In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0909330111 |
Creators | Yeh,Jessie |
Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
Language | 英文 |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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