This dissertation explores why two countries with vastly different configurations in tax systems, electoral institutions and production regimes, Germany and the US, implemented similar tax reforms since the 1980s. I conducted a historical content analysis of tax debates in the American Congress and the German Bundestag to understand under which conditions the neoliberal paradigm was persuasive to majorities of policy makers in parliamentary bodies. I found that the prime movers, Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl, had serious issues implementing their tax plans due to massive protest that sparked among parliamentarians and later in civil society. This protest diminished in time and gave way to tax reforms which considerably shifted the tax burden from higher incomes and corporations to lower incomes and consumption in the early 2000s. I argue on the basis of the theory of discursive institutionalism that coherent narratives of normative and cognitive beliefs can become crucial in convincing parliamentarians of tax cuts for higher incomes and creating coalitions for institutional change. This coordinative discourse was more successful in the 2000s when George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder were able to justify the tax reforms under consistent discrediting of social justice and a strong normative moralization of the tax reforms under the concepts of market justice. It took twenty years to shift the dominant normative discourse. But eventually a reinterpretation of the credibility of actors to comment on tax policy and a reconceptualization of the concept of tax policy itself as apolitical but moral in the realm of markets made the concept of neoliberal tax policy persuasive and it could transcend the boundaries of different national institutions.

The efficacy of the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts was a major topic of discussion in the 2010 midterm elections. I investigate the effect of the possible expiration and eventual extension of the dividend tax cut on US stock market performance in 2010 based on the methodology used by Amronin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008). I compare aggregate performance of US common stocks relative to foreign stocks using equity indices, and examine cross-sectional performance amongst US stocks by creating different stock portfolios based on their dividend yield. This comparison is done over two event windows, (1) 20-24 September 2010 and (2) 3-8 December 2010. Consistent with previous studies, I find that the US stock market did respond to negative and positive news on the extension of the Bush-era dividend tax cuts, with stock prices falling and rising, respectively. My findings also suggest that this aggregate effect was probably muted by the redistribution of funds by investors from lower-yield to higher-yield stocks. Unlike in 2003, however, in the post-financial crisis context of 2010, the redistribution seemed to particularly favor stocks with medium-dividend yield, rather than smaller, higher-risk stocks with the highest dividend yield.

In this paper, I talk about Section 965, also known as the transition tax, enacted in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). First, I examine loopholes under the old tax regime that allowed for the accumulation of offshore earnings and how the TCJA closes those loopholes. After detailing the legislation of the transition tax and a comparison with Section 965 included in the American Jobs Creation Act in 2004, I compare firms’ recorded provisions of the transition tax with an estimation based on the past disclosures of firms’ permanently reinvested earnings and finds that the transition tax will generate an estimated $308 billion in tax revenue. Lastly, I propose three alternate scenarios to the transition tax: taxing all offshore earnings under the GILTI regime, treating offshore cash as eligible for the 21% corporate rate, and a ratable payment plan compared to the current phase-in payment plan.

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The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act contained the largest federal initiative for place-based investment in over half a century. Opportunity Zones (“OZs”) are expected to cost the US government over $15 billion in forgone tax revenue through 2026, exceeding both the Clinton Era Empowerment Zones and the Great Society programs of Lyndon Johnson. Have OZs increased neighborhood investment and, if so, what types of projects and neighborhoods have benefitted? This dissertation presents three baseline evaluations of OZ. The first essay discusses the findings from 76 interviews with community and government officials, program managers, developers, businesses, and fund managers about OZ outcomes in West Baltimore. The second essay uses a difference-in-differences (DID) event study framework, an adjusted interrupted time series analysis, and census tract matching techniques to compare small business and residential lending outcomes in OZs with areas that were eligible but not designated. The final essay combines an online search for OZ supported affordable housing projects, a DID design that examines Low-Income Housing Tax Credit outcomes, and 16 interviews with community development experts to evaluate whether and how OZ is having an impact on affordable housing production. These three analyses show that OZ is a missed opportunity. OZ is stimulating investment conversations and local government capacity, but it is failing at oversight and community engagement and not changing outcomes for distressed community development or affordable housing. OZ is failing because it provides weak incentives for capital gains investors seeking market rate returns, because it does not support investors and developers already active in distressed neighborhoods, and because of several related design flaws that inhibit mission driven development. The essays propose specific policy changes necessary for OZ to encourage investment in highly distressed neighborhoods and to support affordable housing production.

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Cette thèse explore les effets macroéconomiques et distributionnels de la taxation dans l’économie américaine. Les trois premiers chapitres prennent en considération l’interaction entre l’entrepreneuriat et la distribution de richesse tandis que le dernier discute l’arbitrage du mode de financement d’une diminution d’impôt sur les sociétés sous la contrainte de neutralité fiscale pour le gouvernement. Spécifiquement, le chapitre 1 en utilisant les données du Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) , fournit des évidences selon lesquelles le capital humain ou l’expérience entrepreneuriale est quantitativement important pour expliquer les disparités de revenu et de richesse entre les individus au cours de leur cycle de vie. Pour saisir ces tendances, je considère le modèle d’entrepreneuriat de Cagetti et De Nardi (2006), modifié pour prendre en compte la dynamique du cycle de vie. J’introduis également l’accumulation de l’experience entrepreneuriale, laquelle rend les entrepreneurs plus productifs. Je calibre ensuite deux versions du modèle (avec et sans accumulation d’expérience d’entreprise) en fonction des mêmes données américaines. Les résultats montrent que le modèle avec accumulation d’expérience réplique le mieux les données. La question de recherche du chapitre 2 est opportune à la réforme fiscale récente adoptée aux États-Unis, laquelle est un changement majeur du code fiscal depuis la loi de réforme fiscale de 1986. Le Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) voté en décembre 2017 a significativement changé la manière dont le revenu d’affaires est imposé aux États-Unis. Je considère alors le modèle d’équilibre général dynamique avec choix d’occupations développé au Chapitre 1 pour une évaluation quantitative des effets macroéconomiques du TCJA, tant dans le court terme que dans le long terme. Le TCJA est modélisé selon ses trois provisions clés : un nouveau taux de déduction de 20% pour les firmes non- incorporées, une baisse du taux fiscal statutaire pour sociétés incorporées de 35% à 21% et la réduction de 39.6% à 37% du taux marginal supérieur pour les individus. Je trouve que l’économie connait un taux de croissance du PIB de 0.90% sur une fenêtre fiscale de dix ans et le stock de capital en moyenne augmente de 2.12%. Ces résultats sont consis- tants aux évaluations faites par le Congressional Budget Office et le Joint Committee on vi Taxation. Avec des provisions provisoires, le TCJA génère une réduction dans l’inégalité de la richesse et celle du revenu mais l’opposé se réalise une fois que les provisions sont faites permanentes. Dans les deux scénarios, la population subit une perte de bien-être et exprime un faible soutien. Le chapitre 3 répond à la question normative: Les entrepreneurs devraient-ils être imposés différemment? Par conséquent, j’analyse quantitativement la désirabilité d’une taxation basée sur l’occupation dans un modèle à générations imbriquées avec entrepreneuriat et une prise en compte explicite des cohortes transitionnelles. La reforme principale étudiée est le passage d’une taxation progressive fédérale identique tant pour les revenus du travail que pour le bénéfice d’entreprise au niveau individuel à un régime fiscal différentiel où le profit d’affaires fait face à un taux d’imposition proportionnel pendant que le revenu du travail est toujours soumis au code de taxation progressive. Je trouve qu’une taxe proportionnelle de 40% imposée aux entrepreneurs est optimale. Plus générale- ment, je montre que le taux d’imposition optimal varie entre 15% et 50%, augmentant avec l’aversion du planificateur pour les inégalités et diminuant avec son évaluation rel- ative du bien-être des générations futures. Dans le contexte de la réforme fiscalité des entreprises, le chapitre 4 évalue les compromis de neutralité fiscale de revenu dans le financement d’une réduction de l’impôt des sociétés. Pour respecter la neutralité fiscale, le gouvernement utilise trois instruments pour équilibrer son budget, à savoir l’impôt sur le revenu du travail, les dividendes et les gains en capital. Je construis ensuite un modèle d’équilibre général parcimonieux pour obtenir des multiplicateurs budgétaires équilibrés associés à une réforme de l’impôt sur les sociétés. En utilisant un calibration standard de l’économie américaine, je montre que les multiplicateurs liés à l’impôt sur le revenu du travail et l’impôt sur les dividendes sont négatifs, suggérant ainsi un compromis entre une réduction de l’impôt des sociétés et ces deux taux d’imposition. D’autre part, le multiplicateur lié à l’impôt sur les gains en capital est positif, ce qui prédit une coordination d’une double réduction des taux d’imposition des sociétés et des gains en capital. De plus, les gains de bien-être des différents scénarios sont mitigés. / This thesis explores the macroeconomic and distributional effects of taxation in the U.S. economy. The first three chapters take advantage of the interplay between entrepreneurship and wealth distribution while the last one discusses the trade-offs when financing a corporate tax cut under revenue neutrality. Specifically, Chapter 1 provides evidence using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that occupation-specific human capital or business experience is quantitatively important in explaining income and wealth disparities among individuals over their life cycle. To capture the data patterns, I build on Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) occupational choice model, modified to feature life-cycle dynamics. I also introduce managerial skill accumulation which leads entrepreneurs to become more productive with experience. I then calibrate two versions of the model (with and without accumulation of business experience) to the same U.S. data. Results show that the model with business experience margin is the closest one. Chapter 2's research question is timely to the recent tax reform enacted in the US, which is a major change of the tax code since the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) as of December 2017 significantly altered how business income is taxed in the US. I consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship developed in Chapter 1 to provide a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic effects of the TCJA, both in the short run and in the long run. The TCJA is modeled by its three key provisions: a new 20-percent-deduction rate for pass-throughs, a drop in the statutory tax rate for corporations from 35% to 21% and the reduction to 37% of the top marginal tax rate for individuals from 39.6%. I find that the economy experiences, a GDP growth rate of 0.90% over a ten-year window and average capital stock increases by 2.12%. These results are consistent with estimates made by the congressional budget office and the joint committee on taxation. With temporary provisions, the TCJA delivers a reduction in wealth and income inequality but the opposite occurs once provisions are made permanent. In both scenarios, the population suffers a welfare loss and finds them difficult to support. Chapter 3 answers the normative question: Should entrepreneurs be taxed differently? Accordingly, I quantitatively investigate the desirability of occupation-based taxation in the entrepreneurship model of Chapter 1, when transitional cohorts are explicitly taken into account. The main experiment is to move from the federal single progressive taxation for both labor income and business profit at the individual level to a differential tax regime where business income faces a proportional tax rate and labor income is still subject to the progressive scheme. I find that a tax rate of 40% is optimal. More generally, the optimal tax rate varies between 15% and 50%, increasing with the planner's aversion to inequality and decreasing with its relative valuation of future generations' welfare. In the context of business tax reform, chapter 4 assesses revenue-neutral trade-offs when financing a corporate tax cut. To meet revenue neutrality, the policymaker uses three instruments to balance the government budget, namely labor income tax, dividend tax, and capital gains tax. I then construct a parsimonious general equilibrium model to derive balanced fiscal multipliers associated with corporate tax reform. Using a standard calibration, I show that both labor income tax and dividend tax multipliers are negative, suggesting a trade-off between a corporate tax cut and these two tax rates. On the other hand, the multiplier related to the capital gains tax is positive, which predicts the coordination of a double cut in both corporate and capital gains tax rates. Moreover, the welfare gains of the different scenarios are mixed.