After countering claims that truth cannot be a norm of belief, this dissertation argues that truth’s normativity is grounded in personhood. It does so by attending to the fact that truth is a norm for the human person, and to the relationships between the human person and the objective goodness and value of truth. The dissertation develops this argument by critically appropriating writings of Thomas Aquinas and representatives of twentieth-century personalism on the relationship between truth and the human person. The dissertation’s initial chapters rebut objections (1) that the involuntariness of belief rules out any possibility of norms of belief, (2) that truth cannot be a norm of belief because truth is unable to provide guidance in determining what to believe, and (3) that it is incompatible with other norms of belief such as justification. It rebuts the first objection by challenging its general account of belief and outlining an alternative account. It responds to the second argument by criticizing its understanding of guidance as overly narrow and sketching an alternative notion of guidance-by-value. It counters the third objection by arguing for the primacy of the truth-norm. The dissertation then takes up the question of what grounds the truth-norm. Chapter Three surveys recent accounts, drawing from its survey a set of desiderata for any satisfactory account. Chapter Four begins the dissertation’s account of the normativity of truth. Working from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s conception of objective goods, it argues that truth is an objective good for the person by showing how deeply interwoven truth is with friendship. Given that friendship is an objective good for the person, and that truth stands in certain intimate relationships to friendship, it follows that truth is an objective good for the person. Chapter Five rounds out the argument. The objective goodness of truth entails that truth is a value. Values are normative for persons. Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. This chapter defends the claim that values are normative for persons by elucidating the dependency of the realization of personhood—in several of its various dimensions—on value-grasping and value-realizing acts.

Thesis advisor: Marina B. McCoy / Thesis advisor: Peter Kreeft / An in-depth study of Karol Wojtyła's creative synthesis of medieval and modern thought, in which he brings together 1) traditional Thomistic metaphysics and anthropology and 2) the insights of contemporary phenomenology, in order to understand the reality of man as person in his integral totality. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Ever since they were formulated in the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas' famous Five Ways to demonstrate the existence of God have been frequently debated. During this process there have been several misconceptions of what Aquinas actually meant, especially when discussing his cosmological arguments. While previous researchers have managed to tease out why Aquinas accepts some infinite regresses and rejects others, I attempt to add on to this by demonstrating the centrality of his metaphysics in his argument from motion. Aquinas cannot be properly understood or debated with a contemporary view of causality, but rather must wrestle with the concepts he actually employs in the arguments. To demonstrate this, I will compare the Thomistic argument from motion to the contemporary Kalām cosmological argument of William Lane Craig. Although some may consider it beneficial to base theistic arguments on more modern principles, this analysis shows that the metaphysical framework used by Aquinas is much less vulnerable to the rebuttals that otherwise challenge the Kalām argument, and that their differences in strength rest on their differences in metaphysics.

Submitted by SBI Biblioteca Digital (sbi.bibliotecadigital@puc-campinas.edu.br) on 2018-04-12T17:50:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 BRUNO VIEIRA DINIZ.pdf: 2490348 bytes, checksum: b26b41d5296d2042dfc74dfa81a6d99c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-12T17:50:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 BRUNO VIEIRA DINIZ.pdf: 2490348 bytes, checksum: b26b41d5296d2042dfc74dfa81a6d99c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-19 / This dissertation has as the main goal the identification of principles of a possible psychotherapy in the light of the tomasian psychology. To reach this objective, we initially discussed the importance of the theme, namely, the importance of Thomism and of a possible psychotherapy in the light of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the present days. In this regard, we believe, among other things, that Thomism has the ability to bring us closer to the truth about human nature in its fullest completeness. Next, we discussed and established some important theoretical assumptions for this work, which are the definitions of Tomasian psychology and Thomistic psychotherapy. We defined that Tomasian psychology is the theological treaty of Thomas Aquinas on the human soul, its essence, powers and acts; and that Thomistic psychotherapy would be a possible application of this psychology: a science and a prudential art whose objectives would be, through interpersonal help, to alleviate suffering and to seek the perfection of the human soul. Then, in order to identify in the psychology developed by Saint Thomas possible principles for a psychotherapy, we undertook a long study in which we tried to synthesize, systematize and analyze the entire content of Tomasian psychology, having as reference the Summa Theologica. Thus, we studied the human soul, its powers and acts, with emphasis on the following themes: the voluntary act and its principles, the ultimate end of man (and the happiness), the passions of the soul, and human virtues and vices. Finally, in the last chapter of this work, we presented, briefly, by way of conclusion, possible principles of a Thomistic psychotherapy, which were identified and inferred from the previous study. We believe that such principles can shed important light on the nature of the therapeutic relationship and on the means of pursuing the main psychotherapeutic goals, as previously presupposed, that are: the alleviation of emotional suffering and the pursuit of human happiness. / Esta disserta??o tem como objetivo principal a identifica??o de princ?pios de uma poss?vel psicoterapia ? luz da psicologia tomasiana. Para atingir esse objetivo, inicialmente, discutimos a import?ncia do tema, ou seja, a import?ncia do tomismo e de uma poss?vel psicoterapia ? luz de Santo Tom?s de Aquino nos dias atuais. Quanto a isso, acreditamos, dentre outras coisas, que o tomismo tem a capacidade de nos aproximar da verdade a respeito da natureza humana em sua maior integralidade. Em seguida, discutimos e estabelecemos alguns importantes pressupostos te?ricos para este trabalho, que s?o as defini??es de psicologia tomasiana e de psicoterapia tomista. Definimos que a psicologia tomasiana ? o tratado teol?gico de Tom?s de Aquino acerca da alma humana, sua ess?ncia, pot?ncias e atos; e que a psicoterapia tomista seria uma poss?vel aplica??o dessa psicologia: uma ci?ncia e uma arte prudencial cujos objetivos seriam, por meio da ajuda interpessoal, o al?vio do sofrimento e a busca da perfei??o da alma humana. Em seguida, com o intuito de identificar na psicologia desenvolvida por Santo Tom?s poss?veis princ?pios para uma psicoterapia, empreendemos um longo estudo em que procuramos sintetizar, sistematizar e analisar o conte?do de toda psicologia tomasiana, tendo como refer?ncia a Suma Teol?gica. Estudamos assim a alma humana, suas pot?ncias e atos, com destaque para os seguintes temas: o ato volunt?rio e seus princ?pios, o fim ?ltimo do homem (e a felicidade), as paix?es da alma, as virtudes e os v?cios humanos. Por fim, no ?ltimo cap?tulo deste trabalho, apresentamos ent?o, sinteticamente, a t?tulo de conclus?o, poss?veis princ?pios de uma psicoterapia tomista, identificados e inferidos a partir do estudo anterior. Acreditamos que tais princ?pios podem nos lan?ar importantes luzes sobre a natureza da rela??o terap?utica e sobre os meios de persecu??o dos principais objetivos psicoterap?uticos, como pressupostos anteriormente, que s?o o al?vio do sofrimento emocional e a busca da felicidade humana.

Três são os objetivos centrais deste trabalho: (a) especificar, por meio de uma reconstrução histórico-evolutiva do pensamento teórico, os elementos constitutivos (objeto, método, princípios primeiros, teoria da verdade e comunidade científica) e as exigências normativas (objetividade, coerência, clareza e transparência, justificação e consensualização) de um empreendimento que pretenda se qualificar como ciência, de modo propor uma concepção analógica de ciência que possa ser aplicável ao campo do direito; (b) identificar e detalhar os três diferentes paradigmas científicos que se desenvolveram no direito tributário brasileiro (Empírico-econômico, Normativo-comportamental e Formalista-linguístico), de modo a analisar, criticamente, os seus pressupostos teóricos, buscando, com isso, demonstrar a insuficiência dos modelos teóricos que foram até hoje utilizados no campo da ciência tributária brasileira, principalmente em razão do seu reducionismo explicativo; e (c) propor uma concepção mais abrangente e complexa de ciência jurídica – pautada na concepção de ciência prática (scientia practica) desenvolvida pela tradição filosófica aristotélico-tomista – a qual teria pretensões de, não apenas descrever o direito positivo, mas também de explicar, esclarecer e tornar mais inteligível as diferentes dimensões do fenômeno tributário, não apenas no que se refere ao momento da positivação das normas jurídicas, mas também no que se refere aos momentos anteriores e posteriores a esse processo, ou seja, que também se dedique a analisar os motivos, causas, efeitos, consequências e fins das normas de tributação. Portanto, a concepção de ciência prática aplicável ao direito tributário pressupõe o desenvolvimento de uma dimensão formal, material, eficiente/instrumental e final do seu respectivo objeto de estudo, o que culmina na elaboração de uma deontologia tributária, de uma ontologia tributária, de uma metodologia tributária e de uma teleologia tributária. / Three are the central goals of this thesis: (a) first to specify, by means of a historical and evolutionary reconstruction of the scientific thought, which are the constitutive elements (object, method, first principles, theory of truth and scientific community) and the normative requirements (objectivity, consistency, clarity and transparency, justification and consensualization) of a theoretical enterprise that intends to affirm itself as scientific, as to propose an analogical conception of science that could be applied to the field of Law; (b) to identify and detail the three different scientific paradigms that have been developed in Brazilian Tax Law (Empirical-economical, Normative-behavioral and Formalistic-linguistic), in order to, critically, analyze its theoretical assumptions, seeking to demonstrate the inadequacy of these theoretical models applied in Brazilian Tax Law, especially because of their explanatory reductionism; and (c) to propose a more comprehensive and complex notion of legal science, based on the conception of practical science (scientia practica) – based on the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas – which would have claims, not only describe the positive law, but also to explain, clarify and make more intelligible the different dimensions of the taxation phenomenon, not only regarding the procedure that creates legal norms, but also that pays attention to the moments that come before and after this process, namely, that also focuses on analyzing the motives, causes, effects, consequences and ends of taxation. Therefore, a concept of practical science applicable to Tax Law demands the development of a formal, a material, an efficient/instrumental and a finalistic dimension of its object of study. This will require a Theory of Taxation that has a Deontological aspect, an Ontological aspect, a Methodological aspect and a Teleological aspect.

Três são os objetivos centrais deste trabalho: (a) especificar, por meio de uma reconstrução histórico-evolutiva do pensamento teórico, os elementos constitutivos (objeto, método, princípios primeiros, teoria da verdade e comunidade científica) e as exigências normativas (objetividade, coerência, clareza e transparência, justificação e consensualização) de um empreendimento que pretenda se qualificar como ciência, de modo propor uma concepção analógica de ciência que possa ser aplicável ao campo do direito; (b) identificar e detalhar os três diferentes paradigmas científicos que se desenvolveram no direito tributário brasileiro (Empírico-econômico, Normativo-comportamental e Formalista-linguístico), de modo a analisar, criticamente, os seus pressupostos teóricos, buscando, com isso, demonstrar a insuficiência dos modelos teóricos que foram até hoje utilizados no campo da ciência tributária brasileira, principalmente em razão do seu reducionismo explicativo; e (c) propor uma concepção mais abrangente e complexa de ciência jurídica – pautada na concepção de ciência prática (scientia practica) desenvolvida pela tradição filosófica aristotélico-tomista – a qual teria pretensões de, não apenas descrever o direito positivo, mas também de explicar, esclarecer e tornar mais inteligível as diferentes dimensões do fenômeno tributário, não apenas no que se refere ao momento da positivação das normas jurídicas, mas também no que se refere aos momentos anteriores e posteriores a esse processo, ou seja, que também se dedique a analisar os motivos, causas, efeitos, consequências e fins das normas de tributação. Portanto, a concepção de ciência prática aplicável ao direito tributário pressupõe o desenvolvimento de uma dimensão formal, material, eficiente/instrumental e final do seu respectivo objeto de estudo, o que culmina na elaboração de uma deontologia tributária, de uma ontologia tributária, de uma metodologia tributária e de uma teleologia tributária. / Three are the central goals of this thesis: (a) first to specify, by means of a historical and evolutionary reconstruction of the scientific thought, which are the constitutive elements (object, method, first principles, theory of truth and scientific community) and the normative requirements (objectivity, consistency, clarity and transparency, justification and consensualization) of a theoretical enterprise that intends to affirm itself as scientific, as to propose an analogical conception of science that could be applied to the field of Law; (b) to identify and detail the three different scientific paradigms that have been developed in Brazilian Tax Law (Empirical-economical, Normative-behavioral and Formalistic-linguistic), in order to, critically, analyze its theoretical assumptions, seeking to demonstrate the inadequacy of these theoretical models applied in Brazilian Tax Law, especially because of their explanatory reductionism; and (c) to propose a more comprehensive and complex notion of legal science, based on the conception of practical science (scientia practica) – based on the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas – which would have claims, not only describe the positive law, but also to explain, clarify and make more intelligible the different dimensions of the taxation phenomenon, not only regarding the procedure that creates legal norms, but also that pays attention to the moments that come before and after this process, namely, that also focuses on analyzing the motives, causes, effects, consequences and ends of taxation. Therefore, a concept of practical science applicable to Tax Law demands the development of a formal, a material, an efficient/instrumental and a finalistic dimension of its object of study. This will require a Theory of Taxation that has a Deontological aspect, an Ontological aspect, a Methodological aspect and a Teleological aspect.

Três são os objetivos centrais deste trabalho: (a) especificar, por meio de uma reconstrução histórico-evolutiva do pensamento teórico, os elementos constitutivos (objeto, método, princípios primeiros, teoria da verdade e comunidade científica) e as exigências normativas (objetividade, coerência, clareza e transparência, justificação e consensualização) de um empreendimento que pretenda se qualificar como ciência, de modo propor uma concepção analógica de ciência que possa ser aplicável ao campo do direito; (b) identificar e detalhar os três diferentes paradigmas científicos que se desenvolveram no direito tributário brasileiro (Empírico-econômico, Normativo-comportamental e Formalista-linguístico), de modo a analisar, criticamente, os seus pressupostos teóricos, buscando, com isso, demonstrar a insuficiência dos modelos teóricos que foram até hoje utilizados no campo da ciência tributária brasileira, principalmente em razão do seu reducionismo explicativo; e (c) propor uma concepção mais abrangente e complexa de ciência jurídica – pautada na concepção de ciência prática (scientia practica) desenvolvida pela tradição filosófica aristotélico-tomista – a qual teria pretensões de, não apenas descrever o direito positivo, mas também de explicar, esclarecer e tornar mais inteligível as diferentes dimensões do fenômeno tributário, não apenas no que se refere ao momento da positivação das normas jurídicas, mas também no que se refere aos momentos anteriores e posteriores a esse processo, ou seja, que também se dedique a analisar os motivos, causas, efeitos, consequências e fins das normas de tributação. Portanto, a concepção de ciência prática aplicável ao direito tributário pressupõe o desenvolvimento de uma dimensão formal, material, eficiente/instrumental e final do seu respectivo objeto de estudo, o que culmina na elaboração de uma deontologia tributária, de uma ontologia tributária, de uma metodologia tributária e de uma teleologia tributária. / Three are the central goals of this thesis: (a) first to specify, by means of a historical and evolutionary reconstruction of the scientific thought, which are the constitutive elements (object, method, first principles, theory of truth and scientific community) and the normative requirements (objectivity, consistency, clarity and transparency, justification and consensualization) of a theoretical enterprise that intends to affirm itself as scientific, as to propose an analogical conception of science that could be applied to the field of Law; (b) to identify and detail the three different scientific paradigms that have been developed in Brazilian Tax Law (Empirical-economical, Normative-behavioral and Formalistic-linguistic), in order to, critically, analyze its theoretical assumptions, seeking to demonstrate the inadequacy of these theoretical models applied in Brazilian Tax Law, especially because of their explanatory reductionism; and (c) to propose a more comprehensive and complex notion of legal science, based on the conception of practical science (scientia practica) – based on the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas – which would have claims, not only describe the positive law, but also to explain, clarify and make more intelligible the different dimensions of the taxation phenomenon, not only regarding the procedure that creates legal norms, but also that pays attention to the moments that come before and after this process, namely, that also focuses on analyzing the motives, causes, effects, consequences and ends of taxation. Therefore, a concept of practical science applicable to Tax Law demands the development of a formal, a material, an efficient/instrumental and a finalistic dimension of its object of study. This will require a Theory of Taxation that has a Deontological aspect, an Ontological aspect, a Methodological aspect and a Teleological aspect.

Metoděj Habáň (1899-1984): A Probe into the History of Czech Neothomism Abstract The thesis is focused on the depiction of the life and work of Metoděj Habáň (1899-1984), Czech Dominican priest and philosopher. It follows two main goals: First, it strives to present accurate reconstruction of Habáň's life and his involvement in the Czech Church and society. Secondly, it presents Metoděj Habáň's thinking as a specific type of Thomism and analyse his work in the context of the paradigmatic changes, which the Church and society went throught in the 20th century. The thesis is therefore divided into two main parts - first is focused on Habáň's life, second on his work. In the first chapter it present main sources of inspiration for his work and thinking. In the following chapters it describes his life journey, beginning with his studies and spiritual formation within the Dominican order. It continues with his role in the inner life of the order in the position of Novice Master and Prior Provincial (1938-1942). Attention is also paid to his involvement in the public life of the interwar society. In the period after the second world war we follow Metoděj Habáň to Litoměřice, a town in northwest Bohemia and we describe his imprisonment in the 1950s and subsequently his involvement in public life in the 1960s. His...

Philosophical Aspects of Aquinas's Doctrine on the Trinity in Summa Theologiae. The work has the goal to disclose a philosophical background of Aquinas's doctrine on the Trinity in Summa theologiae. The Dogma of the Trinity of Divine Persons is one of the fundamental truths of faith. This fact transcends human reason, yet it is a topic with its position and content, so it was always exciting and theologians tried to cope with this paradoxical claim of a single God in the Three Persons. St. Thomas Aquinas was no exception in this. His scholastic approach uses abundant philosophical material to help him to disclose this reality which exceeds philosophical science as incontrovertible and therefore credible. In his famous work for beginner theologians, he systematically presents his solution based on the analysis of the category of relation. The distinction between being (esse) of relation and its own nature (ratio) will make it possible to distinguish the three Persons in God's only reality. He concludes that divine persons themselves are the relations they represent and that the relations are subsistent. Ultimately, such an understanding of the existence of divine Persons reveals the reason for creation and helps us to understand our salvation, which is according to the Angelic Doctor the ultimate...

Hervé de Nédellec o.p. joua un rôle de premier plan dans la défense du patrimoine doctrinal de Thomas d’Aquin contre les effets des condamnations de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle. Il a néanmoins défendu une position sur la distinction entre l’être et l’essence divergeant sensiblement de la distinction thomasienne, alors que cet élément se présente comme central à la pensée de l’illustre dominicain. Cette étude vérifie cette divergence et en rend compte, considérant le contexte historique et le rôle assumé par Hervé dans la défense de la pensée de son confrère. Allen (1958) caractérise la perspective hervéenne par son essentialisme et son approche sémantique, ainsi que par le rejet de la distinction réelle (Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin) et de la distinction intentionnelle (Henri de Gand). Il évoque par ailleurs l’influence de Godefroid de Fontaines, de Siger de Brabant et d’Averroès au regard de la distinction entre l’être et l’essence selon le mode de signifier retenue par Hervé. Ces observations se voient ici confirmées par l’exposé et la comparaison des principes ontologiques assumés par les différentes positions. Il est par le fait même rendu manifeste que Siger de Brabant, Godefroid de Fontaines, Hervé de Nédellec et encore Dietrich de Freiberg, tenants de la distinction sémantique, rejettent les positions adverses en raison de mêmes éléments qu’ils critiquent de celles-ci. La communauté doctrinale entre la distinction selon le mode de signifier et la théorie modiste ainsi que leur source commune dans le Commentaire à la Métaphysique d’Averroès sont par ailleurs mises au jour. Les modistes distinguent le signifié principal et les propriétés concernant (circa) le signifié principal. Dans la perspective sémantique, l’essence, l’étant et l’être sont conçus comme des propriétés concernant le signifié principal à la manière des propriétés circa de la grammaire spéculative. À l’instar des propriétés circa, « essence », « étant » et « être » diffèrent non parce qu’ils signifient différentes déterminations, mais au sens où ils signifient une même chose de différentes façons. L’analyse des objections soulevées par les tenants de la distinction sémantique et des éléments constitutifs de leur position fournit des outils nouveaux pour apprécier la distinction entre l’être et l’essence chez Thomas d’Aquin. Celle-ci se révèle procéder d’un cadre théorique inconciliable avec celui adopté par Hervé de Nédellec. Nous faisons ici valoir que cette liberté doctrinale d’Hervé de Nédellec s’explique par cela que la distinction entre l’être et l’essence n’était pas constitutive du fonds thomasien concerné par les ordonnances d’enseignement dominicaines de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle, notamment puisqu’elle n’a pas été ciblée par les condamnations doctrinales ecclésiales ni par le correctoire de Guillaume de la Mare. / Hervaeus Natalis o.p. played a leading role in defending the doctrinal heritage of Thomas Aquinas against the effects of the condemnations of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries. Nevertheless, he would have supported a position on the distinction between being and essence which is irreconcilable with the Thomasian distinction, even though this element is central to the thought of the illustrious Dominican. The present study verifies this discrepancy and give an account of it, considering the historical context and the role assumed by Hervaeus in the defence of the thought of his confrere. Allen (1958) characterizes the Hervean perspective by its essentialism and its semantic approach, as well as by the rejection of the real distinction (Giles of Rome and Aquinas) and the intentional distinction (Henri of Ghent). He also evokes the influence of Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger of Brabant and Averroes with regard to the distinction between being (esse) and essence according to the mode of signifying adopted by Hervaeus. These claims are here confirmed by the exposition and comparison of the ontological principles assumed by the different stances. By the same token, it is made clear that Siger of Brabant, Godefroid of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and also Dietrich of Freiberg, the proponents of the semantic distinction, reject the opposing positions on the basis of the same elements that they criticize in them. The doctrinal community between the distinction according to the mode of signifying and the Modist theory, as well as their common source in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Averroes are also brought to light. The Modists distinguish between the object signified and the properties concerning (circa) the object signified. In the semantic perspective, essence, ens and esse are conceived as properties concerning the object signified in the manner of the circa properties of speculative grammar. Like the circa properties, “essence”, “ens” and “esse” do not differ because they signify different determinations, but they differ in the sense that they signify the same thing in different ways. The analysis of the objections raised by the proponents of the semantic distinction and of the constitutive elements of their position provides new tools for appreciating the distinction between being (esse) and essence in Aquinas. It proves to proceed from a theoretical framework that is irreconcilable with that adopted by Hervaeus. We argue here that this doctrinal freedom of Hervaeus is explained by the fact that the distinction between being (esse) and essence was not constitutive of the Thomasian fund concerned by the Dominican teaching ordinances of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries, especially since it was not targeted by the ecclesial doctrinal condemnations nor by the correctory of William de la Mare.