Kommersiella fastigheter har setts som en inflationsskyddad tillgång och en viktig del i densvenska ekonomin. Stigande fastighetspriser och låga finansieringskostnader har varitfördelaktigt för de kommersiella fastighetsbolagen i Sverige. Många bolag har under periodenvarit aktiva på kapitalmarknaden och emitterat skuld till en låg kostnad. Under år 2022–2023har inflationen ökat vilket har genererat i penningpolitiska åtgärder som i sin tur ha genereraten ökad riskfri ränta. Finansieringskostnaden för svenska fastighetssektorn har ökat vilket harbidragit till att många fastighetsbolag har varit tvungna att se över sin finansiering. Obligationersom har emitterats under en period när räntan har varit låg är påväg att löpa ut och detmakroekonomiska händelserna kräver åtgärder från fastighetsbolagens sida. Under det senasteåret har fastighetsbolag genomfört obligationsåterköp som en åtgärd i att stärka den finansiellahälsan. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utvärdera incitamenten och effekterna av obligationsåterköpen somhar genomförts av svenska kommersiella fastighetsbolag. Uppsatsen baseras på branschinsattapersoner som genom sin kunskap och expertis anses ge perspektiv i studien. Utöver intervjuerbaseras uppsatsen på bolag av som har genomfört återköp. I studien framgår attobligationsåterköp genomförs som en rad bland andra åtgärder för att stärka bolagetsfinansieringssituation. Effekterna är starkt beroende av finansieringskällan och incitamenten ärbolagsspecifika. / Commercial real estate has long been regarded as an inflation-safe asset and a crucialcomponent in the Swedish economy. Raising real estate values and low financing costs hasbeen beneficial for Swedish commercial real estate companies. Several companies have beenactive on the capital market and issued bonds at a low cost. The inflation has been rising duringthe year 2022-2023, leading to monetary policy measures that have increased risk-free interestrates. As a result, Swedish commercial real estate has been forced to look over its financingside due to increasing financing costs. Bonds issued during a period of low interest are nowexpiring and the macroeconomic events require measures from the companies side. In the pastyear, several real estate companies have made bond repurchases as a measure to strengthen thefinancing side. This thesis aims to study the incentives and effects of the bond repurchases which have beenmade by Swedish real estate companies. The thesis is based on interviews with persons ofexperience from the commercial real estate and bond market to give perspective to this thesis.Additionally, the thesis is also based on companies that have made bond repurchases. Thefindings reveal that bond repurchases are made as one of other measures to strengthencompanies' financing side. The effects of these repurchases closely tied to the financing formof the repurchases and the incitements are company specific.

1 Company financing analysis Abstract The aim of this thesis is to analyse the forms of financing a company, describe it, not only from a theoretical economic and legal point of view but also from a practical point of view, compare the advantages and disadvantages of various forms of financing and describe the economic and legal context and consequences of using different methods of financing. To fulfil this goal, the author used methods of analysis, comparison, induction and synthesis. The first chapter deals with the various ways of dividing the forms of financing the company, where the various types of capital are defined, which are concepts that are subsequently worked with in the following chapters. The second part of the first chapter then deals with a general description of the company's capital structure and then the basis for setting the optimal capital structure so as to achieve an ideal composition of debt and equity, especially in terms of minimizing the cost of capital and minimizing the risk resulting from the use of different types of capital. The second chapter then deals with the analysis of individual methods of financing the company from the equity and focuses mainly on financing from the company's share capital, shareholders' additional payments, depreciation, retained earnings and also...

In today’s financial markets, volatility is a fundamental concept in regards of the risk assessment of assets and instruments. Financial volatility is commonly used to measure the quantitative aspects of risk and is given a significant amount of attention in past literature and research. The leverage effect refers to the well-established negative relationship between return and future volatility. The relation is usually explained by the increased leverage ratio that arises from a drop in the share price for a firm. A lower price means lower value of the equity and while the debt remains unchanged, the leverage ratio will rise. The leverage ratio affect how risky the equity is from an investor’s perspective, hence affects the volatility of the stock. This paper aims to analyse whether the theory is applicable on the Swedish stock exchange and takes both individual stocks and the OMXS30-index into account. Further theories related to the model is acknowledged in order to enhance the analysis of the findings. The study is performed by a regression model where volatility, estimated through an EGARCH model, represents the dependent variable. Lagged return, together with a number of control variables, constitutes the explanatory variables. The findings claims that the leverage effect is present for individual stocks but can be rejected on the index level. Additionally, significant improvement was noticed when a dynamic approach was added to the model. The conclusions drawn is that the Swedish stock exchange facilitates the leverage effect for individual firms but it is off-set by other theories such as risk-return trade-off and volatility clustering for the index. / I dagens finansiella marknader är volatilitet ett fundamentalt koncept som är ytterst relevant i risk bedömningen av tillgångar och instrument. Finansiell volatilitet används ofta för att mäta risk i kvantitativ form och har på senare tiden uppmärksammats i allt större utsträckning. Leverage effekten (en.”the leverage effect”) refererar till det! väletablerade negativa samband som finns mellan avkastning i nuvarande period och framtida volatilitet. Sambandet mellan dessa faktorer har av många förklarats av en ökning i skuldsättningsgraden för ett företag. Skuldsättningsgraden ökar enligt teorin som en konsekvens av att aktiekursen sjunker, innebärande en värdeminskning av det egna kapitalet, samtidigt som skulderna förblir oförändrade. Skuldsättningsgraden påverkar i sin tur aktiens volatilitet genom en uppfattning av hur stor risk som kan förknippas med en investering i aktien. För att stärka analysen diskuteras, förutom leverage effekten, ett antal teorier som kan relateras till modellen. Uppsatsen syfte är att avgöra om leverage effekten är signifikant applicerbar på den svenska aktiemarknaden, både för individuella aktier samt OMXS30 indexet. Studien utförs genom en regressions modell där volatiliteten, estimerad genom en EGARCH model, representerar den beroende variabeln. Avkastningen i föregående period samt ett antal kontroll variabler utgör de oberoende variablerna. Resultatet visar att leverage effekten har stor applicerbarhet på de individuella aktierna men kan uteslutas på en index nivå. Dessutom ökar relevansen signifikant när en dynamisk angreppsätt adderades till modellen. Slutsatsen är att leverage effekten är närvarande på en individuell nivå men neutraliseras av teorier så som ”risk return trade off” och ”volatilitets klustring” på index nivå.

Efter finanskrisen 2008 blev bankerna mer restriktiva i sin utlåning till företag, vilket har resulterat i att företag söker alternativ finansiering via kapitalmarknaden. Utvecklingen kan härledas till implementeringen av den nya finansiella regleringen (Basel III). I den här uppsatsen analyserar jag den svenska marknaden för företagsobligationer. Jag undersöker vad som ligger bakom den kraftiga tillväxten samt hur marknaden kan komma att utvecklas framöver. Examensarbetet baseras på intervjuer med personer inom finanssektorn och tidigare forskning.På senare år har marknadsplatser såsom First North Bond Market och Räntetorget upprättats med syftet att göra marknaden mer tillgänglig för mindre företag. Till följd av detta har emissionsvolymen av företag med lägre kreditvärdighet eller utan officiellt kreditbetyg ökat. Dessutom har företagsobligationsmarknaden gynnats av historiskt låg realränta och en stark konjunktur. / Since the financial crisis 2008 banks have been more restrictive in their lendings to companies, leading to companies seeking alternatives funding through the capital markets.The development can be derived from the implementation of the new financial regulation (Basel III). In this paper, I analyze the Swedish corporate bond market. I investigate what is behind the strong growth and how the market may develop in the future. The thesis is based on interviews with people in the financial sector as well as previous reserach.In recent year, markets such as First North Bond Market and Räntetorget have been created with the aim of making the market more accessible to smaller companies. As a result, the volume of emissions of companies with lower credit ratings or without official credit ratings has increased. In addition, the corporate bond market has benefited from historically low real interest rates and a strong business cycle.

This thesis explores the effects of three important factors on a firm's investment and financing decisions, using contingent claim structural model. The first essay investigates how implementation lag impacts investment timing for a levered firm. The main finding is that implementation lag can potentially have a substantial effect on a company’s investment trigger. A crucial determinant of the lag-investment relationship is the fraction of investment cost that has to be incurred upfront. If this fraction is small, investment trigger is a decreasing function of implementation lag and the effect can be economically significant. If this fraction is large, investment trigger can be either increasing or decreasing in lag, but the magnitude of the effect is not large. The second essay investigates how future uncertain growth opportunity impacts a firm's investment timing decision and optimal leverage ratio. The firm has an option to expand profits after the first investment. However, the exercise of the growth option depends not only on the underlying profit flow but also on the uncertain arrival of the growth opportunity. The model illustrates that such uncertainty can significantly impact the initial investment timing for unlevered firm in a non-monotonic way. For levered firm, the future growth uncertainty, along with debt overhang problem, can shape the firm’s financing decision at initial investment. The third essay shows how risk-compensating performance-sensitive debt can be used to mitigate the “overinvestment” agency problem. We show that properly designed performance-sensitive debt can add significant value relative to fixed-coupon debt, and identify the risk-compensation level that maximizes shareholder wealth. The optimal risk-compensation level is found to be smaller than that required to eliminate overinvestment; thus, it is optimal for shareholders to incur some agency cost of overinvestment. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This study investigates how family ownership affects firms' financing decisions in Sweden. The study uses data on publicly listed firms in Sweden from 2014-2019 with 730 firm-year observations. Sweden has a significant portion of family firms and a business environment where control-enhancing mechanisms are used to a large extent. Agency theory and previous studies suggest that higher leverage is applied by controlling families to maintain corporate control and avoid ownership dilution. The reason is that family owners have undiversified portfolios and a strong long-term business commitment. The hypothesis is tested with fixed effects regressions. The findings show that family firms tend to be more leveraged than non-family firms, although family ownership does not impact the financing decisions of Swedish companies. The reason is that higher firm leverage in family-controlled firms is not caused by the family ownership characteristics but rather by firm-specific characteristics, such as larger firm size, lower profitability and higher tangibility, compared to their counterparts. These results imply that Swedish family companies do not apply debt issuance as a control-enhancing mechanism to preserve firm control and avoid ownership dispersion.

There is qualitative and anecdotal evidence that corporate management deviates from received risk management theory. These deviations include: an overall hesitancy to accept projects with greater levels of total risk, increased return requirements compensating for firm-specific risk, employment of hedging strategies, the insuring of diversifiable risks, corporate diversification outside of the industry constraint, and the utilization of portfolio and other variance reducing methods. The literature primarily contributes these behaviors to principal/agent conflicts. Evidence from studies on these deviations support strong arguments based in resource scarcity, cost and availability of capital, employee/community stability, and the increases in bankruptcy costs that these risk management deviation are in the interest of shareholders. When considered in the context of the long-term impact on value, the observed deviations from received corporate risk management theory contribute substantively to the perpetuation of the firm as a long-term store of value. This paper supports two hypotheses: (1) the deviation from received risk management theory by corporate managers is broadly practiced, and (2) these deviations are generally in the interest of shareholders. / Master of Arts

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This dissertation consists of two topics. Chapter 1 examines the relationship between contingent commission use and underwriting performance as well as underwriting risk using data from 2005 to 2016. Top brokers were banned from receiving contingent commissions following the inquiry in 2004 led by Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney-General. But the ban raised concerns about whether it created a level playing field across the industry, as smaller brokers continued taking them. In addition, despite the possible conflicts of interest, contingent commissions have also been recognized as a way to better align agent and insurer incentives. Regulators agreed to relax the terms for the leading brokers in 2010, resulting in a less onerous compliance regime for contingent commission use. It is important to study the effectiveness of contingent commission use on improving underwriting performance. This study finds strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contingent commissions’ usage is associated with better underwriting performance as well as lower underwriting risk. This study also finds a curvilinear relationship between underwriting performance and the level of contingent commission use. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of executive overconfidence on capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases using a sample of 37 publicly-traded property-liability insurance groups for the period 2002 to 2016. This study finds that insurance firms with overconfident executives have significantly higher leverage ratios than those without overconfident executives. This study also finds evidence that insurance firms with overconfident executives cede more reinsurance, and this evidence is stronger for insurers with more limited business capacity than those with ample business capacity. The results of this study also indicate that overconfident executives prefer internal reinsurance to external reinsurance. This research provides evidence that personality traits of executive impact capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases for insurance firms, which should be of interest to policyholders and regulators. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance

This dissertation consists of two essays on the impact of managerial entrenchment and ethical corporate citizenship on capital structure decisions of the firm. The first essay examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility and capital structure decisions of firms. Agency conflicts and asymmetric information between managers and shareholders of firms exacerbate managerial entrenchment, which is operationalized using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms within the same 3 digits SIC code is the proxy for financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as proxied by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. Results indicate that compared to managers who are not entrenched, entrenched managers obtain less rather than more debt, and they use long-term rather than short-term debt maturity. Also, entrenched managers keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for firms in small and large market value groups compared to medium sized firms. Results do not change before, during, and after the 2008 global economic crisis. The second essay examines the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value in the context of stakeholder theory. Firms listed as World's Most Ethical Companies (WMECs) exemplify ethical corporate citizenship, which is operationalized as a binary variable of 1 for WMECs, and zero for non-WMECs. This paper matches WMECs and non-WMECs control firms in the same 3 digits SIC code, and within 10 percent of total assets. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. Tobin's q is the proxy for firm value, and cost of capital is measured as the market value weighted cost of debt, and cost of equity. Results indicate that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than matched control sample of non-WMECs. Firms led by powerful CEOs have significantly lower cost of debt capital, and lower industry-adjusted Tobin's q than firms led by weak CEOs. The negative impact of CEO power on firm value is consistent with agency theory that self-interested CEOs extract firm value for personal advantage, subject to managerial controls. Results have implications for research and practice in capital structure, corporate governance, CEO compensation, and corporate social responsibility. / Doctor of Philosophy / This study consists of two essays. Essay 1 examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility, and leverage decisions of the firm. Managerial entrenchment is measured using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms measures financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as measured by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. I find that entrenched managers use less debt than managers who are not entrenched. Also, entrenched managers prefer using long-term rather than short-term debt, and they keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for small and large firms compared to medium sized firms. Essay 2 investigates the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value. Ethical corporate citizenship (ECC) refers to firms' commitment to a culture of ethics, effective governance, leadership, and innovation. ECC is measured as a binary variable of one if a firm is listed on World's Most Ethical Companies (WMEC), and zero otherwise. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice that is calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. WMECs and non-WMECs in the same 3 digits standard industry classification, which have similar total assets as the WMECs are compared. I find that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than non-WMECs. Powerful CEOs often utilize their influence to reduce cost of debt capital, but also reduce firm value compared to weak CEOs. Self-interested CEOs who extract firm value for personal advantage partly explains the negative effect of CEO power on firm value.