Birks' unjust enrichment formula was intended to provide a common descriptive structure to all the instances where there was recovery. He did not, however, engage in an analysis of the various reasons why courts awarded restitution. My thesis seeks to fill this gap. I argue that without such an account Birks work is incomplete. According to Birks, for example, money and services both amounted to enrichments and so should be considered together. But there are some differences and similarities between money and services. In order to be able to group them together Birks needs to be able to say that the reasons for giving recovery in money and service cases are similar enough that they can be grouped together. The same goes for all the unjust factors. The point is, the generalisation that Birks sought to do, can only properly be done if one is attuned to the reasons why recovery is granted in each of those cases. If the reasons are similar then the generalisation makes sense. But if they are not then it does not make sense to so generalise. The argument of the thesis is that there three relevant principles to justifying unjust enrichment: the Property Principle, the Benefit-Burden Principle and the Autonomy Principle. The Property Principle states that one should not have property belonging to another. The Benefit-Burden Principle states that if one takes a benefit then one must bear the associated burdens; to put it more colloquially: you have to take the rough with the smooth. These first two principles provide reasons for considering a situation to be defective and the last principle provides a constraint for the operation of the first two. It is there to ensure that the imposition of liability will not unduly affect the autonomy of the defendant. Based on that the thesis proposes that the scope of the unjust enrichment formula be trimmed down to only cover defective transfers of money and other assets. For the other cases, a different analytical structure is needed. This is because the reasons for recovery in those cases are different.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar que, nas hipóteses em que alguém intervém na esfera jurídica alheia e obtém benefícios econômicos sem causar danos ao titular do direito ou, causando danos, o lucro obtido pelo ofensor é superior aos danos causados, as regras da responsabilidade civil, isoladamente, não são suficientes, à luz do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, enquanto sanção eficaz pela violação de um interesse merecedor de tutela. Isto porque, como a principal função da responsabilidade civil é remover o dano, naquelas hipóteses, não fosse a utilização de um remédio alternativo, o interventor faria seu o lucro da intervenção, no primeiro caso integralmente e, no segundo, no valor equivalente ao saldo entre o lucro obtido e a indenização que tiver que pagar à vítima. A tese pretende demonstrar que o problema do lucro da intervenção não deve ser solucionado por intermédio das regras da responsabilidade civil, devendo, portanto, ser rejeitadas as propostas de solução neste campo, como a interpretação extensiva do parágrafo único, do artigo 944, do Código Civil, as indenizações punitivas e o chamado terceiro método de cálculo da indenização. Como alternativa, propõe-se o enquadramento dogmático do lucro da intervenção no enriquecimento sem causa, outorgando ao titular do direito uma pretensão de restituição do lucro obtido pelo ofensor em razão da indevida ingerência em seus bens ou direitos. Defende-se que a transferência do lucro da intervenção para o titular do direito tem por fundamento a ponderação dos interesses em jogo à luz da Constituição Federal, com especial atenção ao princípio da solidariedade, e da teoria da destinação jurídica dos bens. A tese procura demonstrar, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro não exige um efetivo empobrecimento do titular do direito para a configuração do enriquecimento sem causa e que a regra da subsidiariedade não impede a cumulação de ações, de responsabilidade civil para eliminar o dano (e no limite do dano), e de enriquecimento sem causa, para forçar a restituição do saldo positivo que permanecer no patrimônio do ofensor após o pagamento da indenização, se houver. Finalmente, a tese pretende provocar a discussão acerca da quantificação do objeto da restituição, propondo alguns critérios que deverão orientar o aplicador do direito. / The present study aims to demonstrate that when someone profits by interfering In: another persons rights without causing damage to the victim, or when the act does cause damage but the benefits so obtained are greater than the damage caused, tort rules alone are not enough, under Brazilian Law, as an efficient sanction for violation of an interest or right that deserves protection. Since the maIn: function of civil liability rules is to redress the damage, or make the victim whole, without an alternative remedy the wrongdoer would keep the benefits wrongfully obtained, fully In: the first case and In: the second case to the extent of the difference between the profits obtained and damages paid to the victim. I aim to show that the problem of benefits wrongfully obtained cannot be solved through tort rules alone, and some proposed measures In: this area, such as expansive interpretation of Article 944, sole paragraph, of the Civil Code, punitive damages and the so-called third method of quantifying damages should be rejected. As an alternative, I propose framing the question of benefits wrongfully obtained withIn: the rules on unjust enrichment, granting the victim the right to claim restitution of benefits obtained by the wrongdoer by interference In: the victims assets or rights. I argue that the transfer of the benefits wrongfully obtained to the victim should be based on a balance of conflicting interests In: light of the Federal Constitution, with special attention to the solidarity principle and on the theory of the juridical allocation of assets. Besides this, I argue that Brazilian law does not require the victim to suffer any kind of damage In: order to apply unjust enrichment rules and that the subsidiarity rule does not prohibit the filing of joint claims, a tort one to remedy the damage (limited to the actual damage caused) and an unjust enrichment one to force restitution of any positive balance that remains with the wrongdoer after payment of damages. Finally, I intend to stimulate discussions on how to quantify the amount of restitution In: these cases and offer some criteria that can guide judges.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo solucionar duas questões acerca do enriquecimento sem causa. Primeiramente, busca definir se há utilidade na aplicação da figura jurídica, ou seria caso de uma regra descartável no ordenamento jurídico privado brasileiro. A partir da resposta à primeira indagação, questiona-se qual o campo de incidência da regra de vedação ao enriquecimento sem causa. Destarte, será possível formular um critério rígido, que evite a arbitrariedade do julgador na aplicação de normas abertas e cláusulas gerais. Porém, cabível um critério abrangente, vez que inclui no conceito de enriquecimento sem causa novo parâmetro, para além da posição tradicional. Para tanto, imprescindível analisar os elementos e fundamentos do enriquecimento sem causa e da subsidiariedade de maneira a evitar sua aplicação desmedida e sem critérios, ao bel-prazer do julgador. A hipótese, derradeiramente, repousa na necessidade de estabelecimento do campo de atuação da figura jurídica que fundamente o critério de aplicação no caso concreto. / The present dissertation has as a goal to solve two questions regarding the unjustified enrichment. First, it aims to define if there is any use in the application of the juridical figure or if it is the case of a disposable rule on the Brazilian private juridical order. Then, based on the answer to the first inquiry, it is questioned which is the application field for the prohibition to the unjustified enrichment. Therefore, it will be possible to formulate a rigid criterion that prevents the arbitrarity of the ruler in the applications of open norms and general terms. However, been appropriate a comprehensive criterion once it includes in the unjustified enrichment concept a new parameter, beyond the traditional understandment. For that matter, it is indispensable to analyze the elements and foundations of the unjustified enrichment and the subsidiarity in a way to prevent its unmeasured application, without any criteria and at the will of the ruler. Finally, the hypothesis lays on the necessity for the establishment of the action field of the juridical figure that justify the application criteria in the actual case.

This study analyses certain controversial issues commonly arising when a claim for restitution is brought against a bank. Chapter 1 considers the equitable claim traditionally labelled ‘knowing receipt’. Three issues are discussed: (i) the basis in principle of the claim for ‘knowing receipt’; (ii) whether the claim requires proof of fault on the part of the recipient; and (iii) whether the claim can be brought in relation to the receipt by a bank of a mortgage or guarantee offered to the bank in breach of trust or fiduciary duty. The conclusions are (i) that ‘knowing receipt’ is often a claim in unjust enrichment, though the dishonest recipient will also be liable for an equitable wrong; (ii) that when the unjust enrichment version of ‘knowing receipt’ is in issue, the claim should be one of strict liability; and (iii) a claim in unjust enrichment can be brought against a bank to defeat its interest in a mortgage or guarantee offered in breach of trust. Chapters 2 to 4 concern a concept within the law of unjust enrichment that has come to be called ministerial receipt. A ministerial receipt is a receipt of money or property by an agent on behalf of his or her principal. Banks often receive money as agents on behalf of account holders. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse that concept as it is dealt with at common law and in equity respectively. At common law, ministerial receipt is a defence which exists only if the agent pays over the money in question before receiving notive of the right of the plaintiff to restitution. By contrast, ministerial receipt in equity operates to restrict a right to restitution which would otherwise arise. A claim for 'knowing receipt' cannot be brought against an agent in equity. Chapter 4 argues that the equitable tratement of agents is correct as a matter of principle, and that no common law claim in unjust enrichment should be maintainable against a person who receives as agent. Special attention is given to banks. Chapter 5 analyses three other defences which a bank can plead in answer to restitutionary claims: 'good consideration', bona fide purchase and set off. It is concluded that there is no general defence of 'good consideration'; that the bank can plead bona fide purchase in relation to money deposited into an account in credit; and that in the context of combining two or more bank accounts set off is merely a species of bona fide purchase.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar que, nas hipóteses em que alguém intervém na esfera jurídica alheia e obtém benefícios econômicos sem causar danos ao titular do direito ou, causando danos, o lucro obtido pelo ofensor é superior aos danos causados, as regras da responsabilidade civil, isoladamente, não são suficientes, à luz do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, enquanto sanção eficaz pela violação de um interesse merecedor de tutela. Isto porque, como a principal função da responsabilidade civil é remover o dano, naquelas hipóteses, não fosse a utilização de um remédio alternativo, o interventor faria seu o lucro da intervenção, no primeiro caso integralmente e, no segundo, no valor equivalente ao saldo entre o lucro obtido e a indenização que tiver que pagar à vítima. A tese pretende demonstrar que o problema do lucro da intervenção não deve ser solucionado por intermédio das regras da responsabilidade civil, devendo, portanto, ser rejeitadas as propostas de solução neste campo, como a interpretação extensiva do parágrafo único, do artigo 944, do Código Civil, as indenizações punitivas e o chamado terceiro método de cálculo da indenização. Como alternativa, propõe-se o enquadramento dogmático do lucro da intervenção no enriquecimento sem causa, outorgando ao titular do direito uma pretensão de restituição do lucro obtido pelo ofensor em razão da indevida ingerência em seus bens ou direitos. Defende-se que a transferência do lucro da intervenção para o titular do direito tem por fundamento a ponderação dos interesses em jogo à luz da Constituição Federal, com especial atenção ao princípio da solidariedade, e da teoria da destinação jurídica dos bens. A tese procura demonstrar, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro não exige um efetivo empobrecimento do titular do direito para a configuração do enriquecimento sem causa e que a regra da subsidiariedade não impede a cumulação de ações, de responsabilidade civil para eliminar o dano (e no limite do dano), e de enriquecimento sem causa, para forçar a restituição do saldo positivo que permanecer no patrimônio do ofensor após o pagamento da indenização, se houver. Finalmente, a tese pretende provocar a discussão acerca da quantificação do objeto da restituição, propondo alguns critérios que deverão orientar o aplicador do direito. / The present study aims to demonstrate that when someone profits by interfering In: another persons rights without causing damage to the victim, or when the act does cause damage but the benefits so obtained are greater than the damage caused, tort rules alone are not enough, under Brazilian Law, as an efficient sanction for violation of an interest or right that deserves protection. Since the maIn: function of civil liability rules is to redress the damage, or make the victim whole, without an alternative remedy the wrongdoer would keep the benefits wrongfully obtained, fully In: the first case and In: the second case to the extent of the difference between the profits obtained and damages paid to the victim. I aim to show that the problem of benefits wrongfully obtained cannot be solved through tort rules alone, and some proposed measures In: this area, such as expansive interpretation of Article 944, sole paragraph, of the Civil Code, punitive damages and the so-called third method of quantifying damages should be rejected. As an alternative, I propose framing the question of benefits wrongfully obtained withIn: the rules on unjust enrichment, granting the victim the right to claim restitution of benefits obtained by the wrongdoer by interference In: the victims assets or rights. I argue that the transfer of the benefits wrongfully obtained to the victim should be based on a balance of conflicting interests In: light of the Federal Constitution, with special attention to the solidarity principle and on the theory of the juridical allocation of assets. Besides this, I argue that Brazilian law does not require the victim to suffer any kind of damage In: order to apply unjust enrichment rules and that the subsidiarity rule does not prohibit the filing of joint claims, a tort one to remedy the damage (limited to the actual damage caused) and an unjust enrichment one to force restitution of any positive balance that remains with the wrongdoer after payment of damages. Finally, I intend to stimulate discussions on how to quantify the amount of restitution In: these cases and offer some criteria that can guide judges.

Univ., Diss.-2003--Würzburg, 2002.

This thesis is an investigation of a doctrine generally known as ‘failure of consideration’, but which I term ‘failure of condition’. I have two principal aims. First, to clarify quite what the doctrine of failure of condition is. Secondly, to explain why it has the effects it does – in particular, why it justifies the response of restitution. The doctrine, at core, concerns conditional transfers: when a transfer is made conditionally, and the condition fails, the transfer can be recovered. For this reason, I term the doctrine ‘failure of condition.’ I investigate the nature of this relationship and argue that the reason why the transfer is conditional is that the agent’s intention to make the transfer was itself conditional. The justification of restitution is a more complex affair than is customarily accepted – but there is a valid justification lurking not far from the surface of orthodoxy. A secondary concern of the thesis is to re-examine an old theory in the field of common mistake, frustration and termination following a breach of contract. It used to be thought that these doctrines could be explained by failure of condition. That theory has fallen out of favour – it seems that no one accepts it today. This rejection rests upon a confusion over the nature of the doctrine of failure of condition. Once the nature of this doctrine has been clarified, we can see how closely the various doctrines align with one another; we can also see where the true difficulty with the failure of condition explanation lies.

No description available.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: It is a general principle of the law of South Africa that an unassisted contract of a minor is unenforceable against the minor. Although it binds the other party, the minor is not bound. The minor will only be bound if the contract is enforced by his guardian, or if the contract is ratified by the child after attaining majority. This implies that the other party is in a rather unfortunate position, since the effectiveness of the contract will remain uncertain until the guardian of the minor decides to enforce or repudiate the contract, or until the minor ratifies it after attaining majority. The other party may not resile from the contract during this interim period. Should it be established that the contract has failed, the question arises to what extent the parties are obliged to return performances made in purported fulfilment of the contract. In terms of the law of South Africa, the prevailing view is that these claims are based on unjustified enrichment. However, the extent of these claims differs. In principle, both parties’ liability will be limited to the amount remaining in its estate, according to the defence of loss of enrichment. But the application of the defence is subject to an exception that does not apply equally to the parties. Had the other party known or should the other party have known that the enrichment was sine causa, yet continued to part with it, he will be held liable for the full enrichment. However, this exception does not apply to the enrichment liability of minors. In other words, whether the minor knew or should have known that the enrichment was sine causa, he would still be allowed to raise the defence of loss of enrichment. Furthermore, the rules applicable to minors’ enrichment liability applies to all minors, and no scope is left to consider the specific circumstances of each minor. It is accepted that there are two competing principles relating to minors’ unassisted contracts. On the one hand, the law must protect the minor from his immaturity and lack of experience. On the other hand, the law must protect the interests of the other party. It will be seen throughout this study that the determination of how to balance these competing principles is not an easy task. The key aim of this thesis is to investigate the principles governing the unwinding of unassisted minors’ contracts in South Africa. A comparison will be made with the principles applied in other legal systems, in order to identify similarities and differences in the approaches and, to establish what underlies the differences in the various approaches. Germany, England and Scotland have been chosen for comparison for various reasons. First, they share some historical roots, and they represent three major legal traditions, namely the civil law, common law and mixed legal systems, of which South Africa also forms part. Secondly, both England and Scotland have experienced recent legislative reform in this regard, which implies that their respective legal systems should be in line with modern tendencies, and consequently they may provide a valuable framework for possible reform in South Africa. In Germany, although mainly regulated by rather older legislation, there have been interesting developments in the determination of consequences of failed contracts. Hellwege has argued that the unwinding of all contracts should be treated similarly, regardless of the unwinding factor. He has also suggested that in order to prevent the accumulation of risk on one party, and to ensure that the risk is placed on the person who is in control of the object, the defence of loss of enrichment should not be available to any party. His reasoning and suggestions is dealt with in more detail in this thesis. This study argues that the current strict approach applied under South African law regarding minors’ unassisted contracts needs to be re-considered. The current approach is dated and is not in line with modern tendencies and legislation. No proper consideration is given to minors’ development into adulthood or personal circumstances of the parties. It is submitted that in the process of re-consideration, some form of acknowledgement must be given to minors’ development towards mature adults. It is submitted that this would be possible by introducing a more flexible approach to regulate the enforceability and unwinding of minors’ unassisted contracts. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING Dit is ‘n algemene beginsel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg dat ‘n kontrak aangegaan deur ‘n minderjarige sonder die nodige bystand van sy ouer of voog onafdwingbaar is teenoor die minderjarige. Die minderjarige sal slegs gebonde wees indien die kontrak afgedwing word deur sy voog, of indien die minderjarige self die kontrak ratifiseer nadat hy meerderjarig word. Dit impliseer dat die ander party in ‘n ongunstige posisie is, aangesien die werking van die kontrak onseker is totdat die voog besluit om die kontrak af te dwing of te repudieer, of totdat die minderjarige dit ratifiseer nadat hy meerderjarig word. Gedurende hierdie interim periode mag die ander party nie terugtree uit hierdie kontrak nie. Sou dit bepaal word dat die kontrak misluk het, ontstaan die vraag tot watter mate die partye verplig word om prestasies wat reeds gemaak is, terug te gee. In terme van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg is die meerderheidsopinie dat hierdie eise gebaseer is op onregverdige verryking, maar die omvang van die partye se eise verskil. In beginsel is beide partye se aanspreeklikheid beperk tot die bedrag wat steeds in sy boedel beskikbaar is, weens die beskikbaarheid van die verweer van verlies van verryking. Maar die toepassing van die verweer is onderworpe aan ‘n uitsondering wat nie op beide partye geld nie. Indien die ander party geweet het of moes geweet het dat die verryking sine causa was, maar steeds afstand gedoen het van die verryking, sal hy aanspreeklik gehou word vir die volle verryking. Hierdie reel is egter nie van toepassing op die minderjarige se verrykingsaanspreeklikheid nie. Met ander woorde, indien die minderjarige geweet het of moes geweet het dat die verryking sine causa was, en steeds afstand gedoen het van die verryking, sal hy steeds die verweer van verlies van verryking kan opper. Bowendien, die reels van toepassing op minderjariges se verrykingsaanspreeklikheid is van toepassing op alle minderjariges, en geen ruimte word gelaat om die spesifieke omstandighede van elke minderjarige in ag te neem nie. Wanneer ons kontrakte aangegaan deur minderjariges sonder die nodige bystand, oorweeg, word dit algemeen aanvaar dat daar twee kompeterende beginsels van belang is. Aan die een kant moet die reg die minderjarige beskerm teen sy onvolwassenheid en gebrek aan ondervinding. Aan die ander kant moet die reg ook die belange van die ander party beskerm. Dit sal deurlopend in hierdie studie gesien word dat die behoorlike balansering van hierdie twee beginsels nie ‘n maklike taak is nie. Die hoofdoel van hierdie tesis is om die beginsels wat die afdwingbaarheid en ontbinding van minderjariges se kontrakte in Suid-Afrika, wat aangegaan is sonder die nodige bystand van ‘n voog, te ondersoek. ‘n Vergelyking sal getref word met die beginsels wat in ander regstelsels toegepas word, om sodoende die ooreenkomste en verskille te identifiseer, asook om te bepaal wat hierdie verskille onderlê. Duitsland, Engeland en Skotland is gekies as vergelykende jurisdiksies vir verskeie redes, naamlik hulle historiese gebondenheid en die feit dat hulle drie groot regstradisies (die kontinentale regstelsel, die gemenereg en die gemengde regstelsel) verteenwoordig. Bowendien het beide Engeland en Skotland onlangse wetgewende hervorming ondergaan in hierdie sfeer van die reg, wat impliseer dat hierdie regstelsels waarskynlik in lyn sal wees met moderne tendense. Gevolglik kan hulle ‘n waardevolle raamwerk skep waarbinne moontlike hervorming in Suid-Afrika mag plaasvind. Alhoewel Duitsland grotendeels nog deur ouer wetgewing gereguleer word, het dit ook ‘n reeks interessante verwikkelinge ondergaan in die bepaling van die gevolge van kontrakte wat misluk het. Hellwege argumenteer dat die ontbinding van alle kontrakte dieselfde hanteer moet word, ongeag die onderliggende ontbindende faktor. Hy stel ook voor dat om te verhoed dat die risiko op slegs een party geplaas word, en om te verseker dat dit eerder gedra word deur daardie party wat beheer het oor die voorwerp, die verweer van verlies van verryking nie vir enige party beskikbaar moet wees nie. Sy redenering en voorstelle word in meer besonderhede in hierdie studie bespreek. Hierdie studie argumenteer dat die huidige streng benadering wat in Suid-Afrika toegepas word met betrekking tot kontrakte aangegaan deur minderjariges sonder die nodige bystand van ‘n voog, heroorweeg moet word. Die huidige benadering is verouderd en is nie lyn met moderne tendense en wetgewing nie. Bowendien word geen behoorlike oorweging gegee aan minderjariges se ontwikkeling tot volwassenheid nie, en die partye se persoonlike omstandighede word ook nie in ag geneem nie. Daar word argumenteer dat in die proses van heroorweging, ‘n mate van erkenning gegee moet word aan minderjariges se persoonlike ontwikkeling. Daar word verder argumenteer dat ‘n meer buigsame benadering toegepas moet word ten opsigte van die regulering van die afdwingbaarheid en ontbinding van hierdie kontrakte.

The thesis is focused on the legal concept of unjust enrichment specifically in relation to the area of business law. Although the basic legal regulation relevant also for the area of business law was, and even after the adoption of the new private law codes, still remains in the civil code, the thesis endeavors to focus on certain specifics related particularly to the business relations. For these purposes it deals, in less or more detailed manner, also with other legal concepts, which are significant for the topic and closely related (such as limitation of claims resulting from the unjust enrichment, good faith of legal entities, invalidity of legal acts etc.). The thesis analyses legal acts regulating the institution of unjust enrichment for the area of private law, eventually specifically for the business relations. Especially in the areas where the legal text itself is not exhaustive, it supplies also analysis of relatively extensive case law (available so far only in respect of the previous legislation), eventually also the analysis of expert opinions. It draws attention to certain conflicts in interpretation of individual legal provisions. Considering the recent essential change of the private law basis (new private law codes) the thesis provides to a considerable extent comparison of the...