This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers, as revealed by the available empirical evidence, in supergame-theoretic analyses of long-term competition between oligopolistic firms. The first essay, "Ownership, Control, and Collusion", considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms' competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on "income smoothing" and when managerial compensation has the low pay-performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies. In a similar fashion, the second essay, "Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition", deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price (e.g. stock options), which have become increasingly common in the U.S., on long-term oligopolistic competition. In the third paper, "Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device", shareholders’ commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with "conservative" incentives are considered. These forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the (agency) cost of debt finance; this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms' capital structure and product market competition. The fourth paper, "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion", addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies. It explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms’ objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality, discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers, and extends the results to non-oligopolistic supergames. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999</p>

Lo scopo della nostra ricerca è di proporre un modello dell'intervento pubblico che differisce dall'approccio standard e di valutare le sue implicazioni in termini di benessere. Noi sosteniamo che in molte circostanze la regolamentazione risulta essere un processo di "give-and-take" pittosto che di "take-it-or-leave-it". Più precisamente, la nostra idea è che la politica regolamentatoria possa essere più generalmente modellizzata come il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, che normalmente implica la partecipazione attiva di ciascun agente coinvolto nell'interazione regolamentatoria. Nel Capitolo 1, seguendo l'intuizione di Spulberg, la regolamentazione è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione tra i gruppi di interesse dei consumatori e delle imprese, con l'agenzia nel ruolo di mediatore. La nostra analisi mostra che l'impresa regolamentata sfrutta il suo potere contrattuale per ottenere un sussidio, il quale è più elevato che con un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" di un meccanismo che massimizza il benessere sociale. L'eccessiva sussidiazione dell'impresa penalizza i consumatori ed implica una perdita di benessere sociale. Noi troviamo altresì che, con informazione asimmetrica sui costi, l'intervallo di tipi dell'impresa che partecipano in equilibrio all'interazione regolamentatoria può essere più grande con la politica negoziata che con la politica "take-it-or-leave-it". Vorremmo sottolineare che il Capitolo 1 è introduttivo e costituisce un passo preliminare per la nostra ricerca. Aldilà dei risultati analitici, il suo contributo è duplice. Innanzitutto, esso descrive le strutture basilari di una politica regolamentatoria negoziata e le sua implicazioni in termini di benessere. In secondo luogo, esso mostra che l'approccio basato sulla contrattazione rappresenta effettivamente un'estensione piuttosto che una negazione dell'approccio standard. In particolare, la contrattazione su una politica regolamentatoria può essere interpretata come un modello generale che include l'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" come caso limite, che si verifica quando l'impresa è privata di qualsiasi potere di contrattazione durante le negoziazioni. La discussione nel Capitolo 2 sviluppa la struttura precedente e considera un'agenzia che è delegata dal Congresso a rappresentare gli interessi dei consumatori nel precesso di contrattazione con l'impresa sulla politica regolamentatoria. L'esistenza di un'attività di negoaziazione tra l'agenzia e l'impresa è stata largamente ignorata dalla letteratura economica, con la principale eccezione rappresentata dai contributi di Scarpa. Comunque, Armstrong e Sappington, nella loro rassegna sui recenti sviluppi nella teoria della regolamentazione, hanno riconosciuto che la formulazione standard, la quale alloca tutto il potere di contrattazione al regolamentatore, è adottata per convenienza tecnica piuttosto che per realismo. Mentre l'agenzia è stata precedentemente raffigurata come un arbitro imparziale, nel Capitolo 2 supponiamo che essa rappresenti una parte contrattuale, la cui natura può essere benevolente od egoista. In questo contesto, noi studiamo la possibilità di collusione tra l'agenzia regolamentatoria e l'impresa regolamentata, un fenomeno che spesso si verifica in una relazione regolamentatoria. La contrattazione "a latere" tra i due partner colludenti è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione (eventualmente illegale)parallelo alla negoziazione sulla politica regolamentatoria. La nostra analisi mostra che i consumatori sono penalizzati dalla corruzione, in quanto essi interamente sussidiano il guadagno totale dalla collusione. Inoltre, il nostro modello suggerisce che un'agenzia più forte nel processo di contrattazione rende più desiderabile per il Congresso (cioè per i consumatori)consentire la collusione in equilibrio. Nei primi due capitoli, noi abbiamo considerato l'esistenza di solamente un mercato monopolistico. Il Capitolo 3, che ha beneficiato del contributo fondamentale di Carlo Scarpa, estende l'impianto precedente ed esamina la regolamentazione di due mercati interdipendenti quando i beni sono sostituti. Questo è il caso, per esempio, nelle industrie del gas naturale e dell'elettricità o delle ferrovie e autostrade. Noi ci focalizziamo sul progetto della struttura regolamentatoria. In particolare, noi intendiamo determinare se è meglio per il benessere dei consumatori avere un'autorità unica per entrambi i mercati o suddividere la giurisdizione regolamentatoria tra due differenti agenzie. Quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it", la nostra analisi mostra che due agenzie - ciascuna massimizzante il surplus totale nel suo proprio mercato - impongono prezzi che sono più bassi di quelli derivanti da centralizzazione regolamentatoria. Al contrario, quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, noi troviamo che un regolamentatore unico, che sequenzialmente contratta con entrambe le imprese, dà ai consumatori un livello di benesere più elevato, purchè il costo ombra dei fondi pubblici, attraverso i quali la produzione è sussidiata, sia sotto una certa soglia. Dunque, in presenza di negoziazioni, il nostro modello suggerisce che la centralizzazione dovrebbe essere la migliore struttura regolamentatoria per i consumatori nei paesi sviluppati, ove la raccolta fiscale non è troppo distorsiva. Se il costo ombra è sopra questa soglia, come spesso accade nei paesi in via di sviluppo, decentralizzare la struttura regolamentatoria risulta in un miglioramento del benessere sociale. / The aim of our research is to propose a pattern of government intervention which differs from the standard approach and to assess its welfare implications. We argue that in many circumstances regulation turns out to be a process of give-and-take rather than take-it-or-leave-it. More precisely, our idea is that the regulatory policy can be more generally modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process, which normally entails the active participation of each agent involved in the regulatory interaction. In Chapter 1, following Spulber’s intuition, regulation is modelled as a negotiation process between the consumers’ and firm’s interest groups, with the agency in the role of mediator. Our analysis shows that the regulated firm exploits its bargaining power to obtain a subsidy which is higher than under a take-it- or-leave-it offer of a total surplus maximizing mechanism. The oversubsidization of the firm penalizes consumers and entails a total surplus loss. We find also that, under asymmetric cost information, the range of the firm’s types participating in equilibrium in the regulatory interaction may be wider under the negotiated policy than under the take-it-or- leave-it policy. We would like to stress that Chapter 1 is introductory and constitutes a preliminary step for our research. On top of the specific analytical results, its contribution is twofold. First, it describes the basic features of a negotiated regulatory policy and its welfare implications. Second, it shows that the bargaining approach to regulation actually represents an extention rather than a negation of the standard approach. In particular, the bargaining over a regulatory policy may be interpreted as a general set-up which includes the take-it-or-leave- it offer as a limit case, that occurs when the firm is deprived of any bargaining power during negotiations. The discussion in Chapter 2 develops the previous framework and considers an agency which is delegated by Congress to represent consumers’ interests in the bargaining process with the firm over a regulatory policy. The existence of a negotiation activity between the agency and the firm has been by and large ignored by the economic literature, with the main exception represented by Scarpa’s contributions. However, Armstrong and Sappington, in their review on the recent developments in the theory of regulation, have recognized that the standard formulation, which allocates all the bargaining power to the regulator, has been adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism. While it has been previously depicted as an impartial arbitrator, the agency is assumed in Chapter 2 to represent a bargaining party, whose nature may be either benevolent or self-interested. In this setting, we study the potential for collusion between the regulatory agency and the regulated firm, a phenomenon which often occurs in a regulatory relationship. The side contracting between the two colluding partners is modelled as a (possibly illegal) negotiation process parallel to the bargaining over the regulatory policy. Our analysis shows that consumers are penalized by corruption, since they entirely subsidize the total stake in collusion. Furthermore, our model suggests that a stronger agency in the bargaining process makes it more desirable for Congress (i.e. for consumers) to allow collusion in equilibrium. In the first two chapters, we have considered the existence of just one monopolistic market. Chapter 3, which has benefited from the fundamental contribution of Carlo Scarpa, extends the previous setting and examines the regulation of two interdependent markets, whose goods are substitutes. This is the case, for instance, in the industries of natural gas and electricity or railroads and motorways. We focus on the design of the regulatory structure. In particular, we intend to determine whether it is better for consumers’ welfare to have a unique authority for both markets or to split the regulatory jurisdiction between two different agencies. When the regulatory policy is the outcome of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, our analysis shows that two agencies - each maximizing total surplus in its own market - set prices which are lower than those arising under regulatory centralization. On the contrary, when the regulatory policy is the outcome of a bargaining process, we find that a unique regulator, which sequentially bargains with both firms, gives consumers a higher welfare level, as long as the shadow cost of public funds, through which production is subsidized, is below a certain threshold. Hence, under negotiations our model suggests that centralization should be the best regulatory pattern for consumers in developed countries, where tax collection is not too distortionary. If the shadow cost is above that threshold, as it often happens in developing countries, decentralizing bargaining turns out to be consumers’ welfare improving.

Questa tesi studia da una prospettiva teorica le implicazioni della discriminazione del prezzo in oligopoli spaziali. Nel capitolo 1 presentiamo una raccolta selettiva dei principali articoli riguardanti discriminazione del prezzo e differenziazione del prodotto nel modello di Hotelling. Nel capitolo 2 studiamo l’incentivo per le imprese a discriminare quando la differenziazione del prodotto è endogena. Due diverse versioni di un gioco a tre stadi sono considerate. Nella prima versione, le imprese prima scelgono quale varietà produrre, poi scelgono se discriminare o non discriminare, e infine fissano i prezzi. Emerge un Dilemma del Prigioniero: le imprese discriminano e i profitti sono inferiori di quelli che sarebbero emersi in caso di prezzo uniforme. Nella seconda versione del gioco i primi due stadi sono invertiti: in questo caso, in equilibrio nessuna impresa discrimina e non c’è Dilemma del Prigioniero. Nel capitolo 3 studiamo la relazione tra sostenibilità della collusione e differenziazione del prodotto quando le imprese possono discriminare. Analizziamo tre schemi collusivi: collusione sui prezzi discriminatori, collusione su un prezzo uniforme, collusione per non discriminare. Otteniamo che la sostenibilità del primo e del terzo schema non dipende dalla differenziazione del prodotto, mentre la sostenibilità del secondo schema dipende negativamente della differenziazione del prodotto. / This thesis studies from a theoretical point of view the implications of price discrimination in spatial oligopolies. In Chapter 1, we provide a selective survey of the main contributions regarding price discrimination and product differentiation in the Hotelling framework. In Chapter 2 we study the firms’ incentive to price discriminate when product differentiation is endogenous. Two different versions of a three-stage game are considered. In the first version, firms first choose which variety to produce, then choose whether to price discriminate or not, then set prices. A Prisoner Dilemma arises: firms price discriminate and profits are lower than under uniform pricing. In the second version of the game, the first two stages are reversed: in this case uniform pricing emerges in equilibrium and there is not Prisoner Dilemma. In Chapter 3, we study the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability when firms may price discriminate. Three different collusive schemes are analyzed: collusion on discriminatory prices, collusion on a uniform price, and collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the sustainability of the first and the third scheme does not depend on product differentiation, while the sustainability of the second scheme depends negatively on product differentiation.

The empirical literature on mergers, market power and collusion in differentiated markets has mainly focused on methods relying on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we suggest a novel approach that allows for the detection of collusive behavior among a group of firms making use of information on the spatial structure of horizontally differentiated products. By estimating best response functions using a spatial econometrics approach, we focus on differences in the strategic interaction in pricing between different groups of firms as well as on differences in price levels. We apply our method to the market for ski lift tickets using a unique data set on ticket prices and detailed resort-specific characteristics covering all ski resorts in Austria. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

As the Internet becomes the ubiquitous infrastructure for various applications, demands on the reliability, availability and security of routing protocols in the Internet are becoming more stringent. Unfortunately, failures are still common in the daily operation of a network. Service disruption for even a short time can seriously affect the quality of real-time applications, such as VoIP and video on demand applications. Moreover, critical business and government applications require routing protocols to be robust against malicious attacks, such as denial of Service attacks. This dissertation proposes three techniques to address some reliability and security concerns in intra-domain (distance vector) routing protocols and inter-domain (path vector) routing protocols. The first technique addresses the problem of service disruption that arises from sudden link failures in distance vector routing protocols. We consider two types of link failures: single link failures and shared risk link group failures. For single link failures, we propose an IP fast reroute mechanism to reroute packets around the failed links. This fast reroute mechanism is the first that does not require complete knowledge of the network topology and does not require changing of the original routing protocol. This mechanism proactively computes a set of relay nodes that can be used to tunnel the rerouted packets immediately after the detection of a link or node failure. The mechanism includes an algorithm for a node to automatically identify itself as a candidate relay node for a reroute link and notify the source node of the reroute link of its candidacy. The source node can then decide the validity of a candidate relay node. The mechanism also includes an algorithm to suppress redundant notification messages. We then extend our IP fast reroute mechanism for single link failures to accommodate shared risk link group failures. We achieve this goal by introducing one more bit information. Through simulations, I show that the proposed mechanisms succeed in rerouting around failed links about 100% of the time, with the length of the reroute path being comparable to the length of the re-converged shortest path. The second technique addresses the problem that arises from allowing any node to route data packets to any other node in the network (and consequently allow any adversary node to launch DoS attacks against other nodes in the network). To solve this problem, we propose a blocking option to allow a node u to block a specified set of nodes and prevent each of them from sending or forwarding packets to node u. The blocking option intends to discard violating packets near the adversary nodes that generated them rather than near their ultimate destinations. We then discuss unintentionally blocked nodes, called blind nodes and extend the routing protocols to allow each node to communicate with its blind nodes via some special nodes called joint nodes. Finally, I show, through extensive simulation, that the average number of blind nodes is close to zero when the average number of blocked nodes is small. The third technique addresses the problem that arises when a set of malicious ASes in the Internet collude to hijack an IP prefix from its legitimate owner in BGP. (Note that none of previous proposals for protecting BGP against IP prefix hijacking is effective when malicious ASes can collude.) To solve this problem, we propose an extension of BGP in which each listed AS in an advertised route supplies a certified full list of all its peers. Then I present an optimization where each AS in an advertised route supplies only a balanced peer list, that is much smaller than its full peer list. Using real Internet topology data, I demonstrate that the average, and largest, balanced peer list is 92% smaller than the corresponding full peer list. Furthermore, in order to handle the dynamics of the Internet topology, we propose algorithms on how to issue certificates to reflect the latest changes of the Internet topology graph. Although the results in this dissertation are presented in the context of distance vector and path vector routing protocols, many of these results can be extended to link state routing protocols as well. / text

Submitted by Diego Piotto (dpiotto@gmail.com) on 2017-08-28T18:15:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Diego Piotto_Final.pdf: 1609250 bytes, checksum: 9c276b0e7f775c9cb47d057087a1da5a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2017-08-28T18:21:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Diego Piotto_Final.pdf: 1609250 bytes, checksum: 9c276b0e7f775c9cb47d057087a1da5a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-29T12:42:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Diego Piotto_Final.pdf: 1609250 bytes, checksum: 9c276b0e7f775c9cb47d057087a1da5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-14 / O sistema elétrico brasileiro sofreu grandes mudanças em sua regulação nas últimas décadas no intuito de aumentar a eficiência de mercado baseando-se no incentivo a competição entre os agentes. O incentivo a entrada de geradores privados tem gerado resultados significativos a competição e tem provocado uma reestruturação que tem modificado a operação antes totalmente centralizada para modelos descentralizados que estimulam a competição entre agentes. O objetivo deste trabalho é, partir do artigo de Barroso Et al. (2001), onde é obtido a ação de poder de mercado em sistemas hidrotérmicos para ambiente competitivo e de mínimo custo tanto para modelo estático como modelo dinâmico, desenvolver o modelo de comportamento dos agentes para situações de colusão entre agentes price makers tanto para o modelo estático como para o dinâmico. Além disso obter as taxas de juros limites para o desvio da colusão. Será demostrado que em mercados com poucos agentes, o benefício de se desviar da colusão somente ocorre para altas taxas de desconto. Com a inclusão de maior quantidade de agentes, identifica-se que o incentivo ao desvio da colusão possui taxas descrentes. Será apresentado que para modelos acoplados no tempo o comportamento de um possível conluio fará com que os agentes sustentem o preço spot mais elevado, mesmo em períodos de baixa afluência. / The Brazilian electrical system has undergone great changes in its regulation in the last decades in order to increase the efficiency of the market based on the incentive to the competition among the agents. The incentive to the entry of private generators has generated significant results the competition and has caused a restructuring that has modified the operation before totally centralized to decentralized models that stimulate the competition between agents. The objective of this work is to analyze the market power in hydrothermal systems that is, based on thermal and hydroelectric generation, using low cost models for centralized systems and Nash Cournot model for decentralized systems both decoupled in time in order to obtain the dispatch great. The analysis extends to the strategic behavior of the agents for time coupled systems using low cost models for centralized systems and Nash Cournot model using stochastic programming resources to determine the optimal dispatch of the agents of the market. It has been shown that in markets with few agents, the benefit of diverting from collusion only occurs at high discount rates. With the inclusion of a greater number of agents, it is identified that the incentive to the deviation of collusion has unbelievable rates. It will be shown that for time-coupled models the behavior of a possible collusion will cause the agents to sustain the higher spot price, even in periods of low affluence.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-04-05T12:05:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 2262834 bytes, checksum: 0e24a6e1103d200acff727bae9e6108c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-05T12:05:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 2262834 bytes, checksum: 0e24a6e1103d200acff727bae9e6108c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-26 / In this text discussed the formation of black families and relations of cronyism established by enslaved the Freguesia de Nossa Senhora dos Milagres, located in the current city of the São João do Cariri, located in the Paraiba cariri, between the years 1850 and 1872. To this end was made study of the Vila Real de São João do Cariri analyzing the presence of the enslaved population in this locality, in order to understand the relationships of solidarity established from the ritual ties of marriage and spiritual kinship. The proposed discussion is based on the Social History, whose research focus the enslaved, using the concept of experience proposed by Thompson. For the construction of the narrative of the nineteenth century period was essential to use the ecclesiastical documents, such as baptism and death seats; the notary records as inventories of Province of President reports and the 1st Brazilian Population Census of 1872. With the passing of these sources show the importance of slavery within Paraiba, especially in Cariri, thus we highlight the Vila de São João do Cariri economy in the imperial period, driven by livestock and by the enslaved presence in this region. These slaves constituted families (parent or nuclear) and established crony relationships with people higher in the social hierarchy and often relatives of their masters. We note the various causes of the deaths of the captives too, the site of his burial, and the clothes that used to be buried. This study is linked to the Research Line Regional History, and helps to extend our knowledge of the history of enslaved and freed in nineteenth century of Brazil. / No presente texto discutimos a formação de famílias negras e as relações de compadrio estabelecidas pelos escravizados da Freguesia de Nossa Senhora dos Milagres, localizado no atual município de São João do Cariri, situado no cariri paraibano, entre os anos de 1850 e 1872. Para tanto foi feito um estudo da Vila Real de São João do Cariri analisando a presença da população escravizada nesta localidade, a fim de compreendermos as relações de solidariedade estabelecidas a partir dos laços ritualísticos do matrimônio e das relações de parentesco espiritual. A discussão proposta se fundamenta na História Social, que tem como foco de pesquisa os escravizados, utilizando-se do conceito de experiência proposto por Thompson. Para a construção da narrativa sobre o período oitocentista foi indispensável a utilização dos documentos eclesiásticos, como os assentos de batismo e óbito; os registros cartoriais como inventários, os relatórios de Presidente de Província e o 1º Censo da População Brasileira de 1872. Com o cruzamento destas fontes mostramos a importância da escravidão no interior paraibano, especialmente no Cariri, com isso destacamos a economia da Vila de São João do Cariri no período imperial, impulsionada pela pecuária e pela presença do escravizado nesta região. Estes cativos constituíram famílias (monoparentais ou nucleares) e estabeleceram relações de compadrio com pessoas mais elevadas na hierarquia social e muitas vezes familiares de seus senhores. Também ressaltamos as diversas causas das mortes dos cativos, o local de seus sepultamentos e a roupa que usavam para serem enterrados. Este trabalho vincula-se a Linha de Pesquisa História Regional, e contribui para ampliar nossos conhecimentos sobre a história de escravizados e libertos no Brasil Oitocentista.

The business organization of municipal governments allows these entities to be more efficient when performs its role, management and implementation of goods, resources and services for a given community. However, in recent months we have seen various authorities of the district and regional municipalities make use of the business structure of public agencies they belong to commit crimes against the proper functioning of public administration. / La organización empresarial de los gobiernos municipales permite que estas entidades puedan ser más eficientes al momento de cumplir con su rol prestacional de gestión y ejecución de los bienes, recursos y servicios en favor de determinada comunidad. Sin embargo, en los últimos meses hemos visto como distintas autoridades de los municipios distritales y regionales se valen de la estructura empresarial de los aparatos públicos a los que pertenecen para cometer hechos delictivos en contra del buen funcionamiento de la administración pública.

Submitted by Lucas Ferreira Matos Lima (ferreiroxlima@gmail.com) on 2018-06-21T18:41:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Lucas_Lima.pdf: 1109952 bytes, checksum: 4645ddffe53070ec97127022ae30d850 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Katia Menezes de Souza (katia.menezes@fgv.br) on 2018-06-25T13:48:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Lucas_Lima.pdf: 1109952 bytes, checksum: 4645ddffe53070ec97127022ae30d850 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-06-25T16:51:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Lucas_Lima.pdf: 1109952 bytes, checksum: 4645ddffe53070ec97127022ae30d850 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-25T16:51:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Lucas_Lima.pdf: 1109952 bytes, checksum: 4645ddffe53070ec97127022ae30d850 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-28 / This thesis study the damages a cartel can generate on public procurements. Specifically, we study collusion on a lowest price English auction with endogeneous entry. We show that assuming endogeneous entry with a collusive behavior can generate two important outcomes on auctions: (i) alocative inefficiency and (ii) the prices of auctions lost by the cartel can be affected. So this work contributes with the recent discussion antitrust authorities are having on the relevance of calculating cartel damages. We also study a medicine cartel case that operated in Sao Paulo public procurements and use reduced form models to find evidence of it’s presence. Lastly, we use equilibrium conditions from our model to create counterfactual scenarios of the medicine cartel case. Doing simulations, we find the cartel generated an overcharge of 10%, but did not created alocative inefficiency. / Essa tese estuda os possíveis danos que um conluio pode causar em licitações do governo. Especificamente focamos em um ambiente de leilão Inglês de menor preço com entrada endógena dos participantes. Nós mostramos que ao adotarmos as hipóteses de endogeneidade da entrada dos participantes em conjunto com a estratégia de conluio do cartel, dois possíveis danos podem ser causados: (i) ineficiência alocativa e (ii) os preços de leilões em que o cartel perdeu serem afetados. Esse trabalho contribui com a recente discussão que agências antitrustes estão tendo sobre a importância de quantificar os danos de um cartel. O trabalho também estuda um caso de cartel em licitações públicas de remédios no estado de São Paulo e utiliza modelos de forma reduzida para identificar a presença do conluio. Por fim, fazemos simulações usando as estratégias de equilíbrio derivadas do modelo teórico para construir contrafactuais das licitações mencionadas anteriormente. Neste caso encontramos um sobrepreço causado pelo cartel de 10%, mas não encontramos um aumento da ineficiência alocativa.

La presente tesi fornisce un contributo originale al dibattito esistente tra gli economisti industriali sul rapporto tra concorrenza e asimmetrie informative. Infatti, l’obiettivo principale di questo lavoro consiste nell'investigare, da un punto di vista teorico (e supportato dall'evidenza empirica), come alcune barriere informative presenti nel mercato influenzano le strategie imprenditoriali in diversi contesti competitivi, fornendo implicazioni di policy per autorità garanti della concorrenza e a tutela del consumatore. Nello specifico, il primo capitolo esamina gli incentivi di una impresa dominante in un mercato a monte a offrire contratti di esclusiva ad un monopolista nel mercato a valle, quando vi è incertezza riguardo alla domanda finale dei consumatori. Nei capitoli seguenti, invece, l’analisi si caratterizza dalla presenza del concetto comportamentale di "avversione alla perdita", particolarmente rilevante nelle decisioni di acquisto dei cosiddetti "beni di esperienza". In questi mercati le imprese possono decidere liberamente di permettere test sui propri prodotti prima del loro acquisto, modificando quindi l’utilità attesa dei consumatori. Il secondo capitolo analizza le strategie di vendita per un monopolista. Il terzo capitolo, invece, esamina l’equilibrio di mercato in un contesto competitivo e come l’utilizzo di test sui prodotti possa essere adoperato come strumento collusivo. / This dissertation provides an original contribution to the existing debate between industrial economists on the relationship between competition and information asymmetries. Indeed, the main goal of this work consists in investigating, from a theoretical point of view (and supported by empirical evidence), how some informational frictions in the market affect firm’s strategies in different competitive environments, providing policy implications for competition and consumer protection authorities. Specifically, the first chapter looks at the incentives of a dominant firm in an upstream market to offer exclusive dealing contracts to a monopolist in the downstream market, when there is uncertainty about consumer demand. In the following chapters, instead, the analysis is characterized by the presence of the behavioral concept of "loss aversion", which is particularly relevant in the purchase decisions of the so-called "experience goods". In these markets, firms can freely decide to allow product experimentation before purchase, thus modifying the consumers' expected utility. The second chapter analyzes the monopolist's sales strategies. The third chapter, instead, examines the market equilibrium in a competitive environment and how product experimentation can be used as a collusive device.