The ancient Greek terms parrhesia and isegoria are both frequently translated as "free speech" or "freedom of speech". Translating these terms in a straightforward fashion as "free speech" obscures a number of significant differences among what are in truth three very distinct concepts. These dis-analogies may appear unimportant at first glance, but when we understand the central role these concepts play in their respective cultures – more specifically, in their political and legal systems – it becomes clear that small differences in meaning can make a big difference in our ability to grasp the nature of Athenian civic culture. I will outline the most salient of these dis-analogies, and the mistaken conceptions of Athenian political culture that can, and do, result from them. In particular, though the idea of freedom features prominently in parrhesia and isegoria, what freedom amounts to in Athens is sometimes nearly antithetical to what it amounts to in modern liberal republics. Ancient Athenian freedom was the freedom of opportunity. In the case of parrhesia, it was a custom or value which was not a feature of government or law, but part of the Athenian character. The fact that Athenians valued free speaking was formalised in political practice under the democracy through the equal opportunity to address the political assemblies known as isegoria. There was in Athens no explicit or implied protection against the negative consequences of what one said. In contrast, "freedom of speech" means that the individual is protected against the negative consequences of speaking, in particular protected against action by the government to suppress speech and to punish speech after the fact. This difference in what having "freedom" with respect to speech amounts to, makes the translation of isegoria as "freedom of speech" nearly always systematically misleading, and so we should refrain from doing so in any context in which such confusion might be generated. This misunderstanding is compounded by the frequent translation of parrhesia as "freedom of speech" or "free speech". Parrhesia is the name for a certain mode of speech, namely speech which is direct and truthful, and risks negative consequences. As such, it has both positive and negative connotations, and correspondingly was only valued in contexts in which direct truthful speech would be preferable to other modes of speech. Parrhesia was never formalised as isegoria was, since isegoria was a political privilege while parrhesia was merely a mode of expression. In contrast, free speech is legally protected. Speech which is not believed to be valuable is protected, in order to ensure that valuable speech is not suppressed by the powerful through the instruments of government.

This thesis provides an overview over the existing and emerging correlation of the Internet and Human Rights with the main focus on the human right to freedom of expression. It looks at how freedom of expression is protected and curtailed at the same time by regulation in the global context and nationally and how it could be protected in the future. Firstly, it will address general issues and problems connected with the Internet and Human Rights, like equal access to the new technology, and terrorism and the defence of freedom. It will look at the relationship of freedom of expression and other human rights, especially the right to privacy. Secondly, it will examine the applicability of international human rights agreements and the opportunities offered by them. It will also look at the possibility of drafting a new piece of international legislation and the effectiveness of national regulation. Although in some areas international consensus may be easier to achieve, for example in many aspects of criminal law enforcement, it is unrealistic to expect that countries with different cultural values will agree upon a single set of rules for the whole world. International harmonisation strategies are clearly an important response to the jurisdictional difficulties of Internet regulation, but they can't be the ultimate and single solution. But national regulation faces its problems, too. Due to the character of the Internet as a transnational medium and its borderless flow of information the nation state only has limited possibilities to effectively regulate the Internet within its borders and it has to accept a loss of sovereignty in cyberspace. Although regulation in some areas may be effective, complete control is impossible which will be shown. Thirdly, it will consider the different approaches that are available to regulate and control content on the Internet, their effectiveness and their influence on the human right to freedom of expression. It will illustrate in various examples in form of case studies the difficulties of Internet regulation. It will also provide an overview over selfrating schemes and filtering and blocking software and the problems connected with them. The liability of Internet Service Providers will be examined and alternatives to government control of the Internet will be discussed. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Canada and the United States are similar in many respects, and both protect individual rights at a constitutional level. However, the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme Court have developed alternative conceptions of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and equality. This thesis describes these differences and attempts to explain the reasons for their development. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court merely requires that governmental actors refrain from overt discrimination on the basis of an objectionable ground. Thus, the Court has created numerous doctrines to limit equality to this definition, including color-blindness, intentional discrimination, and multiple levels of review. Each of these concepts has contributed to the application of formal equality by restricting governmental attempts, such as affirmative action, to alleviate social inequality. In addition, the Court's application of content neutrality to freedom of expression cases has restricted attempts to promote equality through legislation restricting hate speech and pornography. By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the protection of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to respond to the actual social consequences of legislation. Rather than limiting the Charter to intentional discrimination, the Court will consider governmental actions which have the effect of creating or encouraging inequality. Similarly, governmental restrictions on hate speech and pornography have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as necessary for the protection of equality. For the Supreme Court of Canada, equality has a social reality. These differences suggest an alternative role of government in the rights sphere in Canada and the United States. The United States Supreme Court has developed a rights interpretation which excludes much significant governmental action, whether positive or negative. The Court has incorporated the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and, in doing so, has expanded individual rights at the expense of state power in the promotion of equality. The lack of such a development in Canada has resulted in a more substantial role for social legislation, while still protecting against governmental overreaching through the Charter. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

La haine a laissé dans nos sociétés de douloureuses cicatrices à travers les siècles. L'explosion du terrorisme et l'essor des tensions communautaires laissent craindre le retour d'une déstabilisation durable de notre société. C'est notamment au droit pénal qu'il appartient d'être en mesure d'endiguer ce phénomène, mais une telle entreprise n'est pas sans difficultés. En premier lieu, celle de comprendre et définir la haine, tant dans ses effets sur le psychique que sur les formes multiples de ses manifestations. Les vecteurs modernes de transmission de la haine sont étroitement liés à la capacité de la haine à avoir de l'emprise sur les plus vulnérables. La maîtrise d'internet est une des clés de cette lutte mais est loin d'être chose aisée. La complexité technologique et juridique de ce contrôle ralentit considérablement le travail du législateur. Cet obstacle, associé à l'explosion du terrorisme, place les juridictions pénales dans une situation particulièrement ardue. Si le seul moyen de désamorcer la haine est d'intervenir avant qu'elle n'atteigne un point de non retour, sa prévention est une tâche complexe. L'équilibre avec le respect des libertés publiques est extrêmement précaire, la liberté d'expression étant bien souvent la première à être altérée. Sanctionner les propos incitant à la haine ou encore négationnistes conduit pourtant nécessairement à censurer des propos. Les modalités de cette censure font l'objet de multiples débats et se confrontent souvent à des fortes oppositions. La place des institutions régionales et internationales est en l'espèce fondamentale, notamment pour orienter un droit français vieillissant. La législation en matière de haine est en effet encore largement enfermée dans le droit de la presse alors que la haine utilise de nos jours bien d'autres moyens de se propager. L'éducation et le renseignement sont les deux clés qui permettront de se projeter dans un futur où la haine sera suffisamment maîtrisée, à la condition bien entendu que l'ensemble des acteurs de la lutte contre la haine travaillent de concert, tant sur le plan national qu'international. / Hate left painful scars in our societies that will never be forgotten. The rise of terrorism and the growing tensions among communities raise concerns about a possible long term instability of our society. Criminal law is the one able to stop this phenomenon but such a task is not without difficulties. The first of them is to understand and define hate, both on its effects on the mind and the shaped of its demonstrations. The modern means of hate transmission are tightly tied to the hate ability to have a strong hold on the most vulnerable people. The control of internet is one of the key to succeed but is far from an easy thing. The complexity of it, both technological and legal, slows down the legislator work. This obstacle, associated with the wave of terrorism, put the criminal courts in a tough situation. If the only way to prevent hate is to stop it before reaching the point of non return, preventing it is complex. The balance with the fundamental liberties is very delicate and the freedom of speech is often the first one hurt. Punishing incitement to hatred or denial of crimes against humanity leads necessarily to censorship. The conditions of this censorship are the subject of many debates and strong oppositions. In this case, the role of regional and international institutions is fundamental, especially to direct the aging french law towards the right direction. The criminal law regarding hate is indeed still widely limited to the press legislation while hate now used many different means to spread. The legislator and justice need to work together in order to create new offenses, improve the already existing offenses and prevention, always respecting fundamental liberties. Globally, it is all the countries together that must face together these new threats.

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The thesis is focused on the legal regulation of protection of personality rights. This topic is up to date not only because of the media exposure, but also with regard to the recodification of private law. The focus of this thesis lies on Act no. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code, which is compared to the antecedent legal regulation. The personality protection belongs to fundamental human rights therefore the thesis includes the constitutional overlap and interpretation of international agreements. The work is divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals with the development of personal rights from a historical perspective. There is also mentioned legislation of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. The second chapter deals with the interpretation of the concept of personality, the theoretical concept of general personality right and possibilities of its limitations. Part of this chapter shows a non-exhaustive list of values protected by the general personality right, namely the right to physical and mental integrity, the right to personal liberty, the right to a name, the right to likeness, the right to honor and dignity and right to privacy. The third chapter provides an overview of legal regulation of personality rights at the international and constitutional level, the general Civil Code...

With the fast pace that technology is currently developing, technology forms a bigger part of our day to day lives. Technological advancement has an impact on all aspects of life, including how we communicate with one another. This has caused an increase in social media usage. South Africa is in no way an exception to this growing trend. The escalation of the use of social media platforms has brought with it the rise in the wrongful use of social media. The growth in wrongful use would lead to the proliferation of legal consequences for defamatory statements with regard to social media situations. The question arises if South Africa‘s current legislation is able to regulate the new phenomena of defamatory statements on social media platforms. The conclusion was reached that South Africa‘s current legislation is more than adequate to regulate this new form of defamation. With the qualification that that judges apply the current legal principles of the law of delict to this new form of defamation correctly. Educating and informing judges, as well as the public is vital in preventing this new form of defamation to become problematic. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

With the fast pace that technology is currently developing, technology forms a bigger part of our day to day lives. Technological advancement has an impact on all aspects of life, including how we communicate with one another. This has caused an increase in social media usage. South Africa is in no way an exception to this growing trend. The escalation of the use of social media platforms has brought with it the rise in the wrongful use of social media. The growth in wrongful use would lead to the proliferation of legal consequences for defamatory statements with regard to social media situations. The question arises if South Africa‘s current legislation is able to regulate the new phenomena of defamatory statements on social media platforms. The conclusion was reached that South Africa‘s current legislation is more than adequate to regulate this new form of defamation. With the qualification that that judges apply the current legal principles of the law of delict to this new form of defamation correctly. Educating and informing judges, as well as the public is vital in preventing this new form of defamation to become problematic. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

I en demokrati är yttrandefriheten en grundbult. Men ett demokratiskt samhälle innefattar även religionsfriheten, som skyddar individers eller gruppers rättighet att utöva religion. Religiösa utövare placerar ofta religionen över allt annat och individens frihet att yttra sig uppfattas därmed som sekundärt. Det resulterar ofta i att religion blir måltavla för kränkande yttringar, något som av de religiösa uppfattas som otillåtligt. Den 19 augusti 2007 publicerades Lars Vilks blyertsteckning ”Profeten Muhammed som rondellhund.” Karikatyren spred sig snabbt och extremister placerade Vilks på sin officiella dödslista. Vilks testar gränser och de religiösa reagerar, ett tydligt exempel på den turbulens som kan skapas mellan yttrandefrihet och religionsfrihet. Genom en analys av de argument som förs fram i debatten om Lars Vilks, är vårt syfte att skapa en ökad förståelse för det ambivalenta förhållandet mellan yttrandefrihet och religionsfrihet. Vår frågeställning består av två delar: Vilka är de mest frekventa för- och motargumenten som förs fram i debatten kring Lars Vilks i samband med yttrandefrihet och religionsfrihet? Hur kan vi, genom dessa för- och motargument, skapa förståelse för det ambivalenta förhållandet mellan yttrandefrihet och religionsfrihet? Studien bygger på en argumentationsanalys, som fokuserar på debatten om Lars Vilks i samband med yttrandefrihet och religionsfrihet. Empirin utgörs av 62 åsiktsartiklar, hämtade från tidningarna Dagens Nyheter och Expressen från åren 2007, 2010 samt 2015. För att ha ett påstående att förhålla oss till urskilde vi vår huvudtes: Religion får inte inskränka yttrandefriheten i en demokrati. Utifrån det identifierade vi fyra argument som understödjer tesen: I en demokrati får man kränka religion, Ett demokratiskt samhälle ska inte tystas av hot och rädsla, Yttrandefriheten är grundläggande i en demokrati och Religion måste utmanas för att samhället ska utvecklas, samt två som undergräver tesen: Yttranden om religion bör inte användas omdömeslöst och Yttrandefrihet ska inte utnyttjas i syfte att kränka religion. Anhängarna argumenterar för att alla åsikter får yttras. En vädring av obekväma yttranden anses vara avgörande för det demokratiska samhället. Opponenterna anser att oförnuftiga yttranden leder till ett mer konfliktfyllt samhälle och att de därför bör begränsas. Det ambivalenta förhållandet belyses extra i och med att majoriteten argumenterar för att yttrandefriheten är grundläggande i en demokrati, men att utlåtanden kräver ett personligt ansvar. Det personliga ansvaret är dock subjektivt, och en gränsdragning för vad som bör och inte bör sägas blir svår, framför allt i ett samhälle som känner sig hotat av extremister. För att förstå det ambivalenta förhållandet mellan yttrandefrihet och religionsfrihet är det nödvändigt att begripa konflikten mellan de legala rättigheterna och de moraliska förpliktelserna.

The aim of this study is to research freedom of expression and its content and value. The focus has been to find answers to where freedom of expression has its limits, if it has any. This study has three aims: to research what freedom of expression means; to research the arguments for it; and to research if there are any limits to freedom of expression. Due to the aim of understanding the limits for freedom of expression, two questions regarding whether freedom of expression shall be restricted by prohibiting racist organisations and hate speech are being answered. Political philosophers Ronald Dworkin, Elena Namli, Thomas Scanlon, and Jeremy Waldron’s theories on the limits of freedom of expression are analyzed through the eyes of the theorists John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin. My conclusion from the research is that freedom of expression should not be limited by forbidding racist organisations, but instead that it shall be limited by prohibiting hate speech.