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In this paper I present a theoretical analysis (genetic decomposition) of the cognitive constructions for the concept of infinite Riemann sums following Piaget\'s model of epistemology. This genetic decomposition is primarily based on my own mathematical knowledge as well as on my continual observations of students in the process of learning. Based on this analysis I plan to suggest instructional procedures that motivate the mental activities described in the proposed genetic decomposition. In a later study, I plan to present empirical data in the form of informal interviews with students at different stages of learning. The analysis of those interviews may suggest a review of my initial genetic decomposition.

Univ., Diss--Bielefeld, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. 189 - 205.

Thesis (Doctoral)--Freie Universität Berlin. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 336-361) and index.

The topic of this diploma thesis is an analysis of history of special language of architecture in Paul Decker´s ?Ausführliche Anleitung zur Civilbaukunst (Bd.1)?. This thesis is divided into nine basic parts. The first, second and third parts characterize the special language, baroque and Paul Decker´s life and work. The following parts concentrate on the analysis of the special language presenting in this Decker´s work, that means on morphology, word-formative processes, the role of metaphors and foreign words, polysemy and synonyms, hyponyms, hyperonyms and co-hyponyms as well as the relation between verbal and nonverbal language part.

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A presente dissertação tem como objeto o prefácio da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes (FMC). Sua investigação concentra-se na concepção aí contida da disciplina da Metafísica dos Costumes, concepção essa pouca levada em conta para a compreensão da argumentação ulterior da FMC. Inicialmente abordamos (i) o que seria essa disciplina a partir da topologia das disciplinas filosóficas oferecida por Kant. Em seguida, exploramos (ii) o conceito de vontade pura, declaradamente o objeto de uma Metafísica dos Costumes. Na sequência investigamos (iii) o conceito de boa vontade, a fim de localizar o conceito de vontade pura na FMC. Como resultado, uma série de distinções úteis são alcançadas. Em (i), introduzimos a distinção entre os dois níveis da disciplina da Metafísica dos Costumes, na falta de termos melhores, “transcendental” e “humano”, a fim de harmonizar afirmações aparentemente contraditórias de Kant na FMC e na obra Metafísica dos Costumes. Em (ii), distinguimos pelo menos três usos distintos do conceito de vontade pura por parte de Kant, a saber, como (a) capacidade de determinar/motivar a vontade de certa maneira; como (b) a vontade determinada/motivada de certa maneira e como (c) a vontade maximamente determinada/motivada de certa maneira. Já em (iii), rastreamos a distinção entre pelo menos três usos do conceito de boa vontade, a saber, como (a) capacidade universalmente difundida de um agente racional agir moralmente; como (b) o bom caráter esparsamente difundido de quem se compromete firmemente com a lei moral, e como (c) a vontade maximamente boa, universalmente ausente porquanto uma ideia. Por fim, a partir da sobreposição dos três usos de ambos os conceitos, concluimos pela identificação do conceito de vontade pura com aquele de boa vontade. / The subject of the present dissertation is the preface of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork). Our investigation focused on the conception of the discipline of the Metaphysics of Morals presented in the preface, whose role for the understanding of the ulterior argumentation of the Groundwork is overlooked. Initially we investigate (i) what is this discipline taking as the start point the topology of the philosophical disciplines offered by Kant. Then we explore (ii) the concept of pure will, professedly the object of a Metaphysics of Morals. Finally we investigate (iii) the concept of a good will, in order to locate the concept of a pure will in the Groundwork. As a result, a number of useful distinctions are achieved. In (i), we introduce the distinction between the two levels within the discipline of the Metaphysics of Morals, in the absence of better terms, “transcendental” and “human”, in order to make coherent the apparently contradictory statements of Kant in the Groundwork and in the Metaphysics of Morals. In (ii) we distinguish at least three uses by Kant of the concept of pure will, namely, the pure will (a) as a capacity of determining/motivating the will in a certain way; as (b) a will determined/motivated in a certain way and (c) as a will maximally determined/motivated in a certain way. In (iii) we track the distinction between at least three uses of the concept of good will, namely, the good will (a) as a universally diffused capacity of a rational agent to act morally good; (b) as a sparsely diffused good character of a person steadily commited to the moral law, and (c) as a universally absent maximally good will, since it is an idea. Lastly, we identify both concepts, since their three uses overlap.

A presente dissertação tem como objeto o prefácio da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes (FMC). Sua investigação concentra-se na concepção aí contida da disciplina da Metafísica dos Costumes, concepção essa pouca levada em conta para a compreensão da argumentação ulterior da FMC. Inicialmente abordamos (i) o que seria essa disciplina a partir da topologia das disciplinas filosóficas oferecida por Kant. Em seguida, exploramos (ii) o conceito de vontade pura, declaradamente o objeto de uma Metafísica dos Costumes. Na sequência investigamos (iii) o conceito de boa vontade, a fim de localizar o conceito de vontade pura na FMC. Como resultado, uma série de distinções úteis são alcançadas. Em (i), introduzimos a distinção entre os dois níveis da disciplina da Metafísica dos Costumes, na falta de termos melhores, “transcendental” e “humano”, a fim de harmonizar afirmações aparentemente contraditórias de Kant na FMC e na obra Metafísica dos Costumes. Em (ii), distinguimos pelo menos três usos distintos do conceito de vontade pura por parte de Kant, a saber, como (a) capacidade de determinar/motivar a vontade de certa maneira; como (b) a vontade determinada/motivada de certa maneira e como (c) a vontade maximamente determinada/motivada de certa maneira. Já em (iii), rastreamos a distinção entre pelo menos três usos do conceito de boa vontade, a saber, como (a) capacidade universalmente difundida de um agente racional agir moralmente; como (b) o bom caráter esparsamente difundido de quem se compromete firmemente com a lei moral, e como (c) a vontade maximamente boa, universalmente ausente porquanto uma ideia. Por fim, a partir da sobreposição dos três usos de ambos os conceitos, concluimos pela identificação do conceito de vontade pura com aquele de boa vontade. / The subject of the present dissertation is the preface of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork). Our investigation focused on the conception of the discipline of the Metaphysics of Morals presented in the preface, whose role for the understanding of the ulterior argumentation of the Groundwork is overlooked. Initially we investigate (i) what is this discipline taking as the start point the topology of the philosophical disciplines offered by Kant. Then we explore (ii) the concept of pure will, professedly the object of a Metaphysics of Morals. Finally we investigate (iii) the concept of a good will, in order to locate the concept of a pure will in the Groundwork. As a result, a number of useful distinctions are achieved. In (i), we introduce the distinction between the two levels within the discipline of the Metaphysics of Morals, in the absence of better terms, “transcendental” and “human”, in order to make coherent the apparently contradictory statements of Kant in the Groundwork and in the Metaphysics of Morals. In (ii) we distinguish at least three uses by Kant of the concept of pure will, namely, the pure will (a) as a capacity of determining/motivating the will in a certain way; as (b) a will determined/motivated in a certain way and (c) as a will maximally determined/motivated in a certain way. In (iii) we track the distinction between at least three uses of the concept of good will, namely, the good will (a) as a universally diffused capacity of a rational agent to act morally good; (b) as a sparsely diffused good character of a person steadily commited to the moral law, and (c) as a universally absent maximally good will, since it is an idea. Lastly, we identify both concepts, since their three uses overlap.

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