Inspired by the contrapuntal and relational critiques of Edward Said and Ella Shohat, this thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the literature and film of Arab Jews in order to deconstruct discourses on Jewish identity that privilege the dichotomies of Israel-diaspora and Arab-Jew. Sami Michael’s novel Refuge, Naim Kattan’s memoir Farewell, Babylon, Karin Albou’s film Little Jerusalem and b.h. Yael’s video documentary Fresh Blood: a Consideration of Belonging reveal the complexities and interconnections of Sephardic, Mizrahi and Arab Jewish experiences across multiple geographies that are often silenced under dominant Eurocentric, Ashkenazi or Zionist interpretations of Jewish history. Drawing from these texts, Jewish identity is explored through four philosophical themes: Jewish beginnings vs. origins, boundaries between Arab and Jew, the construction of Jewish identities in place and space, and, the concept of diaspora and the importance Jewish difference. As a double-diaspora, with the two poles of their identities seen as enemies in the ongoing conflict between Israel-Palestine, Arab Jews challenge the conception of a single Jewish nation, ethnicity, identity or culture. Jewishness can better be understood as a rhizome, a system without a centre and made of heterogeneous component, that is able to create, recreate and move through multiple territories, rather than ever settling in, or being confined to a single form that seeks to dominate over others. This dissertation contributes a unique theoretical reading of Jewish cultures in the plural, and includes an examination of lesser known Arab Jewish writing and experimental documentary in Canada in relation to Iraq, France and Israel.

This thesis deals with the relations between Czechoslovakia and Israel in 1967-1971. It is specifically concerned with anti-Zionist policies of the socialist regime, which reflected themselves not only in the anti-Israeli stance of Czechoslovakia, but also in the relations of state authorities towards Jewish minority, and bore antisemitic characteristics. Contrary to lasting rigorous refusal of antisemitism since 1940s/50s, Czechoslovakia manifested its hostility towards Israel on regular basis. Struggle against Zionism was one of the aims of the Czechoslovak ideological war against alleged or real adversaries. For the regime, Israel represented West, and West was full of so called centres of ideological diversion. One of such centres was also Radio Free Europe (RFE). Author of the thesis assumes that RFE not only reflected the ideological struggle concerning Jews and "Zionists," in Czechoslovakia, but also played a role of a counter-balancing force in the matter. By means of analysis of RFE situation reports, the thesis evaluates the extent of RFE counter-balance of the Czechoslovak anti-Zionist ideology. After theoretical introduction (chapter one), changes in the relations of Czechoslovakia towards Israel and local Jewish community in 1945-1967 are described. Second chapter also debates tension...

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This project explores how and why an Americanized form of Zionism became an effective movement in American Jewish life. In the quest for a just and lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most scholarly attention has been focused on the state (and people) of Israel and the people of Palestine, and their efforts to resolve the conflict that has held them in its grip over the past century. As a result, we have focused too little attention on the role of support for U.S. nationalism in the American Jewish community in sustaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I argue likewise that a critical juncture in this process occurred in the early twentieth century, as the United States emerged as an international power. American Jewish support for Zionism overlaps in many ways with Progressivism. Many of the early leaders of Americanized Zionism, such as Horace M. Kallen and Justice Louis Brandeis, began their careers as Progressive reformers and brought their ideas about social and political action with them into the Zionist movement. Brandeis in particular played a critical role in making Zionism acceptable to American Jews, in no small part by asserting that the Zionism he advocated was required no commitment to emigration. As this Americanized version of Zionism has become normalized in American Jewish life, the principle of Jewish sovereignty has become widely understood among American Jews to be an essential guarantor of Jewish safety. To understand the roots and implications of this stance, I explore the genealogy of the idea of sovereignty, as well as the binary opposition of “Arabs” and “Jews” in Euro-American thought. Americanized Zionism, I conclude, is less a product of Jewish ethnicity or religion than enactment of a commitment to U.S. nationalism as a fundamental aspect of American Jewish identity. / Religion

Since the time of their arrival beginning around 2005, there remain approximately 46,000 African asylum seekers in Israel. The following paper reviews the foundations and implications of Israel’s political discourse in reference to the presence of this community. I situate the treatment of the asylum seekers in their relationship to the Jewish State, Zionist ideology, international refugee law, and Israel’s human rights community. I argue: 1) that the discourse surrounding the asylum seekers reflects larger changes within the ethos of the Jewish State and models of Israeli personhood; 2) that notions of “security” and “threat” in relation to the asylum seekers take on new meanings shaped by Israel’s ongoing demographic concerns; and 3) that the political response to the African asylum seekers sheds light on irreconcilable goals of the Zionist nation-building project seeking to both maintain a Jewish majority and liberate world Jewry from life segregated and isolated in the Diaspora. / Anthropology

This study offers an interpretation of political change in Israel through an examination of amendments to Israel's personal status laws (PSLs) - ""laws governing marriage, divorce, death, inheritance, and adoption. I found that separate ethno-religious groups, including Arab Muslims, non-Western Jews, and non-religious persons (including some secular Jews), do not enjoy equal access to the civil right of marriage and divorce that citizens commonly enjoy within other Western liberal nations. Marriage and divorce within Israel are only accessble through, and sanctioned by, religious institutions. I argue that Israel's PSLs reflect a significant paradox within liberalism, namely the inherent tension between the state's guarantee of religious rights versus the constitutional protection of citizens' civil rights. My research begins within political theory, grounded in theories of liberalism, biopolitics, nationalism, and post-colonial studies. Part one traces the history of Israel from the late Ottoman period through the founding of the State in 1948, with consideration paid both to Israel's founders (and the political Zionisms they espoused) and to political Zionism's critics (including Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin, and Judith Butler). I then turn to a examination of Israel's PSLs, asking what is at stake when a liberal, democratic nation bases its laws governing marriage and divorce upon religious law rather than developing civil laws governing these institutions. Part two considers four legal arrangements caught in a crucial political paradox: laws and programs regulating the lives of women, laws outlawing polygynous marriages, changes in laws surrounding exogamous and cross-border marriages, and the treatment of Ethiopian Jews under the law. Each of these cases demonstrate the ways PSLs are used to address growing concerns over the security and national identity of the Jewish State. Through these four examples, Israel's concerns over national identity, citizenship, and security become manifest, and one important instance of the paradox of liberalism comes into focus. Ultimately, while Israel is unique as the world's only Jewish state, Israel becomes understandable as a liberal state experiencing many of the same anxieties and internal liberal problematics experienced by other states as well. / Ph. D.

Facile de discourir sur la paix ; complexe, par contre, d’évaluer si paroles et gestes y contribuent vraiment. De manière critique, ce mémoire cherche à contextualiser l’émergence de la nation israélienne de 1881 à 1948, de même qu’un certain nombre de forces pacifistes juives, religieuses comme séculières, sionistes comme anti-sionistes, que cette société a engendrées ou provoquées de la fin du XIXe siècle à aujourd’hui. Dans un premier temps, quatre stratégies utilisées pour construire l’État juif sont explorées : la voie pratique (l’établissement de mochavot, kibboutzim et mochavim), la voie diplomatique (le lobbying de Herzl et Weizmann), la voie sociopolitique (la formation de syndicats, de l’Agence juive et du Va’ad Leoumi) et enfin la voie militaire (la mise sur pied d’organisations paramilitaires telles la Hagana, l’Irgoun, le Lehi et le Palmah). Cette exploration permet de mieux camper le problème de la légalité et de la légitimité des nations palestinienne et israélienne. Dans un deuxième temps, une approche conceptuelle et une approche empirique sont combinées pour mieux comprendre ce qu’est un camp de la paix. L’exploration conceptuelle remet en question les critères qu’utilisent certains chercheurs afin d’identifier si une organisation contribue, ou non, à la construction de la paix. L’exploration empirique trace les contours de deux camps de la paix israéliens : les militants de la gauche séculière achkenazi (un pacifisme qui a émergé dans les années 1970) et les religieux haredim (un pacifisme opposé à l’idéologie sioniste dès ses débuts). Ce survol permet de saisir que tout système de croyances peut provoquer la guerre autant que la paix. La conclusion discute des défis du dialogue intercivilisationnel, des défis tant intranationaux (l’harmonie sociale israélienne entre les juifs achkenazim, mizrahim, russes, éthiopiens, etc.) qu’internationaux (la paix entre les Palestiniens et les Israéliens). / It is easy to speak of peace, but much more difficult to evaluate to what extent one’s actions really contribute to it. This master’s thesis seeks to critically contextualize the emergence of the Israeli nation from 1881 to 1948 and highlight certain Jewish pacifist forces, religious and secular, zionist and anti-zionist, which this society has generated or compelled into being from the end of the XIXth century until today. First, four strategies used to build the Jewish state are explored: the practical path (setting up moshavot, kibbutzim and moshavim), the diplomatic path (Herzl and Weizmann’s lobbying), the sociopolitical path (establishing unions, the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi) and finally the military path (setting up paramilitary organizations such as Hagana, Irgun, Lehi and Palmach). This exploration allows the researcher to better frame the issue of the legality and legitimacy of the Palestinian and Israeli nations. Secondly, the notion of peace camp is investigated using a combined conceptual and empirical approach. The conceptual inquiry questions the criteria used by some scholars to determine whether an organization contributes or not to peacebuilding. The empirical inquiry examines two peace camps: the Ashkenazi secular left (a pacifism that emerged in the 1970s) and the religious Haredim (a pacifism opposed to the zionist ideology from the start). This overview highlights the fact that any belief system can incite war as well as peace. The conclusion discusses the challenges of intercivilizational dialogue, challenges that are both intranational (social harmony between Ashkenazim, Mizrachim, Russian, Ethiopian, etc. Israeli Jews) and international (peace between Palestinians and Israelis).

O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer” os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer" os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.

Facile de discourir sur la paix ; complexe, par contre, d’évaluer si paroles et gestes y contribuent vraiment. De manière critique, ce mémoire cherche à contextualiser l’émergence de la nation israélienne de 1881 à 1948, de même qu’un certain nombre de forces pacifistes juives, religieuses comme séculières, sionistes comme anti-sionistes, que cette société a engendrées ou provoquées de la fin du XIXe siècle à aujourd’hui. Dans un premier temps, quatre stratégies utilisées pour construire l’État juif sont explorées : la voie pratique (l’établissement de mochavot, kibboutzim et mochavim), la voie diplomatique (le lobbying de Herzl et Weizmann), la voie sociopolitique (la formation de syndicats, de l’Agence juive et du Va’ad Leoumi) et enfin la voie militaire (la mise sur pied d’organisations paramilitaires telles la Hagana, l’Irgoun, le Lehi et le Palmah). Cette exploration permet de mieux camper le problème de la légalité et de la légitimité des nations palestinienne et israélienne. Dans un deuxième temps, une approche conceptuelle et une approche empirique sont combinées pour mieux comprendre ce qu’est un camp de la paix. L’exploration conceptuelle remet en question les critères qu’utilisent certains chercheurs afin d’identifier si une organisation contribue, ou non, à la construction de la paix. L’exploration empirique trace les contours de deux camps de la paix israéliens : les militants de la gauche séculière achkenazi (un pacifisme qui a émergé dans les années 1970) et les religieux haredim (un pacifisme opposé à l’idéologie sioniste dès ses débuts). Ce survol permet de saisir que tout système de croyances peut provoquer la guerre autant que la paix. La conclusion discute des défis du dialogue intercivilisationnel, des défis tant intranationaux (l’harmonie sociale israélienne entre les juifs achkenazim, mizrahim, russes, éthiopiens, etc.) qu’internationaux (la paix entre les Palestiniens et les Israéliens). / It is easy to speak of peace, but much more difficult to evaluate to what extent one’s actions really contribute to it. This master’s thesis seeks to critically contextualize the emergence of the Israeli nation from 1881 to 1948 and highlight certain Jewish pacifist forces, religious and secular, zionist and anti-zionist, which this society has generated or compelled into being from the end of the XIXth century until today. First, four strategies used to build the Jewish state are explored: the practical path (setting up moshavot, kibbutzim and moshavim), the diplomatic path (Herzl and Weizmann’s lobbying), the sociopolitical path (establishing unions, the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi) and finally the military path (setting up paramilitary organizations such as Hagana, Irgun, Lehi and Palmach). This exploration allows the researcher to better frame the issue of the legality and legitimacy of the Palestinian and Israeli nations. Secondly, the notion of peace camp is investigated using a combined conceptual and empirical approach. The conceptual inquiry questions the criteria used by some scholars to determine whether an organization contributes or not to peacebuilding. The empirical inquiry examines two peace camps: the Ashkenazi secular left (a pacifism that emerged in the 1970s) and the religious Haredim (a pacifism opposed to the zionist ideology from the start). This overview highlights the fact that any belief system can incite war as well as peace. The conclusion discusses the challenges of intercivilizational dialogue, challenges that are both intranational (social harmony between Ashkenazim, Mizrachim, Russian, Ethiopian, etc. Israeli Jews) and international (peace between Palestinians and Israelis).