有關在台階形的公共物品兩難(step-level public good dilemma)中集體失敗的心理影響的研究一直很少。本研究探討在集體失敗後反事實思維 (counterfactual thinking) 對群體成員情緒和隨後合作行為的影響。研究1確定了兩種會顯著增加失敗後合作行為的反事實思維：關注(1)個人的成果 或 (2) 群體的成果，並以自我為中心的向上反事實思維 (self-focused upward counterfactual thinking)。此外，內疚 (guilt)中介了反事實思維對合作行為的影響。我們在研究2中發現以自我為中心的向上反事實思維是否會增加或減少，取決於反事實思維中的結果導向(outcome orientation) 及其結構是否為加法式 (additive)，還是減法式(subtractive)。另外，內疚，不行動引起的後悔 (regret of inaction)和行動引起的後悔 (regret of action) 中介了這些反事實思維對合作行為的影響。我們的研究結果指出反事實思維和個別情緒在研究社會困境的重要性。 / Research on the psychological consequences of collective failure in step-level public good dilemmas has remained scant. The present research addressed how counterfactual thinking influenced group members’ emotions and subsequent cooperation after collective failure. In study 1, we identified two types of counterfactuals which significantly increased post-failure cooperation: self-focused upward counterfactuals that concerned about (1) personal outcome and (2) group outcome. Furthermore, guilt mediated the effects of counterfactual thinking on cooperation. In study 2, we demonstrated that self-focused counterfactuals predicted increase or decrease in cooperation, depending on its outcome orientation and structure (additive vs. subtractive). Guilt, regret of inaction and regret of action mediated these effects. Our findings pointed to the need of studying counterfactual thinking and specific emotions in social dilemma. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Yam, Pak Chun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-49). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.4 / Chinese Abstract (摘要) --- p.5 / Introduction --- p.6 / Counterfactual thinking in social dilemma --- p.9 / Counterfactual thinking and emotion --- p.11 / “Feeling-is-for-doing“ approach of emotions in social dilemma --- p.13 / Counterfactual thinking, emotions and cooperation --- p.14 / Overview --- p.17 / Study 1 --- p.17 / Method --- p.18 / Results --- p.21 / Discussion --- p.25 / Study 2 --- p.26 / Method --- p.29 / Results --- p.30 / Discussion --- p.34 / Chapter General Discussion --- p.35 / Implications and Contributions --- p.37 / Limitations and future directions --- p.39 / Conclusion --- p.40 / References --- p.41 / Appendix1 --- p.50 / Measure of regret --- p.50 / Measure of guilt --- p.50 / Measure of anger --- p.50 / Appendix 2 --- p.51 / Counterfactual manipulations used in Study 2 --- p.51

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Theory of mind has been described in philosophical and psychological literature as "folk psychology", and is the tacit understanding that our behaviour is driven by our thoughts, desires and beliefs (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children are widely considered to have attained theory of mind understanding when they are able to pass the test of false belief understanding devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), at around 4 years of age. There are many theories as to how a child comes to hold a folk psychology, including innate modularism (Leslie, 1987, 1988, 1994), theory change (Gopnik & Wellman 1992), developing representational understanding (Perner, 1991, 1995, 2000), and experiential understanding developed in a socio-linguisitic context (Nelson, 1996). In addition, theory of mind has been linked to the development of symbolic understanding (Deloache & Smith, 1999; Perner, 1991), pretend play (Leslie, 1987; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1993), language (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Nelson, 1996; Olson, 1988) and executive function (e.g. Hughes, 1998a; Kochanska et al., 1996; Reed et al., 1984). The present study sought to bring together these diverse findings and to attempt to provide an integrated account of the emergence of theory of mind understanding during the preschool years. Sixty-four New Zealand children were assessed on their mental state understanding, deceptive abilities, symbolic functioning, language, and executive skills, when they were aged 30, 36, 42 and 48 months of age. There were a number of key findings in the present study. Language was a powerful predictor of false belief performance both within and across time, and was also related to many of the other variables included in the study. Performance on the scale model test of symbolic functioning was related across time to children�s concurrent and later false belief understanding. Scale model performance was also intertwined in a bidirectional relationship with language, and language appeared to play an increasingly important role in mediating the relationship with false belief understanding across time. False belief understanding and scale model performance were also related within and across time to executive function. There was evidence to suggest that the importance of working memory was due to its role in conflict inhibition. Although deception has sometimes been posited to be a precocious manifestation of theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989), in the present study deceptive ability lagged false belief understanding. Furthermore, false belief understanding was related to children�s subsequent (but not earlier) responses to a protagonist�s intention. This supports the hypothesis that false belief understanding allows a qualitative change in the execution of deception, whereby children can move from simple physical strategies to more sophisticated mentalist strategies. Overall, the present study provides some evidence to suggest that symbolic functioning, language, and later theory of mind may form part of a single developing skill set of symbolic representation. In dynamic interaction with social understanding, and supported by cognitive abilities such as executive function, and the socio-linguistic context, it is argued that understanding of one�s own and other minds emerges. Children�s ability to solve the false belief problem at 4 years of age is presented as a milestone on a developmental continuum of social understanding.

Thesis (M. Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Three of the major controversial issues in the field of intellectual styles are: 1) whether or not styles can be changed; 2) whether or not styles are value-laden; 3) whether styles are distinct from or they are part of personality traits. The main purpose of this research was to address these three issues by 1) exploring the socialization process of students’ thinking styles through tracing the change of thinking styles over one year and examining the competing influence of students’ perceived parenting styles, perceived learning environment, and personality traits on their thinking styles; and 2) exploring the role of thinking styles in students developmental outcomes with regard to career decision self-efficacy and subjective well-being. The research adopted a quantitatively-driven mixed method design and it involved three phases: the pilot study (a quantitative study), the main study (a longitudinal, quantitative study), and the follow-up study (a qualitative study). The pilot study validated a series of inventories that were subsequently utilized in the main study and preliminarily explored the relevant relationships among three hundred and forty-one Chinese university students from Shanghai, mainland China. In the main study, nine hundred and twenty-six students from the same university responded to a questionnaire consisting of the modified inventories and some demographic information at the beginning of an academic year. One year later, they responded to the same questionnaire again. After that, based on the results of the main study, 29 students were selected to participate in a follow up study that involved individual face-to-face interviews. Results of the main study generally supported the research hypotheses. With regard to the malleability of thinking styles, the research found that students’ thinking styles changed over one year and the change of thinking styles can be at least partially attributed to the two environmental factors (i.e., parenting styles and learning environments). These findings suggest that, albeit relatively stable, thinking styles can be socialized/changed. With regard to the role of thinking styles in student development, results indicated that mainly Type I thinking styles (characterized by creativity, nonconformity, and autonomy) positively contributed to students’ career decision self-efficacy and subjective well-being. Furthermore, Type I thinking styles were also major mediators in the relationships of parenting styles and learning environments to career decision self-efficacy and subjective well-being. These findings suggest that thinking styles are value-laden, with Type I thinking styles being more adaptive than other styles. With regard to the relationship between personality and thinking styles, results indicated that thinking styles and personality traits overlapped with each other to limited extents and both of them made unique contributions to student development. Moreover, thinking styles were more malleable than personality traits. These findings suggest that styles are distinct from rather than subordinate to personality traits. Results from the follow-up interview study further confirmed the results of the main study and provided explanatory information on how the identified relationships happened. Generally speaking, the present research has both theoretical and practical implications. It significantly contributes to the discussion on the aforementioned major controversial issues in the field of styles. Furthermore, based on the research findings, specific suggestions on how to optimize the development of students’ thinking styles are provided for parents, teachers, and university administrators. Finally, the limitations of this research and the recommendation for future studies are discussed. / published_or_final_version / Education / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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In an attempt to show how rational explanation of human and animal behaviour has a place in the scientific explanation of our physical world, Fodor advances the language of thought hypothesis. The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that, contrary to the language of thought hypothesis, we need not possess a linguistic internal representational system distinct from any natural language to serve as the medium of thinking. I accept that we have an internal representational system, but by analyzing Fodor's theory of content, I show Fodor's argument that the internal system must be as expressive as any natural language, which he uses in arguing that the internal system is the linguistic medium of thought, is unsound. Distinguishing an informational theory of content from a causal theory of content, which Fodor conflates, I argue that internal representations, whose content is determined by information they carry, cannot be related in a way that corresponds to semantic associations between terms in natural languages, reflecting actual associations of items in the world. Furthermore, provided certain animal cognition, which is homogeneous with human cognition, can be explained without requiring that the internal system possess anything corresponding to the logical connectives, the internal system need not possess anything corresponding to the logical connectives. I give such an explanation of animal cognition by developing an approach to content in the Rylean/Dennettian tradition, based on the notion of embodied cognition, in which animals embody the hypotheses they entertain in virtue of their total dispositional state, rather than explicitly representing them. It follows that there are two features of natural languages, semantic associations of terms and possessing logical connectives, that the internal system need not have. Hence a rational interpretation of linguistic behaviour need not be derived from an intentional interpretation of the transformations on int

In the literature on reflection in teaching, authors frequently lament the lack of clarity in understandings of this concept, despite its wide acceptance as a phenomenon beneficial to teaching and learning. This dissertation reports a study of this literature that attempts to clarify the meaning of reflection and to establish a methodology for examining such a complex concept. Three analyses, each intended to explore the literature on reflection from a different perspective, comprise the study. The first is an analysis of the literature on reflection in three professional communities---continuing professional development, higher education and teacher education---to establish general themes in this literature. The second analysis examines definitions of reflection from the three communities, focusing in particular on processes and rationales of reflection. The third analysis explores a variety of critiques of reflection to determine predominant epistemologies and recurring themes in the literature. The merging of the results of the three analyses leads to a framework for understanding reflection. This integrative framework highlights the importance of underlying epistemologies as the bases for different understandings of reflection and shows the intricate interrelationships among four major themes in the literature: the processes involved in reflection, the rationales behind it, the context in which it occurs, and its connection to action. The framework also points to the link between the self and the reflective context, the possibilities of reflection in-, on-, for-, and as-action, the unclear connection between the cognitive and affective processes and the movement from internal to external rationales. The study contributes both conceptually and methodologically by making sense of the range of ways reflection has been understood and by providing a possible model for exploring a complex concept. It provides a consistent language for discussing reflection, demonstrates the complexities of the concept and the interrelationships of the themes contained in the literature, allows for the situating of individual works within the literature, increases understanding of the connection of reflection and action, and helps to position the concept of reflection within broader theories of cognition and social practice.

The lack of the teaching of scientific critical thinking is seen as a major problem in the American educational system by many current educators, theorists, and researchers. Using Introductory Psychology students as subjects, the present study attempted to improve these skills by teaching students using new research method materials as part of classroom instruction. The students were measured with a test developed for the study. The new materials were found to improve students' scientific critical thinking ability over students in courses not using the new materials. These materials can be helpful in improving students' ability to evaluate scientific claims presented in the media. / Department of Psychological Science