A datação cronológica do Parmênides aliada às críticas contidas na primeira parte do Diálogo parece compor um dilema exemplificado pelas leituras de Owen e Cherniss: se as críticas não são relevantes para a doutrina das Formas, por que apresentá-las da maneira aporética, como nos são apresentadas no Parmênides? Se por outro lado, as críticas são relevantes e afetam a doutrina Platônica, como devemos interpretar os Diálogos posteriores ao Parmênides, sobretudo o Timeu, que apresenta uma doutrina semelhante àquela de Diálogos como a República? O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo a doutrina das Formas de Platão no Diálogo Parmênides, e sua relação com a doutrina das Formas presente nos Diálogos da maturidade. Tendo em vista o dilema interpretativo representado pelo Parmênides, nosso trabalho pretende investigar e analisar os argumentos da primeira parte do Diálogo, e mostrar que a doutrina atacada é, de fato, muito semelhante àquela apresentada pelos Diálogos da fase madura do pensamento Platônico, como Banquete, Fédon e República. / The chronological dating of the Parmenides, when combined with the critique present in the first part of the dialogue, seems to present a dilemma which is exemplified by Owens and Chernisss readings: if the criticisms are not relevant to the Platonic doctrine of Forms, why present them in such an aporetic way as we are presented in the first part of the Parmenides? If otherwise the criticisms are indeed relevant and pose real problems for the Platonic doctrine, how are we to interpret the dialogues that follow the Parmenides, especially the Timaeus, which seems to present a doctrine of Forms similar to that of dialogues such as the Republic? This thesis has as its subject the Platonic doctrine of Forms as presented in the first part of the Parmenides, and its relation to the doctrine of Forms present in dialogues contained in the second group of Platonic dialogues, such as Phaedo and Republic. Given the interpretive dilemma represented by the Parmenides, this research intends to investigate and analyze the arguments of the first part of that dialogue, and show that the doctrine under attack is, indeed, very similar to that advanced in the middle-period dialogues, such as Symposium, Phaedo and Republic.

Die vorliegende Dissertation hat als unmittelbares Ziel, die Verwandtschaft zwischen den Werken von Parmenides, Zenon und Empedokles zu untersuchen und aufzuzeigen, wie überaus stark die beiden letzten vom ersten abhängen. Im Werk des Parmenides finden Zenon und Empedokles ihren Ausgangspunkt und ihren Beweggrund. Nachdem die enge verwandtschaftliche Beziehung der Werke und damit die Verbindung der Autoren aufgezeigt wurde, wird ausgeführt, wie Zenon und Empedokles die Umdeutung der parmenideischen Gedanken betreiben, und zwar unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Frage des Seienden, da sowohl die unbestreitbaren Ähnlichkeiten wie die entscheidenden Unterschiede sich speziell im Bereich der parmenideischen Konzeption des Seienden und dessen Wiedererarbeitung durch Zenon und Empedokles befinden, was diesen beiden Autoren den soliden Aufbau eines eigenen Denkens und einer eigenen Philosophie ermöglicht. Diese geht grundlegend von einer Unterscheidung der parmenideischen Vernunft aus. Aus dieser Konstellation resultiert die singuläre Beziehung der Philosophie Zenons und auch der von Empedokles zur parmenideischen Philosophie: einerseits entfernen sie sich von dieser, andereseits sind sie ihr sehr nahe; sowohl gelangen sie zu einem eigenständigen Denkinhalt, als auch bleiben sie unvermeidlich an ihre Matrix gebunden.

In this paper I examine Plato's response in the Sophist to the problem of falsity as it had developed in ancient Greek philosophy. The problem of falsity has its origins in Parmenides' absolute ontological distinction between being and not-being. This ontological distinction was translated by the sophists into an epistemological distinction between truth and falsity: a true statement says what is; a false statement says what is not. Because the problem of falsity has its roots in the views of these earlier thinkers, Plato's approach to this problem in the Sophist is historical. In this paper I attempt to trace out the ways in which Plato's response to the problem of falsity is a response to those thinkers who had made falsity so problematic, viz. Parmenides and the sophists. It has long been recognized that the first part ofPlato's Sophist is a response, indeed a challenge, to Parmenides. What has not been recognized is that the second part of the Sophist is also a challenge--to the sophists. The role the sophists played in the development of Plato's later period epistemological views has been, I think, quite underrated. Though Plato's middle period views on truth and falsity were not quite the same as those of Parmenides, they were certainly Parmenidean in spirit. In the Sophist we see a change. The Parmenides-inspired views on falsity have been quietly dropped. It is the sophists' definition of falsity-a false statement says that which is not--which is adopted, though with significant modifications. I believe it is the purpose of the second part of the Sophist to challenge the sophists by showing that they didn't understand their own definition. Though the sophists were right in holding that a false statement says that which is not, the implications they drew from this were entirely incorrect. A statement which says that which is not is no more problematic than a statement which says that which is. In this paper I examine the Sophist as a challenge directed towards Plato's predecessors. I believe this dialogue can only be properly understood against the historical backdrop ofthe problem ofnot-being and falsity as it developed out of the philosophies of Parmenides and the sophists. It is only by looking at the Sophist against this backdrop that Plato's accomplishment in this dialogue can truly be appreciated. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

In separating the Form from its particulars, Plato is left with the task of describing the way in which they are related to one another. One possible way of construing this relation is to suppose that particulars receive a share ofthe Form. The discussion between Parmenides and Socrates, in the Parmenides 131 a9-e3, interprets this sharing in a material sense: either the whole of the Form is received by each particular, or part of the Form is received by each particular. This disjunction turns out to be a destructive dilemma -the socalled Dilemma of Participation. The three main sections ofthis work study in detail the Dilemma of Participation, as it is presented in the Parmenides. The first section considers the disjunct that the whole of the Form is received by each particular (13 la9-b2). By using a system of classical extensional mereology, it is demonstrated that Parmenides' reductio ad absurdum of this disjunct is deductively valid. The second section deals with Socrates' objection to this argument (which he makes in the guise of the Day Analogy), and Parmenides' response to the objection (which he makes in the guise ofthe Sail Analogy) (131 b3-c4). The validity of Parmenides' response depends on the sense of"day" Socrates intends in the Day Analogy. It is argued (against S. Panagiotou) that there is a sense of "day" that makes Parmenides' response invalid. The third section considers the disjunct that part of the Form is received by each particular (131 c5-e3). Two current interpretations of this disjunct (that ofT. Scaltsas and R. E. Allen) are recounted and critiqued, and a new interpretation is proposed (an interpretation based partially on that of Proclus, and under which Parmenides' argument against this disjunct is valid). / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

[pt] A tese pretende investigar a ontologia defendida pelo personagem Sócrates nos diálogos platônicos. Em oposição à interpretação majoritariamente aceita, que atribui ao personagem Sócrates a adesão a duas ontologias distintas, defendo a hipótese de que o Sócrates dos diálogos platônicos argumenta consistentemente a partir de uma única proposta ontológica. Esta proposta consiste na postulação de entidades inteligíveis realmente existentes que atuam como causa das propriedades dos objetos sensíveis. A tese divide-se em duas partes. Na primeira parte, começo por analisar as particularidades da composição platônica, assim como a formação do paradigma atual de leitura das obras de Platão. Em um segundo momento, tomo como foco os diálogos iniciais e defendo que a ontologia subjacente à argumentação de Sócrates nestas obras é a mesma que encontramos nos diálogos médios. No último capítulo da primeira parte, apresento a argumentação socrática dos diálogos médios e demonstro como, nestas obras, a ontologia dos diálogos iniciais é apresentada de maneira explícita e mais informativa. A segunda parte da tese consiste em uma análise das críticas à Teoria das Ideias que encontramos no diálogo Parmênides. No primeiro momento desta segunda parte, argumento que o Sócrates do Parmênides está, novamente, defendendo a mesma proposta ontológica dos diálogos médios e iniciais. Posteriormente, demonstro como as críticas formuladas pelo personagem Parmênides são válidas e realmente apresentam problemas relevantes para teoria socrática. / [en] This dissertation aims to investigate the ontology proposed by the character Socrates in the Platonic dialogues. In opposition tothe mostly accepted interpretation which attributes to the character Socrates the adoption of two distinct ontologies, I defend the hypothesis that the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues consistently argues from within a single ontological theory. This theory consists in the postulation of real and existing intelligible entities that act as the cause of the properties of sensible objects. The dissertation is divided in two parts. In the first part, I analyze the particularities of the Platonic composition as well as the construction of the actual reading paradigm of the Platonic works. In a second moment, I start investigating the first dialogues and claim that the ontological theory that underlies Socrates arguments in these works is the same as the one we can find in the middle dialogues. In the last chapter of the first part, I expose the Socratic arguments from the middle dialogues and I show how, in these woks, the underlying ontology of the first dialogues is more explicitly and informatively presented. The second part of the dissertation consists in an analysis of the critiques of the Theory of Forms that we find in the Parmenides dialogue. In the first moment of this second part, I argue that the Socrates from the Parmenides is again defending the same ontological theory from the middle and first dialogues. Afterwards, I show how the critiques constructed by the character Parmenides are valid and do present significant problems to the ontological theory of Socrates.

[pt] Esta tese tem por objetivo analisar como o desenvolvimento da noção de Uno em Plotino – princípio radicalmente unitário e transcendente de seu sistema – pode responder aos problemas apresentados por Platão acerca da unidade dos princípios-Formas no diálogo Parmênides. Para tanto, primeiramente busca-se compreender a construção e a apresentação das principais teses que constituem a clássica Teoria das Formas platônica presentes na primeira parte do Parmênides (127a-137c), bem como as aporias delas resultantes. Uma vez que os princípios-Formas são concebidos nesta parte do diálogo enquanto unidades separadas, sendo em si e por si (autò kath’autò), quatro principais aporias resultam desta concepção: 1) o estabelecimento da população do mundo das Formas, 2) a impossibilidade da relação de causalidade entre Formas e a multiplicidade dos objetos sensíveis, 3) a Aporia (ou Argumento) do Terceiro Homem (ATH) e 4) a incognoscibilidade das Formas. Posteriormente, apresenta-se o intrincado desenvolvimento do exercício de hipóteses que constitui a segunda parte do Parmênides (137c-166c), sobretudo no que diz respeito ao problema das antinomias (ou aparentes antinomias), à discussão sobre o status da passagem 155e-157b e à interpretação neoplatônica dessas questões a partir da noção de sujeito das hipóteses. Logo após, examina-se especificamente a interpretação plotiniana das hipóteses presentes na segunda parte do Parmênides, tomando como base a citação direta que se encontra no tratado V 1 [10], a partir da qual Plotino justifica a arquitetura de seu sistema com base nas três hipóstases principais, a saber: o Uno, a Inteligência e a Alma, sendo o Uno o princípio, fundamento e finalidade de toda a realidade. Cada uma dessas hipóstases corresponderá, segundo Plotino, ao sujeito das três primeiras hipóteses do Parmênides. Por fim, descreveremos como Plotino, a partir deste seu princípio radicalmente unitário e transcendente – o Uno – e de toda a estruturação de sua henologia, parece apontar para outros caminhos que escapam das aporias presentes na primeira parte do Parmênides. Para tanto, apresentaremos as concepções plotinianas de 1) radicalidade da transcendência, 2) emanação ou teoria da dupla atividade, 3) distinção de semelhança e 4) inefabilidade do Uno. Cada uma delas, respectivamente, nos auxiliará na análise de cada uma das principais aporias resultantes da unidade dos princípios-Formas presentes na primeira parte do Parmênides. / [en] This thesis objective is to analyze how the development of the notion of the One in Plotinus – the radically unitary principle of his system – can answer the problems presented by Plato, namely the problems about the unity of the Forms in the Parmenides dialogue. In order to do that, we first reconstruct the platonic presentation of the Theory of Forms in the first part of Parmenides (127a-137c), as well as the resulting aporias. Since the Forms are conceived in this part of the dialogue as separated unities, being in itself and for itself (autò kath’autò), four major aporias result from such conception: 1) the constitution of world of the Forms, 2) the impossibility of the relation of causality between Forms and the multiplicity of the sensible objects, 3) the Third Man Aporia (or Argument), and 4) the unknowability of the Forms. Later, we present the difficult development of the exercise of hypotheses that constitute the second part of the Parmenides (137c-166c), especially regarding the problem of antinomies (or apparent antinomies), the discussion about the status of the 155e-157b lines and the neoplatonic interpretation of these questions under the perspective of the diferente subjects of the hypotheses. Next, we specifically examine the Plotinian interpretation of the hypotheses in the second part of the Parmenides, based on direct quotation from the treatise V 1 [10], where Plotinus justifies the architecture of his system based on the three major hypostases, i.e.: the One, the Intelligence and the Soul, being the One the principle, the foundation and finality of all reality. According to Plotinus, each of these three hypostases corresponds to the subject of the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides. Finaly, we describe how Plotinus seems to point to different ways to escape the aporias of the first part of the Parmenides. These ways, are based on Plotinus s radically unitary and radically transcendent One, together with the structure of his henology. Thus, this last moment develops the Plotinian conceptions of 1) transcendence radicality, 2) emanation or the theory of double activity, 3) likeness distinction, and 4) ineffability of the One. Each one these concepts will, respectively, help in the analysis of each of the main aporias from the first part of the Parmenides.

[pt] Esta dissertação pretende oferecer uma análise para um determinado grupo de argumentos contra a possibilidade da falsidade no discurso, tal como elaborados no período clássico da filosofia. A partir da apresentação das teses de Parmênides, será investigada a relação entre estas teses e os argumentos sofísticos contra a possibilidade da falsidade. Apresentaremos, em contra partida, um dos argumentos formulados com o objetivo de fornecer uma base conceitual adequada para a possibilidade do discurso falso. Para tanto, proporemos uma interpretação para a solução que Platão oferece no diálogo Sofista a este problema. Por meio da análise crítica dos principais comentadores, pretendemos expor as dificuldades existentes na tentativa de compreensão desta passagem do diálogo indicando uma possibilidade de solução para algumas destas dificuldades. / [en] This dissertation analyzes a certain kind of arguments against the possibility of false speech. From the central fragments of Parmenides s poem it will be presented an interpretation of the relationship between Parmenides s arguments and the Sophist s thesis against the possibility of false speech. In addition, it will be provided Plato s argument in favor of the possibility of saying something false and yet meaningful. Plato s argument is offered in the dialogue Sophist and by the analysis of the commentators it will be presented the difficulties of interpretation and a way for solving these difficulties.

Afin de comprendre le processus d’acquisition de connaissance chez Platon, nous proposons une étude de la dialectique selon un spectre large, en se focalisant principalement sur la nature dramatique des textes du corpus. À partir d’une analyse des fondement éléates de la méthode antilogique, nous tenterons par le biais de la dialogique (ou sémantique des jeux) de comprendre le caractère agonistique de la méthode proposée par Platon dans ses dialogues. Nous tâcherons par la suite de faire le lien entre les conclusions intermédiaires et la structure générale de la métaphysique platonicienne afin de ne pas perdre la cohérence du système pris dans sa globalité. Nous évaluerons la qualité de l’outil interprétatif obtenu à travers une lecture du Gorgias. / Abstract : In order to understand Plato’s knowledge acquisition process, we suggest a wide-range study of the dialectic, mainly focusing on the theatrical nature of his texts. From an analysis of the eleatic foundations of the antilogical method, we will try to understand the agonistic feature of the method given by Plato in his dialogs by using the dialogical logic (or game semantic). Then, we will bind our mid-conclusions and the general structure of Plato’s metaphysic; in order not to loose the coherence of the whole system. We will evaluate the quality of our interpretative tool through a reading of the Gorgias.

Cette thèse de doctorat, intitulée “Dialectique et mathématique dans le Parménide de Platon” est une nouvelle lecture du Parménide de Platon, dont l’originalité réside essentiellement dans la tentative d’encadrer d’un point de vue mathématique la question de la « participation », qui est la question dialectique par excellence. Le but de la thèse n’est pas seulement de donner une interprétation cohérente et détaillée de toutes les parties du dialogue mais aussi d’aborder d’une façon atypique, via le Parménide, la problématique concernant la relation que la dialectique platonicienne entretient avec la mathématique. La thèse comprend huit chapitres et une introduction. L’introduction contient un état de la question et une panoramique générale des sujets affrontés. Le premier chapitre est un commentaire de la première partie de l’œuvre, le second est un commentaire de la partie intermédiaire, qui traite des indications méthodologiques de l’« exercice » effectué dans la deuxième partie. Le deuxième, le troisième, le quatrième et cinquième chapitre portent sur les trois premières « skepsis » (chacun sur une skepsis différent), et le sixième porte à la fois sur les deux dernières skepseis de la première hypothèse (si l’un est). Le septième chapitre, en revanche, traite des quatre skepseis de la deuxième hypothèse (si l’un n’est pas), alors que le huitième est une conclusion générale qui entend explorer d’une façon plus détaillée, à la lumière des résultats obtenus, la question des rapports entre Dialectique et Mathématique dans le Parménide, et introduire à la question du lien entre le Parménide et les témoignages indirects concernant les « άγραφα δόγματα ». / This Ph.d. Thesis, entitled « Dialectics and Mathematics in Plato’s Parmenides », is a new interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides, whose originality lies in the attempt to focus on the problem of participation, namely the ultimate dialectical problem, from a mathematical perspective. The aim of this thesis is not only to ensure a detailed and coherent interpretation of all parts of the dialogue, but also to approach the problem of the relation between Plato’s dialectics and mathematics via the Parmenides, therefore in an atypical way. The Thesis contains an introduction and eight chapters: the introduction deals mainly with the current state of the research and provides an overview of the subjects that will be treated in the chapters. The first chapter is a commentary on the first part of the dialogue, the second is a commentary of the middle part, concerning with the methodological pattern of the “exercise” performed in the second part of the dialogue. The third, fourth and fifth chapters shall examine the first three “skepseis” (one skepsis for each chapter) of the first “hypothesis” (if the one is), while the sixth deals with the last two skepseis. The seventh chapter comment on the four skepseis of the second hypothesis (if the one is not) and, finally, the eighth is a general conclusion whose aim is to explore more extensively, according to the obtained results, the relation between Dialectics and Mathematics in Plato’s Parmenides, taking also into account some connections between the Parmenides and the so-called άγραφα δόγματα.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-11-01T11:27:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno Loureiro Conte.pdf: 944920 bytes, checksum: b6e263ad63d757cb036b9fc2e713d92a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-01T11:27:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno Loureiro Conte.pdf: 944920 bytes, checksum: b6e263ad63d757cb036b9fc2e713d92a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The aim of this investigation is to establish the place of the so-called Doxa section in Parmenides’ Poem, both in terms of its textual reconstruction and of its theoretical value. The task is justified, in the one hand, by the acknowledgement that the modern picture of the Poem, with its division into two main Parts, Alêtheia (Truth) and Doxa (Opinion), is not in complete agreement with our sources. In this perspective, the dichotomical principle adopted by modern editors of the fragments of Parmenides is in lack of proper scrutinity. We begin thereby with a careful review of the sources, with the objective of determining the precise thematic content referred to in the tradition by the expression ta pros doxan. Particular attention is dedicated to the testimonies of Simplicius and Aristotle. In the other hand, the dominant view in the scholarly litterature, with its tendency to undermine the value of “opinions” in Parmenides’ thought, faces the problem of explaining why a Cosmogony is present in the so-understood Second Part of the Poem. Drawing from our investigation of the sources, we propose a deflationary hypothesis about the Doxa, which is to be regarded as comprehending verses B8.51-61 and B9.1-4 (according to Diels-Kranz numbering of the fragments). As a result, it is shown that this section is to be inserted, together with the Cosmogony properly speaking, into the larger context of a Diakosmêsis, and an interpretative hypothesis is elaborated trying to understand its positive theoretical value, in terms of what has been seen in the tradition as the postulation of cosmological principles (arkhai), corresponding in the Poem to a “cosmical arrangement” (diakosmos) of opposites. According to this hypothesis, however, the Doxa is to be interpreted not only as a physical theory, but also as implying epistemologicalcritical aspects, as well as in the grounding of Parmenides’ philosophy of language, thus revealing its rôle in the global argument of the Poem / O objetivo desta investigação é determinar o lugar da assim chamada seção da Doxa no Poema de Parmênides, tanto do ponto de vista de sua reconstituição textual quanto de seu estatuto teórico. O trabalho se justifica, de um lado, a partir da constatação de que a representação moderna do Poema, dividindo-o em duas Partes principais, Alêtheia (Verdade) e Doxa (Opinião), não concorda com alguns aspectos noticiados pela doxografia. Desse ponto de vista, coloca-se em questão o princípio dicotômico adotado pelos editores modernos no estabelecimento do texto parmenídeo que nos chega fragmentariamente. Trata-se assim, em um primeiro momento, de investigar com cuidado as fontes, procurando a partir delas determinar o conteúdo temático preciso que a tradição identificou através da expressão ta pros doxan. Particular atenção é dedicada aos testemunhos de Simplício e de Aristóteles. De outro lado, a visão predominante na literatura interpretativa, que tende a simplesmente desvalorizar as “opiniões” para o pensamento de Parmênides, depara-se com o problema de explicar a razão da presença de uma Cosmogonia na assim entendida Segunda Parte do Poema. Apresentamos, a partir da investigação das fontes, a hipótese de uma versão deflacionista da Doxa, composta pelos versos B8,51-61 e B9,1-4 (numeração da edição Diels-Kranz). A partir daí, mostramos a sua inserção, em conjunto com a Cosmogonia propriamente dita, no contexto mais amplo de uma Diakosmêsis, e desenvolvemos uma hipótese interpretativa que procura mostrar o seu estatuto teorético positivo, o que a tradição viu como a postulação de princípios cosmológicos (arkhai), e que identifica-se no poema a um “arranjo cósmico” (diakosmos) dos contrários. De acordo a essa hipótese, no entanto, a Doxa pode ser interpretada não apenas como uma teoria física, mas também segundo aspectos de suas implicações crítico-epistemológicas e para os fundamentos de uma filosofia da linguagem parmenídea, o que revela o seu papel no conjunto do argumento do Poema