This thesis characterizes how a mergers profitability and efficiency are affected by its size and by its scale economy factor d in a Cournot market with linear demand and quadratic costs. Our results allow us to challenge the widely believed view among economists that mergers typically are not profitable for the insiders (merged firms). In contrast to the minimum of 80% pre-merger market share required for the insiders to be profitable in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), our model shows that mergers with much less market share are also profitable. It is worth noting that in the market with diseconomies of scale (i.e., d>0), any two-firm merger could be profitable as long as its scale economy factor is greater than the critical value which is solely determined by the market size n. Our results also allow us to provide useful implications for antitrust laws especially the horizontal merger policy. In our model, mergers with economies of scale (i.e., d>-2 and d<0) and with more than 50% combined pre-merger market share are beneficial to both public interest and merging firms. This observation implies that even monopolies in this market could contribute positively to social welfare. This result is different from what Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) have obtained in their papers that only mergers with less than 50% pre-merger market share are both profitable and efficient. Although mergers generally raise price, we find that mergers can also lower price and expand output if and only if they enjoy substantial economies of scale.

This thesis characterizes how a mergers profitability and efficiency are affected by its size and by its scale economy factor d in a Cournot market with linear demand and quadratic costs. Our results allow us to challenge the widely believed view among economists that mergers typically are not profitable for the insiders (merged firms). In contrast to the minimum of 80% pre-merger market share required for the insiders to be profitable in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), our model shows that mergers with much less market share are also profitable. It is worth noting that in the market with diseconomies of scale (i.e., d>0), any two-firm merger could be profitable as long as its scale economy factor is greater than the critical value which is solely determined by the market size n. Our results also allow us to provide useful implications for antitrust laws especially the horizontal merger policy. In our model, mergers with economies of scale (i.e., d>-2 and d<0) and with more than 50% combined pre-merger market share are beneficial to both public interest and merging firms. This observation implies that even monopolies in this market could contribute positively to social welfare. This result is different from what Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) have obtained in their papers that only mergers with less than 50% pre-merger market share are both profitable and efficient. Although mergers generally raise price, we find that mergers can also lower price and expand output if and only if they enjoy substantial economies of scale.

Concerns over the total costs assessed to the beef industry from the implementation of mandatory country-of-origin labeling (COOL) regulations warranted an investigation into the estimation and distribution of marketing and marginal costs of production for retail chain stores and distributors, meat packers and processors, cattle feedlots, cattle backgrounding yards and cow-calf producers. Furthermore, it is thought the implementation of COOL will impose severe market and social welfare effects on the participants in the beef industry. This research focused on two main objectives. The first objective is to provide a full beef industry cost assessment for implementing COOL regulations based on the preliminary guidelines for COOL as published by the United States Department of Agriculture in the proposed rule in October of 2003. Financial and production data was collected and used from U.S. retail chain stores and distributors, meat packers and processors, cattle feedlots, and cattle backgrounding yards and stockers. The second objective was to use the weighted average cost estimates calculated from the data to determine the magnitude of increases in the demand for retail beef, wholesale beef, fed cattle, and feeder cattle needed to negate the increase in costs of implementing mandatory COOL regulations. An equilibrium displacement model was used to demonstrate the supply and demand functions and relationships for retail beef, wholesale beef, fed cattle, and feeder cattle. Estimated elasticities for retail beef, wholesale beef, fed cattle and feeder cattle were used to calculate the relative changes in price and quantity in response to the COOL-induced supply and demand shifts. The quantity intercepts from the estimation of the linear parameters can be used to calculate the increases in consumer demand needed to negate the increases in costs estimated from the survey results for the retail, wholesale, fed cattle, and feeder cattle sectors of the beef industry. A significant cost burden to the beef industry was shown by the weighted average estimates calculated from the research. Retail chain stores and distributors, meat packers and processors, cattle feedlots and cattle stockers are expected to see an increase in marketing and marginal costs of production as a result of implementing COOL.

This thesis contains five papers studying the economic efficiency and political acceptability of road pricing policies and transport investments in distorted economies. Interactions between the transport market and other distorted markets, such as the labor market, can have a large impact on the welfare effect of a road pricing policy or a transport investment. Many road pricing studies therefore try to incorporate effects from other distorted markets in the analysis. Paper I analyzes how the economic efficiency of a road toll in a distorted economy depends on assumptions about the initial tax system. In the road pricing literature, the welfare effect of a road toll is often found to depend on revenue use. Using a simple general equilibrium model paper I shows that the relative efficiency of marginal revenue recycling policies depends more on assumptions regarding inefficiencies in the initial tax system than on the road toll per se. Paper II studies the effect on welfare, equity and labor supply from a road toll in a commuting population with heterogeneous value of time and endogenous labor supply. When explicitly taking into account that commuters have different value of time, the road toll can increase total labor supply even when the revenues are not recycled back to the commuters. The analysis stresses the importance of recognizing traveler heterogeneity when analyzing congestion pricing. Road pricing policies are often characterized by conflicting interests between different stakeholders and different geographical areas. Papers III and IV study the economic efficiency and political acceptability of pricing and investment policies in different institutional and geographical settings. The main contribution of the papers is to explain how political constraints can lead to inefficient tolling strategies. The papers contribute to the existing literature on political acceptability of road pricing by analyzing the conflict and potential trade-off between political acceptability and economic efficiency. A difficulty when assessing the welfare effect of a future transport policy is also that many factors and parameters needed for the analysis are uncertain. Paper V studies the climate benefit of an investment in high speed rail by calculating the magnitude of annual traffic emission reduction required to compensate for the annualized embedded emissions from the construction of the line. The paper finds that to be able to balance the annualized emissions from the construction, traffic volumes of more than 10 million annual one-way trips are usually required, and most of the traffic diverted from other transport modes must come from aviation. / <p>QC 20121010</p>

<p>Trade in agricultural products between Mexico and the EU only counts for a small percentage of total trade between them. With the entry into force of the EU-Mexico FTA in 2000, the tariffs on a number of agriculture commodities between the two parties was eliminated or reduced. This will lead to an opening in the trade of agricultural products between the two markets, something that could affect the welfare of the Mexican people positively, if new trade is created. The elimination and reduction of tariffs on agricultural goods could also lead to positive consumption effects as prices on these goods could be lowered. Lower prices on agricultural goods could help a large number of people, especially the poor people of Mexico. </p><p>In this thesis, using theories on preferential trade, I aim to examine the effects on the Mexican people due to the elimination of traiffs on agricultural goods between Mexico and the EU consequential to the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement. The investigation was carried out for the first two years after integration between the two parties, focusing on agricultural goods in particular. I also aim to determine if there is any group in the Mexican society that has benefited more in terms of welfare as a consequence of the new FTA.</p>

Trade in agricultural products between Mexico and the EU only counts for a small percentage of total trade between them. With the entry into force of the EU-Mexico FTA in 2000, the tariffs on a number of agriculture commodities between the two parties was eliminated or reduced. This will lead to an opening in the trade of agricultural products between the two markets, something that could affect the welfare of the Mexican people positively, if new trade is created. The elimination and reduction of tariffs on agricultural goods could also lead to positive consumption effects as prices on these goods could be lowered. Lower prices on agricultural goods could help a large number of people, especially the poor people of Mexico. In this thesis, using theories on preferential trade, I aim to examine the effects on the Mexican people due to the elimination of traiffs on agricultural goods between Mexico and the EU consequential to the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement. The investigation was carried out for the first two years after integration between the two parties, focusing on agricultural goods in particular. I also aim to determine if there is any group in the Mexican society that has benefited more in terms of welfare as a consequence of the new FTA.

Sverige införde den 1 april 2018 en flygskatt, på 60 kr inrikes, för att sänka flygplanens miljöpåverkan. Syftet med denna studie var att estimera välfärdseffekterna av denna skatt, med 2017 och 2019 som jämförelseår med data från både Trafikanalys och tidigare studier. I min studie kommer endast inrikesflyg i Sverige att analyseras, men data från utrikesflyg och inrikes tåg har tagits med för att kunna ge en bättre bild över hur inrikes flygresor har påverkats av flygskatten. Flygskatten påverkar antalet inrikesresor i Sverige, det blir färre resor vilket leder till välfärdsförluster. I och med att det blir färre resor, kommer däremot den globala nyttan öka på grund av minskat koldioxidutsläpp. Resultatet är varierat beroende på vilka antaganden som görs och vilket värde som används för koldioxidutsläppen. I huvudanalysen ger värdet som användes i Sverige för koldioxid välfärdsvinsten 59 640 000 kr, med värde från EDF blir välfärdsvinsten 11 152 000 kr. Med värde från Tyskland blir det en välfärdsförlust på 8 954 104 kr och om priset på utsläppsrätter inom EU ETS används blir förlusten 5 514 040 kr. Studien har som ett alternativ utgått ifrån data  från en tidigare studie. Med denna data blir istället den totala välfärdsvinsten 42 424 400 kr med Sveriges värde och 8 007 920 kr med värde från EDF. Tysklands värde på koldioxid gav då istället välfärdsförlusten 6 267 413 kr och EU ETS estimerades bli en förlust på 3 824 968 kr. För att få välfärdsförlusten att vara lika stor som välfärdsvinsten krävs det ett estimerat värde på drygt 355 kr per ton koldioxid. / On April 1st 2018 Sweden introduced an aviation tax, at 60 kr for flights domestically, in order to reduce the amount of impact on the climate. The purpose of this study is to estimate the welfare effects of the said tax, using 2017 and 2019 as comparison years. The data that is used to make the estimations are taken from Trafikanalys and previous studies. My study will only be estimating the welfare effects on the domestic flights in Sweden, but in order to get a better understanding of how the aviation tax has affected the flights, data from both international flights and domestic trains will be used as well. Due to the decrease in the number of flights, a welfare loss will arise, but as a result of this less carbon dioxide will be released and result in a global welfare gain. The results are varied depending on what assumptions are made and what value of carbon dioxide is used. In the main analysis, the value of carbon dioxide in Sweden results in a welfare gain of 59 640 000 kr. With the value from EDF the welfare gain is instead 11 152 000 kr, whereas the German value gives us a welfare loss of 8 954 104 kr. The value of emissions rights in the EU ETS instead gives us a loss of 5 514 040 kr. As an alternative, my study has used data from an earlier study which resulted in Sweden's value giving us a welfare gain of      42 424 400 kr. With the new data from the earlier study, EDF’s value results in a 8 007 920 kr gain. Both Germany’s value and EU ETS’s value still results in a welfare loss, with Germany at 6 267 413 kr loss and EU ETS at 3 824 968 kr. In order for as much gains as losses to be made, the value of a ton carbon dioxide must be 355 kr.

This dissertation investigates the impact that a duopoly of a multinational firm and local firm has on a closed economy as they engage in Bertrand competition involving quality and price. It answers the question: Does helping a minor firm reduce welfare? Using a different framework than the existing literature, I examine the following: 1. The welfare effect of a reduction in the R\&D cost parameter induced by ``help'' from the government to one of the firms within a closed economy. 2. The effects of government policy instruments (taxes or subsidies) on welfare considering different ownership of the firms and trade pattern - closed economy and export-oriented economy as government institutes a unilateral policy, discriminatory policy, or non-discriminatory policy. 3. How marginal cost of production of the local firm affects welfare within a closed economy when all consumers are either served or partially-served. In chapter 1, we provide a review of past literature that have studied the endogenous choice of quality by firms and describe how this dissertation is organized. In chapter 2, we examine effect on national welfare from competition in quality between a multinational firm and a local firm operating in a vertically differentiated oligopolistic industry given their strategic use of R\&D costs without any possibility of spillover effects. The model assumes that the multinational firm produces high quality product and the local firm produces low quality product. Both firms have zero marginal production cost. Assuming a closed-economy, we determine the effect of a change in the local firm's R\&D cost parameter on the endogenous variables (prices and qualities) as well as national welfare. We found that a reduction in the cost parameter of the local firm do increase national welfare. Chapter 3 extends the work of Chapter 2. It investigates the incentives to a government for instituting strategic trade policy (unilateral, discriminatory or non-discriminatory) mechanism that would induce R\&D within the duopoly of a multinational and local firms and thereby promote national welfare, under varying assumptions with respect to the ownership structure of the firms and their trade patterns. It determines which policy mechanism would be socially optimal to strategically affect the quality of the target firm (local). We find under an open-economy situation when government policy is unilateral, the optimal policy tool to pursue is a subsidy for the local firm. When the economy is partially-closed, it is optimal for the government to tax the local firm. Besides, under a discriminatory policy mechanism, it is best for government to subsidize the local firm and tax the foreign firm when both export to a third country. However, if both sell to a third country, but profit is retained in the domestic economy, it becomes optimal for the government to tax the local firm. Under a non-discriminatory policy by government when the firms operate within an open-economy, the optimal tool is a tax policy for government that affects both firms. Moreover, when the firms operate within a partially closed-economy, the optimal policy is also a tax policy on both firms. Whereas, given a non-discriminatory policy under a closed-economy framework, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the firms. As a result, these mechanisms by government do promote social welfare as well as correct any distortion that might result into making the multinational firm having a significant market power within the industry. In Chapter 4, we relax the assumption of Chapter 2 that the firms have zero production cost. The duopoly is considered to operate under the condition that one of the firms (local firm) has a production cost disadvantage. The firms are assumed to served the entire market. Hence, the firms compete within a fully covered market scenario. Considering a variable unit (constant marginal) cost of production of the local firm, we determine the effect of an increase in production cost of the local firm on national (total) welfare. We find that within a closed-economy, due to strategic substitutability of the products of both firms, an increase in the marginal cost of production by the local firm would bring about reduction in national social welfare. Chapter 5 continues our welfare analysis. It assumes the firms have asymmetric production costs. The cost of production depends on investment in R\&D to produce an output of quality, $q_i$. Now, we do not associate the output quality to a specific firm in the beginning of our analysis. Notwithstanding, we assume the firms are required to meet a minimum quality standard in the industry. Then, we seek to find the effect of the marginal cost of production of the local firm on national welfare. We find unlike previous chapters, an increase in marginal cost of production by the local firm results into increase benefits to consumers. Hence, national social welfare is improved (positive).

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Morelatti Valenca.pdf: 1731939 bytes, checksum: 7262e318ccfba1e8f24d8bfc0738c7eb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-22 / This study aims to analyze the welfare effects of criminal conviction-dependent killing the insured for the perception of death pension. Society imposes repression of incompatible conduct with the social peace. Thus, one who intentionally kills the insured and claims the pension benefit, hiding this fact, acting in bad faith. With regard to theoretical and methodological studies were conducted collection, study articles, doctrines and court decisions. The results achieved with the thesis in the report concluded that the death pension granted to dependent who intentionally killed the insured must be annulled after the final judgment of the criminal sentence and consequent start of administrative proceedings for cancellation of benefit, ensuring the contradictory and legal defense to run. However, the penal sentence and the consequent responsibility of the murderer dependent can no longer be rediscussed in the administrative process. The bad faith never disappear and should be discarded the theory of consumed fact. Also confirmed that currently there is no mechanism to ensure the communication of the welfare of the criminal sentence, which abruptly affront the principle of administrative efficiency. Therefore, including the suggestion of compulsory communication of social security in the Criminal Procedure Code as soon as the final judgment certification of the criminal sentence is imposed. Also ensuring the administrative efficiency, therefore, the common good, is the suggestion of creating a National Register of Criminal Judgments final sentencing and unappealable, the State Law and Federal, common and specialized / O presente estudo tem por finalidade analisar os efeitos previdenciários da condenação criminal de dependente que mata o segurado para percepção de pensão por morte. A sociedade impõe repressão à conduta incompatível com a paz social. Assim, aquele que mata dolosamente o segurado e pleiteia o benefício previdenciário, ocultando esse fato, age de má-fé. Com relação aos estudos teórico-metodológicos, foram realizados coleta, estudo de artigos, doutrinas e decisões jurisprudenciais. Os resultados alcançados com a tese nos reportam à conclusão de que a pensão por morte deferida ao dependente que matou dolosamente o segurado deve ser anulada após o trânsito em julgado da sentença penal condenatória e consequente instauração de processo administrativo para anulação de benefício, garantindo o contraditório e ampla defesa ao administrado. Todavia, a sentença penal condenatória e a consequente responsabilidade do dependente homicida não mais poderá ser novamente discutida no processo administrativo. A má-fé nunca convalesce devendo ser afastada a teoria do fato consumado. Também restou comprovado que, atualmente, não há nenhum mecanismo que garanta a comunicação da previdência social da sentença penal condenatória, o que afronta abruptamente o princípio da eficiência administrativa. Logo, a sugestão de inserção da obrigatoriedade de comunicação da previdência social no Código de Processo Penal tão logo ocorra a certificação do trânsito em julgado da sentença penal condenatória é medida que se impõe. Também zelando pela eficiência administrativa, portanto, bem comum, é a sugestão de criação de um Cadastro Nacional de Sentenças Penais Condenatórias com trânsito em julgado, da Justiça Estadual e Federal, comum e especializada

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