Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Nicolau Ferrara.pdf: 1124449 bytes, checksum: 7323f16541b3af1bf71cf2dc57b02b5d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-13 / In the analysis of the origins of the severe financial crisis, which began in 2007 in the US, remains an open debate about the reasons that led the Fed to underestimate the severity of the crisis. This study analyzes the perceptions of Central Bank on the peculiar context that has developed from 2001. The economic recovery was based on consumption and housing market, including the income extraction derived from valued housing, and followed by the risk of deflation, which subsequently led to growing fears about what was happening in the markets. The instrument used for this is the thorough analysis of the minutes of the FOMC and the pronouncements of the two presidents of the Fed, from 2001 to 2007, Greenspan and Bernanke, in addition to theoretical concepts and economic problems of that period. The methodology is justified because the communication with the market has become a relevant instrument in the Fed's action since the 1990s. The analysis of documents showed that in the aftermath of the crises of 2001-2002, the Fed used to acknowledge consumption and housing market to be important forces in the economic recovery. From 2003-2004, the FOMC members showed concern about the speculative behavior in housing and the effects of the reversal of the expansionary monetary policy would have on property prices and on consumption. The Fed's action to combat these threats was restrained by the belief in the strength of the deregulated financial system, by pragmatic confidence in the conduct of monetary policy guided by the risk management approach and the belief that Central Bank should not act against the formation of bubbles / Na análise das origens da grave crise financeira iniciada, em 2007, nos EUA, permanece em aberto o debate a respeito dos motivos que levaram o Fed a subestimar a gravidade da crise em formação. Este estudo analisa as percepções do BC sobre o quadro peculiar que se desenvolveu, a partir de 2001. A recuperação econômica foi pautada no consumo e no mercado imobiliário, inclusive na extração de renda derivada da valorização dos imóveis, seguida do risco de deflação que, posteriormente, deu lugar a receios crescentes em relação ao que ocorria nos mercados. O instrumento utilizado para isso é a análise minuciosa das atas do FOMC e os pronunciamentos dos dois presidentes do Fed, de 2001 a 2007, Greenspan e Bernanke, além das concepções teóricas e problemas conjunturais do período. A metodologia de análise justifica-se porque a comunicação com o mercado tornou-se instrumento relevante na ação do Fed, desde os anos 1990. A análise dos documentos mostrou que, no rescaldo das crises, de 2001-2002, o Fed reconhecia no consumo e no mercado imobiliário forças importantes na recuperação econômica. A partir de 2003-2004, membros do FOMC demonstravam preocupação quanto ao comportamento especulativo no mercado imobiliário e os efeitos que a reversão da política monetária expansionista teria sobre os preços dos imóveis e sobre o consumo. A ação do Fed para combater esses riscos foi contida pela crença na resistência do sistema financeiro desregulamentado, pela confiança na condução pragmática da política monetária orientada pelo risk management approach e pela convicção de que BC não deve agir frente à formação de bolhas

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:49:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Olivia Maria Bullio Mattos.pdf: 922804 bytes, checksum: 3e7bae29d19a9a942f72caf436c16254 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / In mid-2007, the world faced one of the biggest crisis capitalism ever experienced, called the subprime crisis, which originated in the US housing market. The Federal Reserve (Fed) had to act promptly, trying to rescue the markets. However, the Federal Reserve, which had always been pragmatic, found itself in great distress when the traditional tools of monetary policy were not enough to stop the liquidity crisis. The Fed had to act aggressively both as a lender of last resort and expanding the monetary base to halt the risk of a widespread "default" in the inter-bank market. Using changes in the size and composition of the Fed's Balance Sheet From July of 2007 to September of 2009, this dissertation analyses the actions taken and new tools created to fight the crisis. Initially, the dissertation presents the prevailing thesis up to the subprime crisis, which were the financial deregulation and the monetary authority's goal of price stability. The dissertation then discusses the Post- Keynesians and Minsky's take of the capitalistic economy, a more adequate view to understand the crisis and the preceding financial processes. In conclusion, the lessons learned from the subprime crisis are that we should rethink how we regulate financial institutions and products created by such institutions in pursue of profit; we should also rethink the way we do monetary policy and its objectives / Em meados de 2007, o mundo se viu a frente de uma das maiores crises financeiras já vividas pelo capitalismo, a chamada crise subprime, que teve sua origem no mercado imobiliário norte-americano. Foi necessário que o Federal Reserve (Fed) agisse e tentasse resgatar o mercado. No entanto, o Banco Central americano, que sempre foi pragmático, se viu em dificuldades quando os instrumentos tradicionais de política monetária não mais conseguiram conter a crise de iliquidez. Foi preciso então atuar agressivamente como emprestador de última instância e expandir a base monetária para conter os riscos de inadimplência generalizada no mercado interbancário. Através da análise das mudanças na composição e tamanho do Balance Sheet do Fed de julho de 2007 a setembro de 2009, esta dissertação analisa as ações e novos instrumentos criados para conter a crise. Inicialmente apresenta-se as teses dominantes até então, que eram de desregulamentação do mercado financeiro e de mandato de estabilidade de preços para a autoridade monetária. Em seguida, discute-se o entendimento de Minsky e dos pós-keynesianos da economia capitalista, uma visão mais adequada para compreender a crise e os processos financeiros precedentes. Conclui-se que as lições tiradas da crise mostram que deve-se repensar o formato de regulação das instituições financeiras e dos produtos criados por elas para busca de lucros; deve-se rever a maneira como é feita a política monetária e seus objetivos

O futuro das relações monetárias entre países é incerto. Enquanto a economia mundial há tempos tem contado com uma moeda internacional dominante, com o seu emissor desempenhando o papel de líder monetário internacional, existe uma série de fatores que coloca em cheque a continuação desse arranjo. Entre esses fatores estão a diminuição do papel dos Estados Unidos no crescimento econômico mundial, a crescente autonomia das políticas monetárias dos países emergentes e em desenvolvimento e a emergência de possíveis desafios ao dólar americano como a moeda chave de reserva internacional. A situação se apresenta por meio de um dilema quanto ao potencial futuro de um processo de cooperação monetária. Essencialmente, na ausência de um sistema hegemônico respaldado por um poder estrutural, como os países concordarão em ajustes mútuos adequados? Com essa questão em mente, esse estudo começa discutindo a cooperação monetária entre países e examina o papel do poder produtivo na coordenação de políticas. Por fim, o estudo procura testar as condições que permitem que os países designam responsabilidade por ajustes de política por meio da aplicação de tal poder. / The future of international monetary relations is uncertain. While the world economy has long relied on a dominant international currency, with its emitter playing the role of international monetary leader, there are several factors that place the continuance of this arrangement into doubt. Amongst these factors is the diminishing role of the U.S. economy in global output, the enhanced monetary policy autonomy of emerging market and developing economies, and the emergence of possible challengers to the U.S. dollar for the position of key international reserve currency. This situation presents us with a dilemma as to the future potential for monetary cooperation. Essentially, in the absence of a systemic hegemon, backed by structural power, how will countries come to agree on proper mutual adjustments? With this question in mind, this paper begins by discussing international monetary cooperation and examines the role of productive power in policy coordination. Finally, the paper looks to test for the conditions that allow for countries to assign responsibility for policy adjustments via the application of such power.

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar a mecânica dos processos políticos internos do Federal Reserve System e sua interação com o Departamento do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos no período entre o auge da crise financeira global no final de 2008 e o impasse sobre a elevação do teto da dívida pública em 2011. Foram analisados documentos oficias das duas instituições, bem como pronunciamentos de seus dirigentes. O estudo mostra que as estratégias desenhadas pelos formuladores de política monetária e fiscal complementaram-se durante a maior parte do período considerado, com a criação e implementação de variados instrumentos e programas de grande impacto. Nesse processo, o papel internacional do dólar foi reforçado. / This research aims at analyzing the mechanics of the internal political processes of the Federal Reserve System and its interaction with the U.S. Department of Treasury between the height of global financial crisis, late 2008, and the deadlock around the debt ceiling raise in 2011. To this end, the study was based on official documents issued by the two agencies and statements made by their representatives. The analysis indicates that the strategies designed by monetary and fiscal policymakers were complementary during most of the period in focus, through the creation and implementation of different policy tools and programs of great impact. In this process, the international role of the dollar was reinforced.

O futuro das relações monetárias entre países é incerto. Enquanto a economia mundial há tempos tem contado com uma moeda internacional dominante, com o seu emissor desempenhando o papel de líder monetário internacional, existe uma série de fatores que coloca em cheque a continuação desse arranjo. Entre esses fatores estão a diminuição do papel dos Estados Unidos no crescimento econômico mundial, a crescente autonomia das políticas monetárias dos países emergentes e em desenvolvimento e a emergência de possíveis desafios ao dólar americano como a moeda chave de reserva internacional. A situação se apresenta por meio de um dilema quanto ao potencial futuro de um processo de cooperação monetária. Essencialmente, na ausência de um sistema hegemônico respaldado por um poder estrutural, como os países concordarão em ajustes mútuos adequados? Com essa questão em mente, esse estudo começa discutindo a cooperação monetária entre países e examina o papel do poder produtivo na coordenação de políticas. Por fim, o estudo procura testar as condições que permitem que os países designam responsabilidade por ajustes de política por meio da aplicação de tal poder. / The future of international monetary relations is uncertain. While the world economy has long relied on a dominant international currency, with its emitter playing the role of international monetary leader, there are several factors that place the continuance of this arrangement into doubt. Amongst these factors is the diminishing role of the U.S. economy in global output, the enhanced monetary policy autonomy of emerging market and developing economies, and the emergence of possible challengers to the U.S. dollar for the position of key international reserve currency. This situation presents us with a dilemma as to the future potential for monetary cooperation. Essentially, in the absence of a systemic hegemon, backed by structural power, how will countries come to agree on proper mutual adjustments? With this question in mind, this paper begins by discussing international monetary cooperation and examines the role of productive power in policy coordination. Finally, the paper looks to test for the conditions that allow for countries to assign responsibility for policy adjustments via the application of such power.

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar a mecânica dos processos políticos internos do Federal Reserve System e sua interação com o Departamento do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos no período entre o auge da crise financeira global no final de 2008 e o impasse sobre a elevação do teto da dívida pública em 2011. Foram analisados documentos oficias das duas instituições, bem como pronunciamentos de seus dirigentes. O estudo mostra que as estratégias desenhadas pelos formuladores de política monetária e fiscal complementaram-se durante a maior parte do período considerado, com a criação e implementação de variados instrumentos e programas de grande impacto. Nesse processo, o papel internacional do dólar foi reforçado. / This research aims at analyzing the mechanics of the internal political processes of the Federal Reserve System and its interaction with the U.S. Department of Treasury between the height of global financial crisis, late 2008, and the deadlock around the debt ceiling raise in 2011. To this end, the study was based on official documents issued by the two agencies and statements made by their representatives. The analysis indicates that the strategies designed by monetary and fiscal policymakers were complementary during most of the period in focus, through the creation and implementation of different policy tools and programs of great impact. In this process, the international role of the dollar was reinforced.

This three part dissertation begins by "Examining the Origin of Federal Reserve Independence." This paper explores early Fed history with a particular emphasis on the period between 1947 and 1953 in order to provide a complete political account of Fed Independence. / Government

This report reviews the 2007 financial crisis and the actions of the Federal Reserve. The Full Employment Act of 1946 and the "Humphrey-Hawkins" Act guides the Fed's actions. These two laws outline the long-term goals of the monetary policy framework the Fed uses; however, the framework lacks principles for achieving the mandated long term goals such as reliable, complete data. This report looks at the use of model-based forecasting and gives recommendations for principles which will strengthen the preexisting monetary framework. / text

Thesis advisor: Peter Ireland / With interest rates stuck near zero for the foreseeable future, the Federal Reserve has had to employ numerous unconventional monetary policy measures in an attempt to stimulate an economy in the after math of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. I assess the usefulness of market-based measures of expectations in gauging the effects of these seemingly extreme policy actions undertaken in an environment of unprecedented fear and uncertainty. I use a principal component analysis to combine a number of asset prices that indicate different types of market expectations; by combining these variables into one single variable indicator, this principal component variable filters out the variance among these similar variables and focuses on the common movements among the variables that can be attributed to a specific market force such as investors’ inflation expectations, overall market risk appetite, and economic growth expectations. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

On November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve initiated what came to be the largest Asset Purchase Program in history1, the Large-Scale Asset Purchase Program, widely known a quantitative easing (QE). When the Federal Reserve in October 29, 2014, announced the end of the program, they held $4.5 trillion worth of assets. This rather unconventional monetary policy came in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and since its implementation, critics have argued that the policy increases inequality in terms of income and wealth. Studies on the impact of QE on income inequality lead to divergent conclusions, but the close link between QE and the stock markets, as explained by the Portfolio Rebalancing Effect, suggests that QE should increase wealth inequality. This hypothesis however, relies on a crucial assumption, namely that richer households hold a larger portion of their wealth in stocks. As other assets of a household, such as the primary residence, are likely to increase less than proportionally with wealth, I find it plausible that the portion allocated to direct or indirect stock holdings increases with wealth, resulting in a higher exposure to stocks for the very rich. Statistics from the Survey of Consumer Finances, presented in this paper, confirm that richer households indeed have the higher exposure to stocks. I use a difference-in-difference model to estimate the causal impact of QE on wealth inequality in the United States and my results suggests that wealth inequality attributable to QE) increased with at least 25 percent, measured as a change in the wealth-ratio between the 9th decile of households and the artificial middle-income household constructed in accordance with the Synthetic Control Method.