Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania sets the principal democratic values of society. Human rights assume special role in the system of constitutional values. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the right of a human being to have his own convictions and freely express them. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the right to everyone to have freedom to express his opinion and convictions and to freely impart them. This is an essential clause for the creation and protection of democracy. Constitutional freedom of expression is realised in ordinary laws. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the principle of freedom of expression that is realised in the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Law on Provision of Information to the Public and other ordinary laws. Freedom of expression, just like other constitutional human rights and freedoms, is not absolute. Employment of the freedom of expression faces such requirements that are required in the democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms of other human beings, as well as the constitutional arrangement. Ordinary courts (general jurisdiction and specialised), which examine cases for determining balance of freedom of expression and other constitutional values, must construe the content of constitutional rights of human beings. Decisions by ordinary courts in the cases of determining the balance of freedom of... [to full text] / LR Konstitucijoje įtvirtintos svarbiausios demokratinės visuomenės vertybės. Žmogaus teisėms konstitucinių vertybių sistemoje tenka ypatinga vieta. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. įtvirtinta žmogaus teisė turėti savo įsitikinimus ir juos laisvai reikšti. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. kiekvienam žmogui suteikia galimybę laisvai formuoti savo nuomonę ir pažiūras bei laisvai jas skleisti. Tai būtina sąlyga demokratijai kurti ir saugoti. Konstitucinė saviraiškos laisvė įgyvendinama ordinariniuose įstatymuose. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. įtvirtintas saviraiškos laisvės principas įgyvendintas LR Civiliniame kodekse, LR Visuomenės informavimo įstatyme bei kituose ordinariniuose įstatymuose. Saviraiškos laisvė, kaip ir kitos konstitucinės žmogaus teisės ir laisvės, nėra absoliuti. Naudojantis saviraiškos laisve susiduriama su tokiais reikalavimais, kurie būtini demokratinėje visuomenėje siekiant apsaugoti kitų žmonių teises ir laisves, konstitucinę santvarką. Ordinariniai (bendros kompetencijos ir specializuoti) teismai, spręsdami žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių pusiausvyros nustatymo bylas, turi interpretuoti konstitucinių žmogaus teisių turinį. Priimdami sprendimus žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių pusiausvyros nustatymo bylose ordinariniai teismai turi remtis žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių konstitucine dimensija.

When is it acceptable to make fun of religion, and when does it become disrespectful? On January 7, 2015, the headquarters of the French satirical news paper Charlie Hebdo was subjected to a terrorist attack that claimed the lives of 12 staff members, due to the publishing of caricatures picturing the prophet Muhammed. The reactions that followed the attack circled around two perspectives; the importance of freedom of expression and the obligation to show respect for certain institutions and traditions in society. How come the caricatures can elicit such completely different reactions? This is the question that this thesis uses as a starting point for the examination of the subject caricatures and satire. The thesis examines caricatures and satire from a rhetorical perspective. It distinguishes four rhetorical aspects of caricature, and discusses if these rhetorical aspects can be what makes the difference regarding how provocative a drawing is considered. The thesis then uses the four rhetorical aspects found, to analyze two caricatures from the French satiric magazine Charlie Hebdo.

Australian debates about racial vilification legislation have been dominated by mainstream American First Amendment jurisprudence and popular American notions of 'free speech' to the exclusion of alternative Europeans models. This can be seen from notions of Australian racial vilification legislation as inconsistent with 'free speech' rights as well as the influence of some of the basic assumptions of First Amendment jurisprudence on political speech cases in the Australian High Court. Despite the widespread existence of legislation that penalises racial vilification at State and Federal levels, there has been a rise in Australia over the past 10 years of divisive 'race' politics. Against that background, this thesis considers the scope and limits of racial vilification legislation in Australia. It is argued that First Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate in the Australian context, because it is heavily dependent upon economic metaphors, individualistic notions of identity and outdated theories of communication. It assumes that 'free speech' in terms of lack of government intervention is essential to 'democracy'. It ignores the content, context and effect of harmful speech, except in extreme cases, with the result that socially harmful speech is protected in the name of 'free speech'. This has narrowed the parameters within which racial vilification is understood and hindered the development of a broader discourse on the realities of racist harms, and the mechanisms necessary for their redress. The author calls for the development of an Australian jurisprudence of harmful speech. Failing an Australian Bill of Rights, that jurisprudence would be grounded upon the implied constitutional right of free political speech, informed by an awareness that modern structures of public speech favour a very limited range of speech and speakers. The jurisprudence would take advantage of the insights of Critical Race Theory into the connections between racial vilification and racist behaviour, as well as the personal and social harms of racial vilification. Finally, it is argued that the concepts of human dignity and equality, which underpin European discrimination legislation and notions of justice, provide a way forward for Australian jurisprudence in this area.

Australian debates about racial vilification legislation have been dominated by mainstream American First Amendment jurisprudence and popular American notions of 'free speech' to the exclusion of alternative Europeans models. This can be seen from notions of Australian racial vilification legislation as inconsistent with 'free speech' rights as well as the influence of some of the basic assumptions of First Amendment jurisprudence on political speech cases in the Australian High Court. Despite the widespread existence of legislation that penalises racial vilification at State and Federal levels, there has been a rise in Australia over the past 10 years of divisive 'race' politics. Against that background, this thesis considers the scope and limits of racial vilification legislation in Australia. It is argued that First Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate in the Australian context, because it is heavily dependent upon economic metaphors, individualistic notions of identity and outdated theories of communication. It assumes that 'free speech' in terms of lack of government intervention is essential to 'democracy'. It ignores the content, context and effect of harmful speech, except in extreme cases, with the result that socially harmful speech is protected in the name of 'free speech'. This has narrowed the parameters within which racial vilification is understood and hindered the development of a broader discourse on the realities of racist harms, and the mechanisms necessary for their redress. The author calls for the development of an Australian jurisprudence of harmful speech. Failing an Australian Bill of Rights, that jurisprudence would be grounded upon the implied constitutional right of free political speech, informed by an awareness that modern structures of public speech favour a very limited range of speech and speakers. The jurisprudence would take advantage of the insights of Critical Race Theory into the connections between racial vilification and racist behaviour, as well as the personal and social harms of racial vilification. Finally, it is argued that the concepts of human dignity and equality, which underpin European discrimination legislation and notions of justice, provide a way forward for Australian jurisprudence in this area.

Australian debates about racial vilification legislation have been dominated by mainstream American First Amendment jurisprudence and popular American notions of 'free speech' to the exclusion of alternative Europeans models. This can be seen from notions of Australian racial vilification legislation as inconsistent with 'free speech' rights as well as the influence of some of the basic assumptions of First Amendment jurisprudence on political speech cases in the Australian High Court. Despite the widespread existence of legislation that penalises racial vilification at State and Federal levels, there has been a rise in Australia over the past 10 years of divisive 'race' politics. Against that background, this thesis considers the scope and limits of racial vilification legislation in Australia. It is argued that First Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate in the Australian context, because it is heavily dependent upon economic metaphors, individualistic notions of identity and outdated theories of communication. It assumes that 'free speech' in terms of lack of government intervention is essential to 'democracy'. It ignores the content, context and effect of harmful speech, except in extreme cases, with the result that socially harmful speech is protected in the name of 'free speech'. This has narrowed the parameters within which racial vilification is understood and hindered the development of a broader discourse on the realities of racist harms, and the mechanisms necessary for their redress. The author calls for the development of an Australian jurisprudence of harmful speech. Failing an Australian Bill of Rights, that jurisprudence would be grounded upon the implied constitutional right of free political speech, informed by an awareness that modern structures of public speech favour a very limited range of speech and speakers. The jurisprudence would take advantage of the insights of Critical Race Theory into the connections between racial vilification and racist behaviour, as well as the personal and social harms of racial vilification. Finally, it is argued that the concepts of human dignity and equality, which underpin European discrimination legislation and notions of justice, provide a way forward for Australian jurisprudence in this area.

Thesis (M.A. Political Science and Public Policy)--University of Waikato, 2007. / Title from PDF cover (viewed April 1, 2008) Includes bibliographical references (p. [92-100])

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed 8 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Economics and Business. Degree awarded 2004; thesis submitted 2003. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 148-153). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 182-196).