The Savings Directive will enter in to force 1st of July 2005, after years of discussions about it. The Directive has caused some controversy and several proposals have been rejected. The Savings Directive means that an individual who recieves savings income in the form of interest payment from another Member State will be taxed in his or hers State of residence. This will be achieved by an automatic exchange of information be-tween the Member States, concerning interest payments on savings. Some countries have opted out of the information exchange and will instead levy a withholding tax during a transitional period. The free movement of capital became fully liberalized when articles 1 and 4 in Directive 88/361/EEC was given direct effect. Later the main provisions from that Directive were implemented in the EC Treaty. All restrictions on the free movement of capital are prohibited, according to article 56 EC. Exceptions to this free movement can be found in article 58 EC. One example of a possible justification is the right for Member States to apply tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested. Certain fundamental principles have to be complied with, foremost the Principle of Proportionality and the Principle of Legal Certainty, to be able to justify a restriction on the free movement of capital. If the Savings Directive is in breach of the free movement of capital according to article 56-60 EC, is analysed in this thesis. It is discussed whether the Directive constitutes a restriction and in that case which possible justifications there are. Our conclusion is that the Savings Directive constitutes a restriction, in so far that it will likely dissuade residents from placing their capital in another Member State, because they will be taxed in their State of residence anyhow. However, this restriction is possible to justify according to article 58 (1) (b) EC. Therefore, the Savings Directive is not in breach of the free movement of capital. / Sparandedirektivet träder i kraft 1 juli 2005, efter många års diskussioner kring det och efter att flera förslag har röstats ner. Sparandedirektivet innebär att en individ från en Medlemsstat som mottager ränteinkomst härrörande från sparande i ett annat Medlems land blir beskattad i Medlemsstaten där han eller hon bor. Detta skall ske genom automatiskt utbyte av information rörande ränteinkomster på besparingar mellan Medlemsstaterna. Några länder har fått dispans från informations utbytet under en viss tid och kommer då istället att påföra en källskatt. Den fria rörligheten av kapital blev liberaliserad fullt ut i och med att artiklarna 1 och 4 i Direktiv 88/361/EEC gavs direkt effekt. Huvudbestämmelserna från det direktivet blev senare implementerade i EG fördraget. Enligt artikel 56 EG är alla restriktioner på fri rörlighet av kapital förbjudna. I artikel 58 EG hittas dock undantag till denna fria rörlighet. Ett exempel på en möjlig rättfärdigande grund för en restriktion är möjligheten för Medlemsstater att behandla individer skattemässigt olika beroende på var de är bosatta och beroende på var kapitalet är placerat. För att kunna rättfärdiga en restriktion på den fria rörligheten av kapital måste också vissa grundläggande principer följas, framförallt proportionalitetsprincipen och principen om rättssäkerhet. Denna uppsats utreder om Sparandedirektivet bryter mot den fria rörligheten av kapital uppställd i artiklarna 56-60 EG, genom att analysera om Direktivet utgör en restriktion och i så fall vilka rättfärdigandegrunder som är möjliga att använda. Slutsatsen, baserat på vår utredning, blir att Sparandedirektivet utgör en restriktion på den fria rörligheten av kapital, eftersom det troligtvis kommer att avskräcka personer från att placera besparingar utomlands, då de kommer att bli beskattade i den stat de bor i alla fall. Restriktionen är dock möjlig att rättfärdiga genom 58 (1) (b) EG. Därför bryter Sparandedirektivet inte mot fri rörlighet av kapital.

Double taxation is known as restricting the free flow of capital and accordingly results in a limited access of the internal market. Although, not many Member States have entered into double taxation conventions in order to avoid juridical double taxation of inheritances. The question then arises whether this failure to eliminate juridical double taxation is restricting the free movement of capital. The ECJ‟s case law regarding inheritance taxes are very varying. In its initial case law, the ECJ stated that national measures which reduce the value of the inheritance are in breach of EC law. Even measures which could restrict investors in one Member State from investing in other Member States are considered to be a breach of EC law. The ECJ also stated that discriminating situations could not be justified with the argument that these situations arise due to the co-existence of national tax systems. Given these facts, it seems like juridical double taxation is likely to constitute a breach of EC law. The ECJ has however only concentrated on which effect the national provisions in a single Member State may have and have not given concern to which effect these provisions may have in connection with the tax provisions in other Member States. The author believes that the Court takes this approach because of a respect of the Member States fiscal sovereignty. This respect also shows in the Block case. In this case the ECJ made it clear that juridical double taxation, caused by the co-existence of national tax systems, is not considered to be a breach of EC law. The ECJ also stated that when the Member States develops their tax systems, due to the lack of harmonised Community rules regarding direct taxation, they are not obliged to adapt to the tax systems of other Member States in order to avoid double taxation. The ECJ also made it clear that the citizens are not guaranteed a neutral tax situation when transferring their place of residence. In this thesis a comparison has also been made to judgements where the ECJ considers economic double taxation to be a breach of EC law. After studying all these cases it seems like the ECJ considers juridical double taxation to be an undesirable restriction of the free flow of capital. But even though the ECJ encourages the Member States to enter into double taxation conventions, there are no consequences when the Member States fail to do this. The difference between cases regarding economic double taxation and juridical double taxation could be that the ECJ considers it to be too far reaching to judge juridical double taxation as a breach of EC law and do not want to regulate how this restriction shall be avoided and thereby take the role of the Community legislator or breach the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States. The author believes that it would be more beneficial for the internal market if juridical double taxation was avoided and that it would not be harmful if the ECJ would give the Member States some incentives for entering into double taxation conventions in order to eliminate or alleviate situations where juridical double taxation occurs.

<p>Double taxation is known as restricting the free flow of capital and accordingly results in a limited access of the internal market. Although, not many Member States have entered into double taxation conventions in order to avoid juridical double taxation of inheritances. The question then arises whether this failure to eliminate juridical double taxation is restricting the free movement of capital. The ECJ‟s case law regarding inheritance taxes are very varying. In its initial case law, the ECJ stated that national measures which reduce the value of the inheritance are in breach of EC law. Even measures which could restrict investors in one Member State from investing in other Member States are considered to be a breach of EC law. The ECJ also stated that discriminating situations could not be justified with the argument that these situations arise due to the co-existence of national tax systems. Given these facts, it seems like juridical double taxation is likely to constitute a breach of EC law. The ECJ has however only concentrated on which effect the national provisions in a single Member State may have and have not given concern to which effect these provisions may have in connection with the tax provisions in other Member States. The author believes that the Court takes this approach because of a respect of the Member States fiscal sovereignty.</p><p>This respect also shows in the Block case. In this case the ECJ made it clear that juridical double taxation, caused by the co-existence of national tax systems, is not considered to be a breach of EC law. The ECJ also stated that when the Member States develops their tax systems, due to the lack of harmonised Community rules regarding direct taxation, they are not obliged to adapt to the tax systems of other Member States in order to avoid double taxation. The ECJ also made it clear that the citizens are not guaranteed a neutral tax situation when transferring their place of residence. In this thesis a comparison has also been made to judgements where the ECJ considers economic double taxation to be a breach of EC law. After studying all these cases it seems like the ECJ considers juridical double taxation to be an undesirable restriction of the free flow of capital. But even though the ECJ encourages the Member States to enter into double taxation conventions, there are no consequences when the Member States fail to do this. The difference between cases regarding economic double taxation and juridical double taxation could be that the ECJ considers it to be too far reaching to judge juridical double taxation as a breach of EC law and do not want to regulate how this restriction shall be avoided and thereby take the role of the Community legislator or breach the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States. The author believes that it would be more beneficial for the internal market if juridical double taxation was avoided and that it would not be harmful if the ECJ would give the Member States some incentives for entering into double taxation conventions in order to eliminate or alleviate situations where juridical double taxation occurs.</p>

<p>The Savings Directive will enter in to force 1st of July 2005, after years of discussions about it. The Directive has caused some controversy and several proposals have been rejected.</p><p>The Savings Directive means that an individual who recieves savings income in the form of interest payment from another Member State will be taxed in his or hers State of residence. This will be achieved by an automatic exchange of information be-tween the Member States, concerning interest payments on savings. Some countries have opted out of the information exchange and will instead levy a withholding tax during a transitional period.</p><p>The free movement of capital became fully liberalized when articles 1 and 4 in Directive 88/361/EEC was given direct effect. Later the main provisions from that Directive were implemented in the EC Treaty. All restrictions on the free movement of capital are prohibited, according to article 56 EC. Exceptions to this free movement can be found in article 58 EC. One example of a possible justification is the right for Member States to apply tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested.</p><p>Certain fundamental principles have to be complied with, foremost the Principle of Proportionality and the Principle of Legal Certainty, to be able to justify a restriction on the free movement of capital.</p><p>If the Savings Directive is in breach of the free movement of capital according to article 56-60 EC, is analysed in this thesis. It is discussed whether the Directive constitutes a restriction and in that case which possible justifications there are.</p><p>Our conclusion is that the Savings Directive constitutes a restriction, in so far that it will likely dissuade residents from placing their capital in another Member State, because they will be taxed in their State of residence anyhow. However, this restriction is possible to justify according to article 58 (1) (b) EC. Therefore, the Savings Directive is not in breach of the free movement of capital.</p> / <p>Sparandedirektivet träder i kraft 1 juli 2005, efter många års diskussioner kring det och efter att flera förslag har röstats ner.</p><p>Sparandedirektivet innebär att en individ från en Medlemsstat som mottager ränteinkomst härrörande från sparande i ett annat Medlems land blir beskattad i Medlemsstaten där han eller hon bor. Detta skall ske genom automatiskt utbyte av information rörande ränteinkomster på besparingar mellan Medlemsstaterna. Några länder har fått dispans från informations utbytet under en viss tid och kommer då istället att påföra en källskatt.</p><p>Den fria rörligheten av kapital blev liberaliserad fullt ut i och med att artiklarna 1 och 4 i Direktiv 88/361/EEC gavs direkt effekt. Huvudbestämmelserna från det direktivet blev senare implementerade i EG fördraget. Enligt artikel 56 EG är alla restriktioner på fri rörlighet av kapital förbjudna. I artikel 58 EG hittas dock undantag till denna fria rörlighet. Ett exempel på en möjlig rättfärdigande grund för en restriktion är möjligheten för Medlemsstater att behandla individer skattemässigt olika beroende på var de är bosatta och beroende på var kapitalet är placerat.</p><p>För att kunna rättfärdiga en restriktion på den fria rörligheten av kapital måste också vissa grundläggande principer följas, framförallt proportionalitetsprincipen och principen om rättssäkerhet.</p><p>Denna uppsats utreder om Sparandedirektivet bryter mot den fria rörligheten av kapital uppställd i artiklarna 56-60 EG, genom att analysera om Direktivet utgör en restriktion och i så fall vilka rättfärdigandegrunder som är möjliga att använda.</p><p>Slutsatsen, baserat på vår utredning, blir att Sparandedirektivet utgör en restriktion på den fria rörligheten av kapital, eftersom det troligtvis kommer att avskräcka personer från att placera besparingar utomlands, då de kommer att bli beskattade i den stat de bor i alla fall. Restriktionen är dock möjlig att rättfärdiga genom 58 (1) (b) EG. Därför bryter Sparandedirektivet inte mot fri rörlighet av kapital.</p>

La libération complète des mouvements de capitaux, devenue tangible depuis le 1er juillet 1990, autorise les ressortissants d'un EM à placer leur épargne dans un autre EM sans aucun obstacle. En l'absence de réglementation européenne, les EM ont toute latitude pour adopter toutes les règles qu'ils jugent nécessaires et souhaitables pour « appâter » les contribuables. Dès lors, les finalités recherchées par la libre circulation des capitaux ne sont pas nécessairement celles produites : certains contribuables sont tentés de placer leurs actifs non pas selon des particularités des différentes offres de placement, mais seulement pour éluder l'impôt. Dans ces conditions, l’assistance administrative « peut » permettre de lutter contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales en accordant à une administration fiscale la possibilité de réaliser certains actes à l’extérieur de ses frontières nationales sans être entravée par les limites qu’impose la souveraineté d'autres Etats. Toutefois, une question subsiste : l’assistance ainsi accordée repose-t-elle sur une obligation consentie ou sur une obligation imposée ? De cette réponse procède l’efficacité de la procédure d’entraide administrative. En effet, l’intensité de l’assistance administrative dépend des moyens mis en oeuvre pour sa réalisation. Ainsi, le mécanisme d’assistance administrative de l’UE se caractérise, dans sa forme, par une adjonction d’exceptions, de restrictions et de toutes sortes de limitations à l’application des différentes mesures. Ainsi, tantôt dans leur totalité, tantôt sur des dispositions particulières, ces mesures ont été amputées de leur substance. Dès lors, les causes de refus sont multiples et parfois discrétionnaires. Aujourd’hui, on se retrouve avec des textes qui éclairent davantage sur ce qu’ils ne font pas que sur ce qu’ils font. En définitive, les dispositions de l’assistance administrative de l’UE laissent beaucoup à désirer : les mesures qu’elles ne proposent pas sont bien plus nombreuses et bien plus importantes que celles qu’elles préconisent. En réalité, ces dispositions servent surtout d’instrument de coordination et non un outil de coopération ou de rapprochement des législations. En sommes, si l’assistance administrative en droit européen « fait souvent double emploi avec les conventions fiscales internationales », elle n’impose pas aux EM un dispositif plus contraignant. Dans ces conditions, on est en droit de se demander si en l’état de la construction européenne, il est judicieux de garder un dispositif qui ne se démarque pas du droit conventionnel ? C’est ainsi qu’à défaut d’une intégration positive juridique qui renforcerait l’efficacité du mécanisme d’assistance administrative de l’UE, il pourrait être envisagé d’autres voies pour en optimiser le fonctionnement : une européanisation du modèle d’assistance OCDE. / The administrative assistance, in tax matters, in the European Union

A presente tese aborda o tema da livre circulação de capitais e da coordenação de políticas econômicas na União Européia e no Mercosul. Objetiva-se demonstrar em que consiste essa liberdade de fluxo de capitais e expor a maneira pela qual ela se desenvolveu nos processos de integração europeu e sulino, trazendo-se em seguida as medidas de coordenação econômica adotadas por cada um desses blocos, como demonstração de que tal coordenação é fundamental para a criação de um ambiente propício à circulação segura do capital. Numa parte introdutória, expõe-se a teoria da formação dos blocos de integração, bem como apresentam-se os contextos históricos em que cada um dos blocos objeto deste estudo foi criado. Após, na Parte I, desenvolve-se uma análise detalhada a respeito da circulação de capitais na União Européia, desde as primeiras previsões do Tratado e as medidas de implementação, até a mais recente reforma de Lisboa. E, em seguida, ainda na mesma Parte, faz-se a pesquisa de tal liberdade no âmbito do Mercosul, mas esta numa sistemática setorial diferenciada. Já na Parte II, o foco é dado ao regime de coordenação e unificação das políticas econômicas européias voltadas à estabilidade monetária e cambial, as quais são responsáveis por criar um cenário efetivo de livre circulação de capital. E, na mesma linha, analisam-se os intentos mercosulinos de coordenar no seio do bloco a condução de tais políticas adstritas ao capital. Por fim, finaliza-se a pesquisa com a aferição da liberdade de capitais de cada bloco frente às estruturas de coordenação econômica por cada qual desenvolvidas. / This monographic work concerns the free movement of capital and the coordination of economic policies within the European Union and Mercosul. It seeks to present an approach of the freedom of capital and its development throughout the European and Southern American integration processes, as well as of the system of economic coordination, so that to demonstrate the need of a coordinated scenario for a safe free movement of capital. To introduce the subject matter, it presents the theory of economic integration process and the historical basis for the establishment of each union. Then, in Part I, it comes a deep analysis about the monetary movement within the European Union, embracing the first provisions set forth in the Treaty and the implementation measures, as well as the most recent Lisbon reform. In addition, still in Part I, such an analysis is made within Mercosul, through a different sector method for explaining the measures to establish the free movement of capital. Achieving Part II, it focuses on the coordination and unification of European economic policies concerning the monetary and exchange stability, which are the ones responsible for a real free movement of capital scenario. Then, by the same token, it analyses the Mercosul attempts to coordinate its capital related policies. At the end, this paper evaluates the freedom of capital movement of each union before the framework of economic coordination developed by each one.

A presente tese aborda o tema da livre circulação de capitais e da coordenação de políticas econômicas na União Européia e no Mercosul. Objetiva-se demonstrar em que consiste essa liberdade de fluxo de capitais e expor a maneira pela qual ela se desenvolveu nos processos de integração europeu e sulino, trazendo-se em seguida as medidas de coordenação econômica adotadas por cada um desses blocos, como demonstração de que tal coordenação é fundamental para a criação de um ambiente propício à circulação segura do capital. Numa parte introdutória, expõe-se a teoria da formação dos blocos de integração, bem como apresentam-se os contextos históricos em que cada um dos blocos objeto deste estudo foi criado. Após, na Parte I, desenvolve-se uma análise detalhada a respeito da circulação de capitais na União Européia, desde as primeiras previsões do Tratado e as medidas de implementação, até a mais recente reforma de Lisboa. E, em seguida, ainda na mesma Parte, faz-se a pesquisa de tal liberdade no âmbito do Mercosul, mas esta numa sistemática setorial diferenciada. Já na Parte II, o foco é dado ao regime de coordenação e unificação das políticas econômicas européias voltadas à estabilidade monetária e cambial, as quais são responsáveis por criar um cenário efetivo de livre circulação de capital. E, na mesma linha, analisam-se os intentos mercosulinos de coordenar no seio do bloco a condução de tais políticas adstritas ao capital. Por fim, finaliza-se a pesquisa com a aferição da liberdade de capitais de cada bloco frente às estruturas de coordenação econômica por cada qual desenvolvidas. / This monographic work concerns the free movement of capital and the coordination of economic policies within the European Union and Mercosul. It seeks to present an approach of the freedom of capital and its development throughout the European and Southern American integration processes, as well as of the system of economic coordination, so that to demonstrate the need of a coordinated scenario for a safe free movement of capital. To introduce the subject matter, it presents the theory of economic integration process and the historical basis for the establishment of each union. Then, in Part I, it comes a deep analysis about the monetary movement within the European Union, embracing the first provisions set forth in the Treaty and the implementation measures, as well as the most recent Lisbon reform. In addition, still in Part I, such an analysis is made within Mercosul, through a different sector method for explaining the measures to establish the free movement of capital. Achieving Part II, it focuses on the coordination and unification of European economic policies concerning the monetary and exchange stability, which are the ones responsible for a real free movement of capital scenario. Then, by the same token, it analyses the Mercosul attempts to coordinate its capital related policies. At the end, this paper evaluates the freedom of capital movement of each union before the framework of economic coordination developed by each one.

A presente tese aborda o tema da livre circulação de capitais e da coordenação de políticas econômicas na União Européia e no Mercosul. Objetiva-se demonstrar em que consiste essa liberdade de fluxo de capitais e expor a maneira pela qual ela se desenvolveu nos processos de integração europeu e sulino, trazendo-se em seguida as medidas de coordenação econômica adotadas por cada um desses blocos, como demonstração de que tal coordenação é fundamental para a criação de um ambiente propício à circulação segura do capital. Numa parte introdutória, expõe-se a teoria da formação dos blocos de integração, bem como apresentam-se os contextos históricos em que cada um dos blocos objeto deste estudo foi criado. Após, na Parte I, desenvolve-se uma análise detalhada a respeito da circulação de capitais na União Européia, desde as primeiras previsões do Tratado e as medidas de implementação, até a mais recente reforma de Lisboa. E, em seguida, ainda na mesma Parte, faz-se a pesquisa de tal liberdade no âmbito do Mercosul, mas esta numa sistemática setorial diferenciada. Já na Parte II, o foco é dado ao regime de coordenação e unificação das políticas econômicas européias voltadas à estabilidade monetária e cambial, as quais são responsáveis por criar um cenário efetivo de livre circulação de capital. E, na mesma linha, analisam-se os intentos mercosulinos de coordenar no seio do bloco a condução de tais políticas adstritas ao capital. Por fim, finaliza-se a pesquisa com a aferição da liberdade de capitais de cada bloco frente às estruturas de coordenação econômica por cada qual desenvolvidas. / This monographic work concerns the free movement of capital and the coordination of economic policies within the European Union and Mercosul. It seeks to present an approach of the freedom of capital and its development throughout the European and Southern American integration processes, as well as of the system of economic coordination, so that to demonstrate the need of a coordinated scenario for a safe free movement of capital. To introduce the subject matter, it presents the theory of economic integration process and the historical basis for the establishment of each union. Then, in Part I, it comes a deep analysis about the monetary movement within the European Union, embracing the first provisions set forth in the Treaty and the implementation measures, as well as the most recent Lisbon reform. In addition, still in Part I, such an analysis is made within Mercosul, through a different sector method for explaining the measures to establish the free movement of capital. Achieving Part II, it focuses on the coordination and unification of European economic policies concerning the monetary and exchange stability, which are the ones responsible for a real free movement of capital scenario. Then, by the same token, it analyses the Mercosul attempts to coordinate its capital related policies. At the end, this paper evaluates the freedom of capital movement of each union before the framework of economic coordination developed by each one.

The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the scientific research field by explaining whether, and if so on what grounds, the Swedish targeted interest deduction limitation legislation can be tested in the European Court of Justice against the free movement of capital. In addition, the study examines whether there can be considered a mutual priority regarding the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. The study conducted in the paper is based on the Swedish law, the preparatory work and doctrine, which is combined with case law. Initially, the meaning of the targeted interest deduction limitation rules is presented as well as the theoretical scope of the legislation in relation to its scope in practice. The targeted interest deduction limitation rules are specific provisions addressing the deductibility of interest incurred by certain companies as a result of intra-group financing. The theoretical scope differs from the practical scope due to the vague conceptual definitions in both the legislative text and the preparatory works. Furthermore, it is analysed which determines when the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment should be applied, based on the EU case law. The study indicates that the controlling interest must be given a significant weight when considering the purpose of the national legislation, but it is difficult to interpret exactly when such an interest occurs in practice. Lastly, it is studied whether it might be possible to review the targeted interest deduction limitation rules against the free movement of capital, and if so, on which grounds. The study shows that there are possibilities to review the targeted interest deduction limitation rules against the free movement of capital. There are incentives that indicate that such a review is possible if both Swedish and EU law practice is interpreted in a fairly narrow way. / Syftet med uppsatsen är att bidra till det vetenskapliga forskningsfältet genom att redogöra för huruvida, och i så fall på vilka grunder, de svenska riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna kan prövas gentemot den grundläggande EU-rättsliga fördragsfriheten beträffande fri rörlighet för kapitalrörelser. Därutöver undersöks om det kan anses föreligga en inbördes prioritet beträffande den fria rörligheten för kapital och etableringsfriheten. Den utredning som genomförs i uppsatsen tar avstamp i lagtext, förarbeten och doktrin, vilket kombineras med rättspraxis. Inledningsvis presenteras innebörden av de riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna och hur lagreglernas teoretiska tillämpningsområde förhåller sig till dess tillämpningsområde i realiteten. De riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna utgörs av särskilda bestämmelser vilka behandlar vissa företags avdragsmöjligheter beträffande räntor uppkomna till följd av, inom en intressegemenskap, intern finansiering. Det teoretiska tillämpningsområdet skiljer sig från tillämpningsområdet i realiteten till följd av vaga begreppsdefinitioner i såväl lagtext som i förarbeten. Vidare analyseras vad det är som avgör när fördragsfriheten den fria rörligheten för kapital respektive etableringsfriheten skall tillämpas, vilket tar avstamp i EU-rättslig praxis. Av utredningen framgår att det bestämmande inflytandet skall tillerkännas stor vikt vid beaktandet av de nationella lagreglernas ändamål, exakt när ett sådant inflytande föreligger är dock svårt att tyda i praxis. Avslutningsvis undersöks om det bör vara möjligt att göra en prövning av de riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gentemot den fria rörligheten för kapital, och i så fall på vilka grunder. Studien visar att det finns möjligheter att för att pröva de riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gentemot fördragsfriheten om fria kapitalrörelser. Det finns incitament som tyder på att en sådan prövning är möjlig under förutsättning att såväl svensk som EU-rättslig praxis tolkas på ett tämligen snävt sätt.

This DPhil thesis analyses the Takeover Bid Directive in the light of EU Law and examines the extent to which this Directive facilitates the exercise of the fundamental freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital in the internal market. Since the Directive is based on the EC Treaty chapter on freedom of establishment (Articles 43 and 44(2)(g) EC Treaty), it should in principle contribute to cross frontier corporate mobility in the internal market through takeover bids; this was the aim of the Commission in its various proposals. Takeover bids and the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment are closely related. The Directive forms part of the EU company law harmonization programme whose weaknesses and limits are also explored. However, the Takeover Bid Directive is an EU company law instrument with strong links to EU capital market law. The initial aims of the EU legislature were to establish an internal market for companies and to achieve market integration in the field of EU company law. However, the Takeover Bid Directive is a compromise and watered down version of a proposal which the Commission envisaged would lead to a more effective pan-European takeover regime than that which actually proved possible. The need for compromise was the result of the very different legal and policy approaches of the Member States in the field of takeover regulation. Some provisions of the Directive are obligatory for all Member States. These provisions include the mandatory bid rule, the squeeze-out right, and the sell-out right. All these obligatory provisions of the Directive are in their present form open to criticism. The two key provisions of the Directive have been made optional for Member States. These are the non-frustration rule, requiring the board to obtain the prior authorization of the general meeting of shareholders before taking any action which could result in the frustration of the bid; and the breakthrough rule, requiring that any restrictions on the transfer of securities or voting rights provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company or in contractual agreements between the offeree company and the holders of its securities or in contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company’s securities shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid. Nevertheless, Member States, which opt out, are obliged to allow individual companies to opt in. Moreover, a reciprocity rule was also adopted, which allows Member States to permit those companies, which apply these provisions, to opt out again if they are the target of a bidder, which does not itself apply the same takeover provisions. Additionally, the non-frustration and the breakthrough rule are not fully comprehensive and even when a company applies them, it might still be able to evade their application since some corporate and financial structures remain outside the Directive’s scope. Finally, this thesis discusses the extent to which obstacles to cross border takeovers addressed by the Directive, or indeed left intact by the Directive, are to be regarded as restrictions on the right of establishment stricto sensu, or simply as obstacles in practice to making a successful takeover bid. More specifically, it scrutinizes the horizontal direct effect of the EC fundamental freedoms and seeks to analyze the extent to which conduct of the board and articles in the corporate constitution might be said to constitute restrictions on the freedom of establishment and on the free movement of capital.