The Great Depression elucidated the shortcomings of the banking system and its control by Wall Street. The creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 was insufficient to correct flaws in the banking system until the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. A.P. Giannini, the American-Italian founder of the Bank of America and Mormon Marriner S. Eccles, chairman of Federal Reserve Board (1935-1949), from California and Utah respectively, successfully worked to restrain the power of the eastern banking establishment. The Banking Act of 1935 was the capstone of their cooperation, a bill that placed open market operations in the hands of the Federal Reserve, thus diminishing the power of the New York Reserve. The creation of the Federal Housing Act, as orchestrated by Eccles, became a source of enormous revenue for Giannini. Giannini's wide use of branch banking and mass advertising was his contribution to American banking. Eccles's promotion of compensatory spending and eventual placement of monetary control in the hands of the Federal Reserve Board with Banking Act of 1935 and the Accord of 1951 and Giannini's branch banking diminished the likelihood of another sustained depression. As the Bank of America grew, and as Eccles became more aggressive in his fight for control of monetary policy, Secretary of State Henry Morgenthau, Jr., became a common enemy to both bankers. Morgenthau caused the Securities and Exchange Commission to launch an investigation of the Bank of America. Later, when Eccles and Giannini were no longer friends, the Board of Governors filed suit under the Clayton Act against Transamerica, a Giannini bank holding company. By 1945, Giannini's bank was the largest in the world. When John W. Snyder replaced Morgenthau, the "freeze" against Giannini's expansion stopped. Eccles was demoted by Truman but served on the Board of Governors until the Accord of 1951 making the Reserve no longer responsible for supporting the pegged interest rates of government bonds.

Este trabajo de investigación aporta evidencia empírica sobre el impacto de cambios en la política monetaria de la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos en la cantidad de entrada de capitales en economías emergentes. Utilizando una muestra de países en desarrollo entre los años 2000 al 2019, se logra establecer que los influjos de capitales de las economías emergentes se reducen considerablemente en aquellos periodos donde hubo un recorte de la expansión monetaria por parte de la Reserva Federal de EE. UU aumentando la probabilidad de ocurrencia de episodios de reversión abrupta de entrada de capitales. Este hallazgo empírico resulta de gran relevancia debido al actual contexto económico donde variaciones en la política monetaria de la Reserva Federal es altamente probable, además de la importancia que tienen los influjos de capitales en el crecimiento económico. Asimismo, a partir de estos resultados, se establece una serie de recomendaciones de política económica. / This research work provides empirical evidence on the impact of changes in the monetary policy of the United States Federal Reserve on the amount of capital inflows in emerging economies. Using a sample of developing countries between the years 2000 and 2019, it is possible to establish that capital inflows from emerging economies are considerably reduced in those periods where there was a cut in monetary expansion by the US Federal Reserve. increasing the probability of occurrence of episodes of abrupt reversal of capital inflows. This empirical finding is highly relevant due to the current economic context where variations in the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve are highly probable, in addition to the importance of capital inflows in economic growth. Likewise, based on these results, a series of economic policy recommendations are established. / Tesis

This dissertation studies topics in the areas of international finance. In the first chapter, the Unintended Consequences of Financial Sanctions, I study the economic impact of the U.S. financial sanctions against Russian companies in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. I show that this sanctions program, which primarily cut off access to international financial markets for sanctioned firms, produced an unintended consequence of strengthening the sanctions targets relative to their unsanctioned peers. Specifically, while the policy successfully halted new international borrowings by sanctioned companies, the spillover impact of the policy resulted in these targets shrinking in size by less than unsanctioned Russian firms. To explain these results, I argue that sanctions led to a reallocation of domestic resources in favor of sanctioned firms. In particular, sanctions precipitated capital crowding out and credit rationing, causing unsanctioned domestic borrowers to suffer more from the policy. The research highlights the limitation of "targeted sanctions" and also sheds light more broadly on the impact of international financial integration and capital flows on firm size dynamics. In the second chapter, Quantitative Analysis of Sanctions Policy, I theoretically and quantitatively analyze the impact of financial sanctions on the target firms and the target economy. I introduce a heterogeneous firm model with segmented capital markets and financial frictions in which sanctions against international borrowers led to capital crowding out and credit rationing among domestic borrowers. I calibrate the model to the 2014 U.S. financial sanctions episode and use the model to estimate the impact of sanctions on firm sizes and macroeconomic variables. I also evaluate policy alternatives and identify factors for policymakers to consider in calibrating future sanctions programs. I conclude by discussing the 2022 sanctions program and inferring broader policy implications. In the third chapter, the Impact of Monetary Policy on the Specialness of U.S. Treasuries, I estimate the causal effect of monetary policy on the specialness of U.S. Treasuries. Quantifying this specialness by the U.S. Treasury Premium, which is the difference in the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries and that of government bonds of other developed countries measured as the deviation from covered interest parity between government bond yields, I find that monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve increases the specialness of U.S. Treasuries primarily by increasing the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries. I also find that the magnitude of the impact varies across the term structure and across countries, especially after the Global Financial Crisis, and U.S. and foreign monetary policy shocks have asymmetric impacts on the specialness of U.S. Treasuries. These results provide evidence for the unique ability of the Federal Reserve to affect the specialness of U.S. Treasuries by altering the supply of dollar safe assets.

Economic sociologists have long produced rich accounts of the economy’s embeddedness in social relations and the hybridity of contemporary governance architectures. However, all too often, they contented themselves with merely disenchanting a liberal ontology that divides the social world into neatly differentiated spheres, such as the state and the economy or the public and the private. In this dissertation, I argue that this is not enough. If we want to understand actually existing economic government, we also need to attend to the consequences of its persistent violation of the precepts of liberal order. This dissertation does so by accounting for the simultaneity of the Federal Reserve’s rise to the commanding heights of the US economy and the repeated, multi-pronged controversies over it. I contend that together, the Fed’s ascendance and the controversies surrounding it are symptomatic of the contradictions inherent to a liberal mode of governing ‘the economy’ which, on the one hand, professes its investment in a clear boundary between the state and the economy but which, on the other hand, operationally rests on their entanglement. Its embeddedness in financial markets exposes the Fed to attacks that it is either colluding with finance or that it unduly smuggles in political considerations into an otherwise apolitical economy. In response, to secure its legitimacy as a neutral arbiter of market struggles, the Fed needs to invest in autonomization strategies to demonstrate that it is acting neither in the interests of capital nor on behalf of partisan politicians but in the public interest. Its autonomization strategies in turn feed back onto the modes of embeddedness and governing techniques the Fed deploys, often resulting in new controversies. Combining insights from economic sociology and the sociology of expertise, the perspective developed in this dissertation thus foregrounds the persistent tension between embeddedness and autonomy and the sequences of reiterated problem-solving it gives rise to.Based on extensive archival research and interviews with actors, I reconstruct three such sequences in the Fed’s more-than-a-century long quest for embedded autonomy in three independent but related empirical essays. The first focuses on the decade immediately following the Federal Reserve System’s founding in 1913. It traces how the confluence of democratic turmoil in the wake of World War I, its hybrid organizational structure, and an alliance with institutionalist economists led Fed policymakers to repurpose open market operations from a banking technique into a policy tool that reconciled different interests. This made it possible to take on a task no other central bank had attempted before: mitigating depressions. This major innovation briefly turned the Fed into “the chief stabilizer” before it failed to fulfill this role during the Great Depression. The essay thus adds a critical, oft-forgotten episode to the genealogy of the Fed’s ascendancy and the rise of central banks to the foremost macroeconomic managers of our time. The second essay most explicitly develops the theoretical argument underlying this dissertation and applies it to a practice that has been all but ignored in the scholarship on central banking and financial government: bank supervision. Emphasizing its distinctiveness from regulation, I reconstruct how the Fed folded supervision into its project of governing finance as a vital, yet vulnerable system over the course of the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st. I especially focus on the Fed’s autonomization strategies in the wake of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis and its internal struggles which resulted in a more standardized, quantitative, and transparent supervisory process centered around the technique of stress testing. However, the Fed’s efforts to reassert its autonomy and authority have in the meantime become attacked themselves. The essay traces these controversies, and subsequent reforms, to the present day, further demonstrating the recursive dynamic of the Fed’s quest for embedded autonomy. The third essay finally zooms in on a single event during the Great Financial Crisis: the first major public stress test run by the Fed and the Treasury between February and May 2009. By reconstructing its socio-technical assembling in detail and comparing it to the failures of stress tests run by European agencies between 2009 and 2011, I show that the stress test’s success rested on a reconfiguration of the state’s embeddedness in financial circuits, allowing the Treasury’s material and symbolic capital to back the exercise and the Fed to function as a conduit that iteratively gauged and shaped its audiences’ expectations as to what a credible test would look like. This made it possible to successfully frame the test as an autonomous exercise based on expertise. Probing the structural, socio-technical, and performative conditions of the Fed’s claims to legitimacy, the essay thus resolves the ‘mystery’ (Paul Krugman) how a simulation technique could become a watershed event in the greatest financial crisis in a lifetime.

This thesis analyses the role of the Euromarket, an offshore market for Eurodollars or expatriate US dollars, in the re-emergence of global finance during the 1960s and 1970s. It charts not only its Cold War origins and the development of various markets for Eurodollars, but also institutions and policies that shaped them from the return to convertibility in 1958 to the ill-fated efforts to regulate the nascent market by international financial institutions. By examining the nature of Eurodollars as both a US and global currency, the thesis sheds light on the changing features of the governance of global finance and its relationship with the economic sovereignty of nation-states. It argues that the Euromarket underwent repeated contestations as politicians, bankers, and economists vested their political ambitions and cultural assumptions in it. The popular, academic, and policy debates challenged the speculative nature of Eurodollars which would destabilise the domestic as well as the international monetary system of the Bretton Woods system. Without a single monetary authority, the tendency of the Euromarket to transcend the order of capitalist nation-states constrained national governments’ capacity to control capital flows and the autonomy of domestic monetary policy. However, nation-states were not impotent but deliberately sought to exploit the liquid pool of capital in Eurodollars. It was not merely the US government that benefited from the seigniorage of Eurodollars and the City of London which was reborn as the international financial centre in the Euromarket. Continental European countries that were hesitant about European economic integration, the UK Labour government, developing countries in the Global South, and even the Communist bloc, resorted to the Euromarket for their national interests. The ambivalent attitudes of national governments and their conflict of interests resulted in the failure of coordinated efforts to introduce the rules of the game but facilitated the transnational network of finance in Eurodollars.

The diploma thesis investigates causes and progression of the financial crisis beginning in 2007 in the United States and leading in the economic recession. Theoretical part of the thesis describes business cycles and their explanations in accordance with the Austrian theory of the business cycle and other theories. Analytical part of the thesis explores the period before the crisis and significant events relevant to it. The main subject of the thesis are institutions and regulatory measures that have major importance for the U.S. real estate market -- including monetary and intervenionist policy of Fed, Community Reinvestment Act, government sponsored enterprises and three major rating agencies. The goal of the work is to provide a comprehensive view of the financial crisis and analyse main factors that influenced its creation -- credit expansion, mortgage market, Fed's monetary policy, bank behavior, etc. This thesis tries to demonstrate an inaccuracy of state inteventions and their impacts on the economy and market system.

The main goal of this thesis is comparison of FEDs monetary policy in times of Great Depression and financial crisis 2007 -- 2009. Both of them began when the speculative bubble burst (in the first case it was in stock market, in the second one it occurred in real estate market). The effect of speculative bubbles bursting had very negative impact on global economic system. The FEDs monetary reaction to the both crises was very different. It differentiates in many aspects -- in times of Great Depression FED acted passive -- did not provide large open market purchases, did not lowered the interest rate quick enough to avoid the money stock fall-down. In current crisis, FED did not repeat mistakes made during Great Depression. In response to the market pressure, FED created several unconventional tools to support liquidity of depository institutions, primary dealers and commercial paper market. Via these new-invented programs, FED did not allow the money stock to fall and as the financial strains eased, they slowly disappeared. Besides these liquidity programs, FED supported economy with fast interest rate lowering and providing quantitative easing. Steps taken by FED helped to stabilize financial markets.

Ce travail de thèse est consacré à l’étude de la participation de James Laurence Laughlin (1850-19133) à l’unification monétaire et bancaire américaine de 1870 à 1913. L’histoire des débat monétaires et bancaires américains de la fin du dix-neuvième et du début du vingtième sièclen’accorde pas une place importante à cet auteur pourtant incontournable. Laughlin devient unéconomiste académique réputé en tant que premier Head Professor à l’université de Chicago et en fondant le Journal of Political Economy en 1892. Il s’affirme comme expert économique grâce à son expérience de money doctoring à Saint-Domingue en 1894 puis sa participation à la commission monétaire d’Indianapolis en 1897-98. Le rapport final de cette commission rédigé par Laughlin est utilisé pour l’écriture du Gold Standard Act voté en 1900 qui institue légalement un système d’étalon-or aux États-Unis. Par la suite, il prend part à la conception du Federal Reserve Act de 1913, aux côtés de son ancien étudiant Henry Parker Willis. La théorie monétaire de Laughlin se veut être une critique de la théorie quantitative de la monnaie et une défense de la mise en place d’un système d’étalon-or. Pour ce faire, il mobilise des éléments issus de la théorie des auteurs de la Banking School anglaise. Il explique alors la formation des prix par des déterminants non monétaires et inclut le crédit et la spéculation à sa théorie en distinguant un crédit « normal » et un crédit « anormal ». / This Ph.D. dissertation studies James Laurence Laughlin (1850-1913) participation in the American monetary and banking unification. The history of American monetary and banking debates of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century does not place emphasis on this author while he is unavoidable. He becomes a renowned academic economist by being the first Head Professor of the University of Chicago and the founder of the Journal of Political Economy in 1892. He also acquires the status of economic expert by doing a money doctoring in Santo Domingo in 1894 and by participating in the Indianapolis Monetary Commission in 1897-98. The final report of this commission written by Laughlin had been used to write the Gold Standard Act, passed in 1900 and establishing a gold standard system in the United States. Subsequently, he gets involved in designing the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 alongside his former student Henry Parker Willis. Laughlin’s theory is meant to be a critique of the quantity theory of money. He includes elements from the English Banking School authors’ theory. He explains the formation of prices by non-monetary determinants and includes credit and speculation in his theory by distinguishing a “normal” credit and an “abnormal” credit.

[pt] O presente trabalho tem como principal objetivo contribuir para a desmistificação da dinâmica atual do deflator do consumo americano.Com esta finalidade, é avaliada a evolução temporal da Curva de Phillips americana, utilizando como referência a especificação apresentada por Yellen (2015). Os resultados encontrados são analisados e comparados com novas estimativas para diferentes variáveis de núcleo de inflação, expectativa de inflação e ociosidade do mercado de trabalho. A hipótese de não linearidade da Curva de Phillips também é testada. Por fim, um modelo alternativo ao de referência é sugerido e o deflator do consumo é desagregado para uma melhor compreensão. Concluímos que a Curva de Phillips continua válida e que não houve achatamento ao longo dos anos 2000. Ademais, não foi constatado suporte estatístico para a hipótese de não linearidade. Com isso, os principais responsáveis identificados pelo caso da inflação perdida são categorias que sofreram choques estruturais relacionados aos seus respectivos setores. E se esta avaliação estiver correta e os choques setoriais forem persistentes, o banco central americano possivelmente precisará implementar uma posição mais acomodatícia do que seria apropriado para atingir sua meta de longo prazo. / [en] The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the demystification of the current dynamics of the inflation in United States.The Phillips Curve in the United States is evaluated since 1990s, using the model presented by Yellen (2015) as a reference. The results are analyzed and compared with new estimates for different core inflation variables, inflation expectations, and labor market slack. The nonlinearity hypothesis of the Phillips curve is also tested. Finally, an alternative to the model is suggested and the consumption price deflator is disaggregated.The results indicate that the Phillips Curve is still valid and that there was no flattening over the 2000s. In addition, no evidence of statistical significance was found for the nonlinearity hypothesis. Therefore, the main cause of the missed inflation are categories that suffered structural shocks related to their respective sectors. If this assessment is accurate and these sector-specific shocks continue, achieving the Federal Reserve s 2 percent inflation goal over the medium term may require a more accommodative stance of monetary policy than might otherwise be appropriate.

The thesis deals with relation between central bank independence and accountability. The relation is examined on example of quantitative easing implemented in the period 2005 - 2016 by the European central bank and the Federal Reserve System. From the theoretical and practical point of view the thesis proves that the relation between central bank independence and accountability are influenced by the specification of targets of monetary policy to a great extent. The thesis also proves that the specific definition of both central bank independence and accountability influenced the characteristics of quantitative resp. credit easing. Moreover, such monetary policy can potentially endanger the independence of both central banks in many ways. Thus, the implementation of quantitative easing itself and its potential consequences evidences that the contemporary conception of central bank independence and accountability is insufficient and needs to be reviewed.