My thesis is on the epistemology of the sophist Protagoras. Through the reading of Plato' Theaetetus and Protagoras, I have reconstructed (a) Protagorean theory of knowledge, according to which Protagoras is an inter-subjectivist (as far as perceptions are concerned) and a moral relativist (as far as ethical judgements are concerned).In Chapter 1,1 first try to reconstruct the development of Protagoras' life. I list then Protagoras' few (extant) fragments, offering their different interpretations. Lastly, I deal with modern and most recent scholarship on Protagoras, ending the chapter with some considerations about the scholarly legitimacy of my thesis. In chapters 2 and 3, I deal with the Protagorean section in Plato's Theaetetus. Through a detailed (and critical) analysis of Plato's exegesis of Protagoras' maxim "Man is the measure of all things", I first reconstruct the perceptual (and individualistic) side of Protagoras' epistemology and then the ethical (and collective) side of such an epistemology. At the end of chapter 3, Protagoras' theory of knowledge already reveals itself as a rather complete epistemology. Such a (complete) picture of Protagoras' epistemology is reinforced in chapter 4, which deals with the Great Speech (mainly the myth) of the Protagoras. Through a close analysis of the core of the Great Speech, I confirm the ethical and collective reading of Protagoras' maxim that I have given in chapter 3. I end the chapter by providing some (modern) suggestions for taking Protagoras as a more serious epistemologist than he is actually thought of In the Conclusion, I sum up my whole reconstruction of the Platonic Protagoras and of his theory of knowledge, connecting it briefly with some features of fifth-century B.C Greek epistemology and, again, with some modern philosophical tenets.

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In this essay, I intend to analyze and respond to criticism directed towards the subjective component of Susan Wolf’s Bi-partite “Fitting Fulfillment View”, criticism directed from Thaddeus Metz, Ben Bramble, and Aaron Smuts. Wolf offers a theory about meaning in life which considers both that the subject should find it meaningful and that the source of this meaningfulness should be objectively valuable. However, critics have argued that a subject’s attitude towards meaningfulness should not affect whether one’s life is meaningful or not. Out of the critics I found promising and responded to I did not find any that seriously threatened Wolf’s theory and, in some cases they even seem to misunderstand Wolf’s claim. In the final section, I raise a question for Wolf’s account that I believe would be interesting to pursue in a further study.

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the meaning of authenticity in Martin Heidegger's Being and Time. This is done first by situating the meaning of authenticity within the project as a whole, second through an exegesis of key parts of the text, and third, through an evaluation of certain scholarly commentaries. The ultimate aim is to argue against an interpretation of authenticity that carries an overly subjectivistic-individualistic connotation. The second chapter seeks to provide the necessary context for the meaning of authenticity within the project of Being and Time as a whole. The goal is to make transparent the situation that Heidegger finds himself in when he conceives of the necessity for the concept of authenticity. Towards this end, it is necessary to highlight those commitments to phenomenology and hermeneutics that informs Heidegger's effort. The third chapter first introduces the various characterizations of authenticity that Heidegger offers in Being and Time and the problematic meaning they suggest. Subsequently, the third chapter aims at creating a context for the meaning of those characterizations through an exegesis of the existentials of every existentiell disclosure of Dasein's being-in-the-world. By examining what it means for Dasein to be in the world in general, the goal is to narrow the scope of what authenticity can and cannot mean. The fourth chapter surveys certain commentaries on authenticity that argue in favor of a subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis for the meaning of authenticity. The goal is to isolate the key points in Being and Time that are used in support of these interpretations, and subsequently to use the frameworks created in Chapters II and III to articulate why such commentaries are incorrect. Finally, Chapter IV gestures towards the right meaning of those descriptions of authenticity that carry a subjectivistic-individualistic connotation in order to place them in the right context. The thesis concludes by suggesting that a non subjectivistic-individualistic interpretation fits more holistically with the other social-historical parts of the text, and that a subjectivistic-individualistic interpretation remains within the provenance of the kind of metaphysics that Heidegger wishes to distance himself from.

This thesis is a critical examination of the boundaries of recklessness and negligence in English and Welsh criminal law and of the extent to which these mentes reae terms reflect the leading theories of culpability. The general principle requiring mens rea to be established before criminal liability is justified stems from the maxim ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, and the historical foundations of this concept will be analysed to assess whether there can be criminal liability for inadvertent conduct whilst still upholding this tenet. The interpretation of recklessness and negligence has proven to be problematic as both have included inadvertent actions and subjective and objective labels have been employed inconsistently, exacerbating an already difficult situation. What becomes clear is that the recent judicial pronouncements that have given rise this state of affairs is the result of a desire for flexibility so that justice can be done in a particular case, but this has culminated in a lack of transparency and some confusion. The aim of this work is to determine appropriate limits for criminal recklessness and negligence with regard to serious offences. Over the last century recklessness has had three main interpretations, none of which are satisfactory as will be demonstrated. This is partly because they cannot be adequately underpinned by the theories of choice and character, the leading theories of culpability. Further, the objective/subjective labels attached to the three interpretations are inaccurate and misleading, with the potential for injustice. Accordingly, other culpability theories are scrutinised and a new interpretation of recklessness is advocated in an attempt to provide a more consistent philosophical and practical approach to determining criminal recklessness and negligence.

The opposition between the realists and the anti-realists isas old as Western science. The question as to whether the“furniture of the world”we call the“things”is to be considered real or not hasconsistently been at the forefront in the debates about scienceand philosophy. This urgent interest is motivated by the closeconnection to another question–namely that of scientificobjectivity - an issue that seldom receives proper treatment.Objectivity has rather been taken for granted in thetraditional Newtonian paradigm with its well-known slogan: Thedetached observer is the objective one and the rational mind ofclarity. It was impossible to continue with this dictum, which isresponsible for the cleft between the natural and socialsciences and still presents a ban on human feelings inscientific endeavours, after the findings of quantum mechanicsat the beginning of the 20th century. However the penetratingpower of this important insight has been astonishingly weak andwith the emergence of computer science in the middle of thecentury, Newtonian science’s self-assumed status ofobjectivity has been apprehended as both very doubtful and asevere hindrance in other areas outside the quantum domain ofscientific activity. The efforts of computer modelling andsimulation analysis revealed a pronounced observer-dependencyregarding investigation. For these reasons this thesis will scrutinise the activityof science and the art of modelling–proposing the use ofa 2-step model of modelling (metamodel) to clarify andemphasize the involvement of the observer in the process ofobservation. This approach reveals that the object-orientedapproach (OOA), which has been the prevailing one since thedawn of Western science and is one of the basic tenets of theNewtonian paradigm, makes science unable to describe itsobjects of discourse in an observer-independent manner. Such ascience is at risk to be considered inconsistent, incompleteand non-objective and for that reason unfit for consensualscientific use. The main claim of this thesis is that the object-orientedapproach is responsible for the genesis of Cartesian dualismand other inconsistencies, which are met in present dayscience. Such a claim is not novel however, but I will arguethat when science is dressed up as the Subject-orientedApproach to Knowledge (SOA) a long row of embarrassing andbewildering situations encountered in classical humanconceptualisation will vanish–in a way that, as far as Iknow, has never been explicitly explained before. This approachalso promises a unification of the different disciplines ofsciences so that e.g. the social sciences can be treated on anequal footing with the natural sciences–and thus thisembarrassing gulf of human knowledge can be removed. This is aprofound shift of paradigm in science and the re-orientation ofhuman thinking required is both considerable andtime-consuming. For this reason this thesis is not a systematic presentationof the SOA, but rather tries, in Part 1, to pave the way for anunderstanding of this approach by an introductory discussionabout the means and scope of science and the essential role ofsymbolic modelling in this endeavour–and in particularthe way these activities will be influenced by the anticipatedchange of paradigm. Some historical aspects of this particularSOA are also given as a background and this section iscompleted by a brief survey of the modern trends in scientificmodelling. Part 2 is collection of papers dealing with the principlesof modelling and simulation, and, rather more importantly, asequence of papers reflecting how the ideas of the SOA havedeveloped throughout the years due to the inconsistencies metwith in these and adjacent areas. To my mind they prove -beyond the point of any consensual doubt–that therealist’s position in science cannot be defended anylonger and that the“things of the world”by thescientific community must be considered merely privateallusions. More important however is the insight that the Newtonianparadigm is unable to produce an observer-independentdescription of this world with its conceived things and theonly way out of this embarrassing dilemma seems to be theacceptance of the SOA–with its hitherto strictly bannedfeature of subjectivity. Using this approach, we claim, sciencecan be given a consensual and consistent foundation–andthe price to pay is the loss of scientific ontology. As alreadypointed out this thesis merely hints at the new path to take–instead concentrating on the reasons for the impendingdemise of scientific realism and need of a constructive systemsscience.

<p>The opposition between the realists and the anti-realists isas old as Western science. The question as to whether the“furniture of the world”we call the“things”is to be considered real or not hasconsistently been at the forefront in the debates about scienceand philosophy. This urgent interest is motivated by the closeconnection to another question–namely that of scientificobjectivity - an issue that seldom receives proper treatment.Objectivity has rather been taken for granted in thetraditional Newtonian paradigm with its well-known slogan: Thedetached observer is the objective one and the rational mind ofclarity.</p><p>It was impossible to continue with this dictum, which isresponsible for the cleft between the natural and socialsciences and still presents a ban on human feelings inscientific endeavours, after the findings of quantum mechanicsat the beginning of the 20th century. However the penetratingpower of this important insight has been astonishingly weak andwith the emergence of computer science in the middle of thecentury, Newtonian science’s self-assumed status ofobjectivity has been apprehended as both very doubtful and asevere hindrance in other areas outside the quantum domain ofscientific activity. The efforts of computer modelling andsimulation analysis revealed a pronounced observer-dependencyregarding investigation.</p><p>For these reasons this thesis will scrutinise the activityof science and the art of modelling–proposing the use ofa 2-step model of modelling (metamodel) to clarify andemphasize the involvement of the observer in the process ofobservation. This approach reveals that the object-orientedapproach (OOA), which has been the prevailing one since thedawn of Western science and is one of the basic tenets of theNewtonian paradigm, makes science unable to describe itsobjects of discourse in an observer-independent manner. Such ascience is at risk to be considered inconsistent, incompleteand non-objective and for that reason unfit for consensualscientific use.</p><p>The main claim of this thesis is that the object-orientedapproach is responsible for the genesis of Cartesian dualismand other inconsistencies, which are met in present dayscience. Such a claim is not novel however, but I will arguethat when science is dressed up as the Subject-orientedApproach to Knowledge (SOA) a long row of embarrassing andbewildering situations encountered in classical humanconceptualisation will vanish–in a way that, as far as Iknow, has never been explicitly explained before. This approachalso promises a unification of the different disciplines ofsciences so that e.g. the social sciences can be treated on anequal footing with the natural sciences–and thus thisembarrassing gulf of human knowledge can be removed. This is aprofound shift of paradigm in science and the re-orientation ofhuman thinking required is both considerable andtime-consuming.</p><p>For this reason this thesis is not a systematic presentationof the SOA, but rather tries, in Part 1, to pave the way for anunderstanding of this approach by an introductory discussionabout the means and scope of science and the essential role ofsymbolic modelling in this endeavour–and in particularthe way these activities will be influenced by the anticipatedchange of paradigm. Some historical aspects of this particularSOA are also given as a background and this section iscompleted by a brief survey of the modern trends in scientificmodelling.</p><p>Part 2 is collection of papers dealing with the principlesof modelling and simulation, and, rather more importantly, asequence of papers reflecting how the ideas of the SOA havedeveloped throughout the years due to the inconsistencies metwith in these and adjacent areas. To my mind they prove -beyond the point of any consensual doubt–that therealist’s position in science cannot be defended anylonger and that the“things of the world”by thescientific community must be considered merely privateallusions.</p><p>More important however is the insight that the Newtonianparadigm is unable to produce an observer-independentdescription of this world with its conceived things and theonly way out of this embarrassing dilemma seems to be theacceptance of the SOA–with its hitherto strictly bannedfeature of subjectivity. Using this approach, we claim, sciencecan be given a consensual and consistent foundation–andthe price to pay is the loss of scientific ontology. As alreadypointed out this thesis merely hints at the new path to take–instead concentrating on the reasons for the impendingdemise of scientific realism and need of a constructive systemsscience.</p>

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal analisar o cabimento, no direito processual brasileiro, de uma distribuição dinâmica das regras do ônus da prova. Na primeira parte, são analisados o conceito, o objeto e a finalidade da prova, com apontamento da distinção entre fontes e meios. Após, são estudados o conceito de ônus da prova e sua distinção da obrigação, dando ênfase aos seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo e às principais teorias, antigas e modernas, que tratam dos critérios para a distribuição do ônus da prova. Estudou-se, em seguida, os principais fenômenos relacionados ao ônus da prova, quais sejam a distribuição, cuja regra geral está no art. 333 do CPC, e a redistribuição como gênero, tendo com espécies a redistribuição strictu sensu, cabível em casos de probatio diabolica e em excepcionais casos em que a prova se apresenta difícil por fatores externos ao processo, e a inversão, cujo exemplo, no direito pátrio, é o art. 6o, inc. VIII, do CDC. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são apresentadas duas novas teorias sobre a distribuição do ônus da prova: a visão solidarista do ônus da prova e a teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios. Por fim, ante a necessidade de flexibilização das atuais regras gerais de distribuição do ônus da prova e, ao mesmo tempo, controle do excessivo subjetivismo judicial, analisa-se o cabimento da aplicação da teoria dinâmica no direito brasileiro, apontando-se os parâmetros para a decisão judicial que a aplique. Do estudo, concluiu-se que o direito processual brasileiro admite a aplicação da teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios em face da incidência do princípio da igualdade, dos poderes instrutórios do juiz e do dever de lealdade, boa-fé e colaboração das partes. Concluiuse, ainda, que embora possa acontecer em momento diverso, o momento mais oportuno para a ocorrência da redistribuição do ônus da prova é a audiência preliminar, não podendo se verificar, em nenhuma hipótese, surpresa às partes, sob pena de ferimento ao princípio do contraditório. Quanto à decisão judicial que aplica a teoria dinâmica, deve esta levar em conta que tal aplicação é de caráter excepcionalíssimo, devendo ser bem fundamentada. / This study has the purpose of analyzing a dynamic employment of the burden of proof in the Brazilian Procedural Law. In the first part of this study, the concept and object and the evidence are analyzed through distinguishing sources and ways. Afterwards, the concept of burden of proof and its difference from obligation are studied based on subjective and objective aspects of dominant old and modern theories. We also examined the main phenomena relating to the burden of proof in general presented on the art. 333 Brazilian Procedural Code, the presentation of the burden of proof strict sensu in case of probatio diabolica and the shifting of burden of proof based on the art. 6, inc.VII, Brazilian Consumption Code. In the second part of the study, two theories related to the shifting of the burden of proof are presented. Based on those two theories, we came to the conclusion that a more dynamic way of applying the general rules for shifting the burden of proof and excessive control of judicial subjectivism is necessary to reach fairness. Finally, we concluded that the Brazilian Procedural Law allows the application of the dynamic theory of burden of proof based on the principle of equity, discretion, loyalty, good faith and the collaboration of the parties. Besides, the best moment to submit some evidence for the shifting of the burden of proof is over the course of a hearing. The decision shall be based on legal matters, facts and principles due to the fact that the dynamic theory to analyze evidence in case of shifting the burden of proof is used in special cases.

108f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-16T18:29:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josemar Silvaseg.pdf: 549748 bytes, checksum: ab3d51db4cd45720fbd8b575d329437d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Alice Ribeiro(malice@ufba.br) on 2013-05-07T13:50:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josemar Silvaseg.pdf: 549748 bytes, checksum: ab3d51db4cd45720fbd8b575d329437d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-07T13:50:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josemar Silvaseg.pdf: 549748 bytes, checksum: ab3d51db4cd45720fbd8b575d329437d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / O tema do perspectivismo na filosofia de F. Nietzsche revela sua pertinência na medida em que as discussões se ampliam e se diversificam sobre a compreensão do seu papel, transitando entre uma concepção cosmológica ou uma concepção epistemológica do perspectivismo. Compreende-se, nesta pesquisa, que Nietzsche não separa de maneira radical essas duas concepções, mas argumenta visivelmente a favor da relação entre elas. Para o filósofo, a compreensão epistemológica pressupõe a cosmológica. Nesse sentido, Nietzsche apresenta sua crítica à tradição filosófica, denunciando-a ou responsabilizando-a por preferir e efetivar uma ruptura na integração entre cosmologia e epistemologia, fazendo emergir uma civilização racionalista, moralista e, por fim, niilista. Para o autor, a afirmação do caráter perspectivista da existência, que compreende o mundo como vontade de potência, possibilita a crítica à metafísica conceitual que deposita no mundo suas figuras lingüísticas, traduzindo-o em idéia. Conseqüentemente, Nietzsche contrapõe seu perspectivismo ao subjetivismo moderno, quando este afirma a existência do sujeito pensante, esse espectro criado pela filosofia moderna, que também vê o mundo a partir de uma relação representacional fruto da oposição entre sujeito e objeto. Igualmente, o filósofo evidencia a relação desse sujeito moderno com os valores morais, identificando-o, por isso, como homem religioso. É nessa medida que o perspectivismo também se opõe aos valores morais, denunciando-os de uma esterilização humana frente ao mundo do devir, que faz emergir o niilismo. Portanto, este trabalho quer investigar o perspectivismo de Nietzsche à medida que ele é pensado dentro do seu argumento cosmológico, possibilitando, assim, compreender sua crítica aos conceitos metafísicos de verdade e de moral, tão fundamentais para tradição filosófica. / Salvador

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal analisar o cabimento, no direito processual brasileiro, de uma distribuição dinâmica das regras do ônus da prova. Na primeira parte, são analisados o conceito, o objeto e a finalidade da prova, com apontamento da distinção entre fontes e meios. Após, são estudados o conceito de ônus da prova e sua distinção da obrigação, dando ênfase aos seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo e às principais teorias, antigas e modernas, que tratam dos critérios para a distribuição do ônus da prova. Estudou-se, em seguida, os principais fenômenos relacionados ao ônus da prova, quais sejam a distribuição, cuja regra geral está no art. 333 do CPC, e a redistribuição como gênero, tendo com espécies a redistribuição strictu sensu, cabível em casos de probatio diabolica e em excepcionais casos em que a prova se apresenta difícil por fatores externos ao processo, e a inversão, cujo exemplo, no direito pátrio, é o art. 6o, inc. VIII, do CDC. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são apresentadas duas novas teorias sobre a distribuição do ônus da prova: a visão solidarista do ônus da prova e a teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios. Por fim, ante a necessidade de flexibilização das atuais regras gerais de distribuição do ônus da prova e, ao mesmo tempo, controle do excessivo subjetivismo judicial, analisa-se o cabimento da aplicação da teoria dinâmica no direito brasileiro, apontando-se os parâmetros para a decisão judicial que a aplique. Do estudo, concluiu-se que o direito processual brasileiro admite a aplicação da teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios em face da incidência do princípio da igualdade, dos poderes instrutórios do juiz e do dever de lealdade, boa-fé e colaboração das partes. Concluiuse, ainda, que embora possa acontecer em momento diverso, o momento mais oportuno para a ocorrência da redistribuição do ônus da prova é a audiência preliminar, não podendo se verificar, em nenhuma hipótese, surpresa às partes, sob pena de ferimento ao princípio do contraditório. Quanto à decisão judicial que aplica a teoria dinâmica, deve esta levar em conta que tal aplicação é de caráter excepcionalíssimo, devendo ser bem fundamentada. / This study has the purpose of analyzing a dynamic employment of the burden of proof in the Brazilian Procedural Law. In the first part of this study, the concept and object and the evidence are analyzed through distinguishing sources and ways. Afterwards, the concept of burden of proof and its difference from obligation are studied based on subjective and objective aspects of dominant old and modern theories. We also examined the main phenomena relating to the burden of proof in general presented on the art. 333 Brazilian Procedural Code, the presentation of the burden of proof strict sensu in case of probatio diabolica and the shifting of burden of proof based on the art. 6, inc.VII, Brazilian Consumption Code. In the second part of the study, two theories related to the shifting of the burden of proof are presented. Based on those two theories, we came to the conclusion that a more dynamic way of applying the general rules for shifting the burden of proof and excessive control of judicial subjectivism is necessary to reach fairness. Finally, we concluded that the Brazilian Procedural Law allows the application of the dynamic theory of burden of proof based on the principle of equity, discretion, loyalty, good faith and the collaboration of the parties. Besides, the best moment to submit some evidence for the shifting of the burden of proof is over the course of a hearing. The decision shall be based on legal matters, facts and principles due to the fact that the dynamic theory to analyze evidence in case of shifting the burden of proof is used in special cases.