This thesis examines the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) sent to French Indochina, from 1950 to 1956, when the United States provided major monetary and material aid to the French in their war against the communist Viet Minh. MAAG observed French units in the field and monitored the flow of American materiel into the region. Relying upon primary research in the National Archives, the thesis departs from previous interpretations by showing that MAAG held generally positive assessments of France‟s performance in Indochina. The thesis also argues that MAAG personnel were more interested in getting material support to the French, than in how that material was used, to the point of making unrealistic assessments of French combat abilities. By connecting primary research with the greater history of Cold War American military assistance, the thesis contributes to the scholarship on American involvement in Vietnam.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (MPhil (Journalism))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / There are certain images of war that are horrific, frightening and at the same time, due to an outstanding compositional structure, they are fascinating and do not allow its observers to keep their distance. This thesis examines three images of war that have often been described as icons of war photography. The images “children fleeing a napalm strike” by Nick Ut, “the falling soldier” by Robert Capa and Sam Nzima’s photograph of Hector Pieterson are historical reference images that came to represent the wars and conflicts in which they were taken. It has been examined that a number of different factors have an impact on a war photograph’s awareness level and its potential to commit itself to what is referred to as collective consciousness. Such factors are the aesthetical composition and outstanding formal elements in connection with the exact moment the photograph was taken, ethical implications or the forcefulness of the event itself. As it has been examined in this thesis, the three photographs have achieved iconic status due to different circumstances and criteria and they can be described as historical reference images representing the specific wars or conflicts. In this thesis an empirical study was conducted, questioning 660 students from Spain, South Africa and Vietnam about their awareness level regarding the three selected photographs. While the awareness level of the Spanish and the South African image was rather high in the countries of origin, they did not achieve such a high international awareness level as the Vietnamese photograph by Nick Ut, which turned out to be exceptionally well-known by all students questioned. Overall, findings suggest that the three selected icons of war photography have been anchored in collective memory. Ut, Robert Capa, Sam Nzima, semiotics, Spanish Civil War, the falling soldier, Vietnam War

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-06-24Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T21:00:17Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 paula_rm_me_sjrp.pdf: 2561833 bytes, checksum: 5e51329f8a6e197890cb17efd957b900 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este projeto examina as maneiras pelas quais a obra The Short-Timers (1979), de Gustav Hasford, e o filme Full Metal Jacket (1987), de Stanley Kubrick, revisitam a Guerra do Vietnã, dessacralizando a História oficial. Em seu romance The Short Timers (1979), o veterano Gustav Hasford narra a trajetória de um soldado e de seus companheiros durante o treinamento militar e o posterior combate no Vietnã. Tomando a perspectiva desse soldado, o narrador focaliza esse episódio da história dos Estados Unidos de forma diversa da tradicional; isto é, denunciando as angústias e dores vividas pelas tropas no treinamento básico e na batalha. Stanley Kubrick dirigiu a adaptação dessa narrativa para o cinema que recebeu o título de Full Metal Jacket (1987). Nela podemos notar como a guerra é revisitada de modo crítico. O cineasta apresenta as narrativas pessoais da personagem principal. Para analisar as obras literária e cinematográfica, serão utilizados textos teóricos acerca da relação entre Literatura e História (Hutcheon, 1989, 1993; White, 1985; Benjamin, 1985) e sobre Pós-Modernismo (Jameson, 1997; Hutcheon, 1989). Com base nestas teorias, propomos verificar como a Literatura e o Cinema representam a Guerra do Vietnã na contemporaneidade, mostrando diferentes pontos de vista sobre o conflito / This project investigates the ways in which Gustav Hasford’s The Short-Timers (1979) and Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987) revisit the Vietnam War rethinking official History. In his novel, The Short-Timers, the Vietnam veteran Gustav Hasford narrates the path of a soldier and his mates during military training and later combat in Vietnam. Taking this soldier’s perspective, the narrator focuses on this episode in American history differently than usual; that is, calling attention to the anguish and pains that the troops go through on training and in battle. Stanley Kubrick directed the adaptation of this work into the film Full Metal Jacket, in which can be noticed how war can be critically reevaluated. The filmmaker presents personal accounts by the main character. For the analyses, theories about the relationship between Literature and History (Hutcheon, 1989, 1993; White, 1985; Benjamin, 1985) and Post-Modernism (Jameson, 1997; Hutcheon, 1989) will be used. Based on those theories, we propose to investigate how Literature and Cinema represent the Vietnam War showing other points of view about this conflict

The United States engagement in Vietnam began during the Second World War. With military bases established in China, the U.S. took part in fighting the Japanese troops in the Pacific theatre. When France surrendered to Nazi Germany in 1940, Japan would take over the French Indochina and the war would spread to Vietnam as well. In order to collect intelligence on Japanese targets, the Americans needed to operate secret services on the ground. After the Japanese coup de main in 1945, they would eventually partner with Ho Chi Minh and his organization Viet Minh. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime predecessor of the CIA, provided intelligence training and equipment, while the Viet Minh would assist with valuable information on Japanese troops. To some extent, the OSS helped Ho Chi Minh and Viet Minh accede to power in Vietnam after the war.

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This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.