Nous avons étudié dans ce travail le statut de la notion de finalité telle qu'elle est décrite par Kant dans l'Analytique de la faculté de juger téléologique de la Critique de la faculté de juger. Nous avons circonscrit la portée de cette notion, nous avons montré ses limites et nous avons défini le rôle que Kant lui assigne au sein de sa philosophie transcendantale. Les liens unissant la finalité logique de la nature avec la finalité objective matérielle ont été soulignés, de même que ceux qui s'établissent entre le mécanisme et la finalité en général. Nous avons fait le point sur diverses interprétations de l'antinomie de la faculté de juger téléologique et nous nous sommes livrés, autant que cela nous fut possible, à une critique des thèses de Kant relatives à la finalité.

Thesis (doctoral)--Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen, 1977. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-128).

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TulioSS_TESE.pdf: 2136315 bytes, checksum: def4a39ad10ea69504e5674a87349257 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-11 / This work whose title is "The transcendental arguments: Kant Andy Hume's problem" has as its main objective to interpret Kant's answer to Hume's problem in the light of the conjunction of the causality and induction themes which is equivalent to skeptical- naturalist reading of the latter. In this sense, this initiative complements the previous treatment seen in our dissertation, where the same issue had been discussed from a merely skeptical reading that Kant got from Hume thought and was only examined causality. Among the specific objectives, we list the following: a) critical philosophy fulfills three basic functions, a founding, one negative and one would argue that the practical use of reason, here named as defensive b) the Kantian solution of Hume's problem in the first critisism would fulfill its founding and negative functions of critique of reason; c) the Kantian treatment of the theme of induction in other criticisms would will fulfill the defense function of critique of reason; d) that the evidence of Kant's answer to Hume's problem are more consistent when will be satisfied these three functions or moments of criticism. The basic structure of the work consists of three parts: the first the genesis of Hume's problem - our intention is to reconstruct Hume's problem, analyzing it from the perspective of two definitions of cause, where the dilution of the first definition in the second match the reduction of psychological knowledge to the probability of following the called naturalization of causal relations; whereas in the second - Legality and Causality - it is stated that when considering Hume in the skeptic-naturalist option, Kant is not entitled to respond by transcendental argument A?B; A?B from the second Analogy, evidence that is rooted in the position of contemporary thinkers, such as Strawson and Allison; in third part - Purpose and Induction - admits that Kant responds to Hume on the level of regulative reason use, although the development of this test exceeds the limits of the founding function of criticism. And this is articulated in both the Introduction and Concluding Remarks by meeting the defensive [and negative] function of criticism. In this context, based on the use of so-called transcendental arguments that project throughout the critical trilogy, we provide solution to a recurring issue that recurs at several points in our submission and concerning to the "existence and / or the necessity of empirical causal laws. In this light, our thesis is that transcendental arguments are only an apodictic solution to the Hume s skeptical-naturalist problem when is at stake a practical project in which the interest of reason is ensured, as will, in short, proved in our final considerations / O presente trabalho - Os argumentos transcendentais: Kant e o problema de Hume -, tem como seu objetivo geral interpretar a resposta de Kant ao problema de Hume ? luz da conjun??o das tem?ticas de causalidade e indu??o o que equivale a uma leitura c?tico-naturalista deste. Neste sentido, tal iniciativa complementa o tratamento anterior visto em nossa disserta??o de mestrado, onde a mesma tem?tica fora examinada a partir de uma leitura meramente c?tica que Kant fez do pensamento humeano e onde foi analisada apenas a causalidade. Dentre os objetivos espec?ficos, listamos os seguintes: a) a filosofia cr?tica cumpre tr?s fun??es b?sicas, uma fundante, uma negativa e uma que defenderia o uso pr?tico da raz?o, aqui nomeada de defensiva; b) a solu??o kantiana do problema de Hume na primeira cr?tica cumpriria as fun??es fundante e negativa da cr?tica da raz?o; c) o tratamento kantiano da tem?tica da indu??o nas demais cr?ticas cumpriria a fun??o defensiva da cr?tica da raz?o; d) que as provas da resposta de Kant ao problema de Hume s?o mais consistentes quando se consideram cumpridas estas tr?s fun??es ou momentos da cr?tica. A estrutura b?sica do trabalho comporta tr?s partes: na primeira - A g?nese do problema de Hume -, nossa pretens?o ? reconstituir o problema de Hume, analisando-o sob a ?tica das duas defini??es de causa, onde a dilui??o da primeira defini??o na segunda corresponde ? redu??o psicol?gica do conhecimento ? probabilidade, do que se segue a chamada naturaliza??o das rela??es causais; na segunda - Legalidade e Causalidade -, menciona-se que quando se considera Hume na op??o c?tico-naturalista, Kant n?o est? habilitado a lhe responder atrav?s do argumento transcendental A?B; A?B da segunda Analogia, prova que est? embasada na posi??o de pensadores contempor?neos como Strawson e Allison; na terceira parte - Finalidade e Indu??o -, admite-se que Kant responde a Hume no n?vel do uso regulativo da raz?o, embora o desenvolvimento dessa prova exceda os limites da fun??o fundante da cr?tica. E isto fica articulado tanto na Introdu??o quanto nas Considera??es Finais, atrav?s do cumprimento da fun??o defensiva [e negativa] da cr?tica. Neste contexto, com base no recurso aos ditos argumentos transcendentais que se projetam por toda a trilogia cr?tica, procuramos estabelecer solu??o para uma quest?o recorrente que reaparece em v?rias passagens de nossa apresenta??o e que diz respeito a exist?ncia e/ou a necessidade das leis causais emp?ricas . Diante disso, nossa tese ? que os argumentos transcendentais somente constituem uma solu??o apod?tica para o problema c?tico-naturalista de Hume quando est? em pauta um projeto pr?tico em que o interesse da raz?o esteja assegurado, conforme ser?, enfim, provado em nossas Considera??es Finais

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Zugl.: Hannover, Univ., Diss., 2004 u.d.T.: Magiera, Günter: Die Rehabilitierung der Meinung

Inaug.-Diss.--Philosophie--Zürich, 1977. / Bibliogr. p. 379-381.

Ce mémoire propose un commentaire linéaire de la section de la Critique de la faculté de juger consacrée à l’esthétique allant des paragraphes 1 à 60. En guise d’introduction, il s’agira de décrire l’environnement philosophique dans lequel s’insère l’ouvrage, et de cerner la nécessité systémique pour le corpus kantien de poser la question de l’esthétique. Ensuite, une conception du sujet transcendantal sera présentée dont il faut comprendre le fonctionnement pour mesurer la portée des thèses soutenues dans le cadre de la troisième Critique. Ceci étant fait, un commentaire mettra en relation différentes interprétations de l’Analytique du beau et du sublime au terme de quoi sera brièvement présenté le contexte artistique au sein duquel Kant évolua pour finalement étudier les paragraphes ayant trait aux beaux-arts et au génie. Au cours de l’étude de l’Analytique du beau et du sublime, nous nous sommes demandé, qui satisfait véritablement les exigences kantiennes du goût. Le goût est-il véritablement l’affaire de tous ? À michemin entre un anti-sensualisme et un anti rationalisme, le sentiment réfléchissant ou réflexif suppose un sujet conscient de ce qui l’affecte, et capable de se maintenir dans cet état satisfaisant de liberté que nous pouvons qualifier de facultaire ou spirituelle. Mais à l’aune de quoi au juste le sujet de goût évalue-t-il la satisfaction éprouvée ? À l’issue de cette analyse, seront présentées en conclusion quelques pistes interprétatives pouvant orienter la lecture des développements sur les Idées esthétiques.

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La tesi contrasta les conseqüències filosòfiques i la constel·lació temàtica de la Crítica del Judici, amb les manifestacions poeticofilosòfiques de F. Hölderlin i S.T. Coleridge. La font principal de recerca són aquelles tesis de la Crítica del Judici rellevants per comprendre l'esclat de l'idealisme allà on aquest nou sistema involucra significativament art i experiència estètica. Hölderlin s'instal·la de manera genuïna en la tensió entre l'idealisme i la filosofia crítica. Per la radicalitat dels seus plantejaments podrem presentar-lo també com a poeta romàntic o precedent del romanticisme. Pel que fa a Coleridge estudiem la recepció immediata de la filosofia Kantiana en el medi cultural britànic per contrastar el paper del poeta en la importació de la ideologia romàntica alemanya. L'objectiu és presentar Coleridge com a poeta que assumeix els postulats del romanticisme alemany i investigar si aquests postulats poden relacionar-se amb el balanç de la filosofia kantiana expressat a Crítica del Judici. / The thesis compares the philosophical consequences of Critique of Judgement to the poetic and philosophical productions of F.Höldelrin and S.T. Colerige. The main source of research are those aspects of Critique of Judgement relevant to understand the outbreak of idealism particularly where this new system deals significantly with art and aesthetic experience. Hölderlin stands in a genuine position beneath the tensions of idealism and kantian criticism, and his radical aproach to poetry allows to present him as a romantic poet or forerunner of romanticism. For S.T. Coleridge we study the immediate reception of kantian philosophy in british soil in order to highlight his role as a mediator of the german romantic ideology. The aim is to portrait Coleridge as a poet who assumed the main postulates of german idealism and to investigate how far those postulates can be connected to the final conclusions of kantian philosophy as formulated in Critique of Judgement.