream, or sexual fantasy. And yet, of course, any image from the shame emotion exists as an object within the aesthetic of painting that it in one way or another engage, what we see is the product of human consciousness, itself part and parcel of culture and history of art.

The main theoretical thrust of my project involves the political uses of parodically performing shame and shaming rituals in resisting normative regulation. I argue that parodic performances of this negative affect—traditionally deployed to erase, obscure, and regulate queers—can expose how shame regulates the gender/sexuality performances of straight people as well as queers. I view this project primarily as a tactical shift from the parodic performances outlined by Judith Butler in texts like Gender Trouble, and I feel that the shift is important as a counter measure to increasing homonormative inclusion of (white, middle class) gays and lesbians into straight or neoliberal society. The first section of my thesis is dedicated to exploring theories of homonormativity. I work primarily from Michael Warner’s The Trouble with Normal, which is a queer polemic, and Lisa Duggan’s The Twilight of Equality, which contextualizes homonormativity in the cultural project of neoliberalism. Homonormativity is, in essence, the opening of cultural space in mainstream society for a certain group of gays and lesbians—those who are “the most assimilated, genderappropriate, politically mainstream portions of the gay population” (Duggan 44). As Warner discusses at length, the shift from queer to conservative gay interests has shifted attention from issues like HIV/AIDS research and physical protection of queers to gay marriage and the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which are causes that primarily benefit the gays and lesbians already most assimilated to straight culture. Section II focuses on the work of Judith Butler and other theorizations of parody. Butler’s theory suggests that gender and sexuality consist of a set of continuously repeated performances, and that by performing gender one is constituted as a subject. Butler argues that it is impossible to step outside gender—to stop performing, as it were —because there is no agency prior to the imposition of gender. She locates the only possibility for resistance to gender as a socially regulatory myth structure in the failure to properly perform gender, or in performing in such a way that gender is exposed as always already performative. I have paired Butler’s theory with Linda Hutcheon’s A Theory of Parody, which examines the uses, limitations, and value of artistic parody. These two theorists, of course, have different goals, which complicates the potential for combining their work. In the final section I develop my own theory, which largely takes its cue from Butler’s notion that we can resist gender/sexuality regulation through parodic performance. But, whereas Butler argues for parodic performances of gender/sexuality, I suggest the usefulness of parodying shame and shaming rituals. Shame—the social imposition of it, as well as the desire to avoid it—has long been a force maintaining proper behavior in the largest sense, but I am concerned specifically with the regulation of gender and sexual performances. Queers (understood broadly) and women have long been the targets of shame, while straight males have long been the performers of shaming rituals—mockery, brutal laugher, violence. What I suggest is that through an appropriation and parodic reinterpretation of these shaming rituals and shame itself, queers can expose the centrality of shame in repressing not only queer existence and performance, but in restricting the performative possibilities of straight people. This new notion of performative resistance is especially important as some gays and lesbians enter straight society and become subject to its shaming restrictions, but also become complicit in shaming those queers still outside the realm of homonormative possibilities

This thesis explores the emergence of functional collusion in groups and communities. Collusion is often taken up as synonymous with conspiracy, as a negative aspect of people seeking to get an advantage by nefarious means. In contrast, the thesis points to how a form of collusion might have a function for supporting people in their ongoing relating and in doing so suggests that there are two important factors in functional collusion. The first is that contextual history is key to understanding how, without planning or discussion, collusion emerges and is maintained in groups and communities. The second is that an absence of discussion is key because bringing collusive patterns of relating into our conversations disables their continuation. This thesis argues that collusion arises as people avoid the discomfort of emotions such as shame as well as maintaining familiar patterns of power relating. As collusive patterns of relating tend to emerge undiscussed between people, the thesis suggests that deciding whether to uncover and discuss them is a matter of contextual practical judgement or phronesis as it will inevitably require the navigation of ethical dilemmas which the author argues cannot be solved simply through the application of universal rules. This thesis offers a challenge to the way people working as organisational development practitioners think about their practice, especially those working in the not-for-profit sector.

Although scholars have explored the role of emotions, specifically White guilt and shame, in combating racism, there is a dearth of research available regarding differences between White guilt and shame, and measures available that independently assess these emotions in relation to White racism. The purpose of this study was to test a model of White Guilt and White shame as distinct forms of racial affect that serve to promote anti-racism (N=881). The White Guilt and White Shame model, tested using structural equation modeling, hypothesized that combined aspects of White guilt and White shame proneness, collective White guilt (e.g., group based culpability) and motivation processes to respond without racism (e.g., internal, external) would serve to challenge the development of colorblindness and fear of people of color, while fostering greater empathy and willingness to combat racism. Although the proposed hypotheses were moderately supported, and an overall acceptable model fit was found, two modifications were made to White Shame within the original proposed model in accordance with theory and empirical findings. Results from this study indicated that White guilt proneness, collective White guilt, and internal motivation to respond without racism loaded on the factor White Guilt, while White shame proneness, collective White guilt, and external motivation to respond without prejudice loaded on the factor White shame. Furthermore, results also provided sufficient evidence that White Guilt and White Shame have a positive effect on reducing colorblindness and promoting racial empathy, rather than fear. Limitations, clinical implications, and further directions of research are discussed.

No description available.

This thesis explores the topic of shame through my perspective as a pro-choice woman and future educator. It tells of the long relationship I have had with shame, which began when I had my first abortion. It also describes the history of shame inflicted on the women of Ireland, who continue to fight for their reproductive rights. I use these narratives to support my position that educators have a responsibility to create safe spaces for controversial topics and vulnerable populations on university campuses.

Aristotle famously claims that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? After all, virtuous actions require virtuous motives – they are performed “for the sake of the noble” – and virtuous motives characteristically belong to virtuous people. Many modern commentators presume that Aristotle’s solution rests upon characterizing the actions of learners as actions that are the right things to do in the circumstances but are not done with virtuous motivation. But this leaves Aristotle with the problem of bridging what I call “the moral upbringing gap” – i.e. the gap between the motivationally-neutral actions of learners and the dispositions to act reliably from a virtuous motive that such actions are supposed to produce. This gap emerges because the weaker the link between the way in which the actions of learners are performed and the way in which virtuous actions are done by virtuous agents, the more difficult it will be to understand how the repeated performance of the learners’ actions produce genuinely virtuous dispositions. The main aim of this thesis is to show that (and how) shame plays a crucial role in the process of moral development as the moral emotion that provides continuity between the actions of the learners of virtue and the corresponding dispositions that those actions eventually yield. My view is that Aristotle understands shame not as mere fear of external disapproval, nor as mere tendency to find pleasure in the noble, but as an emotion responsive to praise and blame and consequently to considerations about the nobility and shamefulness of one’s own actions and one’s character. Understood this way, shame provides learners with the sort of motivation that allows them to perform genuinely virtuous actions before they have acquired practical wisdom and the stable dispositions characteristic of virtuous agents. Shame thus bridges the “moral upbringing gap” by providing the kind of motivation that, when entrenched by understanding, constitutes moral virtue.

Aristotle famously claims that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? After all, virtuous actions require virtuous motives – they are performed “for the sake of the noble” – and virtuous motives characteristically belong to virtuous people. Many modern commentators presume that Aristotle’s solution rests upon characterizing the actions of learners as actions that are the right things to do in the circumstances but are not done with virtuous motivation. But this leaves Aristotle with the problem of bridging what I call “the moral upbringing gap” – i.e. the gap between the motivationally-neutral actions of learners and the dispositions to act reliably from a virtuous motive that such actions are supposed to produce. This gap emerges because the weaker the link between the way in which the actions of learners are performed and the way in which virtuous actions are done by virtuous agents, the more difficult it will be to understand how the repeated performance of the learners’ actions produce genuinely virtuous dispositions. The main aim of this thesis is to show that (and how) shame plays a crucial role in the process of moral development as the moral emotion that provides continuity between the actions of the learners of virtue and the corresponding dispositions that those actions eventually yield. My view is that Aristotle understands shame not as mere fear of external disapproval, nor as mere tendency to find pleasure in the noble, but as an emotion responsive to praise and blame and consequently to considerations about the nobility and shamefulness of one’s own actions and one’s character. Understood this way, shame provides learners with the sort of motivation that allows them to perform genuinely virtuous actions before they have acquired practical wisdom and the stable dispositions characteristic of virtuous agents. Shame thus bridges the “moral upbringing gap” by providing the kind of motivation that, when entrenched by understanding, constitutes moral virtue.

Skambegreppet har kommit att bli allt mer betydelsefullt i mellanmänsklig interaktion. Syftet med föreliggande studie är att undersöka hur skam identifieras i terapirummet och vilka vägar som kan tänkas finnas till skamlindring/skambefrielse. Fem intervjuer med fem terapeuter har genomförts. Tre av dessa arbetar i kyrklig kontext och två i sekulär. Två av frågorna i intervjuguiden har berört skam och skuld. Arbetet har den kvalitativa intervjun som metod och intervjun har analyserats med hermeneutisk ansats. Resultatet visar på att skammen är svår att definiera i terapirummet då den är starkt känslomässigt negativ och döljs ofta genom olika strategier. Vägarna till skambefrielse inkluderar förståelse och acceptans. Några av slutsatserna som studien pekar på är vikten av att terapeuter är väl införstådda med vad skam innebär i deras egna liv för att kunna möta konfidenter med skamproblematik och att upplevelsen av att bli förstådd är en viktig del för att kunna anträda vägen mot skamlindring/skambefrielse. Vikten av att kyrkan kan välja att bidra med goda miljöer för att hantera skam både individuellt och kollektivt diskuteras i studien. / The shame concept has become increasingly important in our human interaction. The purpose of this essay is to examine how shame is identified in the therapy room and what ways that can be used to achieve shame relief/shame liberation. Five interviews with five different therapists have been made. Three of the therapists work in an ecclesial context and two in a secular setting. Two of the questions in the interview guide, evolves around the subjects shame and guilt. The qualitative method is applied to the interviews and they have been analyzed with a hermeneutic approach. The result of the essay indicates that shame is difficult to define in the therapy room since it is a strongly negative emotion and often hidden by different human strategies. The ways to shame liberation includes understanding and acceptance. Some of the conclusions in the essay argument the importance of the therapist’s awareness of what shame means in their own lives in order to encounter patients having problems with shame and that being understood is of high importance in the attempt towards shame relief/shame liberation. The significance of the church choosing to contribute good atmospheres for managing shame both individually and collectively is also discussed in the essay.

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