Thesis (Ph.D.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 211-217)

Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-69).

Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-69).

A presente tese tem como escopo principal delimitar a competência regulatória que incide sobre setor bancário. O tema desperta interesse em face da estrutura do Estado brasileiro a qual apresenta dois tipos de regulação: a geral e a setorial. E esta composição gera, dentro do setor bancário, um aparente conflito entre os órgãos encarregados de exercerem a regulação geral e o Banco Central do Brasil, titular do poder regulatório setorial. Diante deste cenário, o trabalho se inicia com a descrição da nova teoria de regulação e seus desdobramentos dentro do setor bancário, com a exposição dos riscos e dos instrumentos específicos da atividade financeira. Após, uma análise sobre o Princípio da subsidiariedade, o qual sempre foi utilizado como mecanismo de delimitação de competências. Em seguida, um estudo sobre o Sistema Financeiro Nacional e as matérias de regulação geral dentro do ordenamento pátrio, a saber: defesa da concorrência e defesa do consumidor. Por fim, serão demonstradas quais competências são inerentes às atividades do Banco Central do Brasil e quando surgem as competências dos órgãos encarregados de aplicarem as matérias de regulação geral, sendo utilizado como elemento delimitador o Princípio da subsidiariedade. / This thesis has as its principal aim at defining the regulatory competence that focuses on the banking sector. The issue arouses interest in the face of the structure of the Brazilian State, which has two types of regulation: the general and the sector ones. And this composition generates, within the banking industry, an apparent conflict among the bodies responsible for exercising general regulations and the Central Bank of Brazil, holder of the regulatory sector power. In this scenario, the work begins with a description of the new theory of regulation and its consequences within the banking industry, with exposure risk and specific instruments of financial activity. Later, an analysis on the principle of subsidiarity, which was always used as a mechanism of division of powers. Then, a study on the national financial system and general regulatory matters within the homeland planning, namely: competition policy and consumer protection. Finally, we will demonstrate what skills are inherent to the activities of the Central Bank of Brazil and where the responsibilities of the agencies charged with applying the general regulatory matters, using the principle of subsidiarity as enclosing element.

O trabalho parte da premissa de que é altamente importante se precisar os limites da atividade regulatória exercida pela Administração Pública no Brasil. Embora tenha sempre estado entre nós, a regulação econômica tem ganhado mais e mais relevância ultimamente, em especial nos últimos vinte anos. E da mesma forma como têm crescido de incidência, a regulação produzida cada vez mais demonstra ignorar qualquer preocupação com limites interventivos ou mesmo com a capacidade privada. Pois a tese aqui defendida é que um dos principais limites regulatórios se encontra na ideia de subsidiariedade, aqui entendida como o respeito à capacidade e autossuficiência dos atores privados em implementar pautas de interesse público. Não apenas, defende-se ainda que o itinerário ideal para se consagrar a subsidiariedade na atividade de regulação administrativa da economia dentro do rulemaking regulatório reside na Análise de Impacto Regulatório AIR. Com isso, pretendeu-se não apenas defender a existência e juridicidade de uma regra de subsidiariedade da intervenção regulatória administrativa no Brasil, como também definir um critério instrumental para a sua implementação prática. / The work starts from the premise that it is highly important to clarify the limits of the regulatory activity in Brazil. Although it has always been among us, economic regulation has gained more and more importance lately, especially in the past twenty years. And just as it has grown in incidence, the regulation produced shows no concerns about its limits or even with private self-capacity. In this sense, the present study defends that the one of the most important regulatory limit is the idea of subsidiarity, here understood as respect for self-sufficiency and ability of private actors to implement public interest agendas. Not only, it is argued that the ideal itinerary to enshrine the subsidiarity in the regulatory activity of the economy within the regulatory rulemaking lies in the Regulatory Impact Analysis RIA. Thus, it is intended not only to defend the existence and legality of a rule of subsidiarity in the regulatory activity in Brazil, but also set an instrumental criterion for its practical implementation.

Le principe de subsidiarité, en droit de la Convention européenne, est un principe empreint d’ambiguïtés. D’origine prétorienne, il ne fait l’objet d’aucune définition formelle dans les textes ou la jurisprudence afférente et se voit ainsi marqué d’une indétermination sémantique et juridique certaine. Doté d’une double dimension à la fois procédurale et matérielle, il n’en reste pas moins un principe fondamental du droit européen, un principe qui structure, d’une part, l’organisation et le fonctionnement même du système et guide, d’autre part, l’interprétation et le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Parce que naturellement ambigu mais néanmoins directeur du droit européen, le principe de subsidiarité se présente donc comme un principe souple et malléable, par conséquent, adaptable. L’analyse de sa mise en oeuvre dans la jurisprudence européenne met ainsi en exergue l’inconstance et la variabilité d’application du principe, à la libre disposition du juge strasbourgeois. Mais analysée à la lumière du contexte actuel d’un engorgement sans précédent du système et donc d’une réaffirmation urgente de son caractère subsidiaire, l’utilisation fluctuante du principe s’apprécie sous un jour nouveau, visant à faire de la subsidiarité un principe non plus garant des libertés nationales mais désormais source d’un encadrement de celles-ci. Parce que moteur d’une responsabilisation accrue des Etats membres, le principe de subsidiarité apparaît donc comme une pièce maîtresse de la politique jurisprudentielle du juge européen. / As part of the European Convention, the principle of subsidiarity is marked by ambiguity. Originating from judges, it has not been formally defined in legal texts nor in any related jurisprudence and is therefore characterized by a semantic and legal indeterminacy. Featuring both a procedural and a tangible dimension, it remains a fundamental principle of European law. On the one hand, it structures, the system’s organization and operations. On the other hand, it guides the court of Strasbourg’s interpretation and review. Naturally ambiguous but still guiding European law, the principle of subsidiarity is presented as a flexible and malleable principle, and therefore adaptable. The analysis of its implementation in the European jurisprudence highlights its inconsistency and variability at the free disposal of the court of Strasbourg. However, in the light of the current context of an unprecedented saturation of the system and therefore of an urgent reassertion of its subsidiary nature, a fluctuating use of the principle is assessed differently to make it not a guarantee of national liberties, but a guide for them. As a driving force for increased accountability of member states, the principle of subsidiarity appears to be essential to the judicial policy of the European court.

Conformément à l’article 46 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, les États contractants s’engagent à se conformer aux arrêts définitifs de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Il ressort toutefois de la jurisprudence de la Cour que ses décisions sont « déclaratoires pour l’essentiel » et que, par cela, une liberté de choix des moyens à utiliser pour s’acquitter de l’obligation d’exécuter la décision, est laissée à l’État défendeur. En tout état de cause, le sens de l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour demeurerait paradoxal s’il fallait s’arrêter à accepter à la fois que l’État doive exécuter la décision européenne tout en ayant le choix libre de la manière d’y parvenir. Un tel raccourci aurait en effet pour conséquence que les décisions de la Cour soient imparfaitement ou seulement partiellement exécutées dans la mesure où, d’une part, le but consistant à l’exécution de la décision est vaguement précisé et où, d’autre part, la liberté de choix est, quant à elle, expresse. La doctrine de la marge d’appréciation de l’État apporte ainsi une flexibilité nécessaire dans la délimitation des rôles de la Cour et ceux de l’État défendeur pour une meilleure exécution des décisions européennes. A cet effet, le double effet de la décision européenne n’a de sens que s’il est admis que l’État dispose, certes, d’une marge d’appréciation dans l’exécution de la décision de la Cour, mais que les limites de cette marge sont posées par la Cour elle-même, dans sa décision. Il faut dès lors systématiquement partir de la décision de la Cour qui doit préciser ce en quoi consiste l’exécution de celle-ci, et donc ce en quoi consiste la réparation de la violation de la Convention, afin de déterminer si la marge d’appréciation de l’État, au stade de l’exécution de la décision, est plutôt large ou plutôt étroite. La liberté du choix de l’État défendeur en matière des mesures à prendre pour exécuter la décision selon les attentes de la Cour, se rapportera ainsi à une gamme de choix prédéfinie dans le cadre de la décision, et ce, dépendamment de la nature de la violation de la Convention ou encore de la gravité des conséquences de telle violation. En somme, plus la gamme de choix de mesures étatiques est précise, plus il y a de chances que la décision soit mieux exécutée. L’essentiel du travail consiste donc à essayer d’identifier les critères de détermination de l’étendue de la marge d’appréciation de l’État dans l’exécution de la décision de la Cour. Cependant, un tel exercice ne peut être mené à bien sans tout d’abord définir la notion même de « marge d’appréciation » qui, même si elle a déjà été employée par la Cour et par une partie de la doctrine, n’a pas reçu une définition convaincante, ou encore, a souvent été indistinctement associée à la notion de « marge de manœuvre », au « principe de subsidiarité », ou même à la souveraineté, alors qu’elle ne saurait s’y confondre. / In accordance with Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. It is however apparent from the Court’s case-law that its decisions are “essentially declaratory” and, by that, a freedom to choose the means to be used to fulfill the obligation to execute the decision is given to the respondent State. In any event, the sense of the execution of the Court’s decisions would remain paradoxical if we were to stop at accepting at the same time that a State must execute the European decision while having the free choice in the manner to achieve so. Such a shortcut would lead to a poor execution of the decisions of the Court in so far as, on one hand, the purpose of the enforcement of the decision is vaguely specified and, on the other hand, freedom of choice is expressly precise. The doctrine of the State's margin of appreciation thus gives the flexibility needed in delimiting the roles of the Court and those of the respondent State for the purpose of a better implementation of European decisions. To that end, the dual effect of the European decision only makes sense if it is accepted that the State indeed enjoys a margin of appreciation in the execution of the Court’s decision but that the limits of such margin are laid by the Court itself, in its decision. It is therefore necessary to systematically start from the decision of the Court which must specify what the expected execution is, and therefore what the compensation for the violation of the Convention should be, in order to determine whether the margin of appreciation of a State, at the stage of implementation of the decision, is rather broad or rather narrow. The freedom of choice of the respondent State as to the measures to be taken to implement the decision according to the expectations of the Court will thus relate to a range of choices predefined in the decision, depending on the nature of the violation of the Convention or the gravity of the consequences of such violation. In short, the more precise the ranges of choices of measures are, the more likely it is that the decision will be better executed. The essence of the work is therefore to try to identify the criteria for determining the extent of the State’s margin of appreciation in the execution of the Court’s decision. However, such an exercise cannot be carried out without first defining the very notion of “margin of appreciation” which, even if it has already been used by the Court and by a part of the doctrine, has not received a convincing definition, or has often been indistinctly associated with the notion of “margin of manoeuver”, the “principle of subsidiarity”, or even sovereignty, while it cannot be confused with them.

Application of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on involvement of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process 10 years later Abstract Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has brought about several essential institutional changes in the functioning of the European Union. For example, a further shift towards co-decision by the European Parliament on secondary law that became ordinary legislative procedure. Also, qualified majority voting in the Council has been extended and subjected to the new conditions. Last but not least, the EU competences have been divided as exclusive, shared and supporting. These and related further steps simultaneously gave rise to a more intense involvement of national parliaments, both in the sense of a scrutiny over a due exercise of conferred powers as well as a democratic safeguard of the new processes. The main goal of this thesis is to present a comprehensive picture of existing legal framework in this field, including a brief summary on crucial historical factors that have been shaping it until its current form. Hand in hand with that, it also offers evaluation of the most frequently used mechanisms throughout the 10 years of its application. Consequently, it leads to a reflection on how, and if at all, effectively exploit the potential of national parliaments in this regard,...

This qualitative study examined the decision-making processes among principals of parish-based Catholic elementary schools in low-income communities within the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, against the backdrop of a decentralized governance structure and increased financial pressures intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic. The study was grounded in a conceptual framework derived from contingency theories of leadership and decision-making research and investigated three areas: (1) the principals’ decision-making processes, (2) the situational factors influencing these processes, and (3) the pandemic’s impact on their decision-making processes. The findings revealed dynamic integration of cognitive, social, and procedural processes, rooted in faith and community collaboration. The principal participants demonstrated a keen awareness of their schools’ financial limitations and a strong dedication to their communities’ needs. The study also highlighted the dual nature of decentralization and subsidiarity, presenting both the challenges in principal-pastor relationships and support through relationships with diocesan teams.

Procedural aspects of mediation in EC law Eva Rivera, 2011 1 Abstract The objective of this dissertation is the determination of the significance of procedural aspects of mediation and the answer to the question to what extent it has been considered within European Union law. The research is based on the assumption that the acknowledgment of a procedural relevance of mediation is crucial for its overall effectiveness. Mediation is besides its feature as a communication technique becoming ever more important as a dispute resolution procedure for civil and commercial conflicts in Europe. In this context the role of mediation within and in relation to other procedures for the resolution of disputes has to be considered. While on one hand the terminology and the differences between mediation and other forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as well as certain judicial attempts of settling disputes may not always be easily determined, on the other hand, it can be stated that the ADR form of mediation is beyond its early stages and clearly shows its own procedural relevance. The comparison of European national jurisdictions in the field of mediation leads to a core definition of mediation as a voluntary process where a third person without the authority to pass a binding decision over the dispute between...